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ABSTRACT OF THESIS OF PHILIP D.B. FLANDERS.
CANDIDATE FOR THE DEGREE OFMPhil. UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF 
RICHARD N.W. SMITH, OF THE DEPT. OF LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS, 
UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS. THESIS SUBMITTED 20th OUNE- 1981
The thesis is entitled Metaphysics and Religious Experience and is 
concerned, in the main, to explore the degree to which metaphysical 
argument can, if at all, corroborate the professed insights of those who 
claim, or have claimed, to have personally encountered God, or a Divine Being.
The thesis is divided into an introductory chapter and nine subsequent chapters.
The introductory chapter is entitled "Does Religious Language convey an 
Intelligible Message?" and is concerned to clear the ground for talking about 
religion, by rebutting verificationist-inspired claims that religious language 
is not, and cannot be, cognitively meaningful. In Chapter One, which is 
entitled "Religious Experience and Knowledge of God" the question of whether 
it is legitimate to make truth-claims on the basis of ostensible religious 
experience is examined, and it is concluded that critics of religious experience 
such as Hepburn and Martin ultimately fail to prove their case.
Chapter Two moves away from the critique of verificationism with which the 
first two chapters (including the introductory chapter) are concerned, to a 
consideration of whether the various subjects of supposed religious experience 
have in all ages and cultures been led through their experiences to make 
similar claims. It is argued that those whose experiences are the outcome of 
serious spiritual training and effort have indeed been led to make similar 
affirmations about the existence and nature of a Divine Reality. The chapter 
adopts the method of showing that the mystic etc. have made such similar 
claims, by refuting the most well-argued case for there being a plurality 
of forms of mysticism, each of which is distinctive and incompatible with other forms.
Chapter Three is entitled "The Possibility of Metaphysics" and sets out 
to examine the major criticisms of the enterprise of metaphysical argument.
This task is undertaken because if any "a priori" objection to the very 
enterprise of metaphysics were found to be valid, no metaphysical/system or 
argument could possibly be such as to confirm claims based on religious 
experience. The chapter concludes that the major anti-metaphysical arguments, 
be they in the Humean, Kantian or Wittgensteinian tradition, are all and 
equally invalid.
Chapter Four is entitled "The Nature of Finite Individuals" and is 
concerned to argue for a metaphysical proposition, which, on the basis of 
more immediate intuitive experience, the mystics (and other subjects of 
ostensible religious experience) would also uphold. That proposition is that 
finite individuals are not ultimately distinct from one another, since each 
is a particular and limited manifestation of something transcending the finite 
nature. It is pointed out that this proposition has been upheld and argued for
\ ' k \ .  . . . "  ' '  " °  , I . : / %- '- nimber of philosophers, in particular by Hegel, Bosanquet and Findlay. It 
IS also stated that the position to be taken in this thesis will emerge as the 
 ^I outcome of an assessment of the arguments of these philosophers. The examination
' i of Hegel, Bosanquet and Findlay carries on through chapters five and six, and it
is not until the end of chapter six that final conclusions about the matter are 
drawn (though provisional conclusions are drawn throughout). Chapter Four is 
mostly concerned with an appraisal of Hegel ' s arguments for there being an 
ultimate unity, or confluence, of finite selves. Chapter Five is entitled 
§ "Bosanquet's Refutation of Pluralism" and Chapter Six is entitled "The Position 
<»lof J.N. Findlay on the Nature of Finite Individuals." The chapters primarily deal 
•;=. with the philosophers' respective arguments for the truth of the metaphysical 
‘/ proposition mentioned above.
Chapter Seven is entitled "Man, Nature and the Primacy of the Subject" and 
is concerned to appraise arguments for and ultimately to defend the view that a 
further metaphysical proposition, supportive of the mystics' (& etc.) claims, may ’
plausibly be affirmed, that propostion being that in addition to there being an 
ultimate confluence of finite minds, there is also an ultimate unity between mind '■
and nature. The precise nature of this unity is outlined in detail in the thesis, 
but we may say briefly that it is brought about by the creative reconciling power 
of subjectivity. The rift between subject and object in any (finite) subject- 
object relationship can only be finally overcome through the labour of an 
Absolute Subject,
Chapter Eight is entitled "The Testimony of Religion as it is Practised" and 
"deals with the question of whether the ritualistic religious consciousness of the 
ordinary religious believer contains any element of genuine insight. It Is argued 
that when, we reflect deeply on this form, of consciousness, it is revealed - that 
it does contain such an element, but that we need to pass beyond its own 
I ; self-understanding to adequately grasp its full significance. The chapter proceeds
\  largely through an examination and modification Hegel's arguments to this effect.
Chapter Nine, the final chapter, is entitled "Moral Experience as Evidence 
ifor the Mystical Absolute." This chapter is concerned to argue that deep 
5 philosophical reflection on the nature of our moral experience provides us with 
I'strong evidence that finite individuals have an acute, consciousness of a 
universal spiritual "state of being", transcending their natures as particulars.
This "state of being" corresponds closely to the "Divine Being" or "Spiritual 
Presence" which mystics (& etc.) claim to have encountered, and thus moral 
experience provides further support for their claims. The Spiritual Reality .,<j
’A'> revealed through metaphysical reflection transcends finite beings, but is - J
immanent to them nonetheless. It constitutes a Reality which shows up the .
tragic'limitation of finite life. Yet it also shows that the potential, value,
I and destiny of all finite life is to express an essence which goes far^beyond
h ' t h e  finite. f/
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INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
DOES RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE CONVEY AN INTELLIGIBLE MESSAGE?
In the past, before philosophy had felt the impact of linguistic 
analysis and before philosophers had begun to see themselves as needing 
to pay special attention to the problems concerned with language, 
philosophers of religion usually went about their task by immediately 
proceeding to deal with questions about the truth and justification of 
religious beliefs. Today however, any philosopher of religion who went 
about his task in this way would find himself immediately challenged, 
not just by those with arguments against his thesis on the truth and 
justification of religious beliefs, but also by those with arguments 
purporting to show that his very enterprise was unintelligible, since 
it rests on the assumption that religious language can be factually 
informative.^
In this thesis, we shall ultimately be concerned with questions è
'i
concerning the truth and justification of religious propositions. But 
before we do this, we must attempt to meet the challenge of those who 
deny that religious propositions can be factually meaningful. For if /
religious language cannot by its very nature be factually informative, 
then it is a nonsensical task to ask questions about the truth and
1. By the phrase religious language I mean to embrace not onlyspecifically Christian or theistic language (though most of my examples will be drawn from this form of language) but also other 
statements about a transcendent spiritual reality, such as those statements about the Absolute which occur in Idealist metaphysics.
2justification of religious propositions.
The preliminary question, with which we shall be concerned in 
this chapter, may therefore be formulated in the following way: 
Irrespective of any truth or falsity in particular religious 
utterances, is this form of language one in which it is possible to 
make statements, such as may be true or false?
The Case against Factually Informative Religious Propositions
It is argued by those philosophers who deny that religious 
statements can be factually significant that upon inspection these 
statements turn out to be no more than expressions of feeling, or to 
belong to stories designed to enforce morality. They do not, it is held, 
yield any cognitive insights; their function is purely performative.
The reason for this, according to protagonists of this view, is that 
religious believers appear to allow no conceivable states of affairs to 
count as evidence against their assertions. Thus, for example, no matter 
how bad the world becomes, religious believers continue to claim that 
there is a God who is both all powerful and all good. It is not 
difficult to see how this gives rise to a problem. For what can it 
possibly mean to speak of a Being who is powerful enough to prevent evil 
yet who doesn't prevent evil, as being all good? The word "good" does 
not seem to be being used in its natural sense. Anthony Flew has 
formulated the problem as follows:
2. In particular, we shall be asking the question to what degree (if any) experiences of alleged religious significance and metaphysical 
argument can justify religious conclusions.
lo
"Now it often seems to people who are not religious as if there were no conceivable 
event or series of events the occurrence of 
which would be admitted by sophisticated 
religious people to be sufficient reason for conceding "There wasn't a God after all" or 
"God does not really love us then." Someone tells us that God loves us as a father loves 
his children. We are reassured- But then we see a child dying of inoperable cancer of the 
throat. His earthly father is driven frantic in his efforts to help, but his Heavenly Father 
reveals no obvious degree of concern. Some 
qualification is made - God's love is "not a 
merely human love" or it is an "inscrutable love", perhaps, and we realize that such sufferings are quite compatible with the truth 
of the assertion that "God loves us as a father 
(but, of course ...)." We are reassured again. 
But then perhaps we ask: What is this assuranceof God's love (appropriately qualified) worth, 
what is this apparent guarantee really a 
guarantee against? Just what would have to 
happen not merely (morally and wrongly) to tempt but also (logically and rightly) to entitle us to say "God does not love us" or even "God does not exist?',..3
Considerations such as those of Flew have led to the many theories 
which see religious language as non-informative. For greater clarity, 
and to facilitate systematic examination of the argument against factual 
religious language, we may set out this argument in the form of a simple 
hypothetical argument. The premises of this argument capture, I think, 
what is most fundamental in the objections against cognitively 
meaningful religious language in the writings of such philosophers as 
A.J. Ayer, L. Wittgenstein (in his positivist phase) and A. Flew.
This argument is as follows:
3. New Essays in Philosophical Theology. (Edited by A. Flew and A. MacIntyre) Chapter VI, pages 98-99.
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Premise 1 If a statement is to be factually significant then there
must be some (knowable) state of affairs with which it 
is incompatible, and thus it must allow certain possible (knowable) states of affairs to count against it, and at 
some point falsify it.
Premise 2 Religious believers will not admit that anything
(knowable or unknowable) does or ever could count 
against their propositions.
Conclusion Religious statements, being compatible with anything andeverything, are vacuous and do not assert facts.
The statement of the argument in this way is intended to throw 
light on how the conclusion could be prevented from following. The 
conclusion will not follow if we can find reason to deny the truth of 
either premise one, premise two, or both.
Philosophers who have sought to vindicate religious language have
normally done so by attempting to produce arguments aimed at demolishing 
one or other of the premises. We may therefore go about our investiga­
tion by way of an examination of the validity of the arguments which
have been brought against these two premises.
Examination of the First Premise
The first premise states that for a statement to be factually 
meaningful it must be, in principle, falsifiable, through our coming to 
know of some state of affairs with which it is incompatible. Some 
philosophers have attempted to vindicate religious statements by denying 
this. It has been argued by these philosophers that a statement can 
both convey information and be unfalsifiable.
It is not very easy to see how we can vindicate religious 
language by means of any argument which successfully shows the 
inadequacy of the first premise. For it seems that if we are to know 
the meaning of a statement we must always have an idea of the
12
circumstances under which it is true and those under which it would be 
false, otherwise how could we single out the determinate state of 
affairs whose existence the statement is trying to convey? A knowledge 
of what a statement may include and what it excludes is surely necessary 
if we are to identify its reference. And it seems that although we may 
not have to know precisely at which point the counter-evidence 
falsifies a given statement, it would be irrational not to accept, at 
least at a point where the counter-evidence is overwhelming, that the 
statement has finally been falsified. "Counting against" in a sense 
which cannot ever finally falsify a statement is not really "counting 
against" in any relevant sense at all. For this reason, we may not get 
out of our difficulties by shying, as Basil Mitchell tries to, that 
things do count agœinst religious statements, but are not (in principle) 
able to finally falsify them.^
Having made these general remarks, we may now proceed to consider 
two important recent arguments both of which aim to show that religious 
statements can be informative and unfalsifiable at the same time. The 
first of these has been put forward by Henry Allison.^
4. Basil Mitchell - ibid pp 103-106.
5. Article: Faith and Falsifiability Review of Metaphysics Vol. 22(1968-69) pp 499-522.
-S
.
I
Allison's view is that religious statements are unfalsifiable '1
because they are disguised counterfactual conditionals. As such he %
believes that they are genuine and possibly false assertions. Allison 
tells us that in order to understand how religious propositions work, 
we need to recognize the "dialectical nature of faith." This means that 
our faith is not because of, but in spite of, the facts. According to
13
Allison, Soren Kierkegaard was the first theologian to become aware of 
this. He quotes from Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript 
in order to establish his point.
"I contemplate the order of nature in the hope 
of finding God, and I see omnipotence and wisdom; but I also see much else that disturbs 
my mind and excites anxiety. The sum of all this is objective uncertainty."^
Allison thinks that Kierkegaard gets carried away and transforms the 
objective uncertainty into a glorification of the absurd. But he 
thinks that from the notion that faith is an objective uncertainty we 
gain a profound insight. The believer, says Allison, can specify the 
types of things which would count against his faith, but he can't say 
at what point the instances would actually falsify his belief. To know 
at what point suffering or evil is incompatible with God's existence, 
we would have to see the world under the aspect of eternity, and this 
is something we can never do. The point is that from the point of view 
of the human individual, no perspective on the whole is possible.
Allison goes on to say that Flew's claim, like the old verifica­
tion principle, cannot account for counterfactual conditionals, or at 
least not all of them. He remarks that:
"There are however many other statements of 
this form (counterfactuals that the verifi­
cation and/or falsification principle can't deal with) which refer to a particular person, 
place, thing or event in its uniqueness and in which the subjunctive is unfulfilled. For 
example, 'if he had only been on time, he
6. Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript p 182 of 
David F. Svenson and Walter Lowrie translation. Quoted by H. Allison in Review of Metaphysics Vol 22 (1968-69) p 508.
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could have saved her life', 'if Caesar had 
not crossed the Rubican, the republic would not have fallen'. Judgements like these are 
unfalsifiable, yet obviously cognitive.
Also, although these judgements are unfalsifiable, Allison maintains 
that things do count against them. Historical discussion can meaning­
fully take place but there can be no guarantee that the disputants will 
reach agreement. As in the case of faith, we have no ultimate 
perspective on what would have happened had Caesar not crossed the 
Rubican. Certain factors are relevant to our deliberations but we can 
never be absolutely sure that everything has been taken into account.
In logical form, says Allison, statements like "God loves mankind" 
are counterfactual, for the believer appeals to a situation that he 
"explicitly denies he is capable of observing."^ Despite this, the 
believer still knows what he is saying. For although the believer 
neither knows nor claims to know what it would be like to view things 
"sub specie aeterni", he's able to use references to the transcendent 
in a significant manner. This is because such references are not 
intended to depict an inaccessible realm of being, but to be relevant 
to the present facts, even if they affirm a framework of interpretation 
which goes beyond them.
Allison's remarks seem to be plausible enough if taken as a 
reason why it is impossible, in the cases he considers, to know the 
precise point at which such a proposition is falsified. But this does 
not mean that these propositions are in principle unfalsifiable, in the 
sense of nothing (knowable) being finally able to count against them. 
Allison admits that we know what counts for or against such propositions.
7. Review of Metaphysics Vol 22 (1968-69) pp 515-516.
8. ibid p 518.
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and it may well be that the point at which various people would accept 
the truth of any of these may differ. But looking at the matter from 
the point of view of any individual who affirms the truth of the 
proposition, there must be for each one a point at which he would 
accept that the proposition has been falsified. If he would not, then 
he is, as we have seen, not letting evidence tvuly count agavnst 'it.
Consider Allison's example about Caesar crossing the Rubican. 
Suppose that some historian believes the proposition "had Caesar not 
crossed the Rubican, the Republic would not have fallen". Suppose 
further that he went on affirming this proposition no matter what 
historical evidence was brought against it. More extreme still, let 
us imagine that he actually admits to the view that no further evidence 
could e'Oer change his mind. In such circumstances, it would not seem 
out of place to question whether his statement of belief was a normal 
historical statement at all. If religious statements really are like 
th'is type of historical assertion, then the objections which have been 
made against them would have to be taken seriously indeed.
Happily however, this type of thinking is not characteristic of 
9historians. No historian would ever admit that he would hang on to 
some historical belief in spite of any possible evidence, and the fact 
that he could never be absolutely certain how much counter evidence was 
sufficient to disprove it for him, would give him no warrant for 
holding that nothing ever could.
If it were true that religious statements were really incapable 
of being falsified by any (knowable) state of affairs whatsoever, the
9. We shall later attack the view that it is characteristic of those who maintain the truth of religious propositions.
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analogy between religious statements and historical statements would 
break down. For we have seen that even counterfactual conditionals 
are falsifiable in a certain way of their own. What is objected to 
by philosophers like Flew is precisely that religious believers seem 
to proceed unt't'ke historians; they do not (it is claimed) allow facts 
to count against their assertions. Religious statements are charged 
with being vacuous in just the way that historical assertions are not. 
Allison's attempt to defend the meaningfulness of religious statements 
on the ground that they are on a par with other unfalsifiable but 
meaningful statements is therefore unacceptable.
Another attempt to explain how religious statements can be both 
factually significant and unfalsifiable has been made by Alastair 
McKinnon.McKinnon, like Allison, accepts that religious statements 
are unfalsifiable, but tries to vindicate them by showing that in a 
certain context they are on a par with other obviously meaningful but 
unfalsifiable statements. McKinnon compares religious statements with 
a scientist's remark 'that "the world has an order", in a case where the 
scientist wants to say nothing determinate about the world. The order 
he is concerned with is simply that order which is a necessary 
consequence of there being anything at all. The phrase "the order of 
the world", in this sense, necessarily has a reference. McKinnon 
suggests that as it is with the world's order, so it may be with God.
He considers the situation of the young man dying of cancer who firmly 
maintains that God loves him. The young man's conception of God must 
be such that his tragedy is reconciled with his belief. McKinnon
10. See American Philosophical Quarterly 1965 pp 224-9.
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suggests that in such circumstances the victim would not claim to know 
how to reconcile them, for this would be merely to solve his problem by 
claiming to see what he could not see. He would rather use the word 
"God" as a sort of marker for ultimate reality, whatever that should 
turn out to be. McKinnon says that a believer who maintains that God 
exists in this sense is not claiming to know the nature of God.
So far from refuting Flew, it seems to me that such an argument 
merely emphasises Flew's point. McKinnon here seems to have revealed 
just how vacuous statements which cannot in principle be falsified by 
anything at all in fact are. The assertion that "God loves mankind" 
he admits cannot be understood in the normal sense since all the 
evidence seems to count against it. But somebody, he feels could 
meaningfully continue to believe it, so long as he accepted that he 
didn't know the nature of God at all! The believer, he says, is only 
asserting "the existence of Being or Reality as such." Apart from the 
peculiar contradiction in claiming to know nothing of the nature of a 
Being who we know loves us, the sort of Being whose existence is 
asserted tells us nothing determinate about the nature of the world.
It is reminiscent of the "pure being" with which Hegel begins his 
Science of Logic which is prior to all determinations. As such, it 
tells us nothing which is factually informative. Belief in such a 
Being would indeed be vacuous, in just the way that the protagonists of 
the "unfalsifiable - therefore meaningless" view claim.
The mistakes of Allison and McKinnon suggest that we have been 
looking in the wrong direction for a vindication of factual religious 
language. For we have seen that if it is really true that we cannot 
know what counts against a particular statement then we have no way of 
defining the limits of its reference.
18
Premise One of our syllogism must therefore be allowed to stand. 
But this does not mean that we have conceded the validity of the 
arguments of Flew and his supporters. We have conceded only that for 
a statement to be factually meaningful there must be some (knowable) 
state of affairs which could count against it. Allison and McKinnon, 
throughout their arguments, made the assumption that religious assertions 
are unfalsifiable in a fairly absolute sense. It is this assumption 
which we shall challenge, in our examination of the foundations of 
premise two.
Examination of the Second Premise
According to the second premise, religious believers refuse to 
admit that anything does or ever could count against their propositions. 
But is it really true that believers of religious statements are 
believers in statements which are radically unfalsifiable to the point 
of being compatible with every state of affairs which we could 
conceivably imagine to occur? If we look carefully at the details of 
what has been argued by those who have upheld the truth of premise two, 
we find that they have done so, not really because religious believers 
allow (in principle) nothing to count against their claims but because 
they will not allow any "observations"^^ to count against them.
11. "Observations" in this context refers to that part of experience 
which involves an emotionally detached conscious subject perceiving publicly observable phenomena by means of sense - 
experience. It is thus a form of cognition in which the subject is essentially passive, the subjective contribution to the process 
of knowledge construction is at its lowest point. It is thus in 
no way commensurable with total human experience and it is, as we shall see, highly dubious to claim that it is commensurate with 
total cognitive experience.
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F. Copleston, a philosopher who is a Christian and who seeks to
defend cognitively meaningful religious language, remarks in his book
Contemporary Philosophy that he has no objection to verificationism if
it means only that "reflection on the nature of descriptive language
will show that a statement which asserts a certain state of affairs
12excludes a contradictory state of affairs."
13And in another essay in the same book he asserts that if a statement 
such as "God loves all human beings" were to exclude no other factual 
statement then it would indeed be vacuous. But Copleston points out 
that the statement "God loves all human beings" does exclude other 
statements. It excludes;?for example the statement that "God wills the 
eternal damnation and misery of all human b e i n g s . A n d  he further 
maintains that the reason why the believer is led to assert the one 
statement and not the other is because something in his experience 
points one way and not the other.
As it is with Copleston, so it is with most religious believers, 
it is not the case that they allow nothing in experience to count for 
or against their propositions. On the contrary, they are normally 
concerned to emphasize the importance of certain experiences in bringing 
them to their religious commitments. However, it is the fact that these 
experiences are of a certain nature which worries the verificationists. 
For the type of experience which gives rise to religious conviction 
(other than more dramatic mystical experiences) usually consists
12. F. Copleston Contemporary Philosophy in his essay entitled "A 
Further Note on Verification" p 58.
13. ibid Essay entitled: "The Meaning of the Terms Predicated ofGod." p 100.
14. ibid p 100.
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largely of a personal "sense of the presence of God", and the 
propositions based on this type of experience are not readily 
translatable into statements about possible observations of publicly 
observable phenomena. To the verificationist, if a statement cannot 
be verified by observations, it cannot be verified at all, 
irrespective of the fact that experiential evidence of a different 
sort is claimed.
But why? It is not just because observations are held to give
us better evidence, than do the more subjective experiences on which
religious propositions are based. It is rather because knowledge
claims which are incapable of being verified by observations are held
to be logically incoherent. From the work of the logical positivists
15and the verificationist influenced functional analysts it is possible 
to Separate out a number of strands of argument for this view. It is 
to a consideration of three of these strands of argument - which seem 
to be the main ones - that we must now turn.
Observations as a Precondition for Conclusive Verification
It was maintained by the early logical positivists, who held the 
verification principle in what is now called its "strong form" that any 
proposition which was not conclusively verifiable was not really 
verifiable at all in any genuine sense. It seemed to them that any
15. The school of philosophy which maintained that "every language has 
its logic" and followed the later Wittgenstein, will be referred 
to throughout this thesis as the school of functional analysis.The reason why it is claimed that they were influenced by verificationism will be explained later.
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propositions which could not be verified conclusively were devoid of 
meaning, because if anybody made an assertion which he couldn't 
conclusively verify then he didn't really know under which conditions 
his assertion was true. Thus a mode of experience was sought which 
could conclusively verify, and it seemed natural to logical positivists 
such as Waismann and Schlick to think that the mode of experience which 
had produced so much success in the natural sciences was the obvious 
candidate for conclusive verification. Only the observational mode of 
experience it seemed to them, could be capable of unambiguous and 
conclusive verification. It was assumed, rather naively we now know, 
that the natural sciences had achieved their success through a series 
of "conclusive verifications."
The verification principle, in its strong form, was seen to have 
serious deficiencies soon after it was put forward. And one of its 
main deficiencies was that it could not allow for the cognitive 
meaningfulness of many statements at the heart of the natural sciences. 
R.W. Ashby sums up these deficiencies in the following way:
"1. A strictly universal statement, that is, a 
statement covering an unlimited number of instances (for example einy statement of 
scientific law), is not logically equivalent to any conjunction of any finite number of observation statements and hence is not conclusively verifiable;
2. Any singular statement about a physical object 
can in principle be the basis of an unlimited number of predictions and hence is not 
conclusively verifiable;
3. Statements about past and future events, and statements about the experiences of other people are not conclusively verifiable.
16. R.W. Ashby. Article entitled the "Verifiability Principle" in 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, pp 241-2.
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These criticisms of strong verificationism are now almost 
universally accepted even by philosophers who are sympathetic to some 
form of verificationism. From looking at the first two of these, we 
can see that the strong verificationist test of meaningfulness would 
assign not only metaphysical and religious propositions to the realm 
of nonsense, it would also exclude many scientific statements.
It is now clear that observations as they are employed in science, 
cannot be used to develop a conclusively verifiable body of knowledge. 
Scientific knowledge incorporates within itself many well established 
and certainly meaningful propositions which cannot be conclusively 
verified. Conclusive verification then is not necessary for science.
But even if it were, it would be quite impossible for the observational 
mode of experience to provide it.
We must therefore abandon the strong verificationist view that 
observations alone give us cognitive experience, since they provide us 
with a vitally necessary means of verifying our propositions 
conclusively. There have however been other reasons why verificationists 
have insisted that only through observations do we acquire cognitive 
insights.
Verification by Observations as a Precondition of the Prediction
of Future Experience
Verificationist philosophers quickly came to see the flaws in 
the conclusive-verification formulation of the verification principle, 
and the demand that factually informative propositions must be 
conclusively verifiable was soon dropped. What was not dropped was the 
view that only observations were relevant to the verification of 
informative propositions in the required, though weaker, sense. Thus
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A,J. Ayer writes, in Language, Truth and Logic:
"We say that the question which must be asked 
about any putative statement of fact is not. 
Would any observations make its truth or falsity logically certain? but simply. Would any observations be relevant to its truth or 
falsehood? And, it is only if a negative 
answer is given to this second question that 
we can conclude that the statement under 
consideration is nonsensical."1?
In this passage Ayer is making the point that only propositions 
which are verifiable (in the weak sense) by observations can exclude a 
determinate range of phenomena, and thereby give us factual information 
about how we can expect to experience the world. Or to put this another 
way, any statement which is not verificable (in the weak sense) by 
observation, is compatible with any prediction whatsoever about the 
nature of our future experience. And a statement which is compatible 
with any prediction about the course of our future experience cannot 
possibly be informative. In another passage Ayer writes:
"We say that a sentence is factually significant 
to any given person if and only if he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express, that is, if he knows what observations would lead him under certain conditions to accept 
the proposition as being true, or reject it as being false. If, on the other hand, the putative proposition is of such a character that the 
assumption of its truth or falsehood is consistent with any assumption whatever concerning the nature 
of future experience, then, as far as he is concerned, it is, if not a tautology, a mere pseudo-proposition."18
17. p 38 Language, Truth and Logic, Second Edition (Gollancz) A.J. Ayer.
18. ibid p 35.
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We have already accepted the view that a meaningful factual 
statement must refer to a state of affairs which can make itself felt, 
somehow in our experience. But Ayer wants more than this. He wants 
to say that no prediction about our future experience is at all possible 
from statements which are not verifiable by means of one type of 
experience, i.e. that type which involves the observation of publicly 
observable phenomena. This would effectively rule out any statement 
expressing religious convictions which characteristically arises from 
an alleged non-observational mode of cognitive experience, even though 
religious believers usually hold that QôTtain predictions about future 
experience can be made on the basis of their statements.
Why then does Ayer claim that only statements which are verifiable 
by means of observations can provide a legitimate basis for making 
predictions about all future experience? Why does he refuse to accept, 
in spite of what religious believers would themselves affirm, that 
religious statements do yield information which is relevant to the 
future course of experience, and as such are capable of telling us 
something determinate about how we can expect to find the world?
In Language, Truth and Logic Ayer does not really attempt to deal
with this question directly. He tends rather to equate cognitive
experiences with observations, without explicit argument. It sometimes
looks as though he feels it doesn't need argument, it being so self-
evident that observations and cognitive experience are one and the same.
However, despite Ayer's lack of explicit argument for this, a careful
19scrutiny of his writings reveals his reasons.
19. A careful scrutiny of his writings, that is, at the stage in his development when he wrote Language, Truth and Logic.
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Ayer's main reason for thinking that religious propositions
tell us nothing that will make any difference to our future experience
seems to be as follows: Religious believers, as we have seen, base
their assertions on experience, but not on the experience of observing
publicly accessible phenomena. The experience they describe is more
personal, and depends not on the senses, but on what might be called
an "inner sense". Thus, as Arthur Pap puts it " ... devout Christians
often speak of the ways in which God manifests himself in human
experience; they profess to feel certain indescribable emotions which
20cannot but be manifestations of God." The problem with this, however,
is that the Being which supposedly manifests itself is not experienceable
apart from its manifestations. God has never in the past, appeared in
his total fullness, thus enabling us to make the connection between the
manifestations (which are his partial appearances), and the fullness of
his Being. If it is not possible to observe God apart from these
manifestations then it follows that in asserting his existence you
assert nothing else than the existence of the manifestations. Pap,
summarizing Ayer's argument asks, "Why not just report the psychological
21fact, then, that during worship you feel unique emotions?"
The point is that we might legitimately make predictions about future 
experience on the basis of our past experience but, in religious state­
ments, the reference to the transcendent Being tells us nothing about 
our future experience which we couldn't equally well know without it. 
Precisely the same prediction about our future experience can be made 
if we confine ourselves to descriptions of our subjective (religious)
20. A Modern Introduction to Philosophy edited by P. Edwards and A. Pap p 546 - (Published by The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc.).
21. ibid p 548.
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emotions. And because there are no predictions which follow specific-
22ally from statements about God (other than those which could equally 
well be made from non-religious statements) we cannot test the truth of 
these statements by seeing whether the predictions come true.
Religious statements, for Ayer are untestable and therefore vacuous.
But is it really the case that religious statements add nothing
to our knowledge of how we can expect to experience the world, beyond
that which we could know perfectly well without them? In attempting
to answer this question it is useful to consider a comparison between
22statements about God and statements about physical objects.
It has often been pointed out that when we believe in physical 
objects we are believing in a transcendent reality no less than when 
we believe in God. For physical objects cannot be observed otherwise 
than by means of their manifestations, and we can never get behind these 
partial manifestations to experience their total being, since the series 
of their possible appearances is infinite. Belief in any physical 
object's existence thus is belief in something which transcends 
anybody's experience. If Ayer were to be consistent, he would have to 
say that the reference to the transcendent in statements about material 
objects is as redundant as it is in statements about God, since it would 
enable us to predict nothing more, (which could be confirmed in our 
future experience) than that which could be predicted from statements 
about subjective sense - impressions. If it is true that a description 
of the world in subjectivist phenomenalist terms leads to precisely the 
same expectations as does a description of the world in terms of 
transcendent physical objects, then we would have to concede that the
22. Or a non-theistic spiritual reality.
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reference to the transcendent is redundant. But if it is not true 
that the reference to the transcendent is redundant, that is, if 
assertions about physical objects really do lead to dïfferent 
expectations about how we will experience the world in the future, 
from the expectations we would have if they were based on patterns of 
our sense - impressions alone, and if it is possible for these 
expectations to be fulfilled and for the statement from which they 
follow to be thereby confirmed, we shall be forced to admit that 
statements about a transcendent reality are not reducible to statements 
about our subjective states.
When we compare statements about physical objects with the 
statements about sense - impressions which correspond to them, it 
becomes clear that the same predictions about future experience cannot 
be derived from both. That is, a statement about a physical object 
will enable us to make some different predictions (though some will be 
the same) from a statement which merely describes the subjective sense - 
impressions which are associated with our perception of that thing.
But what are these differences in the predictions which can be derived 
from the two different types of statement?
Perhaps the most important difference between a phenomenalist 
and a non-phenomenalist description of experience is that from the 
latter it is possible to predict mOTô than from the former. Anybody 
who would confine his descriptions of his experiences to statements 
about subjective sense - impressions would have to base his predictions 
on regular conjunctions between sense - impressions which he had observed 
in the past, i.e. if X had always been followed by Y in previous 
experience, he could conclude with a fair degree of certainty that if 
X were to occur again, Y would follow. The phenomenalist could thus 
grasp patterns and structures in his mental life, but what he is
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prohibited from doing is locating the reason for them in any external 
objective structure.
!
The non-phenomenalist, on the other hand, can grasp objective 
structures and can therefore say more about how he expects the world to 
unfold in his experience. For he is not confined to observing regular 
conjunctions between his sense-impressions and basing his predictions 
on them, he rather sees the world in terms of objective structures, 
and because of this he can predict, with a fair degree of accuracy, 
the probable occurrence of (partial) manifestations of even those 
objective structures which have never appeared to him before. To the 
non-phenomenalist, the manifestations of an object which have appeared 
to him are a clue to that object's total structure, and the object's 
total structure is the key to knowledge of its infinite series of 
possible appearances, most of which have not appeared to him. As 
opposed to the phenomenalist, the non-phenomenalist is not confined to 
predicting repetitions of sequences of sense-impressions which have 
already occurred in his experience. The former can base his future 
expectations on observations such as "Y has always, in the past, 
followed X", whereas the latter can see that Y follows X because of an 
objective structure Z of which X and Y as well as (possible appearances) 
A and B are all integral parts.
Another consequence of the phenomenalist's translation of the 
language of sense-impressions is that, again because he does not see 
the world in terras of objective structures outside himself, he cannot 
be equally certain about any of his predictions - A prediction that Y 
will follow X because it has always done so in the past is, however 
probable, still not as certain as if the prediction can be made with the 
additional knowledge that objective structure Z is the reason why Y has 
always follows X in the past, and is the reason why we can expect Y to
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follow X in the future.
A further and final difference between the phenomenalist's and 
the non-phenomenalist's (justified) expectations about future experience 
is that the latter can expect to intervene more and to be more creative 
in the world which he describes. Because of his ability to grasp 
objective structures and his consequent ability to predict more about 
what is likely to happen in his experience if he does such and such, he 
is in a better position to manipulate the objects of experience to 
bring about an end which he desires. As for the phenomenalist, he will 
of course be able to learn that he can voluntarily influence the course 
of his sense-impressions, but every new way of producing an effect 
would have to be learnt by rote as a new "brute fact", a fact which is 
ultimately unintelligible. Compared to the non-phenomenalist he will 
stand passive and helpless before the series of those sense impressions 
which parade across his mental "screen".
From this comparison between the phenomenalist's descriptions 
and the descriptions of those who speak of material objects, it is 
clear that statements about material objects are not reducible, without 
any loss, to statements about sequences of sense-impressions. In 
translating the former into the latter we alter the scope and nature 
of what can be predicted about future experience - in particular we 
lose, (a) the range of predictions which can be made from any given 
statement, (b) the certainty with which those predictions can be made, 
and (c) the intelligibility of the world of experience described in 
the statements whose implication is that we have a high capacity for 
creative manipulation of this world.
In the case of material object statements we can now see that 
the reference to the transcendent does add something (relevant to 
predictions about future experience) which cannot be conveyed by
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statements about subjective experiences alone. And just as the
reference to the transcendent adds something in the case of these
statements, so it does too in the case of religious statements.
22Statements about God give us information which leads us to expect
our future experience to be of a certain nature, a nature which we
would not be justified in expecting if we did away with the reference
to the transcendent Being, and restricted ourselves to expressing our
religious convictions in terms of statements about such things as our
subjective feeling during worship. The "test" of religious statements,
would be the test of whether future experience fell within the limits
of the type of experience expected.
One expectation about future experience which statements about
a transcendent God would give rise to, but which statements about, say,
23emotional feelings during worship wouldn't , is the expectation that 
no event or series of events would ever occur which signified that evil 
had ultimately triumphed in the world, and that the influence of love 
and goodness had been totally withdrawn. The believer in a God of 
supreme goodness could, on the basis of his religious statements, 
predict that he would never find himself in a world in which, however 
hard and sincerely he tried to make contact with the force of love and 
goodness, he would still be left utterly alone and desolate. Such a 
believer in God could also predict that his religious awareness would
22. Or a non-theistic spiritual reality.
23. Or at least wouldn't be justified in doing so.
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24not suddenly vanish , and also that his (sincere) prayers would always 
be answered in some way which was intelligible to him. Finally, he 
would be led to expect very different things concerning death (different, 
that is, from the things concerning death which he'd be justified in 
expecting if he had to translate his religious convictions into state­
ments about subjective emotions), for, if there is such a transcendent 
God death cannot be absolutely final. For either there would be some 
sort of survival after death for each individual or else we would, as 
particular individuals finally die but only because we had, as particulars, 
played our part in the fulfilment of the divine purpose, a purpose in 
which we would not be ultimately annihilated but rather transformed, in 
such a way that the essential meaning of our lives did not perish in 
death.
None of the predictions about future experience which have been 
mentioned above as possible expectations of a religious believer could 
ever be made by somebody who was confined to making statements about 
exalted feelings. Yet these predictions which follow from religious 
statements are not compeltely untestable, since they consist of 
expectations which can be borne out, or not borne out, in future 
experience. As against Ayer, we can say that religious propositions are 
verifiable in the weak sense, since they convey information which can 
be confirmed or disconfirmed by way of future experience. The only real 
difference between the predictions which can be made about future 
experience on the grounds of religious statements and the predictions 
that can be made on the grounds of ordinary factual anpirical statements 
is that, in the former case, the predictions are a little less precise
24. This could not be predicted if religious awareness had to be
translated into terms of,subjective emotions, since the cause of 
these emotions would not be known, and it would not be known 
whether the cause, whatever it was, would continue to operate.
32
since religious statements allow us to predict more that a certain range 
of experiences will not occur and that a certain type of experience will 
tend to occur rather than that we will have an experience of a certain 
precise nature. This lack of precision in our predictions about 
precisely how a divine Being will reveal itself is to be expected when 
we contemplate the self—determining nature of such a Being, but it is 
not so great as to militate against our having any expectations on the 
basis of religious affirmations, and these expectations will either be 
fulfilled, or remain unfulfilled, in our lives.
Thus we may conclude that neither Ayer nor any philosopher who 
rests his case on the verifiability principle in the weak sense, has 
succeeded in demonstrating the truth of premise two.
The Problem of the Intelligibility of the Concept of
'Inner' Experience
We have seen that religious propositions are, in a certain weak 
sense verifiable, but not by observations, in the strict sense of that . 
word. They are 'verifiable' rather by experiences which are really 
self-conscious apprehensions of being a certain type of subject standing 
in a certain type of subject-object relationship. This means that such 
experiences as pertain to our inner conscious life will be highly 
relevant to initial belief in, and subsequent confirmation of, religious 
assertions. Predictions such as the one that we won't experience the 
ultimate triumph of evil in the world, or that we won't be left in the 
world utterly abandoned and desolate if we sincerely seek God's care, 
can be confirmed, not by observations of publicly accessible phenomena, 
but by our lives taking one course as opposed to another. They concern 
the things that will and won't happen to us 'inwardly', in the course of
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our mental and spiritual development.
This mode of verification presents a grave problem from some 
philosophers, who say that we cannot even speak or think coherently 
about events in any inner conscious life, let alone allow these events 
to verify propositions. Such philosophers hold that we cannot deny the 
truth of the second premise, since religious believers allow nothing 
(relevant to cognitive experience) to count against their statements.
The only thing that believers would admit could (logically) count 
against their statements is an alternative development of an inner 
conscious life (an alternative, that is, to the development of conscious 
life we'd expect if religious statements were true) the content of which 
cannot be coherently thought about. If these philosophers are correct 
then it will indeed be necessary to affirm the truth of the second 
premise, and to conclude that religious statements are vacuous.
The philosophical school which held these ideas is the school 
which followed the later Wittgenstein (of Philosophical Investigations) 
and has often been referred to as the school of "functional analysis".
It did not see itself as a branch of logical positivism but rather as 
a move away from logical positivism, towards the view that "every 
language has its logic". This school held that it is impossible to lay 
down a priori criteria of meaning. Although functional analysis looked 
at first like being a liberalizing influence as regards what was to be 
allowed to count as factually meaningful language, the movement did not 
become more tolerant towards religious language.
The reason for this was that religious statements are the (alleged) 
expressions of the insights of some sort of "inner sense", and are 
confirmable only by further evidence from this "inner sense". But 
language, which depends on public conventions, cannot reach down beyond 
the publicly observable circumstances which render a factual statement
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true or false, to descriptions of insights which are essentially private, 
and which no public conventions can in principle be established for. 
Therefore, it was held, religious statements cannot be descriptive, 
since there are no public rules which can be- applied to enable us to 
talk about the difference their truth would make to our experience, 
given that the experience they would make a difference to is of this 
"inner" sort. Those who take religious propositions as factual are, 
according to the functional analysts, simply confusing the conditions 
of utterance of factual assertions with the conditions of utterance of 
non-factual assertions. Cognitively meaningful language must always be 
linked to publicly observable conditions of correct utterance.
Now this view of language looks suspiciously as if it might be 
based on the a pniort criterion of meaning which the analysts claimed they 
were trying to avoid. For as we have seen, religious statements were 
deemed cognitively meaningless on account of a link between the factual 
and the publicly observable. The analysts themselves however held that 
this link was not introduced as an a priori assumption, it was rather 
the outcome of an unbiased look at the facts about how language operates.
We have said already that the link between observable conditions 
of utterance and factually informative statements had to do with the 
analysts' acknowledgement that public rules, must govern the application 
of terms if a statement is to convey information. But we have not yet 
seen precisely why it was held that public convention for the use of 
language can onty come about by statements being correlated with 
publicly observable phenomena.
The notion that all factual statements derive their total meaning 
from the observable circumstances which are their conditions for correct 
assertion seems especially odd when applied to first-person psychological 
statements, such as the statement "I have a pain in my left hand".
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For this assertion is surely factual, yet it seems to refer to something 
which is not observable. It seems impossible therefore for anybody to 
have learnt the public convention governing the application of the 
term "pain" by merely correlating it with the observable conditions 
under which it is (correctly) uttered. Yet this is precisely what 
Wittgenstein and his followers did want to claim.
The reason for this was because they realized that language, if 
it is to convey information, must be intelligible to both the speaker 
and hearer. A statement such as "I love her" must be translatable into 
"he loves her" in the mind of another person. And it seemed to the 
analysts that if this was to be possible then the criterion of meaning 
must be the same in the case of the third person proposition as it is in 
the case of the first person one. So when the analysts asked: "under
what conditions is an informative proposition correctly uttered?", it 
seemed to them that the conditions must always be accessible to the 
first and third person alike. That is they must always be observable.
The analysts' way of thinking seems understandable enough but 
the result which it produced was queer. It meant that in the case of 
first person propositions about psychological states, the logically 
relevant conditions for their correct assertion are publicly observable 
phenomena. The person who utters the statement, "I am in pain" uses 
the concept pain, on this view, because he knows that he has, in this 
particular state, a tendency to behave in certain ways characteristic 
of others when they utter this statement.
The third person use of psychological statements was taken as 
primary because we learn our language from other people. How could I 
be in a position to assert that "I love her" had I not watched the 
behaviour of others who have claimed to love somebody? The need to 
take third-person statements as primary, the analysts reasoned, comes
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out even more clearly when we consider what the result would be if we 
tried to tcike the first-person utterance as fundamental, Suppose I 
were to contend that when he says "he loves her"he is (metaphorically) 
pointing to an inward feeling which is the same as mine when I say 
"I love her". In this case I would be trying to explain his feeling 
by comparison with my own. But the problem here is that I have to have 
a way of pointing to my own feeling. Obviously this cannot be done 
ostensively in the same way that I can point to a tree or a barn. It 
is difficult to see how it could be done at all. A language, it is 
argued, must have public rules of use, and how can such public rules 
be invoked to talk about an inner feeling or (alleged) awareness which 
is peculiar to myself? It is not difficult to see why the analysts 
felt that the simplest answer was to maintain that factually significant 
language can only be concerned with the world of outward behaviour.
The simplest explanation however, is not always the best, 
especially if it achieves its simplicity by leaving something funda­
mental out of consideration. And in the case of the analysts' view of 
language we are left with the uneasy feeling that something important 
has been missed out. What seems to have been left out, especially in 
the analysis of first^person psychological statements, has something to 
do with the capacity of language to convey, at least in part, something 
of the depth and richness of subjective conscious life.
We must therefore look again at the functional analysts' view 
of language to see whether it is the only possible one. If it isn't, 
and if it entails an impoverished picture of human thought and 
experience, it seems clear enough that we should reject it in favour 
of one of its alternatives.
The main strength of the functional analysts' case lies in their 
insistence that the use of language must be governed by public
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conventions. However, we can accept this without accepting in toto 
the analysts' theory about how these conventions come about. In 
particular, we may challenge the view that conventions of descriptive 
language always work by linking a symbol with some publicly observable 
phenomenon, as well as its underlying assumption that third-person 
utterances are the descriptive norm, and that first-person utterances 
should be interpreted always by reference to third, rather than sometimes 
third-person utterances by reference to first. We should note also that 
in challenging this view of language, we are challenging a view of 
language, which, despite claims to the contrary, really went little 
further towards allowing different types of language to acquire their 
meaning in different ways than did logical positivism. As even A.J.
Ayer pointed out, the functional analysts were committed, not to an 
enquiry without philosophical presuppositions, but to a particular 
form of analysis, from the very beginning.
How then can we challenge this view that the conditions of 
utterance of factual statements must be publicly observable phenomena?
How can the conventions which govern the application of descriptive terms 
be developed for mental events which are private? If we cannot point 
them out to anybody, how can we have public rules for making statements 
about them? How indeed can we even have names for them? And, even 
more importantly, how can we convey in language any cognitive insights 
which they yield?
The answer to all these questions lies in the fact that although 
we cannot point to the object of an inner awareness or the content of 
emotional feeling in the same way that we can point to a tree or a barn, 
we can nonetheless acquaint people with such an object or content 
through a series of hints. The hints may not be totally unambiguous, 
but then neither is my pointing to a tree or a barn, since even there my
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gesture has to be interpreted by another conscious being. If it is 
admitted that such things as barns and trees cannot be unambiguously 
pointed out but that we can still have public rules for the use of 
descriptive statements about barns and trees, the fact that we cannot 
unambiguously point to the content of our inner conscious life does 
not raise any speotat problem.
But how is it possible to use these hints, even granting that 
they must be ambiguous, to convey information about an inner life whose 
essential nature is private?
We may reply at once that the mistake here is to regard the 
inner mental life as essentially private. If it were, it would be, by 
definition, cut off from penetration by others. But to call the inner 
mental life essentially private would really be to beg the question.
We can give others an idea of what is going on in our minds in 
various ways. In the case of emotions, the explanation that what we 
feel makes us want to do such and such, and (therefore) disposed to do 
such and such, can convey to another person not just that we are 
disposed to behave in a certain way but that we are inclined to behave 
in this way because our behaviour is part of a subjective-objective 
structure (only a part of which is the actual behaviour) which the 
other person finds intelligible as a whole. In the case of (alleged) 
intuitive awareness of such things as God, I could describe to another 
person the type of future I expected to have (and expected him to have) 
on account of the truth of my theistic statements, and this would 
enable him to build up for himself a picture of my object of awareness.
Because it is possible, in one way or another, to reveal at 
least in part the contents of one's inner mental life, there is no 
reason why public rules cannot be developed for descriptive statements 
whose terms refer to that life. And if this is the case, then there is
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no reason to assume that the more "inner" experiences which are the 
initial reason for, and subsequent confirmation of, religious 
assertions, cannot be identified by terms whose application is governed 
by rules in a public language.
Indeed, it seems very clear that the (grammatical) first and 
third persons are on precisely the same footing. The same statements 
are made, or can be made, in sentences of either form. What differs 
is not the content, but the point of view from which the assertion is 
regarded by whoever utters it. Translation between first-person and 
third-person statements is regular, frequent, and necessary, and is 
accomplished without loss or even alteration of content. The third 
person is not, really, any more "impersonal", impartial, or general, 
either in its reference, or in respect of its intelligibility.
Thus we may conclude that we can talk, in a way which is perfectly 
intelligible, about the experiences which are compatible and those 
which are incompatible with the truth of religious assertions. And 
because of this we may further conclude that the functional analysts 
have given us no reason to affirm that religious statements are 
(logically) immune from falsification by any type of experience which 
can be described in (coherent) language. We still have no reason to 
affirm that premise two is true, on the ground that religious believers 
do not allow that anything can (logically) count against their statements.
The Argument that Religious Language makes Illicit use of Analogy
A further objection to (factual) religious language, which has 
been put forward by C.B. Martin^^ and W.P. Alston^^, is based on the
25. See his Religious Belief, Chapter 1.
26. Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Article entitled Religious Language.
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observation that theological predicates seem to have meaning by analogy 
with the meaning of the predicates in other forms of discourse, but 
that, upon closer inspection, the analogy appears to break down.
Alston states the problem as follows:
"When one reflects on the use of predicates 
in theological assertions one comes to 
realise two fundamental facts:(i) this use is necessarily derivative from the application of predicates to human beings and other observable 
entities;
(ii) the theological use of predicates is markedly different from the application 
of predicates to human beings." 26
Alston goes on to explain how this gives rise to the problem of
how we are to make sense of theological predicates, especially, as
27Professor Ronald Hepburn points out, we cannot overcome this by 
ostensively pointing to an object which is the subject of such 
discourse. The question arises, for Martin and Alston, how can such 
talk single out anything at all? But this question only arises because 
it is assumed that theological predicates cannot have meaning otherwise 
than in a precise mathematical way, sharply delimiting the object of 
their reference. And anybody who assumes this is surely denying the 
possibility that ideas can be expanded and new ideas conveyed by means 
of analogy, not only in relation to religion, but in general.
Consider the statement "God loves mankind". It has long been 
recognised by theologians and by ordinary religious people that the 
terra "loves" in this statement does not mean quite what it does in 
statements about human love. However, the term is still useful in the
26. Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Article entitled "Religious Language"
27. See his Christianity and Paradox, Chapter 3 entitled "Encounters".
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statement, for the statement evokes in us a feeling which is suggestive 
of something which is already part of our experience yet which goes 
beyond it. In understanding our own capacity for love as a partial and 
inadequate manifestation of that capacity which occurs, in a wholly 
adequate way, in God, (and it is easy for anybody to offer the explana­
tion that this is the relation God's love bears to human love) it is 
possible to understand something of the nature of the Being whose name 
occurs in the statement.
Religious predicates make suggestions by comparing God's 
qualities with the finite manifestations of those qualities with which 
we are more familiar, and these comparisons can help to illuminate the 
nature of God, provided that the differences are also explained, and 
the loose resemblances are not equated with identities.
Conclusion
We are now in a position to finally conclude that, although we 
must accept the first premise, there are no arguments which convincingly 
establish the truth of the second. Religious statements can (logically) 
be falsified, and they can be falsified by experiences which can 
perfectly well be thought and spoken of. The converse of this is that 
there are conceivable and logically possible experiences which are 
relevant to the confirmation and initial acceptance of religious 
statements. In rejecting the second premise, we have no reason to 
accept the conclusion which follows from the two premises, and thus 
have no reason to embrace the position that religious statements are 
vacuous.
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So far, we have been concerned mainly with the question of 
whether religious language is factually meaningful, and not with 
whether religious beliefs are true or can be justified. It is to 
these questions which we must address ourselves in the chapters 
which follow.
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CHAPTER ONE
RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE AND KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
We shall begin our enquiry into the truth and justification of 
religious assertions by considering, in this chapter, the most common 
piece of experiential evidence, and one which people often offer in 
support of their claims; that is the feeling or intuition that (at a 
given moment) they have, or (at some time have had), some sort of 
personal experience of God, relationship with God, or direct awareness 
of God.
There are, of course, many types of religious experience 
falling within this broad range, and in particular there is an important 
distinction to be drawn between the more spectacular mystical experiences 
which normally occur in a particular place at a certain time, and the 
more serene "sense of the presence of God" which is the sort of ongoing 
awareness of a divine reality which is closer to the experience of most 
ordinary believers. But for the purposes of this chapter it will not be 
necessary to discuss these kinds of experience separately, since our 
epistemological considerations will apply equally well to all of them.^
1. Neither do we, at this stage, need to distinguish between those who have claimed to experience the presence of a personal being like 
the Christian God and those who claim to have had experience of 
some non-personal transcendent spiritual reality. For, in our 
present discussion, the objections against religious experience to 
be examined are objections to the idea that any experience which is as inward and subjective as that of alleged encounters with 
transcendent spiritual realities can provide sound evidence (or 
indeed any evidence) for any assertions about the objective world.
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What we do have to bear in mind here is that we are considering the
claims of those who have wanted to say that they've had some sort of
special experience of a Divine Being, as against those who have inferred
God's existence by reflecting, at a deep level, on ordinary worldly
phenomena. These inferential knowledge-claims are also, in a sense,
rooted in experience, though here the rational side of the experient
is far more active. We shall deal with them in some detail in later
chapters, in our discussion of the question, whether metaphysics can
yield knowledge of a Divine Being.
Philosophers who have commented on religious experience, of the
sort we are concerned with here, may, for convenience, be divided into
four categories. In the first category, we may place those philosophers
who regard this sort of religious experience as logically irrelevant to
the conclusions about the objective nature of things which religious
believers often claim are based on it. Another way of putting their
criticism is to say that religious experience is the worst form of
evidence possible if we are attempting to establish the truth of
religious assertions (taken as cognitive), for such evidence is utterly
2irrelevant to them. In this category we may put C.B. Martin , Terence 
Penelhum^, and possibly Ronald Hepburn^. In the second category are 
those philosophers who, while not totally committed to the view that 
religious experience is logically irrelevant to the truth of religious 
claims (taken as cognitive) hold nonetheless that such evidence is, at 
best, extremely weak. Ronald Hepburn seems sometimes to fall into
2. See C.B. Martin's Religious Belief Ch. 5 "Seeing God".
3. See T. Penelhum's Religion and Rationality, Ch. 13.
4. See R. Hepburn's Christianity and Paradox, Chapter entitled "Encounters".
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this category, but a much better example is C.H. Whiteley, as 
represented by a paper he wrote in reply to H.D. Lewis for an 
Aristotelean Society Symposium^. There are very few modern 
philosophers who can be squarely placed in this second category, since 
nearly all who have been critical of religious experience in recent 
times have upheld the logical objections, and by doing so have placed 
themselves in the first category. Better examples of philosophers who 
fall into this second category may be found among rationalists such as 
Descartes, although these were sceptical about learning anything about 
the world from any form of experience, not just religious experience.
In the third category we find those philosophers who, while not totally 
unsceptical about what can be revealed to us on the basis of religious 
experience, nonetheless do not find the problems of basing factual 
claims upon that mode of experience so very much greater than the 
problems involved in having claims about the external world upon our 
ordinary perceptual experiences. Two philosophers in particular,
W.J. Wainwright^ and Professor C.D. Broad^, have explored the analogies 
and disanalogies between religious experience and sensory experience 
in a most interesting way, in the attempt to discover whether the 
epistemological status of the two modes of experience is utterly 
different. Both conclude that there are some differences, but not 
such as to totally vindicate ordinary experience and condemn religious 
experience. Finally, in the fourth category, are to be found those
5. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Sup. Vol.XXIX (1955) 
Paper entitled: The Cognitive Factor in Religious Experience.
6. See W.J. Wainwright's article Mysticism and Sense Perception. Religious Studies Vol.9 (1973).
7. C.D. Broad. Religion, Philosophy and Psychical Research.
See second part of essay entitled Arguments for the Existence of God, pp 190-201.
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philosophers who are firmly convinced that religious experience
provides extremely good evidence of the truth of religious assertions.
8 9Among these we may number Professor H.D. Lewis , H.H. Farmer , Martin 
Buber^^, and R. Otto.^^
However, possibly the most famous exponent of the view that religious
knowledge is adequately grounded on religious experience was the
eighteenth and early nineteenth century Romantic philosopher, Friedrich 
12Schleiermacher
It is unfortunate that the philosophers of the fourth group 
have often said very little about the logical objections of the first 
group of philosophers. Sometimes such philosophers even write as if 
there is no problem about the epistemological status of knowledge 
claims based on religious experience, from the point of view of some­
body who has a "direct" encounter with God. Both those philosophers 
who would (in the end) defend religious experience, and those 
philosophers who are more critical of it, should deplore any attempt 
to by-pass the logical and epistemological problems to which it 
unquestionably gives rise, whether or not these problems turn out to 
be insurmountable. Bearing in mind Hegel's remark that those who base 
their religious "knowledge" on the "unrestrained ferment of sheer
8. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Sup. Vol.XXIX (.1955) . 
The Cognitive factor in Religious Experience. See Lewis's contribution.
9. See H.H. Farmer's The World and God.
10. See Martin Buber's I and Thou.
11. See R. Otto's The Idea of the Holy.
12. See F. Schleiermacher's On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured 
Despisers.
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13emotion" are likely to conceive and bring forth only dreams, we 
shall proceed at once to a detailed examination of the logical 
objections to those knowledge claims which purport to be based on 
religious experience.
Logical Objections to Knowledge of God through Religious
Experience
One of the most articulate expressions of the view that there 
are insuperable logical difficulties in making claims about the 
objective world on the basis of (ostensible) religious experience is 
put forward by C.B, Martin in his book Religious Belief. Like all 
the first category philosophers, Martin tries to show that religious 
experiences, which are essentially inward and subjective, can never 
provide adequate grounds for our being able to pass from a psychological 
statement about our own state of mind to a cognitive statement about 
knowledge of the objective world.
Martin begins his discussion of religious experience by offer­
ing his readers a "useless deduction". The statement that "I have 
direct awareness of God" he tells us certainly includes the assertion 
that "God exists". But, he claims "to be useful, the addition of the 
existential claim to the psychological claim of having religious
experiences would have to be shown to be warrantable, and this cannot 
14•be done".
13. Hegel. Phenomenology of Mind, p.10 in translation by J.B. 
Baillie, Vol.I,
14. C.B. Martin Religious Belief, Ch.5, p.67.
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We may accept Martin's assertions that on deductive grounds
religious experiences do not entail the existence of God, in so far
as it would not be self-contradictory to speak of somebody reporting
an experience "of God", yet at the same time God failing to exist.
However, Martin wants to claim also that the jump from the psychological
claim that one has had a religious experience to the existential claim
that "God exists" is not justified by inductive argument either. The
reason for this he states quite clearly: "There are no tests agreed
upon to establish genuine experience of God and to distinguish it
15decisively from the non-genuine".
This (alleged) absence of agreed tests is a serious problem for 
Martin, not because it means that we can never be quite sure about 
whether any ostensible religious experience is genuine, but because 
it means that there are no criteria for the identification of any 
Divine Being. But how, we may ask, does Martin arrive at his view 
that there are no (such) criteria?
Martin is aware of course that people of various religious, and 
of no (institutionalised) religion, have different conceptions of the 
nature of God, and would therefore disagree about the criteria which 
would suffice to establish the identity of God in a (seemingly) 
religious experience. But this empirical fact of disagreement between 
people about the criteria which are relevant to deciding whether a 
genuine encounter with God has taken place is not Martin's main concern. 
For his point is not just that there are no agreed tests, in an 
empirical sense, but that there can be no agreed tests, in a logical 
sense, if our knowledge of God comes from direct personal encounters 
with Him.
15. ibid, p.67.
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The logical problem about identifying genuine cases of 
experiencing God arises, for Martin, because the directness of these 
encounters seems to make them logically immune from criticism. Those 
who claim to have knowledge of God on the basis of their personal 
religious experience are unconcerned about whether anybody else can 
have the same type of experience or whether the alleged object of 
their experience can be detected in any other way than through their 
own subjective awareness. They rather believe that (supposedly) 
religious experiences yield direct and seIf-authenticating insights 
into the nature of the Divine Reality. Because nothing, beyond the 
experience itself, is allowed to count for or against the validity of 
such experience, the subject of a religious experience has no criteria 
which enable him to correlate his subjective experience with any 
objective structure transcending his experience. Thus, he has no 
warrant for saying that his experience is an experience of an objectively 
existing God, and in his claims about the (supposed) object of his 
experience, he fails to refer to anything beyond the content of the 
subjective experience itself. As Martin puts it:
"Because 'having direct experience of God' does not admit the relevance of a society of tests and checking procedures, it tends 
to place itself in the company of other ways of knowing which preserve their self sufficiency, 
uniqueness, and incommunieability, by making a psychological and not an existential claim.
For example, ’I seem to see a piece of blue paper' requires no further test or checking procedure in order to be considered true." 16
But "The presence of a piece of blue paper is 
not to be read off from my experience as of a 
piece of blue paper. Other things are relevant; 
what would a photograph reveal? Can I touch it? What do others see?" 17
16. ibid. p.72.
17. ibid. p.87-88.
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Thus "Ontological reference is something to be earned.
We shall see however that we do not need to deny that we need 
criteria of objectivity, or that "ontological reference is something 
to be earned" in order to reject Martin's critique of religious 
experience.
Objections to Martin's Position
Against Martin's position may be levelled two inter-related 
types of objection. In the first place, we can challenge his view 
that religious experience is direct in the sense of being logically 
immune from criticism by the application of any standards of objectivity. 
And secondly we may challenge what seems to be the underlying assumption 
behind this view, which is that if certain types of tests and checking 
procedures are not being applied, then no (valid) tests or checking 
procedures are being applied. We need to ask whether there are not 
perfectly valid tests and checks being applied by the reporters of 
religious experiences (and by those who would accept the cognitive 
validity of their claims) which Martin overlooks on account of somewhat 
arbitrary preconceptions as to the types of tests and checking 
procedures which can be relevant.
In What Sense is Religious Experience "Direct"?
Much of Martin's argument, as we have seen, starts from the 
fact that many religious people have often claimed that their 
experience of God or of the Divine Reality is in some way direct.
Martin interprets this claim to have had "direct" experience of God
18. ibid. p.88
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as meaning that the experience is logically immune from criticism, and 
this interpretation generates the logical objections to religious 
experience which we have outlined above.
Now it is true that many religious people, and even some 
philosophers, have encouraged this interpretation by holding that 
genuine religious knowledge comes from unmediated encounters with God, 
in which thought and reason play no part and in which they could in 
principle play no part. As regards the views of such people, we must 
accept that Martin’s objections to direct experience apply with the 
greatest force. Martin is right to say that those who refuse to submit 
their personal experience to criticism by (appropriate) standards of 
objectivity have no right to make assertions about anything other than 
their own states of mind.
However, it is far from clear that the great majority of those 
who claim, and have claimed, to have knowledge of God on the basis of 
religious experience would want thereby, or at the same time to claim, 
logical immunity from criticism. They may be thoroughly convinced 
that their experiences are cognitively valid but still not claim that 
they are direct in the sense of being logically immune from criticism. 
And this may be so, even if such people persist in using the phrase 
"direct experience".
Logical .immunity from criticism is not the only, nor even the 
most obviously implied meaning of the phrase "direct experience".
Martin assumes that if an experience is described as direct, then the 
knowledge of what is experienced is absolutely unmediated by any 
consideration outside the single experience itself. But it is possible 
to have "direct experiences" which are not unmediated. For example, 
if I encountered a material object which I had not previously seen 
(or felt, or smelt etc.) or if I became personally acquainted with
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somebody whom I did not previously know, then I could quite correctly 
describe my new knowledge as being the product of a direct encounter.
I might be quite certain that my experience in either case was 
cognitively valid, having no particular reason to think otherwise, 
but that would not mean that the interpretation of the experience as 
cognitive would be unmediated by criteria of objectivity, even though 
these criteria might be unconsciously assumed rather than explicitly 
stated. The fact that religious people sometimes speak of their 
experiences as direct does not mean that they employ no criteria of 
objectivity.
However, it might be objected at this point that some religious 
people describe their experience of God, not merely as "direct" but 
also as "self-authenticating". If one can have a d'ireot experience 
which isn't logically immune from criticism, surely one can't have a 
setf-authent'ioat'Cng one which isn't? Weil, when some people speak of 
their experiences as being seIf-authenticating, they probably do intend 
to claim that they are logically immune from criticism. And against 
such people we must say, once again, that Martin's objections apply. 
However this interpretation of "self-authenticating" is by no means 
the only possible one, for there is a way in which religious experiences 
might be self-authenticating which does not render them logically 
immune from criticism. Martin, throughout his discussion always 
assumes that a sharp distinction is to be drawn between a religious 
experience, (which he always takes as an immediate, unreflected-upon, 
mental perception) and the reflective process by which we come to an 
understanding of the nature of the object of experience. But it is in 
fact at least equally realistic (and I contend, considerably more 
realistic), to regard this reflective process as part of the total 
experience itself. The immediate unreflected-upon "awareness" is
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after all an abstraction from what might be called the total religious 
experience, and if we include within this total religious experience 
the process of appraisal of the more immediately "felt" elements of 
that experience, such an experience might well be called self- 
authenticating but not because it had somehow managed to make itself 
immune from criticism; it would rather be self-authenticating because 
it had taken that criticism into itself, faced it, and survived it.
The self-authenticating and direct nature of such an experience would 
then have been established precisely as a result of the mediation.
It is no doubt the claims of those theologians and religious 
believers who have wanted to dispense with reason and reflection in 
religious matters entirely, that have misled Martin into a view of 
"direct" and "seIf-authenticating" experience which is too narrow.
The fact that they have misled Martin, however, does not mean that 
they need to mislead us.
Relevant Tests and Checking Procedures
That there should be relevant tests and checking procedures for 
19evaluating particular subjective experiences is not something which 
we have found cause to deny. But when Martin claims that "other things 
are relevant" (besides the subjective experience of a particular 
individual) to any attempt to distinguish between cognitive and non- 
cognitive experiences, it is fairly clear that his other relevant 
things are really the sort of things which are relevant to deciding 
whether somebody has had a genuine cognitive experience of a material
19. Evaluating, that is, in the sense of trying to determine their cognitive content.
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object. Martin does not explicitly say that he is taking one type of 
cognitive experience as his paradigm. Indeed, the fact that he does 
so is sometimes veiled by the fact that he tends to vacillate between 
a mere demand for criteria which enable us to identify objective 
structures in our subjective experience, and a demand that these 
criteria of objectivity should be of a certain sort. But that 
Martin's tests and checking procedures are relevant only to one 
particular type of cognitive experience, the type which consists of 
observing material objects, becomes apparent when we consider his 
emphasis on checks which take the form of other people's sensory 
observations. Martin says that what is relevant to establishing the 
genuine objectivity of an ostensible object of experience is whether 
people in general can see it, touch it, etc., or can at least detect 
its (sensory) effects through the medium of an instrument. He assumes 
that for all forms of experience, irrespective of their specific 
(professed) objects, no special training or state of consciousness is 
necessary in those other observers whose pronouncements count for or 
against the original experient's claim to have experienced a genuine 
object (or Being). All that is necessary is that the "checks" should 
be carried out by observers whose sensory apparatus is intact. Martin 
even remarks at one point that the judgment of a numerical majority of 
persons is an appropriate criterion for judging whether somebody has 
experienced something which has genuine objectivity. Thus he writes:
"Absolute confidence and indifference to the 
majority judgment is bought at the price of 
reducing the existential to the non-existential." 20
20. ibid. p.67.
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Martin totally ignores the consideration that only a limited range of 
things can be discerned by the untrained majority, and that many 
things which can be dimly apprehended by the untrained majority cannot 
be apprehended by them in their fullest depth and richness.
The type of objects for which Martin's tests are appropriate 
is that of those whose apprehension is possible with a minimum degree 
of subjective effort and involvement. They are objects which 
constitute that aspect of reality perceived when a conscious subject 
somewhat passively "gazes", and does not (at a highly theoretical 
level) reflect on the world which he encounters. Material objects, 
existing in space and time, are of this character (at least as they 
appear on the surface), in that they reveal themselves easily to 
observers, without arduous struggle or effort, and that is why, in 
relation to these, Martin's tests are not inappropriate. But for 
objects, which, by their very nature, require a higher level of 
subjective involvement in order to reveal themselves (or to fully 
reveal themselves), Martin's checking procedures are utterly inadequate.
In relation to experiences of God or a Divine Reality, the 
inappropriateness of Martin's tests is particularly clear, since the 
nature of any Divine Being must be radically different from the nature 
of the objects for which Martin's tests are constructed.
In the case of our experiences of material objects and other 
people, our checks must presuppose the spatial and physical separateness 
of oneself and the other object or person. And this separateness of 
the object or person in question means that the presence of such a 
person or object will make an incursion into the experience of anybody 
with normal sensory apparatus who happens to be in the vicinity, in such 
a way as to (at least partially) delimit that person's field of thought 
and action. Such an "other" cannot be ignored. Thus the sense
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experiences of the average observer are appropriate, if we are trying 
to check up on the genuine existence of some separate spatio-temporal 
reality.
With God, however, the matter is rather different. If we take 
seriously the notion of the infinite power, majesty, duration, etc. 
of God, we must say that God is ultimately not separate from his 
creatures, in the way that these are separate from one another (or 
seem to be, from the standpoint of finite experience). God being 
infinite and uncreated, and they being both created and finite, God 
includes, as well as transcends, each and every one of them. We 
therefore do not have an identity wholly separate from that of God, 
and therefore cannot detect the Divine Reality by observing something, 
existing outside ourselves in space and time, which makes the same 
type of incursion into our experience as do material objects. Checks 
on experiences of God must be appropriate to the nature of such a 
Being. There is after all no point in using a litmus paper test in an 
attempt to determine the speed of a vehicle.
Notwithstanding, we have argued that Martin's tests and checking 
procedures are irrelevant to determining whether anybody has had a 
genuine experience of God, but have said also that there must be some 
sort of test (appropriate to God's nature) for determining the validity 
of such experience, it may (aptly) be asked; just what are these 
alternative tests and checks which are supposed to be specifically 
appropriate to the Divine nature?
If we bear in mind our previous remarks about God being 
transcendent yet not wholly separate from us (or from any of his 
creatures) we would not expect the observation of phenomena in the 
external world to provide clear evidence in favour of, or against, an 
ostensible religious experience. But if God exists in the way we have
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outlined, we would expect to find any account of our thought and 
experience which failed to allow for such a Being somehow incomplete.
For a genuinely existing God must inform the nature of and provide the 
unity for, self-conscious thought and experience. Thus one relevant 
test of the genuineness of a religious experience would consist of 
reflecting upon the question of whether the deliverances of the 
experience taken as deliverances about something transcending subjective 
experience - can be corroborated by these conclusions which arise from 
the deepest reflections on the nature and unity of our experience as a 
whole. A second test closely related to the first, which we would 
^PPlyf is to try to determine whether non-cognitivist interpretations 
of the experience can do adequate justice to it. That is, we would 
ask whether psychological or sociological reductionist-type explanations 
can deal adequately with the various facts of the experience, or whether 
we have the uneasy feeling that something has been left unexplained, 
something which would not be left unexplained on a cognitivist 
interpretation. (It must be remembered here that the ability to 
explain an experience in sociological or psychological terms does not 
necessarily mean that we must combine this explanation with a non- 
cognitivist view of the experience. God might have given us such 
psychological equipment or made us in such a way that we would develop 
religious social institutions, precisely because he does exist and 
wants us to know itI)
A third test which we might apply to try to determine the 
validity of a (supposedly) religious experience would be to ask 
people who have tried to educate themselves in spiritual matters 
whether they have ever been able, through their own experience, to 
discern anything which seems to be similar to the object of the 
enquirer's experience.
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Against regarding this third type of test as appropriate, it 
has sometimes been argued that although people who put themselves 
through similar courses of training (meditation is often cited here) 
tend to have similar experiences as a result, this in no way shows that 
those experiences are cognitive. It is pointed out that if large 
numbers of people take certain hallucinatory drugs then similar 
experiences often result, but that doesn't mean that these experiences 
are cognitive, and it is also pointed out that a person's particular 
religious training and tradition tends to influence the form which his 
religious experience is liable to take. MacIntyre remarks that 
Alphonse Ratisbonne's Vision of the Blessed Virgin Mary would have 
been a most unlikely occurrence had Ratisbonne not been a Roman 
Catholic.
Our response to this objection must be to begin by acknowledging 
that we do have to be suspicious of reports of religious experience 
which are the products of practices which, by their very nature, 
strongly suggest that those who participate in them can expect to have 
certain sorts of experience. We have also to be suspicious of those 
forms of religious training which subject the mind to stress and 
disorientation to the point where hallucination is more probable than 
genuine cognitive experience.
However, if we find that a vast number of those who have tried 
to educate themselves in spiritual matters have made claims on the 
basis of their experiences which are strikingly similar to each other, 
despite the fact that such people have lived in very different 
cultures and at very different times, and have adhered to religious
21. See A. MacIntyre's article: Visions. In New Essays in 
Philosophical Theology, (edited by Flew and MacIntyre).
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traditions having very different suppositions about the nature of God,
then the chances of the experience being an hallucination or a product
of the power of suggestion are very greatly decreased. For firstly,
the types of spiritual training which the individuals would have
subjected themselves to would be very varied, and there would be no
particular reason to suppose that, if the practices employed were to
result in hallucinations, the participants would hallucinate in the
same way. The similarity of the experiences would be better accounted
for if there were a genuine object (or Being) to be experienced.
And secondly, if the spiritual endeavour of individuals who are likely
to have very different preconceptions about the nature of the Divine,
nonetheless leads to a fairly uniform experience, it is most unlikely
that the claim made on the basis of this experience are such as to
merely reflect what the experients expected to happen all along.
Again, the uniformity is better accounted for by the existence of a
22genuine object of experience.
If there is such a uniformity in the experience, and in the 
religious claim based on that experience, of people who have been 
concerned to educate themselves spiritually (though in very diverse 
ways), then there is a good chance that the spiritual training of 
such people was genuine (i.e. likely to lead to knowledge of the
22. C.D. Broad, writing as a religiously uncommitted philosopher in 
Religion Philosophy and Psychical Research expresses this point well. He asserts: "Where there is a nucleus of agreement between 
the experiences of man in different places, times and traditions, 
and when they all tend to put much the same kind of interpretation 
on the cognitive content of these experiences, it is reasonable to ascribe this agreement to their all being in contact with a certain objective aspect of reality unless there be some positive reason to think otherwise." p.197.
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23truth, rather than error and illusion). Thus, the objections to our 
third test would be overcome, since we would be testing the experience 
in question against the experiences of those whose spiritual education 
could be seen to have a high probability of validity. This test will 
not, of course, provide an absolutely guaranteed method of sifting 
genuine from non-genuine.
A fourth test, and the final one which we shall mention here 
(though there may indeed be many others) might consist in considering 
whether the facts about that aspect of experience which consists of 
our moral awareness, point to, or are rendered more intelligible by, 
a transcendent being such as subjects of religious experiences claim 
to encounter. In our application of this test we must remember that 
we do not need, and can hardly hope for, anything like a proof of 
God's existence based on the facts of ethical life. What we shall 
most likely discover from this test, if anything, is that the concept 
of God or the Divine Reality helps us to make the facts about our 
moral consciousness and our capacity for value judgments a little less 
absurd, a little less unintelligible, than they would be otherwise.
23. We must beware at this point of begging the question of whether 
religious experiences corroborate one another, by only calling 
those experiences religious which do corroborate one another.As Copleston warns, in relation to mysticism: "The wider we 
extend the application of the term 'mystic', the greater become the differences between their utterances. Hence there is a 
danger of narrowing down or restricting application of the term 
in such a way as to diminish these differences in advance, thus enabling us to find the sort of agreement which we are seeking. 
Indeed some might question whether any real measure of agreement 
can be found, except through the policy of selective attention or of being very choosy in our admission of people to the class 
of mystics." F.C. Copleston, Religion and Philosophy, p.77. It was to avoid this difficulty that it was suggested that we 
compare the experiences of people who had, in their various ways, 
attempted to educate themselves in spiritual matters, rather than simply comparing the experiences of those who had had 
(ostensible) religious experiences.
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We shall not, at this point, attempt to determine the precise 
results which the application of tests such as those we have outlined 
would yield. For we are concerned here rather to establish that there 
are tests which can be applied to religious experience, and that it is 
(logically) possible for the ontological reference of the claims of 
those who have reported religious experiences to be earned. We shall 
deal with the application of our tests in the chapters which follow.
Before proceeding to this however, we have yet to consider the 
objections to religious experience which have been put forward by 
another philosopher, a philosopher who, unlike Martin, acknowledges 
that, if God exists, his presence will not be verifiable in the same 
way as is a material object's but who claims that the alternative 
nature which is ascribed to God presents its own logical problems of 
verification.
Ronald Hepburn's Position
Hepburn begins by observing, quite rightly, that if God is 
personal then we wouldn't expect his presence to be verified in the 
same way as is a physical object's. There seems to be, he says, a 
fundamental difference between the way in which we have knowledge of 
such objects and the way in which we know persons. Thus he writes:
"We approach things in detachment, confident 
that they will passively suffer our scrutiny, that our discoveries about them can be corroborated by others. Persons on the other 
hand reveal themselves fully only if we 
renounce our detachment and enter into reciprocal relations with them." 24
24. Ronald Hepburn Christianity and Paradox, p.24. Chapter "Encounters"
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So, Hepburn suggests, perhaps "The living God, the God of 
Abraham, can be authentically known only to the man who addresses him
25as Thou, who finds him in the unique directness of personal contact." 
Hepburn goes on to examine the question of what an I - Thou encounter 
would be like. He points out that it is possible to have a sort of 
I - Thou relationship with a natural object, for example a mountain. 
Also it is not possible to have a totally pure I - Thou relationship 
with a human being.
Hepburn suggests that perhaps an encounter with God is an 
encounter with a pure Thou, and that if we try to "think away" all 
the descriptions of material features which are indispensible in 
encounters with human persons and yet which make those encounters 
impure, we can get some way towards understanding what it would be 
like to encounter a pure Thou. He mentions certain theologians who 
would understand by an experience of God an encounter of such a kind. 
Martin Buber in his main example, but he also refers to H.H. Farmer 
and Karl Barth.
Hepburn proceeds to examine the nature of pure I - Thou 
relationships and concludes that they don't make sense. The problem 
is one of identity. Hepburn describes the situation in this way:
"If we seriously try to conceive circumstances 
in which we might claim to have done away with 
all behavioural checks in communing with someone we will find that we have in a 
peculiar way failed to maintain the separate 
identities of the two people concerned, and that we have no means of knowing whether we 
are in rapport with someone or not, which do not ultimately rely upon the behavioural checks themselves." 27
25. ibid. p.24
26. We shall see why later.
27. ibid. p.35
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Thus, although Hepburn is prepared to accept that there is more
to an I “ Thou encounter than these I - it relationships, it is still
the case that for him the sense of an I - Thou encounter is logically
dependent on the I - it relation. Acquaintance with always involves a
certain amount of knowledge that. Hepburn gives some examples of
cases which bring this out further. He cites cases which seem to
come close to Brunner's "purity" of encounter. But he points out that
even though such relationships are not reducible to encounters with
material features, the presence of the latter is nonetheless necessary.
Hepburn is perceptive enough to see that the possibility of
mistakes about encounters with human beings would "not necessarily
27upset the scale of purity." But he addes:
"What does upset it is a fact brought out by 
the same examples - namely, the continuing 
importance of 'knowledge about' and 'knowledge 
that' even in the most intimate relationships. 
Only the unexpected disappointment brings home 
to us that although we rarely, or never list the characteristics our friend displays, we 
presuppose them during every moment of our relationship." 27
At another point in the book, Hepburn brings out his objection 
to I - Thou encounters by way of a report of a debate between Black 
and White. Black, in this debate, says to White:
"Here is the crux. You wish at all costs not 
to distort your I - Thou encounter with God.
This pushes you towards excluding descriptive elements from the word 'God'. But if you do 
exclude them, you cannot also consistently claim 
'directness' and 'immediacy' for your judgment 
that the one you encounter is Father Creator, and so on. What you are doing is giving an 
illusion of immediacy through oscillating between descriptive and proper-narae uses of the word 'God'. 28
28. pp. 56-57.
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Hepburn shows, through remarks such as these, that he 
recognizes the inadequacy of trying to observe God, in the way that one 
would observe a material object. God does not have the nature of a 
material object, and so we would not expect to be able to verify claims 
of his presence in the same way. But Hepburn makes the assumption that 
if God cannot be perceived in the same way as can be a material object, 
then his presence can only be detected through a "pure encounter" of 
a sort which turns out to be logically incoherent. He presupposes, 
throughout his discussion that either,
(1) God can be described and his existence can be verified by virtue 
of the same criteria and procedures employed in relation to material 
objects, or
(2) God is purely personal and such that experiences of him are 
utterly unique, and no criteria can be laid down which enable us to 
identify him as a Being of a certain kind since we cannot capture his 
identity by using general terms. Hepburn admits that the criteria of
(1) for describing God and the corresponding procedures for verifying 
the existence of God, are obviously inappropriate; yet if we opt for 
alternative (2), we are faced with an identity problem which is so 
great that it bars us from having any knowledge of God at all.
What Hepburn does not consider is the possibility that God 
does not have to be a pure "Thou" with no describable features, just 
because his existence cannot be verified in the same way as can be a 
material object's. God might after all be unlike a material object 
yet have features which can be discerned and described, and verified 
by one or more of the types of tests listed below. But Hepburn makes 
the strictly positivistic assumption that descriptive statements can 
only meaningfully convey information about those things which can be 
verified by universal sense - experience. He then concludes that God
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must be a pure "Thou" with no features which could be verified at all.
Thus, although Hepburn promises at the beginning of his 
discussion of religious experience to pay special attention to the 
specific nature of God, he presupposes throughout that if God has no 
existential or behavioural characteristics which can be discerned by 
everyday sense experience or through the techniques of positive natural 
science, then we cannot ascribe descriptive predicates to him, and 
cannot therefore form any coherent idea of him at all.
It is quite possible that had Hepburn taken more notice of the 
actual descriptions of the nature of God which have been given by 
mystics and others who have claimed to have had some sort of religious 
experience, he would not have been misled into thinking that if God is 
not like a material object then he must be a "Pure Thou" of whom no 
general terms can be used.
We shall discuss some of these reports of religious experience 
in our next chapter in greater detail. For the present, it is sufficient 
to have seen that Hepburn has not managed any more than Martin to put 
forward arguments to demonstrate convincingly that there are logical 
errors in all existential claims about God which result from (ostensible) 
religious experience.
Martin and Hepburn together encapsulate the logical objections 
which are normally raised against basing existential claims on 
religious experience. We therefore do not need to look in detail at 
other philosophers, such as Penelhum, who say what is essentially the 
same thing.
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29Philosophers of the other Categories
We have now seen that philosophers of the first category have 
failed to show that there are no tests or checking procedures for the 
appraisal of religious experience. We have seen that, if a dogmatic 
positivistic stance is avoided, it is possible to specify what such 
tests must consist of, in a fairly straight forward way. (We 
specified four, though we did not claim that our list was exhaustive). 
It should now be noticed that these tests which were produced in 
response to the logical objections to religious experience, as upheld 
by philosophers of the first category, are also relevant in a funda­
mental way to the claims of the philosophers of the other three 
categories. For they (the tests) provide us with criteria by which 
the claims of these philosophers can be assessed.
We shall, in the chapters which follow, employ these tests in 
:ein attempt to establish the plausibility of the claims made by the 
philosophers of categories two, three, and four. That is, we shall 
employ them to determine, as far as possible, whether the evidence for 
the claims made on the basis of religious experience is (a) very weak, 
(b) more or less on a par with the evidence which can be produced for 
the claim that sense perception is veridical, or (c) very strong 
indeed. The more the various tests tend to corroborate each other's 
results, the stronger the evidence will be, one way or the other.
29. It was stated earlier that Hepburn sometimes seems to fall into 
the second group of philosophers, i.e. those who believe that 
religious experience provides weak (as opposed to no) evidence for existential claims. In Christianity and Paradox however Hepburn seems to fall fairly clearly into the first category, 
and for convenience, we have dealt only with his views as expressed there.
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We shall take as our starting point that test which consists of 
considering whether those who have been concerned to find out about 
spiritual matters have reported, despite their having lived in very 
different cultures that they have had experiences which are similar 
enough to be suggestive that the various experiences represent a 
common cognitive insight into a genuine spiritual r e a l i t y , W e  shall 
start with this test because it is the one which leads us, fairly 
immediately, into detailed descriptions of the phenomena which mystics 
and (some) other religious people claim to have experienced. And it 
is obviously necessary, throughout our various attempts to appraise 
religious experience, to have before our minds a clear picture (or a 
picture which is as clear as possible) of the nature of the phenomena 
supposedly experienced.
Having dealt with this question (of whether reports of religious 
experience from different ages, cultures, and religions, tend to 
corroborate one another) we shall proceed to the question of whether 
any (or some, or most, or all) of the claims based on such experience 
are further corroborated by the outcome of valid metaphysical argumenta­
tion. That is, we shall ask whether it can be demonstrated that if we 
reflect deeply on the nature and unity of all our experience - 
ordinary as well as extraordinary, we shall see that this experience 
can only be adequately understood if we postulate a spiritual Absolute,
of the sort that (at least some) religious people claim to encounter
31in a more immediate way.
30. This test corresponds to the third in the above list.
31. This corresponds to the first test in the above list.
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Finally, we shall consider whether any type of ethical 
awareness, such as can be ascribed to a self-conscious rational being, 
is capable of providing any evidence for a transcendent Divine Reality.
The attentive reader will have noticed by now that although we 
have mentioned four possible tests or checking procedures we have 
promised to deal with only three. The second test, which consists of 
assessing the plausibility of trying to explain religious experience 
by way of naturalistic psychological or sociological explanations, has 
been omitted. This however is quite deliberate. The adequate 
application of this test would require a knowledge of the sociology 
and psychology of religion beyond the scope of the present writer.
We shall therefore concentrate on what we may learn from the other 
tests, and we must be content to discover whether these other tests 
point to the plausibility or implausibility of reductionist naturalistic 
explanations of the phenomenon of religious experience. But we must 
bear in mind that our conclusions would be strengthened (whatever they 
may eventually turn out to be) if they were supported by strong 
sociological and/or psychological findings.
32
32. This corresponds to the fourth test in the above list. It should 
be noted that although we shall refer briefly to aesthetic, as well as ethical, awareness, we shall deal primarily with ethics. 
This is because more philosophers have been impressed with the 
idea that (genuine) morality either presupposes God, or requires God as a postulate.
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CHAPTER TWO
RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCES AND THE
QUESTION OF GENERAL AGREEMENT
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CHAPTER TWO
RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCES AND THE
QUESTION OF GENERAL AGREEMENT
In this chapter we shall be concerned with the question of 
whether ostensible religious experiences of all ages and cultures are 
phenomenologically such as to lead us to suspect that these experiences 
represent valid insights into the same Absolute or Divine Being. To 
avoid begging the question by adopting a selection procedure by which 
we admit to the class of religious experiences only those experiences 
which support a presupposed thesis (see footnote twenty-three to 
Chapter One) we shall deliberately adopt a procedure in selecting 
experiences for consideration, which cannot beg the question in this 
way. The essential element in our procedure shall be to compare with 
one another those experiences which are the most intense and profound 
of those which the experients themselves call religious, according to 
the dictates of their own spiritual education, the validity of which 
we shall not prejudge, except insofar as we require that experiences 
which are correctly labelled as religious should be the result and 
culmination of a deliberate and arduous process of training.^
Are the mystical experiences selected by this procedure 
similar enough to each other to strongly suggest that they are all 
(or nearly all) genuine cognitive apprehensions of the same underlying
1. Because in this Chapter we are seeking to compare those religious 
experiences which are of the strongest intensity, we shall refer 
henceforth primarily to mystical experiences.
72
reality? It is the contention of many that this is so, notably of 
W.T. Stace in Mysticism and Philosophy and Aldous Huxley in The Doors 
of Perception. But there are also those who have argued the other 
way, one of the most interesting being R.c. Zaehner in Mysticism,
Sacred and Profane. We shall deal with Zaehner's arguments in some 
detail. If we are to decide whether experiences which are descriptively 
different point to conflicting truth-claims, we must particularly take 
into account how they differ. If any two mystical experiences are very 
different from each other, this does not necessarily mean that they 
cannot both be apprehensions of the same reality, though of course if 
they are such they cannot differ in such a way as to exclude this.
Thus Zaehner, to establish his case must do more than merely show that 
mystical experiences are sometimes different from each other. He must 
also show that the differences are sufficiently fundamental to rule out 
the possibility that such religious experiences can yield insights 
into the nature of a common reality.
There are at least four possibilities, it seems, regarding the 
way in which variation in the descriptive content of different mystical 
experiences relates to the possibility of their being indicative of a 
common reality. These are as follows:
(1) Mystical experiences are sufficiently similar or complementary 
to suggest that they could well be apprehensions of the same 
reality.
(2) Mystical experiences are so variegated that they do not suggest 
this, but they are not different to the point where we must rule 
out the possibility.
(3) Mystical experiences are different from each other to the point 
when it would be absurd to say that any one truth is supported 
by their occurrence.
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(4) Mystical experiences are everywhere and always identical, and 
the claims which are based on any one such experience therefore 
receive the strongest possible corroboration from the experiences 
of other mystics.
Our enquiry in this chapter requires us to attempt to decide 
which of these four possibilities is most likely to be an actuality.
At the outset, we may begin by dismissing (4). Even those most 
sympathetic to the idea that there are similarities between mystical 
experiences have not wanted to claim this, and even a cursory glance 
at the writings of a few of the mystics is sufficient to dispel the 
idea. It is therefore possibilities (1), (2) and (3) which need to be 
taken seriously.
According to Zaehner, it is (3) which is true, since he believes 
that there are three distinct categories of mystical experience, and 
that it is quite impossible to interpret them all, or even any two of 
them, as suggestive of the same truth. They lead, he argues, to quite 
incompatible beliefs regarding the nature of the divine reality.
Zaehner’s three mutually exclusive categories of mysticism are
(a) nature mysticism, (b) monistic mysticism, and (c) theistic 
mysticism. As Zaehner has forcefully argued that these three types 
of mysticism show that there is no general agreement between mystics, 
we shall proceed in this chapter, by asking whether the descriptive 
accounts of mystical states which Zaehner produces in support of his 
conclusions really serve to warrant those conclusions. If we find that 
Zaehner's examples, which are supposedly those which most fully 
highlight the differences between mystical experiences, are not 
capable of supporting his conclusion, we shall be in a position to 
look more confidently for evidence of the affirmation of the truth of
(2) or (3) in the above list of possibilities. In the course of our
74
examination, we shall find reason to maintain that what Zaehner calls 
nature mysticism is not so profound or so properly religious in 
character, as either of the other two species of mysticism here 
recognized. It lacks an important characteristic which is common to 
the other two in decidedly not being the outcome of spiritual labour 
and effort.
It will be our contention in this chapter that Zaehner's 
examples do not support his conclusions and that Zaehner's classifica­
tion of mystical experiences into three distinct and exclusive 
categories is only made possible by a tendency to superimpose religious 
doctrines on top of the actual phenomena of mystical experience. If 
the doctrines of religion were more closely tied to the beliefs which 
the experiences themselves give rise to, then (we shall see) these 
doctrines would not diverge as they do.
Zaehner's category of monistic mystical experience is an 
especially good example of the way in which a category of mysticism 
is produced by entangling the doctrines of a partiuclar religious 
standpoint with a form of experience, and then, on the basis of 
doctrinal differences now taken as the essential outcome of the 
experience, this category is shown to be incompatible with other 
categories of mystical experience which have been (falsely) identified 
with other religious doctrines.
In his discussion of monistic mystical experience Zaehner 
tells us a good deal about Sankara's Hindu school of Vedanta, with 
which, we are told, this form of mysticism is mainly associated. 
According to this school, says Zaehner;
"There is only one reality - Brahman who is 
identical with the individual soul. The Brahman - soul, quite pointlessly, it seems, imagines both the inner world of ideas and
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the external world of objective phenomena, 
and is deceived by his own imaginings. This 
condition which is the state of normal human 
consciousness, is usually described as the 
state of one 'found*. Release (moksa or 
mukti) consists in the destruction of the 
illusion imposed on oneself (the Self!) by oneself and against one's own will (the will 
of the Self). The state of release, the 
so-called 'fourth' state (turiya) is absolutely unqualifiable but more akin to dreamless sleep than to anything else: it is equivalent to
the eighth and final stage of release in 
Buddhism in which one pauses 'entirely beyond 
the stage of neither consciousness nor non­consciousness' and 'attains and abides in the 
stage of the cessation of perception and feeling'. In such a state, there is no 
perception of external objects, nor is there any discursive thought, not because one has 
detached oneself from them as purusa (the soul) does from prakrti (nature) in the Samkhya^ 
system, but because one realizes that they do 
not exist ... " "Once release is achieved, it 
is realized that nothing exists except the one, realized as oneself ... " ^
This, it should be observed is an account of the doQtvi-ne of 
(Hindu) monism and is not an account of the phenomena of anybody's 
experience. It is basically a description of the only possible road 
to salvation left open once the monistic premises have been granted. 
After giving this outline of the Vedantic system, Zaehner
2. The Samkhya system is that analysis of reality which came to be more and more accepted in the classical period of Hinduism.Zaehner tells us that "in the Purusha Upanisad (4.8) the 
essentials of the system are already present, whereas the Svetasvatara and the Maitri, generally regarded as the last of the Upanisads, are thoroughly permeated by it. Its classical formulation, however, is in the Samkhya-Karika ascribed to one 
Kapila who may or may not be identical with a sage mentioned in the Svetasvatara Upanisad.
The Samkhya (which means 'enumeration') divides existence into 
twenty-five categories. Twenty-four of these are evolutes of 
prakrti or nature, and are subject to modification and change; 
the twenty-fifth is purusa, the 'person' who is indestructible and not subject to change; she is the soul." (See R.C. Zaehner's Hinduism pp 67-68, O.U.P. 1962).
3. R.C. Zaehner. Mysticism Sacred and Profane, p.143.
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proceeds to tell us that the system is incoherent. He argues that any 
purely monistic system is incoherent, and the very fact that Sankara 
found it necessary to account for the diversified phenomenal world by 
the introduction of the concept of maya (illusion) shows up duality in 
the system. Zaehner writes:
"Starting from the premise which he (Sankara) 
derives from selected passages of the Upanisads, that reality is One without a second, that the 
individual soul is identical with that reality, and that all individual souls are therefore the 
same reality absolutely, he can only account for the phenomenal world by stating that it is maya 
or illusion, a concept for which Upanisadic 
authority is singularly poor: and once illusionis admitted the simple monad is shattered.
As well as arguing against the absurdities of monism on logical 
grounds, Zaehner also claims that there is something very odd about it 
from the ethical standpoint. Thus he asserts:
"It does much credit to the heart of the ultra- 
monist Vedantins that they have always been 
ready to help others towards liberation; it 
does very little credit to their head, for what logic can there possibly be in seeking to free from illusions a person who, from the point of 
view of the would be liberator, is, by definition, illusory?"^
Now we may agree with Zaehner in his view that thorough-going 
monism (as opposed to those types of monism which allow for the 
Absolute to find its self-expression in a differentiated world of 
finite creatures) is incoherent, at least insofar as the universe 
contains any conscious beings. For consciousness must always be conscious­
ness of some other thing, and this is sufficient to introduce diversity.
4. idem.
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But just because we may agree with Zaehner that thorough-going monism 
is an absurd theory, it seems very odd to associate with this theory 
a distinctive type of experience. If monism is really absurd on 
logical grounds, how can monistic metaphysics provide us with useful 
concepts for the description or explanation of anybody's experience? 
Presumably Zaehner does not really think that there is a form of 
logically absurd experience, which is best described in terms of a 
logically absurd theory!
It seems that what Zaehner must really have been trying to 
express though he never succeeds in clearly doing so, was the idea 
that there is a distinctive type of experience which, though not truly 
supporting monistic theory, is the sort of experience which mtsteads 
people into thinking that monism is true. This form of experience 
would be associated with monism then because, unlike the other forms 
of experience, it tends to mislead people in that direction.
If this solution is adopted we shall have solved the logical 
problem of how Zaehner can tie a distinctive category of experience to 
a logically absurd doctrine. But we have still to decide whether 
Zaehner is actually right in thinking that there is a distinctive type 
of mystical experience which has an inherent tendency to mislead the 
experients in the direction of monistic metaphysics. Where, somebody 
might justifiably ask, do we find descriptions of the sort of experience 
which Zaehner has in mind?
One obvious place to look, it might be thought, would be in the 
autobiographical accounts of the mystics who have upheld monistic 
doctrines. But, according to Zaehner, we will not get very far this 
way, since the only modern writer worthy of consideration is Sri Raraakrishna 
who, though technically a non-dualist Vedantin has strong theistic 
tendencies, and the ancient writings are by and large not autobiographical
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or even biographical reports but rather "raystico-magical tracts like 
the earlier Upanisads, or expositions of mystical doctrines in verse 
like the late Upanisads and the Bhagavad-Gita". All in all, there seems 
to be a marked dearth of actual reports of this type of experience.
How then does Zaehner arrive at the view that there is a 
distinctive type of mysticism with the peculiar tendency to mislead 
people towards monism? What is the source of his information about 
the existence of such mystical phenomena?
That Zaehner's source of information can only be the Upanisads 
(which by his own confession do not consist of reports of the 
experiences of particular people) is clear when we consider the list 
of characteristics which Zaehner ascribes to this form of mysticism.
It is useful to set out this list in some detail, so as to be in a 
better position to see whether mystical experience with characteristics 
of the sort mentioned is best regarded as a distinctive type. (We 
shall refer henceforth to this type of mysticism as "monistic 
mysticism" although as we saw earlier, this is strictly inaccurate).
According to Zaehner, there is a distinctive type of mystical 
experience which involves the following:
(1) A sense of the isolation of the self from the phenomenal 
world, (which in monistic theory is regarded as illusion), a sense 
of isolation which is achieved by emptying the mind of all empirical 
content.
(2) Being in a state which corresponds more closely to deep 
dreamless sleep than anything else in ordinary consciousness.
(3) A final release in which a person passes beyond 
consciousness and non-consciousness.
(4) A final stage which is accompanied by the cessation of 
perception and sensation.
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(5) An "emptiness" which, is very blissful, in fact supremely 
blissful.
(6) A state of mind which is the culmination of a number of 
previous stages.
(7) A state of mind in which the experient feels himself to 
have passed beyond good and evil, as well as beyond space and time.
Is it true that these characteristics delimit a distinctive 
type of mysticism? According to Zaehner they do, and this distinctive 
type of mysticism suggests very different views about the nature of 
reality than do the other two categories. In particular, Zaehner 
thinks that this "monistic mysticism" is very much in conflict with 
theistic mysticism, and he tries to show this by comparing a number of 
the characteristics mentioned above with the features of theistic 
mysticism.
Perhaps the most fundamental disagreement, Zaehner claims, 
between monistic and theistic mysticism is about the monist's claim 
to be, in the mystical stage, somehow above moral obligation. The 
monist, as we have seen in our last point to be mentioned above, 
feels himself to have passed "beyond good and evil". The theist, 
Zaehner tells us, could never go along with this. Zaehner contrasts 
theistic and monistic mystical perceptions of moral value in the 
following way:
"For he, (.the monist) , is intent on realizing 
his own soul, or to put it into the terminology we have been using in this chapter, he is intent 
on realizing his immortal spirit in detachment from his mental frame. This is his bliss, and he is quite convinced that it is the supreme 
bliss; but so long as he sticks to his monistic view of life and feels that his philosophy is 
confirmed by his experience, then I do not think that his bliss can be identified with that 
experienced and described by the Christian and
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Muslim mystics (insofar as these remain 
theist) whose bliss consists rather in 
the total surrender of the whole personality to a God who is at the same time love.
A number of replies are in order, in respect of Zaehner's 
comment.
Firstly, we should note that the Upanisads do speak of moral 
value, and when they do, the sort of moral value spoken of seems to be 
very close indeed to the Christian idea of love. For example, there 
is a comparison of the mystical experience with the case of a man who 
is embraced by a beloved wife. And this corresponds very closely with 
the Christian image of Christ as the Bridegroom and the Church as the 
Bride of Christ. Also Zaehner himself compares what he conceives to 
be mystical union with. God to the union between a man and a woman.
"If man is made in the image of God then it would be natural that God's love would be reflected in human love, that the love of 
man for woman should reflect the love of God for the soul." ^
There are also passages in the Upanisads which describe the mystical
7state in terms of apprehending the Supreme Good and even passages 
which describe this awareness as being in a state of pure love. 
Passages such as these ought to be enough to make us look again at 
Zaehner's interpretation of the Upanisadic statements that the mystic 
is beyond good and evil.
5. idem.
5. ibid. p.151.
7. See especially the Isa Upanisad.
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Secondly, it would be hard to know what the bliss of the Upanisadic 
supreme state could be were it not the bliss of an experience infused 
with moral worth. Certainly it cannot be sensual bliss; Hinduism and 
Buddhism are both adamant in their condemnation of dependence on the 
senses which to them are the root of all desire and, - since desire is 
normally unfulfilled - of all suffering.
Thirdly, Zaehner himself admits that Vedantin monists have not 
been led by their experiences to live amoral lives, and it would be 
very strange if this had nothing at all to do with those experiences 
which they themselves regard as supremely important.
In view of these considerations it seems most plausible to say 
that in the mystical states described in the Upanisads the mystic is 
only beyond good and evil in the sense of having no need for rules of 
conduct or appeals to moral authority. At this level one's inclinations 
are permeated with and transformed by the power of love, and rules and 
regulations appear ridiculous and superfluous. Because the terms good 
and evil are very often associated with moral injunctions, which 
presuppose a cleavage between duty and inclination, it is necessary 
sometimes for the Upanisads to speak of the mystic being beyond good 
and evil.
We have now seen that Zaehner fails to show that "monistic" 
mysticism is radically different from theistic mysticism, on the 
grounds of their having very different attitudes to moral value.
But there are other points at which they may differ. Another 
point at which Zaehner claims they do differ is in their attitudes 
towards the isolation of the self from the phenomenal world. The 
isolation and state of emptiness which characterises monistic mystical 
experience, Zaehner argues, can never characterise genuine theistic 
mystical experience.
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"Monism, in practice, means nothing more than 
the sort of emptiness or detachment from the 
world which may, if one is rightly motivated, 
make possible union with God. But delectable though this state obviously is, it is not a 
Beatific Vision, nor is it in any sense a 
union with God, it is only the purification of 
the Vessel which can, if it will, be filled with God. Emptiness is the prelude to Holiness.
But it is also possible, says Zaehner, that such emptiness might 
not be a prelude to holiness, and to remain in the state of "natural 
rest" without the impulse of love (and he thinks there can be no love 
in such a state) may lead to disastrous consequences.
"To rest in this emptiness is dangerous, for 
this is a house swept and garnished, and 
though it is possible that God may enter in 
if the furniture is fair, it is equally likely that the proverbial seven devils will rush, in if either the remaining furniture is foul, or 
if there is no furniture at all."®
We may agree with Zaehner that an interpretation of isolation 
and emptiness based on monistic metaphysics would be of the nature 
which he describes. However, if we dispense with monistic metaphysics, 
and look to the descriptions of what a subject of mystical experience 
will actually experience, contained in documents such as the Upanisads, 
we find that although they speak of the mind’s isolation from the 
phenomenal world through the emptying of its normal content, this is 
only because this normal content comes to be replaced by content of a 
totaZty di-fferent kt-nd. There is then isolation from the world of 
surface appearances, but not from the world as such. This is often 
expressed in paradoxical language, but careful examination makes it 
quite clear that the emptiness Which mystics describe is understood by
8. ibid. p.173.
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them not as emptiness pure and simple, but rather as a sort of fullness- 
in-emptiness. In the Isa Upanisad, for example, we read:
"That One, the Self, though never stirring, 
is swifter than thought ...Though standing still, it overtakes those who are running ... it stirs, and it stires 
not." 9
There are many other passages which could be quoted which are 
suggestive of this fullness-in-emptiness. But what is most telling 
against Zaehner's view of the soul's isolation through emptiness, is 
the set of very positive descriptions given of Brahman in the Upanisads. 
The Kena Upanisad teaches that all power comes from Brahman, the 
Mundaka Upanisad teaches that he is the source of all goodness, and 
the Svetasvatara Upanisad teaches that he is the creator of the world.
In a mystical encounter with a Being as determinate as this, one could 
hardly be said to have a totally empty consciousness.
Many of the passages in the writings which speak of the Void or 
Emptiness which is experienced in a mystical encounter, tell us a 
good deal about the type of emptiness involved. For example, in the 
following passage^^ whiah ts aotualty quoted by Zaehner in support of 
his own view of emptiness, it is fairly clear that the emptiness referred 
to is of a very specific sort, that is, the soul is not wholly empty, 
but empty of one particular type of content.
9. Isa Upanisad 4 and 5.
10. This passage is not from the Upanisads but that does not matter, 
since similar ones may be found there, and in any case this 
passage is quoted by Zaehner as being descriptive of monistic mysticism.
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"It is then, when one resorts to emptiness, 
characterized as blissful and as the 
disappearing of all discursive ideas, that 
all discursive ideas, which are a net of 
thought construction, disappear. When 
discursive ideas have disappeared 
discrimination comes to rest, and with it all Karma and defilement, and all kinds of rebirth. Hence one calls emptiness Nirvana, and it brings to rest all discursive ideas." H
The emptiness spoken of in this passage then, refers to the 
absence of discursive ideas, not to an absolute emptiness. Zaehner 
has failed to show that there is a type of mystical experience which 
is characterised by absolute isolation and emptiness of the soul such 
as misleads people to adopt a belief in (or to find a confirmation of 
their belief in) thorough-going monism, and he has failed to do this, 
even from his own specially selected examples. If even Zaehner, with all 
his knowledge and scholarship, cannot find convincing examples of 
experiences which mislead people into monistic metaphysics, then the 
deep suspicion is that there are none.
Because Zaehner misunderstands the nature of the isolation and 
emptiness of the soul or self as they occur in monistic mystical 
experience, he is unable to see that these phenomena, rightly under­
stood, also occur in theistic mystical experience. We shall now 
examine some of the correspondences and similarities between monistic 
and theistic mystical experiences. And here we must stress one 
important correspondence between the situations of the two kinds of 
mystics. Both alike come to their experiences only after a sometimes 
long and always rigorous course of discipline and religious preparation.
11. From Candrakirti, Prasanna pada, quoted by E. Conze, Buddhist Texts through the Ages, pp 168-169.
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Zaehner chooses Jan van Ruysbroeck as a theistic mystic 
whose writings serve to show up the incompatibility between the 
monistic experience of isolation and emptiness and the union with God 
which he claims characterizes theistic mystical experience. Zaehner 
quotes Ruysbroeck in an attempt to show that the latter regards mystical 
states which involve isolation and emptiness as deeply unsatisfactory:
"When a man possesses this rest in emptiness, 
and when the impulse of love seems to him to 
be a hindrance, so in resting he remains within himself, and lives contrary to the first 
manner which, unites man with God; and this is the beginning of all spiritual error."
Ruysbroeck himself may have intended his words as a criticism 
of the monists' experience of emptiness. But if so, it is probable 
that he too misunderstood the nature of the monists' emptiness, and 
thus failed to see how close was their experience to his own. If we 
look closely at the passage quoted by Zaehner we can see that Ruysbroeck 
is not saying that any state of emptiness is reprehensible but rather 
that without tove it is impossible to attain the highest mystical 
state. And if we look at Ruysbroeck's descriptions of his own 
experience, it is apparent that he exhibits distinct tendencies towards 
just that sort of emptiness which, according to Zaehner, he repudiates. 
Thus Ruysbroeck writes:
"The God-seeing man ... can always enter, 
naked and unencumbered with, images, into 
the inmost part of his spirit. There he 
finds revealed an Eternal Light ... If (his 
spirit) is undifferentiated and without
12. Quoted by Zaehner from Blessed Jan van Ruysbroeck - The Spiritual Espousals translated by Eric Colledge.
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distinction, and therefore it feels 
nothing but the unity."
Or again:
"Such enlightened men are, with, a free 
spirit, lifted above reason into a bare 
and imageless vision, wherein lives the eternal indrawing summons of the Divine Unity." 14
From passages like these it can be clearly seen that the 
similarities between Ruysbroeck’s theistic mystical experiences and 
the descriptions of mystical states which are found in documents like 
the Upanisads are much more important than are the differences. Yet 
Ruysbroeck was chosen by Zaehner specifically as a good example of a 
theistic mystic whose mystical experiences supposedly highlight the 
differences between theistic and monistic mysticism. Thus Zaehner's 
case for a total divorce between monistic and theistic mysticism is 
weakened to the point of beginning to totally break down. The fact 
that emptiness and isolation takes the form which it does (that is, 
it is emptiness in one sense but fullness in another) explains why 
theistic mystics speak of union with God in a sense which they clearly 
do not regard as involving the coming together of two quite distinct 
entities. Thus, even mystics like St. Teresa, whose intellectual 
orientation was in no way towards deep metaphysical speculation, 
describe an experience which involves the total interpenetration of 
God and man. St. Teresa's imagery is as anthropomorphic as it could 
be, but through this imagery we can still see that the idea that she
13. From Jan van Ruysbroeck's The Adornment of the Spiritual
Marriage. The Book of the Supreme Truth, the Sparkling Stone. Translated by C.A. Wynschenk. Quoted by W.T. Stace in Mysticism and Philosophy, pp 94-95.
14. idem.
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is trying to convey is that of being a finite creature permeated with 
the Infinite. Thus she asserts speaking of how God's love once appeared 
to her in the form of an angel:
"In his hands I saw a great golden spear, 
and at the iron tip there appeared to be a point of fire. This he plunged into my 
heart several times so that it penetrated my entrails. When he pulled it out I felt 
that he took them with it, and left me 
utterly consumed by the great love of God. The pain was so severe that it made me 
utter several moans. The sweetness caused 
by this intense pain is so extreme that one cannot possibly wish it to cease, nor is one's soul then content with anything but 
God." 15
St. Teresa found it difficult to express herself in less anthro­
pomorphic terms than she does here, but behind these terms is an idea 
about the permeation of the finite by the Infinite to be found almost 
always in the writings of the so-called monistic mystics. Theistic 
mysticism is found, once again, not to be in conflict with monistic.
The conflict between monism and theism, which is admittedly a 
real one, has little to do with the claims of the mystics of these two 
major traditions. It has rather more to do with a theological 
tendency in the former to emphasize the immanence of God, and a tendency 
of the latter to emphasize his transcendence. The mystics of both 
traditions have, on the whole, wanted to say, on the basis of their 
religious experiences that God is both immanent and transcendent.
Thus if one considers the experiences of mystics rather than the 
theology of the religions to which those mystics adhere, one finds 
that there is not a division between the ways in which God is
15. Quoted from The Life of St. Teresa (Penguin Books) by Ben-Ami
Scharfstein in Mystical Experience. (Oxford. B. Blackwell) p.6.
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(ostensibly) experienced, corresponding to the division between the 
ways in which he is understood in theology.
We have now discussed the most important points at which 
theistic and monistic mysticism are alleged to differ. We have also 
seen that Zaehner is not justified in coming to the conclusions which 
he does. However, it is important to note that there is no fundamental 
difference in the phenomena experienced by theistic and monistic mystics 
in respect of those other (.less significant) features which we have 
not yet specifically discussed.
It is clear that theistic and monisticism are in agreement, not 
only about isolation, emptiness, and the experience of value, but also 
on the other features of the mystical experience.
For example, the state of deep dreamless sleep which we earlier 
claimed was typical of the monist's experience, is, correctly under­
stood, characteristic of the theist's experience also. We must 
remember that although deep dreamless sleep was held to be the nearest 
that ordinary experience comes to the mystical state, mystical 
experience was not identified with it. The aim of saying that there is 
a sort of analogy between the two is surely, for the monist, to point 
out just how different from the mystical consciousness is the state of 
ordinary consciousness. And how close this comes to the theists' 
repeated assertion that the experience which they seek to describe is 
ineffable 1 In deep dreamless sleep there is an absence of empirical 
content, including that content which is the conscious awareness of the 
barriers of selfhood, such as is found in the mystical experience of 
theists and monists. There is, as in mysticism, a total absence of 
desire and anxiety. But in this dissolution of the old self, the 
self is not totally destroyed. It is rather reduced to what Eckhart 
calls "one little point", and finds its essential nature as an expression
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of the Divine Unity.
In both theistic and monistic mysticism the finite individual 
experiences himself as being absorbed into the being of God, and 
thereby transmuted into an expression of the Infinite. And this has 
the further consequence that the mystics (of both traditions) feel 
themselves to have passed, in their experiences, beyond space and time.
We have now arrived at the end of our comparison between 
monistic and theistic mysticism. It was said earlier in this chapter 
that we would proceed by comparing the religious experiences of those 
who had made an effort to educate themselves in spiritual matters, 
without prejudging what counts as a genuine spiritual education. In 
our comparison of mystical experience as it is attributable to monists 
with that which is ascribable to theists, we have taken two traditions 
which are, in their theological perspectives sufficiently opposed to 
have as widely different ideas about what counts as valid spiritual 
endeavour as any pair of religious traditions. But despite the 
differences in form which spiritual education takes in the two 
traditions, the awareness which, results from this education (at least 
when this awareness is heightened to the degree of mystical experience) 
is strikingly similar in the two traditions. It seems therefore that 
when an understanding of spiritual matters is sincerely sought, and a 
great deal of effort is put into the seeking, then despite the precise 
methods which the seeker has used in his attempt to educate himself in 
these things, and despite the theological assumptions of his own 
tradition, it is most unlikely that he will come to an experiential 
understanding of God which differs in fundamental ways from the under­
standing of others who have claimed to experience God.
Having established that monistic and theistic mysticism are 
similar to each other in all the fundamental respects, we have now to
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enquire whether there are any other forms of intensified religious 
experience in which the phenomena experienced are different from 
those experienced by monistic and theistic mystics.
According to Zaehner, there is at least one other form of 
mysticism (besides monistic and theistic) which is distinctive and 
unlike any other form. This is what he calls "nature mysticism".
We shall now examine this type of mysticism.
Zaehner is at pains to sketch the phenomenology of nature
mysticism, to show that it differs sharply from the other forms. It
is possible to pick out, from what Zaehner says on the subject, a 
number of qualities which he regards as characterizing what he calls 
the pan-en-henic experience.
Firstly, in this type of mystical experience, the experient feels 
himself to be dissolved into the phenomenal world. The walls of self- 
identity fall away, but one is aware of oneself as a being who is not 
ultimately distinct from the surrounding world. A good example of this 
type of experience is given by Aldous Huxley in The Poors of Perception 
in which he reports that under the influence of mescalin he "became" 
the bamboo chair legs at which he had been gazing.
Secondly, in nature mysticism one feels that one "owns" the 
Infinite, a feeling somewhat akin to the feeling of awe and wonder which 
may be felt in gazing at a scene of great natural beauty.
Thirdly, there is a feeling of time ceasing to matter, a sense
of eternity.
Fourthly, this state is discontinuous with ordinary consciousness, 
and often comes upon people suddenly and unexpectedly.
Fifthly, there is the feeling that matter is "ennobled and 
sanctified by spirit".
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Sixthly, there is a feeling that opposing forces are reconciled, 
that (seeming) opposites melt into unity.
Seventhly, the experience is accompanied by the metaphysical 
notion that the nobler and better is always ultimately victorious, by 
soaking up and absorbing its opposite into itself.
Eighthly and finally, there is in nature mysticism an 
experience of elation which seems to bear a close relation to the manic 
phase of the manic-depressive psychosis.
From this outline of the fundamental characteristics of nature 
mysticism, it seems clear that this phenomenon is descriptively very 
different from theistic and monistic mysticism. But we should notice 
at once that nature mysticism does not meet our "spiritual effort" 
criterion, and so strictly should not have been selected for consider­
ation in the first place. The monistic and theistic experiences which 
we discussed previously are characteristically the outcome of a long 
and arduous struggle to come to an understanding of spiritual truth, 
but this experience of nature mysticism comes upon people who have in 
no way prepared themselves.
It is therefore not surprising that this experience is 
descriptively different from those experiences undergone by people who 
have subjected themselves to lengthy preparation and training. Nor 
does it mean that there is disagreement about what the nature of 
spiritual reality is like among the (relevant) subjects of a religious 
mystical experience. We had to have criteria for deciding whose 
experiences should be compared with whose, and our criteria were such 
as to exclude the range of intense experiences into which nature 
mysticism falls.
Whatever nature mysticism were found to be like, it would not 
count against the hypothesis that those who have sincerely sought
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spiritual truth in various religious traditions and cultures have 
tended to have experiences - ostensibly of God, which are remarkably 
similar to each other. But even if we did have to take nature mysticism 
seriously, its descriptive features are not, in any case, such as to 
suggest that spiritual reality as perceived by the nature mystics is 
utterly different from that which is suggested by monistic and theistic 
mystical experience. It is most plausibly interpreted as a more limited 
insight into the same transcendent Being that lies at the root of 
monistic and theistic experience.
The nature mystics do not in their experiences identify the 
ordinary finite world with God, as Zaehner seems to think. It is 
rather that, in this form of experience, the phenomenal world is 
transformed into an expression of a deep underlying unifying principle. 
It is experienced as a manifestation, an externalization, of God. The 
difference between nature mysticism and the mysticism previously 
discussed seems to be best accounted for by saying that in the deeper 
mysticism of isolation and emptiness one makes contact with the Infinite 
source of the differentiated finite world, whereas in nature mysticism 
one makes contact with the externalized differentiated world, recognized 
as the work of this source. The world of nature is seen, in this 
experience, as a manifestation of the unifying work of the Absolute, 
but not as the unifying principle itself. Thus William James speaks of 
his deepest experiences of the phenomenal world in the following way:
"It is as if the opposites of the world, whose 
contradictoriness and conflict make all our difficulties and troubles, were melted into unity. Not only do they as contrasted species 
belong to one and the same genus, but one of the species, the nobler and better one, is 
itself the genus, and so soaks up and absorbs 
its opposite into itself. This is a dark saying, 
I know, when expressed in terms of common logic,
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but I cannot wholly escape from its 
authority."
Nature mysticism, although not strictly an (ostensible) 
experience of God himself which is the outcome of a spiritual education, 
nonetheless serves to add support to the insights of monistic and 
theistic mystics.
So far, the evidence which we have considered points to the 
conclusion that mystical experiences are sufficiently similar or 
complementary to suggest that they could well be apprehensions of the 
same reality. Indeed, it seems that the deepest mystical experiences 
display a striking uniformity, and that this uniformity is broken only 
when we begin to consider the experiences of those who have had little 
or no preliminary spiritual education and whose effort in spiritual 
matters is minimal.
17Thus, when William James tells us in his famous book of the 
diversity of religious experience, we find on close inspection that his 
"Varieties" have been produced by uncritically including within 
religious experience many forms of experience which are not the outcome 
of deliberate spiritual struggle and effort. Indeed, if we take our 
spiritual effort criterion seriously, we may dismiss nearly everything 
James tells us about the varieties of religious experience. For as 
James proceeds with his discussion of the varieties of (supposedly) 
religious experience, it becomes fairly clear that he only manages to 
produce a number of distinct varieties because he allows into his 
survey a number of forms of experience whose claim to be regarded as
16. William James. Varieties of Religious Experience pp 388-389.
17. Varieties of Religious Experience.
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religious is in reality highly dubious. Where James discusses those 
experiences which are undergone by people in the course of a serious 
spiritual search which the experients themselves claim to be genuine 
encounters with God, those experiences display a strong similarity 
with the monistic and theistic mystical experiences discussed earlier.
It would of course be an impossible task to catalogue for the 
purposes of comparison the whole gamut of allegedly religious 
experiences which have occurred, even over a relatively short period 
of history. That is why we have had to have recourse to the procedure 
of examining those modes of experience which have been presented by 
writers such as Zaehner for the purpose of showing their diversity.
The point of adapting this procedure was because if, even when we look 
at those experiences which are chosen specifically to highlight the 
differences between forms of religious experience, we still find that 
there is a striking uniformity among all the relevant experiences, then 
the chances are high (unless, as Broad says, there is some independent 
reason to think otherwise) that the subjects of these experiences have 
had a genuine cognitive insight into the same transcendent reality.
Our investigations have revealed that there is indeed a striking 
uniformity between the mystical experiences of those who have adhered 
to various religions and lived in very different cultures, a similarity 
which is strongly suggestive of the experiences being insights into a 
commonly perceived reality. Thus we now have the result of one of the 
relevant tests of religious assertions (the third) mentioned in the 
second chapter.
The fact that we have seen that mystical experiences are very 
similar to each other in the various ages and cultures means that the 
probability of their being insights into a genuine reality is greatly 
increased. But of course it does not proVe that they are genuine
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cognitive insights. There is such a thing as mass hallucination, and 
certain drugs can produce experiences which are falsely taken to be 
cognitive and which are strikingly similar for everybody who takes 
thera^ .^ How do we know then that religious experiences are not similar 
to each other in the same way that the individual experiences of mass 
hallucination are?
The answer is that we cannot provide a water-tight guarantee,
but if we can see no specific reason to think that religious experiences
are illusory, and if their cognitive validity is confirmed by our other
19"tests" then it is reasonable to conclude that it is highly probable 
that religious experiences represent genuine insights.
In this chapter, we have drawn our conclusions from the starting- 
point of an examination of the phenomena observed or reported by some 
people and these constitute rather special and unusual experiences.
But it is important to remember that these special experiences are not 
supposed to tell us only about a world which is totally divorced from 
the world of ordinary experience; they rather claim to tell us the 
deepest truth about that world.
Therefore, it is appropriate to consider whether, if we take as 
our starting point ordinary experience, and reflect deeply upon it, we 
shall come to the same conclusions that others have arrived at by way 
of their extraordinary experiences. If we find that justifiable meta­
physical argumentation, which takes as its starting point the phenomenal 
world, leads to the conclusion that we can gain a deeper understanding
18. However, it should be remembered that similar religious exper­
iences are produced through different types of spiritual endeavour, 
and this makes it less likely that religious experiences are on a par with the experiences produced by drugs.
19. That is, those tests or checking procedures of religious assertions 
which were outlined in our second chapter.
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of the nature and unity of our experience if we postulate a divine 
reality, then the notion that religious experiences yield genuine 
cognitive insights is greatly supported.
We shall therefore, in the chapters which follow, attempt to 
determine what metaphysics can tell us, if anything, about the nature 
of spiritual reality.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE POSSIBILITY OF METAPHYSICS
Can the deliverances of religious experience, taken as valid 
insights into something transcending subjective experience, be corro­
borated by those conclusions which arise from the deepest possible 
reflections on the nature and unity of our experience as a whole?
We raised this question in Chapter Two; it was our first "test" for 
determining the probable validity of an individual's religious 
experience. To answer it, to find out whether a transcendent divine 
Being such as the mystics claim to have encountered serves to make the 
world and our total experience of that world more intelligible, we 
need to ask questions about the precondition of human experience, in 
all its richness and fullness. And that is to say that we need to 
engage in metaphysics.^
However, before we can begin our metaphysical enquiries, we are 
brought to an abrupt halt by the large number of philosophers who have 
put forward objections to the very enterprise of speculative metaphysics 
The objections are very different from the type of attack which might 
be levelled against a particular metaphysical system, for example that
1. Since, in this chapter we shall be concerned with, the capability of metaphysics to lend support for specifically religious 
conclusions, it is inevitable that we shall be discussing the 
possibility of Cwhat has been called) speculative, transcendent 
or transcendental metaphysics. When the term meta­
physics is used in this chapter without further qualification it should be also borne in mind that we shall, in the course of this chapter, find reason to reject a sharp division between 
transcendent and descriptive metaphysics.
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of Bosanquet or Hegel, For they are concerned, not with disproving the 
results of particular metaphysical enquiries, but rather with establish­
ing that a whole method of enquiry, a whole way of approaching 
philosophy, is entirely misguided.
This view, that the whole enterprise of metaphysics must be
discarded "en masse" is a view often associated with the logical
positivists. But we saw, in our introductory chapter, that their old
tool for making metaphysical and religious statements redundant, the
verification principle, has now itself been made redundant. However,
although the verification principle is no longer accepted, at least not
in its original form, still many objections to the possibility of
metaphysics are put forward which seem to have their deepest roots in
2the epistemological theories of Hume, Kant, and Wittgenstein .
The most obvious reaction to these attempts to exclude meta­
physics "en masse" is to say with A.E. Taylor - "You can never tell 
till you try".  ^ That is to say, the only refutation of the possibility 
of metaphysics would be a refutation of every metaphysical theory one
by one, there can be no general refutation of metaphysics for all
time.
These "a priori" objections to the possibility of metaphysics 
seem initially to reflect that very sloppiness of thought and lack of 
attention to detail which the metaphysicians have themselves so often 
been accused of. However, underlying the critics’ objections is the 
assumption that metaphysics, taken as a whole, represents a way of
2. There is also an attack on metaphysics from the existentialist 
tradition, associated with such continental philosophers as
S. Kierkegaard and J.P. Sartre. However, the critique from this 
standpoint has had relatively little impact on British philosophy.
3. Elements of Metaphysics, p.8 (Methuen & Co.Ltd. 1903 edition 7).
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trying to understand the world which is distinctive enough and unified 
enough for all metaphysical theories to be, despite the variation 
between particular metaphysical systems, misguided in the same way.
We are not justified in dismissing this assumption, as Taylor seems 
to do, without examination. Metaphysics might correctly be ruled out 
"in toto" if we discover it to be a distinctive method of enquiry 
characterized by some major defect.
What is Metaphysics?
In the introduction to Appearance and Reality, F.H. Bradley
wrote:
"We may agree, perhaps to understand by 
metaphysics an attempt to know reality as 
against mere appearance, or the study of 
first principles or ultimate truths, or again the effort to comprehend the universe, 
not simply piecemeal or by fragments, but 
somehow as a whole." ^
Most philosophers would probably agree that Bradley's remark is 
a fairly good description of metaphysics as it has been traditionally 
conceived, and of what is now called transcendent, or speculative 
metaphysics. It is metaphysics in Bradley's sense which is nearly 
always being attacked when philosophers say that it (i.e. metaphysics) 
is impossible.
Bradley's attempt to know reality "somehow as a whole" is 
regarded as an example of transcendent metaphysics because it is 
supposed to involve speculation which transcends experience in that its 
conclusion, according to the critics, has no grounding in experience and
4. Appearance and Reality, p.1 (Oxford University Press 1930).
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cannot be supported by empirical phenomena. Any philosophy which 
produces conclusions about such things as God, the soul, substance, 
free will, and the unity of reality is thought by such critics to be 
paradigmatic of the sort of philosophy which indulges in illegitimate 
metaphysical speculation.
Now if it were true that any attempt to know reality "somehow 
as a whole" must inevitably lead to speculation freeing itself from 
all reference to evidence or experience, then speculative metaphysics 
of the sort which arrives at conclusions about God, the soul etc. 
would certainly have to be prohibited. But is speculative metaphysics 
really like this? We would be begging the question to say that it 
must be, just because it arrives at a certain type of conclusion. If 
speculative metaphysics is to be rejected, its method of argument must 
be shown to be transcendent in the sense of making no reference to 
experience.
In recent years, it has become commonplace for a large number of 
philosophers to counterpose to (what they call) transcendent metaphysics, 
a metaphysics which is purely descriptive or immanent. The former is 
alleged to be illegitimate, the latter is thought to be legitimate.
The late Cambridge philosopher, A.C. Ewing, describes this division 
thus:
"Metaphysics is not such a disreputable subject 
as it was thirty or forty years ago, but a sharp 
distinction is made between immanent metaphysics which makes a system of what is known to us in 
our ordinary experience and of the concepts we 
need to organize it, and transcendent metaphysics which goes beyond this." ^
5. Value and Reality, p.24 (George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1973)
102
Although philosophy which produces conclusions about God or 
Absolute spirit etc. is nearly always thought to belong firmly to the 
transcendent side of this division, it is too often forgotten that 
metaphysicians have nearly always arrived at these through an attempt 
to discover the basic concepts we need in order to make a system of our 
ordinary experience, that is, through an attempt at descriptive 
metaphysics.
Descriptive and transcendent metaphysics coalesce if the very 
concepts we need to make a system of our ordinary experience happen to 
correspond to the concepts usually associated with transcendent 
metaphysics. And this possibility cannot be rejected a priori, for 
that would be to presuppose without argument that transcendent concepts 
cannot be useful in describing human experience. As Ewing puts it:
" ... suppose human experience Itself when 
adequately studied drives us by its inherent nature to go beyond itself, as the realist 
holds is the case with sense-perception, which can only be explained by physical things that are not themselves experiences but exist quite independently of the human mind. The possibility of this cannot be dismissed a priori. Nor can 
the claim of the religious man who likewise holds 
that our experience leads us beyond ourselves, though in quite a different way, pointing to God, or being unintelligible without God." &
Speculative metaphysics then does not proceed by ignoring 
human experience or by attempting to deduce matters of fact by means 
of a priori reason. Its procedure is really no different from that of 
descriptive metaphysics. If some metaphysical thinkers have used 
concepts which are transcendent insofar as they are useless for 
helping us to explain our experience, then these errors are attributable
6. idem.
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to particular metaphysical systems; they are not a feature of 
speculative metaphysics as such..
The argument that metaphysics is impoosible because it pays no 
attention to experience we may declare to be false without further 
consideration. We have seen that this view is based on a total 
misconception of the nature of metaphysics. However, an opponent of 
metaphysics might concede that metaphysicians do make reference to 
human experience, but claim that metaphysicians universally misrepresent 
and misunderstand the nature of that experience. Concepts like God 
and the soul, he might argue, do arise from experience if experience 
is understood in a certain way. But he might add, precisely the 
mistake of all speculative metaphysics is that it does understand 
experience in the way it does, when it has no justification for doing 
so. The argument about the possibility of metaphysics would then turn 
on the validity of the view of experience which metaphysicians operate 
with. We need therefore to ask which conception of experience gives 
rise to metaphysics, and whether that conception is warranted.
The Genesis of Metaphysics
In his major metaphysical work, A.E. Taylor described the origin 
of metaphysics as follows:
"So long as our various direct perceptions are 
not felt to conflict with one another, we readily accept them all as equally real and valid, and no 
question arises as to their relative truth and falsehood. Were all our perceptions of this 
kind, there would be no need for the correction, by subsequent reflection, of our first immediate impressions about the nature of ourselves and the 
world, error would be a term of no meaning for us, 
and science would have no existence. But when 
two immediate perceptions equally authenticated 
by ourselves stand in direct conflict with one
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another, we cannot without doing violence 
to the fundamental law of rational think­
ing regard both as equally and in the 
same sense true." ^
Metaphysics arises for Taylor because our immediate impressions 
of things do not always hang together harmoniously, yet we must seek 
to avoid contradiction in our thought if we are to find the world we 
experience intelligible. When rival perceptions conflict, and seem 
to tell us contradictory things about the nature of the world, meta­
physics attempts to discover that "whole" which is the truth behind
and the explanation of such (apparently) contradictory perceptions. 8
Radical empiricist philosophers like Comte and Mill together 
with their (less radical) empiricist followers have consistently refused 
to recognize that we can have conflicting perceptions (unless we be 
suffering from outright delusion, as in hallucination) in our most 
basic levels of experience. And they refused to recognize this, it 
seems, because to them, the only alternative to formal contradiction 
was non-contradiction. They perceived, quite correctly, that we cannot 
have two conflicting perceptions together constituting an experience of 
it raining and not raining in the same place at the same time, but 
concluded from this that experience contains no conflicting perceptions
9of any kind.
7. Elements of Metaphysics, p.2-3 (Methuen & Co. Ltd. 1903. Edition 7.)
8. Here we use the term 'perceptions' in the sense in which it seems
to have been meant by Taylor; that is, to refer to ways of 
perceiving reality, as opposed to the narrower sense in which it refers to immediate sense impressions.
9. See Gottfried Martin - General Metaphysics - Its Problems and
Method (Allen & Unwin 1961) for a fuller treatment of the radicalempiricists' attack on speculative metaphysics.
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The type of conflicting perceptions upon which, metaphysics is 
based is not one which issues in formal contradiction. Taylor perhaps 
does not make clear enough what he means by "conflicting perceptions" 
and he does at times write almost as if he believes that something 
akin to formal contradiction is a feature of our experience at its 
primitive levels. However, a careful reading of Taylor's writings 
reveals that when he speaks of conflicting perceptions he has in mind 
something more like equally plausible but conflicting ways of appre­
hending, or, at a very elementary level, interpreting the world. He 
does not believe that metaphysics exists as a cure for any schizophrenic 
tendency we might have to affirm and deny the same proposition, as a 
result of two strange contradictory perceptions.
Once we understand the true nature of the contradicto.riness 
which Taylor and others claim to be inherent in human experience, it 
becomes clear that what they have in mind is a type of tension which 
is readily identifiable as an important aspect of our experience at 
its more primitive levels. J.N. Findlay makes this considerably 
clearer than Taylor, when he speaks of and gives examples of the sort 
of contradictoriness which resides in Cwhat he calls) our "natural 
view" of the world. Speaking of our tendency to regard the concepts 
of space and time in each of two conflicting ways, Findlay writes:
"It seems part of the idea of body, on the 
one hand, to demand a space and time that are quite void and neutral, and this from a point of view that is truly and purely bodily, one which states the central claims that the idea of body involves, rather than 
its half-hearted reservations and implications. Space and time are from this point of view 
merely loose containers of bodies, which leave all states and changes open without dictating 
their course, which bring things together and make mutual influence possible, without nece­
ssitating it at any point. But when deeply reflected upon, void neutral space and time
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show themselves up as not being truly self- 
sustaining, as being no more than a foil to 
bodies and bodiliness, as organically related to body and as shown in bodily behaviour and 
pattern and inseparable from these last. To enter into this new point of view is to view 
body in a manner which demotes it from its independence, its pure bodiliness, it becomes 
as dependent upon its foil and as moulded by its foil's permanent structure as that 
structure depends on it. We are introduced to 
the possibility of queer spaces which are as 
positive in their nature as the bodies which 
occupy them, which in a sense decide what forms bodies may take and where they may go, though 
it is in bodily manifestation that their deciding influence is made known. We are introduced to 
the possibility of times geared to particular bodies and regions, and to what can be brought 
to bear on them and in a sense determining bodies and their states revealed only in the latter."
Another good example of the sort of contradictoriness which 
resides in our "natural view" of the world is to be found in the concept 
of selfhood. We are, on the one hand, tempted to think of the essential 
self as mental and immaterial; on the other hand, when we look for 
this substantial self we find it elusive, and are thus tempted to 
regard the self as a set of behavioural dispositions.
The task of metaphysics is to postulate a context or "whole" 
wherein the contradictions which inhere in our "natural view" of the 
world are both explained and dissolved. If experience really does 
contain such contradictoriness, then metaphysics is both possible and 
necessary. It is necessary, not in a formal sense, but in the sense 
that the world would not be wholly intelligible without it.
Metaphysicians usually go about their task by postulating more 
and more adequate wholes to explain and dissolve more and more "natural
10. J.N. Findlay. The Discipline of the Cave, p.143 (George Allen & Unwin. 1966).
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view" contradictions, and the final whole within which they are all 
dissolved and explained is that which has usually been called the 
Concrete Universal. Metaphysics could well be described as the search 
for this Universal. Hegel, for all his obscurities, saw and expressed 
this clearly, and although there have been many ideas about the precise 
nature of the Concrete Universal, the notion that (speculative) meta­
physics is the search for the Concrete Universal has never been 
abandoned.
It is clear now that a philosopher who recognizes a tremendous 
depth, richness, and complexity in human experience of the world is 
more likely to find within it levels which present us with the contra­
dictoriness which gives rise to metaphysics, than a philosopher who 
accepts a more reductionist account. But it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to finally prove that the non-reductionist is right and 
the reductionist is wrong. This is because anything to which a non­
reductionist might point as an element which ought to be included in 
an adequate account of human experience will not have its existence 
denied by the reductionist, but will simply be reinterpreted in the 
reductionist’s categories. Thus a reductionist would not deny that we 
have such a thing as conscious awareness, he would simply say that the 
meaning of this affirmation is to be located in the fact that we can 
observe other peoples’ behaviour. It is because we cannot finally
11. The various dualisms with which western philosophy has concerned 
itself may well be regarded as manifestations of the contra­
dictoriness which is inherent in our 'natural view' of the world. 
For example, the tendency to oscillate between seeing human actions 
first as free and then as causally determined, between regarding a thing with properties first as a substance with properties and 
second as a mere congeries of properties, provides us with illus­
trations of the mode of contradictoriness which metaphysical 
speculation has usually set out to overcome.
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refute reductionist accounts of experience, that it is always possible 
for philosophers to insist, without logical absurdity, that metaphysics 
is redundant. The only "refutation" of a view of experience which is 
narrow enough to avoid the need for metaphysics is the felt awareness 
of those who are sensitive enough, to the richness of experience to be 
left with a sense of unease with such reductionist accounts.
"Metaphysics" Daly writes, "begins with the recognition that 
there is mystery in being and in experience. But it is not merely the 
recognition of mystery. Metaphysics cannot end until it has rendered
12such reason of that mystery that it shall not become instead absurdity."
It seems strange indeed to seek to avoid metaphysics, considering 
the view of experience and the world with which we are left when we 
attempt to do without it. It may not lead to formal contradiction to 
dispense with metaphysics, but if a metaphysical approach can render 
being and experience more Intelligible, then only the strongest 
epistemological reasons should prevent us from adopting it.
We have already discussed some of the general epistemological 
arguments against metaphysics, but have found them to be wanting. In 
view of the difficulties presented by the non-metaphysical views of 
experience, it may well seem strange so many philosophers have 
continued to maintain that experience is such that it cannot justify 
metaphysics. Perhaps, since they insist on it in the face of obvious
12. C.B. Daly, Prospect for Metaphysics (ed.l Ramsey) Essay entitled:Metaphysics and the Limits of Language (1961 Allen and Unwin) p.204,
H.D. Lewis writes convincingly about the way in which, non­metaphysical reductionist accounts of aspects of human life and experience inevitably fail to render such reason of their mystery as to save them from absurdity. Thus he writes: . "In my actual 
writing more is involved than the physical movement, and this 
movement is not merely of a dispositional kind .... It move)is my part, and to my mind, the essential part, of what goes on 
and ray continuous purposing to do it. This cannot be dissolved 
into dispositional attitudes." The Elusive Mind, p.51 (1969 Allen & Unwin Ltd.).
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difficulties, these philosophers have had some stronger reasons for 
their claims. We shall therefore, in the sections which follow, turn 
to the detailed arguments of the three major critics of metaphysics 
mentioned earlier, that is of Hume, Kant and Wittgenstein.
Hume's Criticisms of Metaphysics
Hume's critique of the possibility of metaphysics was among the 
first of the famous general attacks on metaphysics and set the tone 
for all the later ones. It is of course true that before Hume particular 
metaphysical systems had been criticized, and severely. We need only 
to remember the much maligned Spinoza to assure ourselves of this.
But the idea which was suddenly introduced into western philosophy that 
the whole enterprise of metaphysics was misguided was something totally 
new. This type of attack on metaphysics was rooted in a strong awareness 
of the limitations of the powers of human reason. As Penelhum points 
out, prior to the time of Hume, the successes of the natural sciences 
had led to an increase, not a decrease in respect for the powers of 
human r e a s o n . B u t  Hume and others like him noticed that such successes 
relied heavily upon experimentation and observation, and that in this 
area the best results are obtained when the mind does not make postula­
tions which are not warranted by the data. Scientific knowledge, as 
knowledge which can be established by observation and experiment, is 
of course more readily assented to, than are the knowledge claims which 
arise as the outcome of speculative philosophy. So impressed by this 
were the empiricist philosophers that it came to be held that only 
knowledge which was established by the methods of the natural sciences
13. See Religion and Rationality, p.93 ff C1971 Random House Inc.)
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was really knowledge at all, and metaphysical speculation came to be 
regarded as an attempt to make claims for which, there is no basis in 
experience. It was further held that because there is no warrant in 
experience for metaphysical assertions, there are no criteria for 
deciding which ones are true and precisely this accounts for centuries 
of disagreement between speculative philosophers of differing schools.
According to Hume, all knowledge can be divided into two 
distinct classes, the first being concerned with relations of ideas and 
the other being concerned with matters of fact. Hume insisted that, 
for the establishment of matters of fact, we may appeal to experience 
only. There can be no a priori, demonstration of factual statements. 
This view of human knowledge was put forward by Hume, in connection 
with the discussion about the possibility of proving the existence of 
God, in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Thus Cleanthes is 
made to remark:
"I shall begin by observing that there is an 
evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate 
a matter of fact, or to prove it by argument a priori. Nothing is demonstrable, unless the 
contrary implies a contradiction. Nothing that is distinctly conceivable implies a 
contradiction. Whatever we conceive as 
existent, we can also conceive as non-existent. There is no being, therefore, whose non­existence implies a contradiction. Consequently 
there is no Being whose existence is demonstrable. 
I propose this argument as entirely decisive and 
am willing to rest the whole controversy upon it." 14
The argument is aimed at showing that if we cannot experience 
God then it is absurd to suppose that we can, as it were, argue him 
into existence. Reason is concerned with relations between ideas, and
14. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, p.77 (Bobbs-Merril Co. 
Inc. 1970).
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we can have no idea of anything without first having had an experience 
of it. Or, in Hume's language, to have an idea of something we must 
first have had a corresponding impression. Human reason can only 
organize what has been "given" in experience, and when it tries to do 
more, as Hume thinks it does in natural theology and metaphysics, it 
runs amuck. It is clear then that Hume regards all metaphysics and 
natural theology as attempts to demonstrate matters of fact a priori. 
What has already been said about the nature of metaphysics suggests 
that, in the case of metaphysics at least, this view is not justified. 
However, further argument against Hume may be adduced.
The most obvious objection to Hume's account of the nature of 
knowledge is that even our scientific and common-sense beliefs, that 
is, those beliefs which Hume would regard as being most firmly anchored 
in experience, often transcend the impressions upon which they are 
based. It is easy to see how this applies to such propositions as 
"the sun will rise tomorrow". This statement clearly exceeds the 
evidence upon which it is based and so, on Hume's account, it should 
represent an illegitimate a priori attempt to demonstrate a matter of 
fact. It is however, clearly an example of a statement arrived at 
inductively. If we really were tied down to basing knowledge only on 
experience in the Humean sense of "impressions", then we would not be 
entitled to say any more than that the sun has risen a number of times 
in the past.
Penelhum tries to defend Hume at this point. He claims that 
common-sense beliefs such as the one we have been considering are 
rooted in experience in a way in which theistic and metaphysical beliefs 
are not. Thus he (Penelhum) writes:
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"Even though I have not seen tomorrow's 
sunrise, at least what I believe will 
happen tomorrow is of the same kind as the 
sunrise I have already seen. But the philosophical belief in the existence of 
substance or the theist's belief in a 
designer of nature exceed the evidence 
available in a far more marked way."
Now even in Penelhum is right, and there is a greater gap between
evidence and conclusion in inferences to God and substance than in
inferences to common sense beliefs, this only shows that such, (former)
inferences have more scope for going wrong, and their conclusions are
less probable. And this in no way gives Hume what he wants, which is
to claim that such inferences are always and necessarily invalid.
Penelhum has actually implicitly admitted, in spite of his intentions,
that the difference between the inference to the conclusion that the
sun will rise tomorrow and the inference to the statement that God
17exists is if anything, a matter of degree,
Penelhum however might defend himself in this way. He could 
point out that in inferences to such things as God or substance we run 
such a high risk of going wrong that we should never trust the conclusions 
arrived at. A difference in degree if pressed far enough can sometimes 
be transformed into a difference in kind. But why, we may ask, does 
Penelhum think there is such a high degree of difficulty in making the 
inference "from world to God"?
15. T. Penelhum Religion and Rationality, p.96.
16. The phrase "always and necessarily invalid" means, in this 
context, not merely formally so, but in a manner which renders 
the inferences as inherently unsound, as modes of reaching a 
particular sort of conclusion from a certain species of premise,
17. T. Penelhum Religion and Rationality, p.96 ff.
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It is important to notice that Penelhum does not base his view 
on the simple consideration that the world as we know it affords no 
evidence for belief in a divine creator. His argument is rather that 
it must inevitably be more difficult to make an inference to such, things 
as God and substance, than it is to infer one thing which is found 
within (immediate) experience from another. The difficulty of making 
an inference to something outside immediate experience seems to turn, 
for Penelhum, on the assumption that it is extremely difficult if not 
impossible for the human mind to frame conceptions of such things at 
all •
It is not however so very difficult for the human mind to conceive 
of things which fall outside the sphere of immediate sense experience.
The fact that we often do this in fact is sufficient to show that we 
can. Many of the concepts with which we operate in the nature sciences, 
although they help us to understand the empirical world, are not such as 
could present themselves to immediate sense experience. In scientific 
and in common-sense statements then as well as in metaphysical ones, we 
frequently make assertions which take us beyond experience in the
Humean sense of "the present testimony of my senses and the records of
„18memory.
If metaphysics is the attempt to transcend the world of immediate 
sense experience in order to explain and complete it, and if, as we have 
argued, there is nothing inherently wrong with the logic employed in 
this process, it follows that Hume's view that all metaphysics and 
natural theology is an attempt to demonstrate matters of fact a priori 
is totally unsubstantiated. For that metaphysical beliefs nearly always
18. Quoted by T. Penelhum Religion and Rationality, p.95.
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arise from reflections on the nature of experience there can be no 
doubt; even a cursory glance at the remarks of the great metaphysicians 
is enough to establish that.
It was because Hume underestimated the scope and depth of 
human experience that he could not see how experience itself gives 
rise to metaphysics. And not seeing this, it was only left open to him 
to conclude that metaphysics is the attempt to establish facts by 
unaided reason. Hume, in his narrowing down of experience, selected 
from self-conscious experience as a whole just those aspects of 
experience least likely to issue in metaphysics to feature in his 
account.
There is no better illustration of this than in Hume's treatment 
of the concept of the self. The concept of the self, taken as a concept 
arising from experience, is a problematic idea highly likely to lead 
to metaphysical speculation. The self seems, on the one hand, to be a 
substantial entity, constant throughout changes affecting the external 
world and the subject itself, but on the other it seems to be merely 
a name given to a loosely unified bundle of perceptions and dispositions 
which are constantly changing or being forced to change. Metaphysics 
is needed to help us to know what to think about the self but Hume 
avoided the problems associated with the concept of selfhood by ignoring 
that aspect of self-conscious awareness in which we experience ourselves, 
not merely as bundles of perceptions, but as unifying subjects of 
experience. Thus metaphysical speculation was avoided, but at the 
cost of an unrealistic reductionist view of experience. Hume's 
reductionism is clearly presented in the following passage:
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"It must be some one impression that gives rise 
to every idea. But self or person is not any 
one impression, but that to which our several 
impressions and ideas are supposed to have a 
reference. If any impression gives rise to the 
idea of the self, that impression must continue 
invariably the same, through the whole course of our lives; since self is supposed to exist after that manner. But there is no impression constant 
and invariable.
For my part, when I enter most intimately into 
what I call myself, I always stumble on some 
particular perception or other, of heat or cold, 
light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure.
I never can catch myself at any time without a perception and can never observe anything but the perception. When ray perceptions are removed for 
any time, as by sound sleep, so long am I insensible 
of myself and may be truly said not to exist. And 
were all my perceptions removed by death and could 
I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor 
hate after the dissolution of my body, I should be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive what is
further requisite to make me a perfect non-entity. ,.19
There are basically two arguments in this passage. The first is 
that we have no reason to believe that there is a substantial self 
since experience provides us with no impression of such a self. The 
second argument is that what we speak of when we speak of the "self" 
is perfectly well accounted for by the sum of our perceptions. This 
second argument is particularly weak. Hume begins from the premise 
that in the absence of perceptions, the self cannot exist. This in 
itself has been disputed. In our third chapter we saw that many 
mystics have claimed that in the absence of all perceptions what is 
left is a species of "pure self". But even allowing that Hume's 
assumption here is perfectly correct, it still does not follow that 
because without perception there would be no self, the self is no more
19. David Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1 Section VI,p. 251, Selby-Bigge Edition.
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than those perceptions. It may well be that the self cannot continue 
to survive without oxygen, but it does not follow from this that the 
self ^6 oxygen.
The real reason however why Hume believed that the self is no 
more than a bundle of perceptions is not, it seems, that he relies (too 
heavily) upon this weak argument. For Hume relies mainly on the first 
argument, that is on the consideration that when he tried to look into 
himself, he never had an impression of his ego, in the form of a direct 
visitation. He found instead only impressions of things none of which, 
could be identified with himself. Had Hume been prepared to accept that 
the self might be a very different kind of thing from an impression, he 
might have realized that awareness of the self does indeed play a part 
in human experience.
What Hume failed to notice was that every perception and every
thought presupposes a thinking subject, and our awareness that there
is such a subject is part of the experience of thinking or perceiving
itself. In the article by Daly quoted earlier, there is a striking
passage in which Daly points out the phenomenological significance of
Descartes' "Cogito ergo sum" as against critics like Ayer who maintained
20that the "Cogito" argument makes only a trivial point.
"Descartes' 'cogito'-experience is of 'I 
thinking, "there is a thought now"*; 'I 
knowing or doubting that I know many things'; 'I who doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, imagines, perceives'; 'I 
co-existing with and involved in every
20. A.J. Ayer writes: " ... if I start with the fact that I am 
doubting I can validly draw the conclusion that I think and 
that I exist. That is to say if there is such a person as 
myself, then there is such a person as myself and if I think, I think." The Problem of Knowledge, p.47 (Macmillan and Co. 
Ltd. 1958).
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experience'. The empiricists are looking 
for some perceptible thing or object of 
experience corresponding to 'I'. Obviously 
there is no such 'thing' or 'object'. They conclude that there is 'no such thing' as 'I'. 
Descartes' whole point is that there is an 
'I', but it is not an object of thought but a subject thinking, without which there could not be any objects of thought."
The non-reductionist account of selfhood will certainly lead to 
metaphysical problems and speculation in a way which the Humean 
account can avoid. For Hume's phenomenalism, in which the self is 
identified with what it experiences, by-passes the whole question of 
how subject is related to object, which is one of the very problems to 
which metaphysics has traditionally sought to provide an answer.
Hume's epistemology is never obliged to face the conflicting ways in 
which we tend to characterize and apprehend the subject-object 
relationship, and thereby can avoid the metaphysical criteria which 
arise in the attempt to assess rival standpoints. But Hume wins his 
avoidance of metaphysics at the cost of reducing human existence and 
experience to something less than human. And if this is so, it is 
surely preferable to be rid, not of metaphysics but of Hume's account 
of experience, an account which has been specially chosen so as to avoid 
the mystery and wonder that makes human life what it is.
Kant's Criticisms of Metaphysics
Immanuel Kant is another major philosopher in whom we find the
origin of the modern suspicion of metaphysics. Although Kant was, in
22his younger days, a metaphysician himself, his mature critical writings
21. C.B. Daly Prospects for Metaphysics, p.184 Edited by I. Ramsay 
Essay entitled: Metaphysics and the Limits of Language (1961)
(Allen & Unwin).
22. See Kant's Inaugural Dissertation of 1770.
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contain what is perhaps the sharpest attack on speculative metaphysics 
in the history of modern philosophy. The Critique of Pure Reason,
Kant's major critical work, is like the writings of Hume, a plea for 
caution in the use of reason, a plea which Kant attempts to justify 
by means of a rigorous attempt to trace the limits of human knowledge.
The Critique of Pure Reason falls into two main parts; the first part 
consists of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Analytic, 
and attempts to provide a deduction of the condition of what Kant 
regards as legitimate human knowledge, whereas the second part entitled 
the Transcendental Dialectic purports to explain how human reason is 
led to leap to conclusions which are unwarranted, through attempting 
to operate independently of the basis of all knowledge, namely, 
experience. Metaphysics, according to Kant, is the product of these 
flights of reason, and so for Kant, as for Hume, metaphysics is seen 
as the attempt to demonstrate matters of fact by means of unaided 
reason.
Kant was more open-minded than Hume since he was prepared to
admit that "though all knowledge begins with experience, it does not
23follow that it all arises out of experience." That is to say that 
not all human knowledge consists of us being passively receptive to a 
given series of impressions. Kant was in that remark acknowledging 
that experience, if we are to make sense ot it, must be interpreted, 
and that in this process of interpretation the original form of 
experience, the mere intuitions must be transcended.
Our contention will be that had Kant remained true to his 
initial insight, he would never have come to the conclusion that
23. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Norman Kemp-Sraith. (Macmillan Second impression 1933) p.41.
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metaphysics is always the attempt to demonstrate matters of fact a 
priori. He would have realized rather that metaphysics is usually 
the product of an attempt to make sense of the world of experience, 
once sufficient attention is given to the richness and depth, of that 
experience. Thus he would have seen that metaphysics "begins with 
experience", no less than his own categories and conditions of 
sensibility.
It is of course impossible to undertake a depth study of the 
Critique of Pure Reason in this short section, as such a mammoth, task 
would require a thesis in itself. We must therefore be content to 
consider only certain points from the "Critique" concerned mainly with 
Kant’s general procedure in criticising metaphysics as such. Our task 
will be to discover where Kant went wrong, but we may take as our 
starting point an insight in which Kant seems to have been perfectly 
correct.
Kant saw that if the world of experience is to make sense as an 
objective unified structure then there must be conditions which 
facilitate the unity of that structure. If the world is not to 
collapse into chaos, or rather if it is to be capable of appearing 
to intelligent consciousness at all, we must have definite ways of 
identifying the various aspects of experience and relating them to 
each other. Kant saw, as against Hume, that these conditions are 
certainly objects of knowledge for which there are no impressions; 
they are rather established a priori as the necessary conditions of 
our having any experience at all. The type of argument which 
proceeds in this way, by asking how a particular state of affairs is 
possible (in this case the "state of affairs" is human knowledge) has 
become known as a transcendental argument.
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Kant fully recognized that such a priori concepts are absolutely 
necessary, and that this is so because consciousness must always unify 
its diverse experiences or "manifold". The conditions according to 
which, this "manifold" is synthesized in a subject constitute the 
necessary conditions for all possible experience. Thus Kant says 
that;
"This unity of possible consciousness also constitutes the form of all knowledge of 
objects; through it the manifold is thought of as belonging to a single object. Thus the 
mode in which, the manifold of sensible 
representation (.intuition) belongs to one consciousness precedes all knowledge of the 
object as the intellectual form of such knowledge, and itself constitutes a formal a priori knowledge of all objects, so far as they are thought (categories). The synthesis 
of the manifold through pure imagination, the unity of all representations in relation to 
original apperception, precedes all empirical 
knowledge. Pure concepts of understanding are 
thus a priori possible, and, in relation to experience are indeed necessary ... " ^4
The categories of the understanding, together with the conditions 
of sensibility, namely, space and time, Kant regards as the entirety of 
those a priori conditions of any possible experience. Most philosophical 
discussion of Kant's categories has revolved around the question of 
whether his deduction of them is in fact valid, but our task will not 
involve us with the details of the validity of Kant's deductions. We 
shall rather try to discover whether Kant's procedure generally, of 
deducing the necessary conditions of experience, opened the way for 
the elimination of metaphyscis.
24. ibid. p.149-150.
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We may begin by noticing that Kant went some way towards 
metaphysics himself in his recognition that experience must be 
organized by the human mind, and that the organizing principles are 
a priori. It is the need to make sense of the world - to see the unity 
through the diversity - which gives rise to the need for the categories 
of the understanding and the conditions of sensibility. Insofar as 
Kant sees this need, he shares an insight which has produced the most 
ambitious metaphysical schemes, the insight which apprehends that the 
world of immediate sense experience, or intuitions, does not fully 
make sense on its own; it can only be made sense of by being 
transcended. But what then prevents Kant's list of synthetic a priori 
conditions of experience from constituting a thorough-going metaphysical 
theory? Since on Kant's own admission we need a priori categories in 
order to make sense of experience, and since, ex hypothesi, these a 
priori concepts are not given in experience, we might ask why Kant 
regarded himself as an opponent of speculative metaphysics rather than 
as a metaphysician himself.
One very obvious difference between Kant's transcendence of 
immediate experience in the metaphysics of a philosopher such as Hegel, 
is that for the former we do not require the great degree of transcendence 
without which Hegel would argue that experience cannot make sense.
For Hegel, that transcendence takes us to the Absolute Idea, the 
infinite ground of all Being (including all that is finite) which is 
a synthesis of freedom, love and rationality, and which is the 
reconciling principle underlying all contradiction and diversity in the 
lower levels of experience.
For Kant, transcendence takes us only as far as concepts such 
as causation, negation, necessity and contingency. The difference 
between the transcendence advocated by Hegel and that advocated by Kant
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seems at first to be only a matter of degree.
Neither Hegel nor Kant however would have accepted that the 
differences between the forms of philosophizing which led to their 
respective conclusions were a matter of degree alone. But in that case, 
what could it be, that makes the Hegelian transcendence of immediate 
sense experience different in kind from the Kantian one, and why did 
Kant believe that the injunction against any further transcendence should 
come at just the particular point at which he arrives?
Kant, in his attempt to make sense of our experience by going 
beyond the world of sensible intuitions, stopped at the point at which 
he did because, in this view, it is at this point that we have all the 
a priori concepts without which experience could not exist at all.
But Kant, in this approach, entirely overlooked the possibility that 
further concepts may be the precondition of human self-consscious 
experience as it actually -Cs, even if they are not necessitated by a 
minimal self-conscious experience. Thus this injunction against meta­
physics is based on the presupposition that our transcendence of 
immediate sense experience need only go as far as is necessary to 
avoid the collapse of a minimal world of self-conscious awareness not 
the real world of human experience. And in this minimal world of 
experience, we find none of the tensions and "contradictions" which, 
as we mentioned previously, we find in our actual experience.
Kant, like Hume, was able to overlook the tensions and "contra­
dictions" within experience because he focused his attention not on our 
experience as a whole but rather on one aspect of it, an aspect in which, 
when taken by itself, the dialectical tensions and contradictions simply 
do not arise. They do not arise because here we assume the attitude 
of the passive observer. Kant has, like Hume, taken scientific 
observation as his paradigm for all human experience, and thus he
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thinks that once the conditions for this type of experience have been
found we have discovered the conditions for all consciousness. Kant's
list of categories and his conditions of sensibility relate only to
the scientific mode of cognition, and whatever their defects in this
area, they do not even attempt to tell us anything about how we can
interpret experience as a whole which embraces other modes of awareness.
Yet it is the totality of our experience which is the origin of
metaphysics, and had Kant realized this he would have seen that
speculative metaphysics itself "begins with experience". Hegel in
his Lectures on the History of Philosophy comments poignantly on the
Kantian view of experience; "Experience and observation of the world
mean nothing else for Kant than a candlestick standing here and a
25snuff box standing there" . Hegel goes on to point out that if 
experience is thought of like this, it is not surprising that we do 
not need metaphysical postulates such as God or the Absolute Idea in 
order to explain it.
Another way of putting this point of Hegel's would be to say 
that Kant sees the nature of our experience of the phenomenal world 
undialectically. For Kant the world of immediate sense experience 
makes perfectly good sense by itself; it contains no inherent tensions. 
In Kant's idea that the phenomenal world contains no tensions or 
dialectical contradictions we see the origins of the Wittgensteinian 
view that philosophical problems do not arise from the nature of the 
world, but rather from our misuse of language. Indeed it would not be 
too much to say that this Kantian undialectical view of human experience
25. G.W.F. Hegel Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Vol.III. 
Translated by E.S. Haldane and F.H. Simpson, p.444-445. (Routledge and Kegan Paul. First published in England 1896).
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has dominated modern analytical philosophy.
One of Kant's general arguments against metaphysics is that once 
we engage in metaphysics we end up with antinomies, or conclusions 
which are no more justified than their opposites. This is so, says 
Kant, because metaphysics involves reason taking flight beyond 
experience, and thereby allows there to be nothing in experience to 
which we can appeal when we wish to settle the i s s u e . W e  have seen 
however that equally plausible but conflicting apprehensions of things
25. According to Kant, when the categories are employed to makeinferences beyond the limits of possible experience to that which 
is unconditioned, they become transcendental ideas, from which 
paralogisms ("a syllogism which is fallacious in form, be its 
content what it may") and antinomies result. There has recently 
been much discussion of whether Kant's logic is valid with 
respect to the particular examples he chooses. But even were Kant's reasoning perfectly correct in the cases which he 
discusses, this would certainly not show that all metaphysics 
is the outcome of reason divorcing itself from experience. His 
criticisms would apply only to one mode of metaphysical argument, 
which he rightly thinks should be avoided. To show how very 
different is Kant's presupposition about the nature of all 
metaphysical reasoning from the account which we have given, it 
is only necessary to look at the chapter in the Transcendental 
Dialectic section of the Critique of Pure Reason entitled "The Dialectical Inferences of Pure Reason". Kant writes:
"Although a purely transcendental idea is in accordance with the 
original laws of reason, a quite necessary product of reason, 
its object, it may yet be said, is something of which we have no concept. For in respect of an object which is adequate to the 
demands of reason, it is not, in fact possible that we should 
ever be able to form a concept of the understanding, that is, a 
concept that allows of being exhibited and intuited in a possible 
experience. But we should be better advised and less likely to be misunderstood if we said that although we cannot have any 
knowledge of the object that corresponds to an idea, we yet have a problematic concept of it.
The transcendental (subjective) reality of the pure concepts of 
reason depends on our having been led to such ideas by a necessary 
syllogism. There will therefore be syllogisms which contain no 
empirical premises, and by means of which we have no concept, and to which, owing to an inevitable illusion, we yet ascribe object­ive reality. These conclusions are, then, rather to be called pseudo-rational, although in view of their origin they may well 
lay claim to the latter title, since they are not fictitious and 
have not arisen fortuitously but have sprung from the very nature 
of reason. These are sophistications not of men but of pure 
reason itself."
Critique of Pure Reason, pp.178-9 Kemp-Smith translation.
125
arise at the most primitive levels of human experience, and not just in 
philosophical speculation. And therefore we may well suspect that 
conflicting views of things, when they arise, are more a product of 
reason not having gone far enough, rather than having gone too far.
If some metaphysical speculation generates antinomies, perhaps this is 
precisely because we have ceased to employ our rational faculties at 
a point before they have been overcome, when really we should have 
speculated until we had explained and dissolved them. If metaphysical 
speculation leads us into problems, it does not follow that we should 
immediately give it up. It may well be better to allow the problems to 
arise and then squarely face them.
The view that we should overcome philosophical problems by avoiding 
whatever type of thinking generates them rather than by facing them 
head on is characteristic of that whole tradition in philosophy which 
has had as its guiding principle since Hume a love of caution, and 
which has its modern expression in much British analytical philosophy.
But it must be remembered that the method of the "caution philosophy" 
which has its roots in Hume and Kant, is only one method of approach in 
philosophy, and it stands in contrast to an alternative tradition which 
seeks not so much to avoid philosophical problems, as to recognize 
such problems as there really are and then to try to find their 
solution. The major spokesman for this tradition is Hegel, whose basic 
idea was that there are perfectly genuine tensions within human experience, 
and that the only way of resolving them is to find that whole wherein 
the apparently conflicting aspects of experience are seen ultimately 
to rest together in a single harmony. As a very crude generalisation, 
we may say that this bolder approach, to philosophical issues has been 
prevalent on the continent of Europe and the cautious approach has been 
more prevalent in the English speaking countries. Each tradition has
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its own characteristic pitfalls. European philosophers are continually 
accused of lacking rigour in their thinking, whereas the British style 
philosophers are accused of aridity and infertility of thinking.
While it is true that many of the accusations of sloppiness in 
particular metaphysical systems are perfectly justified, this does 
nothing to prove that metaphysical thought as such must inevitably lack 
rigour. There is nothing inherently non-rigorous about a bold approach, 
indeed we have seen that concern with caution can lead us to conclusions 
which are so absurd that the acceptance of them is most definitely 
extremely sloppy. Our contention is that we need to adopt the bold 
approach if we are to hope to get anywhere towards the solution of 
philosophical problems and then once this approach has been adopted, ;d
we should concern ourselves with careful argumentation. ;|
In conclusion, we have now seen that two ideas of Kant which
•Iare supposed to lead to the elimination of metaphysics are simply not j
justified. These are, firstly, that we can have a perfectly adequate
account of the phenomenal world once we have laid down a set of |
"1categories which are the conditions of synthesizing the sensory
"manifold" at any given moment in an individual's experience. And ça
secondly, that metaphysical problems only arise when we do not accept 
that the categories of the understanding and conditions of sensibility 
cannot be applied outside sense experience.
!
Wittgenstein's Objections to Metaphysics i
“ .1,iIt was mentioned earlier that the critical method in philosophy, 
the method of trying to discover the limits of human knowledge so as ::
to guard against going beyond them, has been prevalent in British /'I
philosophy since the time of Kant. But since Kant, the respect for
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caution which figures so highly in the critical method has been taken 
even further, to a point where Kant himself is seen as having been 
over-ambitious. For Kant tried to trace the limits of possible human 
knowledge. But it has been asked: how can we possibly have any idea
of what the human mind can know before we are acquainted with the 
limits of what the human mind can th-ink? Thus there has been a strong 
shift from questions of epistemology to questions of meaning, the 
latter being dealt with through the analysis of various types of 
proposition. This it was thought was a less ambitious project and the 
chance of success was therefore considered to be correspondingly higher. 
Attention to strict detail in our use of language has now become the 
order of the day, and the old traditional philosophical problems about 
how we can apprehend an ordered objective world and what such 
experience tells us about the nature of reality had dropped out of 
mainstream philosophy.
Of itself, an enquiry into the true nature of meaning in human
investigation of the depths of the consciousness from which such 
language springs, as indeed it did with Chomsky. In attempting to 
discover what it is like to have thought of the richness and 
complexity of human beings, we would be doing nothing less than 
metaphysics in the grand sense. An enquiry into the nature of meaning 
in discourse is not therefore inherently less ambitious than a meta­
physical enquiry. It is only the manner in which that enquiry has 
been conducted in the philosophy of modern linguistic analysis which 
makes it so.
Linguistic analysis is a somewhat loose label for a school of 
thought whose work was largely inspired by the writings of the later 
Wittgenstein. It saw itself as having progressed beyond logical
-J
discourse is not necessarily anti-metaphysical. It could lead into an J
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positivism, although the younger Wittgenstein and other logical
positivists were also extremely interested in language. Thus it
27rejected such dogmatism as the view expressed in the Tractatus 
that there are only elementary and logical propositions, but held the 
view, no less than the logical positivists, that we are often misled 
by language.
We have already, in an earlier chapter, dealt with the objections 
to (supposedly) non-verifiable statements which have been advanced by 
logical positivists. In this section therefore, we shall be concerned 
with the ideas, not of the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus but of the 
(later) Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations.
The Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations was chiefly 
responsible for bringing into philosophy the idea that every form of 
language has its own logic, and that conceptual confusions can take 
many forms. But (the later) Wittgenstein also held that all philosophical 
problems are reducible to linguistic muddles, a view which is not only 
dogmatic in itself but which also presupposes a very definite delineation 
of the ways in which language can legitimately be used. Wittgenstein's 
seemingly liberal view of the various types of language thus became 
somewhat attenuated. What is more, it left no more scope for meta­
physics than did the philosophy of the Tractatus.
The point that all philosophical problems are a result of 
linguistic muddles Wittgenstein states quite clearly in the Philosophical 
Investigations, in words which have now become famous. In section 
thirty-eight he remarks:
27. For a useful summary of Wittgenstein's ideas as expressed in the Tractatus, see Gottfried Martin's General Metaphysics;- Its Problem and Method, p.12 (Allen and Unwin 1961).
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"Philosophical problems arise when language 
goes on holiday."
We would do well to begin by discovering how Wittgenstein defends 
that remark; how he shows that philosophical problems arise purely as 
a result of conceptual confusion. His method is by way of elimination, 
by showing that when conceptual confusions are ironed out, the problems 
of metaphysics are exposed as pseudo-problems, Wittgenstein makes his 
programme plain in the Investigations ;
"We must do away with, all explanation and 
description alone must take its place.
And this description gets its light, that is to say its purpose, from the philosophical problems. These are of course not empirical 
problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our language; and that 
in such a way as to make us recognize those workings: despite of an urge to misunderstand
them. The problems are solved, not by giving 
new information, but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language." ^9
This type of sentiment Wittgenstein repeats many times during 
the course of the Investigations. But it leads us on to the question, 
precisely how can philosophical problems be solved, or rather 
dissolved, by arranging what we have always known? Wittgenstein's 
reply to this question is illustrated by his treatment of the 
traditional philosophical problem of our knowledge of other minds.
The existence of other minds has been a perennial problem for 
metaphysics, arising from our "natural view" of the world. On the
28. Ludwig Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, Section 38, p.19 (Blackwell 1972).
29. ibid. Sec. 109, p.47^.
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one hand it seems utterly obvious that we can know that there are other 
minds and that we can know, to a certain extent at least, the contents 
of those minds. On the other hand it seems totally incomprehensible 
how we can have such knowledge, since there is no way of experiencing 
for ourselves the contents of other consciousnesses. For Wittgenstein 
however the problem of other minds provides us with a good example of 
how a clear description can render superfluous any metaphysical 
solution. Wittgenstein’s attempt to clearly describe how we can have 
knowledge of other minds is set out in the Philosophical Investigations 
and runs as follows;
'"What is internal is hidden from us.' - The 
future is hidden from us. But does an astronomer 
think like this when he calculates an eclipse of 
the sun?
If I see someone writhing in pain with evident 
cause I do not think "all the same, his 
feelings are hidden from me."
We also say of some people that they are trans­parent to us. It is however, important as 
regards this observation that one human being 
can be a complete enigma to another. We learn this when we come into a strange country with entirely strange traditions, and what is more, even given a mastery of the country's language, 
we do not understand the people. (And not because 
of not knowing what they are saying to themselves). 
We cannot find our feet with them."
'I cannot know what is going on in him' is above 
all a picture. It is the convincing expression 
of a conviction. It does not give the reasons 
for the conviction. They are not readily accessible.
If a lion could talk, we could not understand him.
It is possible to imagine a guessing of intentions 
like the guessing of thought, but also a guessing 
of what someone is actually going to do.
To say "he alone can know what he intends" is nonsense: to say "he alone can know what he willdo" is wrong. For the prediction contained in my 
expression of intention (for example 'when it
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strikes five I am going home') need not 
come true, and someone may know what will 
really happen" 30
"I can be as certain of someone else's sensations 
as of any fact. But this does not make the propositions 'he is much depressed', '125x125 = 625' and 'I am sixty years old' into similar instruments. The explanation suggests itself 
that the certainty is of a different kind. - 
This seems to point to a psychological difference. 
But the difference is logical." 31
Before we attempt to discover the basic doctrine being expressed 
by Wittgenstein here, a few preliminary comments are in order. For 
whether or not these comments constitute a oteav description of our 
knowledge of other minds, their truth at certain points is highly 
questionable. For example, in relation to Wittgenstein's assertion:
"If a lion could talk, we could not understand him" we may ask 'why 
not?' Is it really so impossible to understand a non-human intelligent 
creature? We communicate, now, with some apes, and they with us.
Why would a lion, if he could talk, be so different?
Another example of a dubious claim of Wittgenstein's is to be 
found in his assertion: "To say, 'he alone knows what he intends' is
nonsense. For the prediction contained in ray expression of intention 
... need not come true."
If I say, at 4 p.m. "I am going home when it strikes five", and 
when it strikes five I do not go home, this has no tendency whatever
to show that at 4 p.m. I did not intend to go home at five. I could
have changed my mind, even as late as 4.59 - or laterI Besides:
even if someone else predicts that I shall not go home, it does not
follow that he knows my intention, or knows it better than I do.
30. ibid.. p.223e-224e, II, xi
31. ibid, p.224e-II,xi.
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He may know no more than that I am notoriously weak willed or impulsive.
From these two examples it becomes clear that certain aspects of 
Wittgenstein's account of our knowledge of other minds are highly 
suspect. It seems to avoid metaphysical speculation about other minds 
by means of a reductionist account of our experience of them. However, 
before we can finally dismiss Wittgenstein's view that clear description 
dissolves the philosophical problems associated with other minds, we 
must look more closely at what Wittgenstein is saying in his attempted 
clear description.
The passages which were quoted are, like the rest of Wittgenstein’s 
work, often difficult to make sense of, and take the form not of a 
dogmatic statement of a position but of a report of an arduous intelle­
ctual struggle. Nonetheless, a definite viewpoint tends to emerge in 
them. What Wittgenstein seems to be saying is that it seems at first 
mysterious how we can have knowledge of somebody else's inner mental 
states, but it is only mysterious because we put the question in a 
general, and therefore mysterious way. We ask, "how can we have certainty 
concerning another person's inner mental states?" The generalisation 
about a person's inner states leads us to regard these as something 
mysterious and elusive. But if we abandon this way of asking the 
question, and instead look at what happens in a particular concrete case 
when we would naturally claim knowledge of another person's state of 
mind, there is, argues Wittgenstein, no longer any mystery left. This
faith in paying attention to the concrete and particular has character-
32ised the British tradition in philosophy ever since Wittgenstein.
32. It should be noted that the Hegelian tradition has held precisely the opposite view to that of Wittgenstein, i.e., it has held that 
it is just by paying attention to the concrete and particular that we see those dialectical contradictions in reality which require metaphysical solutions.
i
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In the particular case, says Wittgenstein, we can be "as certain j
of someone else's sensations as of any matter of fact". And in reply
33. ibid- p.224e II, xi.
34. idem.
to the question "But, if you are certain, isn't it that you are shutting |
33your eyes in the face of doubt?" Wittgenstein answers: "They are shut."
This, of course, does not explain why our eyes are shut, or tell 
us why it is justifiable that they should be shut with regard to the 3
situation. At face value, it only tells us that we are prone to jump to f
conclusions without sufficient reflection in the situations of practical 
life. All this is true, but how does this observation do away with our %
intellectual need to discover how we have knowledge of other minds?
How does the mystery of the inner mental state dissolve once we see what i
happens in the particular case? Wittgenstein gives a sort of answer by 
way of this passage:
" "He alone knows his motives" - that is an 
expression of the fact that we ask him what 
his motives are. - If he is sincere he willtell us them; but I need more than sincerity
to guess his motives. This is where there is a kinship with the case of knowing". 34
The point here is that the statement "he alone knows his motives" 
may mislead us into thinking that this means he has a private mental 
state which only he can be familiar with. This way of putting the 
matter gives rise to the idea that there is a philosophical problem 
involved in our coming to know his mind. But it is just here that we 
are being misled. For all that is really the case when we talk like 
this, i.e. when we say that somebody knows his own motives, is that in 
this situation we ask the person what his motives are. There need be
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no qualitatively different type of knowledge of his motives possessed 
by him for us to say this, it is something we say and regard ourselves 
as warranted in saying in situations determined by observable external 
criteria. This is the type of clarification which is supposed to 
dissolve the mystery. For Wittgenstein the reason we are misled 
eventually boils down to our tendency to make generalisations. This is 
true in ordinary language and it is even more true in philosophy. When 
we make generalisations we get far away from what really happens in the 
particular case, or in reality, and thus our generalisations give rise 
to problems which result purely from this way of using language, and 
not from the world itself. Metaphysics is therefore not required, 
because the reality which we experience - construed as the particular 
and concrete - makes perfectly good sense by itself. If we are to 
refute Wittgenstein, we have to show that attention to the particular 
leads us not away from but towards metaphysics. We need to show that 
the problems and tensions which seem to require further explanation are 
not only in language but in the world itself. And it seems that it is 
not difficult to do this with reference to the Wittgensteinian treatment 
of the other minds.
According to Wittgenstein, in actual cases we do not doubt 
whether we know the contents of someone else's consciousness. We do not 
worry about the theoretical justification of our knowledge. And this is 
not, for Wittgenstein, simply because we are indulging in sloppy thinking 
or are basing our judgment on a probable inference. It is because we 
actually do not need justification. We do not need justification because, 
in the particular case "all lies open to view." But this can only mean 
that when we describe what is going on in someone's mind we mean nothing 
more than that he is liable to do such and such given some particular 
situation and we attribute the same descriptive features to our own
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psychological states when we are prone to behave in similar ways. And 
if this really is aVt we mean, then it is certain that the metaphysical 
problem of other minds is rendered redundant.
But that this is not an adequate account of how we regard other 
minds can be seen by looking at the very particular and concrete case 
which Wittgenstein valued so highly. For it is just here that the total 
experience of what it is like to communicate with other minds comes 
before us in its inescapable fullness. The first thing we can say is 
that in a concrete experience of this sort we do not, and cannot, think 
of another person's state of mind as no more than a tendency to behave in 
a certain way given certain conditions. This way of thinking of another 
mind is only the result of seeking for the way to get rid of a philosophical 
problem, it is itself the result of being misled by philosophy and not 
looking at the facts of the concrete situation. In the particular case, 
in real life, we can never perform this reduction, and we regard other 
minds as transcending a list of behavioural characteristics, however much 
we rely upon the latter as indicative of the thoughts of another person. 
Wittgenstein goes some way towards recognition of this when he asserts 
that one person can be a complete enigma to another. In communicating 
with others, we presuppose that they have minds somewhat like ours. It 
seems that they must have, yet those minds are far from being open to 
view. Our actual primitive experience is like this, it is the task of 
phenomenology to give a complete description of it and the task of 
metaphysics to try to make sense of it (i.e. to interpret the primitive 
experience). It is because of how we regard other minds from the start, 
as living feeling consciousnesses like ourselves, that we do not stop to 
doubt when we see somebody writhing in pain.
Once we accept that our experience of other minds has a richness 
and depth which arises from human experience itself, we see that the
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35. That Wittgenstein does take such a narrow view of experience can be seen from the following passage:
"Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. 
For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us." Philosophical Investigations Sec. 126, p.50e.
The assumption here that things must be absolutely open to view or absolutely hidden is obviously wrong. For there could be 
things which are hidden to the unreflective consciousness which become revealed - at least in part - to the reflective mind.
-4
thesis that the humand mind is not mysterious or elusive is only viable !
when we ignore important facets of our experience. We see too that
once we give minds their full status, it becomes pointless to give
simple solutions as to how they communicate with each other. We need
to realise the full depth and wonder of the situation we are dealing
with before we can even begin to hope to produce a correct answer. It
is the attempt to make sense of human experience in its fullness which
is the essence of metaphysics. Wittgenstein's view that all mysteries
which seem to require further explanation are due to tension in our
language only holds when we reduce our experience to something less than 
35human.
Wittgenstein is unsuccessful then in demonstrating the redundancy 
of the need for metaphysics even in relation to an example he chooses 
especially in order to illustrate this point. We have seen that his 
method here involves a form of reductionism which cannot be tolerated.
Here, as much as anywhere, a close attention to the particular and 
concrete situation leads to the need to posit explanations beyond the 
world of immediate sensory experience. And if Wittgenstein's view does 
not work even with his own example, we must be all the more suspicious v
Iof an attempt to dispose of metaphysics generally in this way. "
Indeed, even if it were to be proved (and it no doubt ooutd be) 
that in some cases at least metaphysics arises because of misuse of 
language, this would do nothing to show that metaphysical conclusions
I
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are always arrived at in this way. It would be very difficult for 
Wittgenstein to show that every metaphysical problem arises because 
of some specific type of misuse of language. It seems that to 
establish his thesis, he would have to go systematically through every 
philosophical problem and show by just wh'ioh misuse of language that 
problem had arisen. This type of attention to the particular case 
would demand no less than this, yet it is evident that this is a nearly 
impossible task. Wittgenstein, however, does not attempt to go 
systematically through even the major philosophical problems. He 
rather speaks generally about how philosophical problems arise when 
language is misused, and shows at most only how they can arise in this 
way not that they must.
Contemporary objections to metaphysics owe their origin largely 
to the work of Wittgenstein. What Wittgenstein put forward can be 
seen as the work of a mind grappling with deep problems, and the 
struggle itself is reflected in a certain reticence in putting forward 
dogmatic assertions. The Philosophical Investigations has the flavour, 
not of dogmatic statements, but of "this is how it seems to me", and 
the Tractatus shows us that Wittgenstein had a mystical side to his 
nature which perhaps explains why he could never wholly swallow the 
conclusions of the Investigations. What Wittgenstein could only accept 
with difficulty, however, certain later philosophers have had no trouble 
in accepting dogmatically.
The work of the modern philosophers of this school has taught 
us a useful lesson: that is, that if we are not careful in our use of
language, pseudoproblems may be generated. We need to be more careful 
than was, say, Hegel, in passing from one stage to another in argument. 
But though this is a useful lesson, it in no way entails that all 
metaphysics must rest on misuses of language. For the impetus for
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metaphysics lies in the roots of experience itself, once we have paid 
full attention to the richness of our experience. It will be our task, #
in the following chapters of this thesis, to show in detail how the 
nature of human experience is such that we must pass beyond our "natural 
view" of the world to metaphysics in the effort for complete understanding.
That is, we must show where the tensions in our experience actually lie, 
and the sort of reality which could restore sense and harmony to these 
apparent conflicts. In the words of J.N. Findlay, we shall attempt to 
"brïdge the gulf between this alienated surface-world, on the one hand, 
and the mystical unity which explains its puzzles and appeases its 
stresses, on the other.
36. J.N. Findlay The Transcendence of the Cave, p.203. (G. AllenUnwin Ltd. 1967).
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE NATURE OF FINITE INDIVIDUALS
We saw in Chapter Two that mystics and others who have claimed
to have had religious experiences, are invariably committed to
propositions of a metaphysical nature. They hold, on account of their
experiences, beliefs about such things as God, the soul, and the
1nature of ultimate reality. But how far can these mystical meta­
physical propositions be backed up by (valid) metaphysical argument? 
Or, to put the question another way, to what extent does our ordinary 
self-conscious experience, when deeply and systematically reflected
upon, suggest conclusions which coalesce with those arrived at in a
2more immediate way by mystics and others.
1. We must qualify the comment that subjects of religious experience 
hold certain propositions to be true by acknowledging that they 
are often at pains to stress that no verbal formulae can ever 
fully or adequately capture the truth about what they have exper­ienced. However, such people do attempt to communicate, at some level, what they believe their experience tells them about the 
nature of the universe, and the propositions which they enunciate 
are the most adequate vehicles for this which they have at their 
disposal. Therefore we are justified, in our attempt to discover whether metaphysics lends any support to the deliverances of 
religious experience, to ask to what degree metaphysical reasoning can validate such propositions, so long as we remember that they are limited in their capacity to convey what the subject of 
religious experience is trying to express.
2. The word "ordinary" in this context is used to distinguish non- 
mystical everyday experience from the form of experience in which 
the apprehension of something spiritual (however loosely we may define the term "spiritual") seems to be, or is, explicitly present in one's consciousness.
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This question may now be approached directly, for we have seen 
that there can be no general refutation of the possibility of meta­
physics for all time, and that metaphysics arises, not in spite of, 
but because of, our experiences. Thus we shall examine, in this and the 
chapters which follow, many of those arguments which take as their 
starting point, features of ordinary self-conscious experience, but 
arrive at conclusions which represent a final view of the world which 
is as mystical as that of the mystics themselves. In particular, we 
shall consider the alleged mystical or spiritual implications of:
(a) Our experience of our own selfhood and that of others;
(b) Our subjective interaction with an objective external world;
(c) The sense of the Infinite as mediated through the definite
religions, adhered to by ordinary religious believers; and
(d) Our capacity and need to make value judgments.
In this and the two subsequent chapters, we shall concern our­
selves with the first of these, that is, with the arguments which 
purport to demonstrate that the deepest reflection upon the nature of 
our own and others’ selfhood will disclose to us the characteristic 
mystical view of selfhood, namely, the view that finite individuals are 
not ultimately distinct from each other.
This doctrine, as espoused both by mystics and metaphysicians, 
must be distinguished both from thoroughgoing metaphysical monism in 
which individuals' souls are literally identical with the One,^ and 
therefore with each other, as well as from individualistic pluralism 
according to which we are just as distinct from each other as it appears 
is the case to unreflective commonsense. It is rather the case, in this
3. In the Hindu monism of Sankara, this doctrine takes the form of saying that Atman is Brahman.
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view, that finite individuals are manifestations of a universal essence, 
an essence which transcends their finite individuality and which yet 
requires such finite individuality as the vehicle of its self- 
expression.
Various metaphysical philosophers have sought to defend this 
standpoint and therefore we shall consider the arguments offered in 
its support by three of the most prominent ones. We shall consider the 
work of the most famous representative of classical German Idealism,
G.W.F. Hegel, first of all? secondly, the work of a representative of 
late nineteenth/early twentieth century British Idealism, B. Bosanquet, 
and thirdly, the writings of the contemporary Yale Philosopher, J.N.
Findlay. However, before we proceed to our discussion of these 
philosophers, some general remarks are in order.
The idea that we are not, in the final analysis, totally separate
4from each other has been called a difficult doctrine. And in a certain 
respect it is indeed difficult. The view is anathema to commonsense, 
and even for more reflective thinking, it does not immediately 
recommend itself. For it seems that whatever criteria of personal 'Ï
identity we finally come to accept, surely it is utterly impermissible
that such criteria should allow for an overlapping or confluence of jIpersons. However, whatever the difficulties of this doctrine, that does -1
not mean that there are not facets of human experience which strongly 
and deeply suggest it. When commonsense decrees that the idea is 
utterly implausible, it does so at the cost of compelling us to refuse 
to follow through the implications of forms of consciousness which one 
does not have to be an academic philosopher to experience. Commonsense
4. See H.D. Lewis The Elusive Mind, p.274-297, (1969).
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sets up one mode of consciousness as its paradigm, and blinds itself 
to those other forms which do not suggest its own outlook. In poetry, 
prose, and sacred literature, we find expressions of just that 
consciousness of self-transcendence which becomes a carefully formulated 
doctrine in the philosophy of the Idealists. These words of Jesus, for 
example, capture its essence:
"If any man would come after me, let him 
deny himself and take up his cross and 
follow me. For whosoever would save his 
life will lose it, and whosoever loses his life for my sake will find it." 5
Although these words could be interpreted to mean simply that 
someone who dies (physically) or is willing to die (physically) will be 
rewarded with an eternity of continued existence, the emphasis on 
denying oneself strongly suggests that Christ was speaking of something 
much deeper than this. The passage is more plausibly understood as 
saying that we can only attain real life by giving up an illusion of 
life, an illusion which makes us seem to be mere particular historical 
individuals quite distinct from the external world as well as from 
each other. It is this type of selfhood or individuality which we must 
sacrifice and gladly so, if we want to discover what we are more truly. 
And once we make this discovery, we will find that we are not simply 
self-complete and self-sufficient units whose relations with the world 
are merely accidental, but are rather expressions of something deeper and 
all-embracing, and something which it is the value and destiny of the 
finite individual to know itself as.
5. Matthew 16, v. 24,25.
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The words of Christ quoted above are echoed in the poetry of 
T.S. Eliot^ and at various points in the Hindu Upanisads. And in many 
other writings we find references to an experience in which a loss of 
individuality is keenly felt. Often these references are to an exper­
ience of a special and sudden nature, but mystical experience, we 
should remember, has its analogue in more ordinary experiences.
Whether it be in playing a game, or loving another person, we have a 
strong feeling of self-transcendence.
Can this feeling of self-transcendence be defended philosophically 
as a valid insight into the way things really are? Our contention in 
this thesis shall be that it can be, and that our profoundest thought 
can make explicit and justify an awareness which is implicit in some of 
our most primitive experiences, as well as in nearly all of our deepest. 
For our first clue as to how this is possible, we shall turn to the 
writings of Hegel.
Hegel's View
In the famous preface to the Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel 
writes as follows;
"The life of mind is not one that shuns death 
and keeps clear of destruction, it endures its death and in death maintains its being. It 
only wins to its truth when it finds itself in 
utter desolation." 7
In this passage Hegel is expressing the same idea about finite 
selfhood as is typically expressed by the mystics, namely, that in any
5. See T.S. Eliot's Little Gidding in The Four Quartets.
7. Phenomenology of Mind, pp 30-31. Baillie Translation, Vol.I.
-.î
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finite individual's ultimate realization of his true essence, there is 
a loss of individuality in which the finite individual is not simply 
annihilated, but in his dissolution finds that all the while he was 
potentially more than finite. Only in this destruction of the finite 
individual qua finite individual can we overcome the death and limita­
tion which are inevitably characteristic of finite things. And once 
we attain to this truer essence, and cease to be alienated from it, 
the apparent separateness between finite individuals begins to break 
down, since we find that we are one in being (differentiated) expressions 
of the infinite.
In the Phenomenology of Mind we find Hegel's clearest attempt 
to defend these ideas, and to understand how he arrives at them we need J
to delve deeply into the philosophical ideas expounded there. We shall 
therefore reconstruct his arguments in some detail, before attempting 
to assess them.
For Hegel, the development of human consciousness, and consequently 
of human history, whether it be political, philosophical, or religious 
history, is the struggle of the universal to express itself through the 
particular, that is to say, of the dialectical interplay between them.
To put this another way, the development of consciousness is the 
discovery of and the making explicit of that universal essence which 
was implicitly contained in the particular from the beginning. For in 
the beginning, the universal essence is expressed by the particular in 
a distorted and inadequate way. By this distortion, the particular 
conceals from itself its own true nature. The process of making explicit 
what was implicit from the beginning Hegel speaks of in this way:
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"When devoid of that sort of reality (i.e. when 
it expresses its essential nature only in an 
attenuated form) science is merely the content of mind qua something implicit or potential (An 
sich)} purpose which, at the start is no more 
than something internal; not spirit, but at first merely spiritual substance. This implicit moment (An sich) has to find external expression,and become objective on its own account." 8
Most importantly then, Hegel's philosophy is an essent-iaii-st
9philosophy , arrived at by way of one of the most exciting and compre­
hensive studies of the nature of consciousness in the history of 
western philosophy. Starting with the most primitive mode of 
consciousness, the consciousness of immediate sense certainty, Hegel 
shows how consciousness is forced through many stages and forms, being 
driven always onward to new levels by virtue of inadequacies in the 
previous ones. We become aware of the universal essence implicitly 
present in all of "the series of shapes, which consciousness traverses 
on this road" when we become aware of the inadequacies which inhere in
any one of those shapes - taken by itself rather than as part of the
structure of a whole which embraces them all. The Universal is developed, 
or rather develops itself, from the most primitive modes of conscious­
ness - the Absolute as the totally adequate Universal thus emerges as 
the result. In this Universal self-conscious Mind, the previous 
phenomenological shapes are not simply dissipated, rather they find 
their true meaning. This meaning turns out to be that they are the ;|
■'Ipreliminary ways in which Absolute Mind manifests itself, they are its IIpresuppositions, but from their own standpoints, they have not come to
see themselves in this light. And this is why, in their truest essential 'I3natures, individuals are not finally separate from each other. .1
8. ibid. p. 25. 19. We shall later deal with Popper's objection that Hegel's essential- -3 
ism contains a built-in immunity from criticism, which
renders it, in his view, so much nonsense.
"I
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"It (the development towards the Universal or 
Absolute Mind) is the process of its own 
becoming, the circle which presupposes its end or its purpose, and has its end for its 
beginning; it has become concrete and actual 
only by being carried out, and by the end it 
involves." 10
"The truth is the whole. The whole, however, is merely the essential nature reaching its 
completeness through, the process of its own development. Of the Absolute it must be said 
that it is essentially a result, that only at the end is it what it is in very truth ... ". 11
No matter where we begin in the Phenomenology of Mind, we can 
see how Hegel is trying to establish his dialectical principle as the 
moving force of the world. For each mode of consciousness breaks down 
always because the dialectic of particular and universal is not 
perfectly balanced. Sometimes particularity is stressed at the expense 
of the universal. However, although in principle it is possible to 
begin at any point in the Phenomenology, there are two main starting 
points which illustrate the dialectical development particularly 
clearly.
The first beginning is to be found in the very first chapter of 
the Phenomenology of Mind, where Hegel describes the world of "Certainty 
or Knowledge at the level of sense". This is the type of consciousness 
which strongly reminds us of Russell's knowledge by acquaintance, and 
seems initially to provide us with the most satisfactory type of 
knowledge since there is no room for errors of interpretation, the 
latter becoming more likely the more theoretical knowledge becomes. 
Hegel, no less than Russell, sees how this type of knowledge would 
appeal to those seeking absolute certainty.
10. Phenomenology of Mind, p.16, Baillie translation. Vol.I.
11. ibid. p.17.
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"It seems to be the truest, the most authentic knowledge, for it has not as yet dropped any­
thing from the object; it has the object before itself in its entirety and completeness." 12
We thus have a world made up totally of empirical atomistic particulars,
"I, this particular conscious I, am certain 
of this fact before me." 13
The problem with this type of knowledge is that at the very
moment when we try to recognize this level of awareness as knowledge, it
inevitably breaks down. For the moment that we try to say anything at
all about particulars, we are forced to use words like "here", "now",
and "this". But these "pointing words" are actually universais, and in
fact the most universal of all our concepts - absolutely anything can
be "this". In trying to think the particular, we cannot avoid thinking
the universal too, and the more we try to grasp the particular entirely
on its own, we succeed only in grasping it through impoverished and
abstract universals. We therefore grasp it even its particularity much
less adequately than we would if our universals were more fully developed.
As J.N. Findlay points out, the actual particulars of sense cannot be
14reached by language at all.
The first chapter of the Phenomenology of Mind thus enables us 
to see why all conscious life is a dialectical interplay between parti­
cular and universal. Abstract universals are empty, they need the 
moment of the particular if they are to relate to determinate contents.
12. ibid, p.90,
13. ibid, p.91.
14. This view is expressed repeatedly by J.N. Findlay in his two 
volumes of Gifford lectures. The Discipline of the Cave and The Transcendence of the Cave.
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If I am to be a thinking being, consciousness must be intentional, 
that is, it must have an object. But because I must necessarily 
differentiate myself from that object, I must view it from a certain 
perspective at a specific moment in time. Thus my apprehension of it 
is limited by my partioulav relation to it. Without the moment of 
particularity in conscious experience, consciousness would be identicat 
with its object. And a consciousness which is totally identical with 
its object, without any sort of differentiation, would be, as Hegel 
points out, an utterly abstract and empty self-identity, as in the 
proposition, A==A. Reality would be nothing more or less than one static 
homogeneous substance. And what would be the difference between this 
and there being just nothing at all?
The moment of the particular also requires the universal in 
order to be understood meaningfully. Without the universal moment, 
consciousness has no grid into which to fit the particulars, and its 
world would be a chaos, or rather there would be for it no world.
Immediate sense-certainty shows up the inadequacy of a one-sided 
emphasis on the particular, it shows up the need for the universal. 
Indeed, since knowledge of pure particularity turns out to be knowledge 
through pure abstract universlity, we pass to a level of oonsciousness 
where the moment of the particular is regarded as totally non-essential. 
This is the level of Perception, where the percipient is seen as a 
universal, an "I" which could have any content, and what is perceived 
by this "I" is seen as a set of objects or "Things" which are sheer 
congeries of properties. We have therefore one universal confronting 
another. But Hegel goes on to say how such a one-sided emphasis on the 
universal can only lead to the "thing" of perception containing a 
contradiction, a contradiction which can only in the end be healed by
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15Perception giving up its claim to be absolute knowledge.
Even before the contradiction which inheres in the "Thing" is 
made explicit to consciousness, there is the rather obvious and embarr­
assing problem of having two universals from the beginning. According
to Hegel, consciousness simply and arbitrarily postulates one side as 
non-essential; this side falls to the perceiver. Mistakes of perception 
do not arise because of the nature of objects themselves, it is the 
subjective side which is held to account for them.
The main contradiction which concerns Hegel, we have said, lies
in the very notion of the Thing of perception itself. It is on the one 
hand a mere congeries of properties, since we are here operating totally 
without particulars. Hegel, in his illuminating way, helps us by 
describing something of this nature as an "Also". But the problem with 
this is that there can be two or more quite separate things with exactly 
the same properties; and what can distinguish these from each other 
except their internal particularity, called by Hegel their Unity, which 
gives them an independence as separate particulars? At this point of
course, we have a dialectical contradiction between the character of
"Things" as Alsos, and also as Unities, Findlay makes all this reason­
ably clear when he explains as follows:
If the distinctness and universality of the properties be stressed,
"the Thing's unity and separateness become shadowy: this unity deteriorates into a mere
"also" in which the properties are externally
related. But if, on the other hand, the unityand separateness of the Thing are emphasized, 
the mutual distinctness of its properties, as well as their genuine universality, falls into jeopardy." 16
15. It should be noted that each level of knowledge, for Hegel, pro­claims itself to be the absolute level of knowledge, or else, 
what knowledge is.
16. See J.N. Findlay's Hegel A Re-examination, p.91 (G. Allen & Unwin 1958).
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Thus Hegel shows with reference to Perception, that the phase in 
which knowledge claims to be composed one-sidedly of universals needs 
to be surpassed. Perception breaks down into understanding, the 
details of which we need not go into for the time being.
So far, we have spoken about the need to operate with universal 
concepts, but at the end of the Phenomenology of Mind we find that Hegel 
affirms that there is only one true concrete Universal, or Absolute.
We have seen that universal concepts are necessary in order to make 
sense of the world of particulars, to give them some meaning transcending 
the sheer effect they have upon a subject, a form of consciousness which 
cannot be properly called knowledge, since here the subject's awareness 
is reduced to and totally limited by his perspective. But why should 
there be, in the end, only one Universal? Why can we not grasp the 
true nature of particulars through a plurality of universals?
The answer to this becomes clear when we remember the basic
reason for which we employ universals - that is, to transcend our
particular perspective. By employing universal concepts to speak and
think of things, we begin to transcend our own finite and limited vantage
points, since through these concepts we can make contact with an inter- 
17subjectively shared world which goes beyond our immediate experience.
However, so long as we employ a plurality of universals in order 
to understand one particular part of the world, we still remain limited 
by (rather than fulfilled through, by being able to transcend) our own 
particular perspective, which is to say that the moment of the particular
17. Hegel would argue that the way objects are for-another, that is, 
the way that they appear to self-consciousness, is in fact 
nothing less than the way in which, they manifest their essence. Thus there is ultimately an identity of being-for-another and 
being in itself. See Phenomenology of Mind Vol.l, p.139 ff.
18. This for Hegel is the level of the analytical Understanding (as opposed to synthesising Reason).
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is not abolished, but rather subsumed under the Infinite. The Concrete 
Universal therefore is the source of all finite perspectives, and a .%
view of the Whole which is complete would not do away with these. It 
would rather imbue them with their true meaning.
Earlier we said that Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind contains two 
beginnings, and we are now ready to discuss the second of these. In 
the first three chapters, Hegel is concerned with forms of consciousness 
which are essentially passive. This section has been called the 
epistemological section, but so to call it actually presupposes precisely 
what Hegel was expressly concerned to deny, namely that when we speak 
about questions of knowledge we are concerned with a passive cognitive 
process, totally divorced and separate from the modes of consciousness 
associated with action. Nonetheless, in the first three chapters,
Hegel is concerned with those types of knowledge where one assumes the 
standpoint of the observer. The observer comes to see how all thought 
involves the dialectical interplay of particular and universal, but he 
sees this principle as it were, on a screen before him, it is something 
which relates to knowledge in the narrow, passive sense. This type of 
knowledge, he, (the observer), sees as something over against him, 
detached from his essential being and his life. But he cannot forever 
remain a mere observer.
The full truth of the dialectical principle, involving as it 
does, the overcoming of estrangement and alienation between universal 
and particular, is only implicitly realized in even the most developed 
form of passive c o g n i t i o n . I t  is made explicit when it emerges that 
the principle infects not only the realm of passive cognition, but
A
153
rather the whole world of social and political activity. At this point 
there is a major qualitative break in the dialectical development, as 
consciousness passes into self-consciousness. Spirit, at this stage, 
becomes aware of itself as more than individual consciousness passively 
confronting the various objects of knowledge. It realizes rather,
(though at first only in a dim way), that in any adequate expression of 
its universal essence, it has the task of forming the world which we 
know. Spirit's knowledge of itself as a dynamic subject-object inter­
action, in which the subject knows itself to be creatively and rationally 
expressing itself through an objective world shares with other, yet not 
wholly separate, self-conscious beings; this is the truth of self- 
consciousness. Hegel puts it as follows:
"What still lies ahead for consciousness is ' 
the experience of what Spirit is - this 
absolute substance which is the unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses 
which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: 'I' that is 'We'
and 'We' that is 'I'. It is in self-conscious­ness, in the Notion of Spirit, that conscious­
ness first finds its turning-point, where it leaves behind the colourful show of the 
sensuous here-and-now and the nightlike void 
of the supersensible beyond, and steps out into the spiritual daylight of the present." 19
Knowledge of the fact that finite individuals are not ultimately 
separate from each other then, is rooted for Hegel in the understanding 
of our subjectivity (interacting with objectivity) which initial 
attempts to know objectivity by itself invariably lead to.
We can only understand a subjective/objective relationship if 
we are active and creative. This is why, for Hegel, the knowledge which
19. Phenomenology of Spirit, p.110-111. A.V. Miller translation, Oxford University Press 1977.
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accrues to Spirit at the level of self-consciousness is dependent on 
total involvement with the world, an involvement not of a purely 
detached intellectual sort, but an involvement which has room for the 
element of volition, as well as that of cognition.
It is now necessary to say more about the way in which, for 
Hegel, the dialectical interplay of particular and universal is worked 
out in the social and political sphere. In this sphere, it is desire 
which first brings particularity and finitude to attention. For 
desire, which is the sense of being unfulfilled and dependent on some­
thing "other" for fulfilment, first brings to the view of finite 
consciousness the fact that it is limited, and thereby leads to the 
struggle of a finite, self-conscious being to overcome its limitations. 
Taken abstractly, the moment of the particular corresponds to the
phenomenon of total bondage, deprivation, and limitation in the social 
20world.
In the social and political sphere, the moment of the universal 
(which taken abstractly is the absolutely unlimited) corresponds to the 
social existence of freedom. But just as the absolutely limited is too 
limited to even exist by itself, so the absolutely unlimited cannot 
exist entirely alone either. For freedom, by itself and without the 
finite, involves no element of determinateness. Everything remains a 
possibility and nothing is actual. Yet a freedom which must not 
actualize itself by the production of determinate (and therefore limited) 
content, if it is to remain freedom, can hardly be said to be free, for 
it is precluded from doing anything at all. Pure freedom is an abstra­
ction, a vacuousness corresponding precisely to the abstract universal.
20. Since the absotutety limited would be nothing, the moment of the 
particular can never exist in concrete reality in a pure form.
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whose content is an empty self-identity. Freedom therefore needs the 
world of bondage and limitation to express itself as freedom.
The dialectical interplay of particular and universal is made 
explicit in the historical world as the interplay of freedom and bond­
age. There can be no mode of freedom totally devoid of finitude and 
limitation, that is of unfreedom, and no form of bondage which contains 
no element of freedom. And just as the Concrete Universal seeks not 
to annihilate the particular but to subsume it under itself and give it 
meaning, so freedom does not try simply to destroy the finite, but to 
express itself through it. And it is of the nature of the world of 
limitation and unfreedom to come to know itself as nothing less than 
the expression of infinite freedom. Sorrow and alienation exist in the 
finite world, insofar as that world sees itself as merety finite, but 
by coming to know that its own essence is to express freedom, it can 
transcend its finitude.
History is the story of the overcoming by self-consciousness of 
the alienation brought about by a one-sided emphasis on either the 
(abstract) freedom or the finitude and limitation of the human spirit. 
The former tends to issue as blind wilfulness and the following of 
personal inclinations, be they expressed as primitive urges or 
unreflected-upon-formulae which, masquerade as rational laws, but which.
turn out in the end only to constitute what Hegel calls "the law of the
21heart". And the latter tends to issue in various forms of abject 
self-abasement, the prostration of the human spirit before a God or an 
earthly master convolved of as infinite (e.g. various Roman emperors) 
whose transcendence and authority over the finite (from which he is
2. See the Phenomenology of Spirit, p.221-228 (A.V. Miller translation).
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totally separate) is total, such that the finite consciousness can only 
cringe before it in humility, obedience, and fear.
The aim and outcome of the dialectical interplay between freedom 
and bondage is freedom, but not a freedom which is abstract and involves 
merely lack of restraint. It is rather a freedom in which all the 
fragmentation and alienation of self-consciousness is overcome, a freedom 
whose essence is to manifest itself in a determinate world harmoniously, 
such that the finite world no longer strives for independence from its 
essence, which in actuality means choosing its own unfreedom. We have 
before us now a concept of freedom which is not the freedom which says 
"take any road, it does not matter which you choose." We rather have 
before us a freedom which finds its being in necessity.
In morality, this freedom is achieved by the harmonisation of 
duty with inclination, and in political life, by the coalescence of the 
individual and the social good. In Hegel's organic state, which is 
the outcome and culmination of more primitive and one-sided forms of 
social organisation, a perfect balance of freedom and necessity is 
achieved. The individual citizen transcends his individuality and 
expresses his nature more truly by way of his participation within the 4
whole.
In the opening section of Hegel's discussion of dialectical 
development at work in the social sphere, we are shown with reference 
to concrete historical examples why epochs which embody one-sidedly the 
principle,of freedom or bondage must inevitably be superseded. In the 
chapter of Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind entitled "Independence and 
Dependence of self-consciousness: Lordship and Bondage" we are
introduced to the sort of freedom which self-consciousness seeks to 
gain from wilful and immediate self-assertion. And we are shown why, 
as an attempt to win freedom, it must inevitably fail. Hegel is
I
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discussing here, historical societies in which there have existed direct 
forms of slavery, where one man has literally been able to own another.
When self-consciousness first becomes aware of itself, it becomes 
aware too, that it is demarcated from a world which stands over against 
it as a not-self. It finds itself to be limited both by the external 
material world and by other self-consciousnesses. It responds to this 
aspect of reality which is alien self-consciousness by attempting to 
subdue it in a life and death struggle. The struggle is one for 
recognition so that each tries to make the other an expression of his 
own will, that is to say, a slave. Each participant in the struggle 
thus aims to be Infinite, a Universality which embraces its "Other'* 
within itself. The struggle is one in which one stakes one's life, but 
this does not mean that the one always goes so far as to kitZ the other. 
Were this to happen, the one could not express his will through the 
other. What often happens is that one participant gives in - refuses to 
fight on to the death, and becomes a slave of the other in order to save 
his life.
The domination of the slave by the master makes the slave into 
something object-like and thing-like, the sort of thing whose recognition 
must inevitably fail to satisfy the master. The master is alienated 
from the work by which he sustains himself, that is, the work of the 
slave, because it is merely presented to him as it were "on a plate" and 
is in no wây the product of his own creative effort. In this way, the 
master in no way is able to achieve his ambition of becoming infinite, 
he is instead acutely reminded of his finite limitations. The attempt 
to express universality and overcome limitation by an arbitrary exercise 
of the will leads to the master's efforts collapsing into a form of 
bondage and limitation. The slave too, is alienated (though through the 
mere fact that he can be in some small way creative through his work.
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less so than the master), for his work is carried out at the command 
of another, and is not an expression of his free creativity.
The type of freedom which accrues to the master^ who has believed 
that this forcible domination is the way in which to be Infinite, is 
beautifully described by Hegel:
"Since the entire content of its natural consciousness has not tottered and shaken, 
it is still inherently a determinate mode of being; having a "mind of its own" (der 
Eigen Sinn) is simply stubbornness (Eigensinn), 
a type of freedom which does not get beyond 
the attitude of bondage." 22
Abstract freedom thus collapses into the finitude of the parti­
cular self-consciousness which is therefore forced to find ever more 
subtle ways of overcoming this alienation from its not-self, since it 
now sees that direct domination defeats its own purpose. The next ;
type of freedom which it seeks to find is radically different from the 
abstract freedom of the master, it is a freedom in which self-conscious- !I
ness seeks freedom through or at least in spite of bondage. This is [
Stoicism, which "is a freedom which can come on the scene as a general
form of the world's spirit only in a time of universal fear and 
23bondage ... "
In Stoicism, the only freedom which is believed to matter is 
freedom of thought, the type of freedom which can be enjoyed by the 
meanest slave.
"The essence of this consciousness is to be free, on the throne as well as in fetters, throughout all the dependence that attaches 
to its individual existence, from effective 
activity as well as from passive endurance, 
into the simple essentiality of thought." 24
22. See Phenomenology of Mind, p.188 (J.B. Baillie translation) Vol.l
23. ibid. p.193.
24. idem.
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This freedom is certainly less abstract than that freedom
conceived of as a master's arbitrary will. However, it has its own
pitfalls. Freedom of thought can only exist in isolation from freedom
as it manifests itself in our activity in the world, insofar as thought
itself can exist in isolation from activity in the world. And we saw
earlier that one of Hegel's main aims is to deny precisely this.
Thought abstracted from activity in the world is not the highest
intellectual faculty of human self-consciousness, it corresponds rather
to the most primitive forms (which were discussed earlier) of cognition,
the totally passive ones. Freedom of thought thus cannot exist by
itself, it is accordingly not a form of being which can satisfy the
demand of self-consciousness to be Infinite. It is only, says Hegel,
25"an incomplete negation of otherness." Thus as a stage in the 
struggle towards the liberation of self-consciousness. Stoicism too 
must collapse. It collapses, according to Hegel, into scepticism, but 
the details of this we need not go into here.
It is now apparent that in the sphere of passive cognition as well 
as in the sphere of social activity, the general drift is towards the 
universal expressing itself through the particular, in progressively 
more adequate forms. The series of stages which Hegel describes 
invariably break down because they are one-sided embodiments of 
particular and universal.
We have now set out the basis for Hegel's view that finite 
individuals are not ultimately distinct from each other. The develop­
ment of consciousness is the story of the attempt of finite selves to 
break free from their limitations, to know themselves as expressions of 
the Infinite, a truth which was dimly apprehended but not explicitly
25. ibid. p.194.
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grasped from the very beginning. And if Hegel is right, we can see too 
the connection between his key concepts of freedom, reason and love, 
all of which are ways of representing the transcendence of finite 
individuality, and of expressing the essence of Absolute Mind. But is 
Hegel right? We must now, as promised earlier, turn to an appraisal of 
the arguments by which Hegel arrives at his conclusions.
We have seen that Hegel may be called an essentialist philosopher,
because of his notion that there is in self-consciousness a form of
necessary development.^^ This necessity infuses all finite consciousnesses,
and it is by being so infused that they are enabled to transcend their
finitude. The necessity is the drift of self-consciousness, which as
Findlay puts it, "is dispersed among a number of distinct centres in
all of which it recognizes itself. It is an I which is a We, a We which 
27is an I." Most of the objections to Hegel's view that finite 
individuals are not absolutely separate from each other, aim therefore 
against the type of necessity which Hegel employs in working out his 
dialectical development. There are three widely held objections to Hegel’s 
dialectical necessity. The first is that the dialectical development 
moves not by necessity but by the obfuscation which arises when one 
takes what amounts in fact to a contradiction as the principle which 
generates the movement. A movement which is based on sheer contra­
diction, so far from being a necessary development, can go one way as 
well as another, which is to say that the direction of the development 
is completely arbitrary. This brings us on to the second objection, 
which has to do specifically with arbitrariness in the Hegelian system.
26. As we shall see later, this Is not the strict necessity of formal logic.
27. Hegel, A Re-examination, p.97.
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28. Mind 1940 p.416. Article entitled What is Dialectic?
This is not the arbitrariness of the first objection, which follows 
from the supposed self-contradictoriness of dialectical premises; it 
is the arbitrariness which is thought to exist as a result of a simple -ti
failure on Hegel's part to show why any one of the stages in the 
development of self-consciousness must follow from its predecessor.
Hegel's outline of the facts of the historical development of self- 
consciousness, it is claimed, in no way supports the sort of necessity 
which Hegel claims for it. There is no reason, it is argued, why Çî
Stoicism has to arise out of slavery, or perception out of immediate 
sense-certainty. Hegel thus made the mistake of claiming a priori 
necessity for what is in fact purely contingent. Thirdly and finally, S
we are confronted with the objection that what Hegel produced was a i
Iclosed system, with a built-in immunity to falsification. This immunity |
from criticism, it is argued, is injected into Hegel's system by a 
series of equivocations, and by the (deliberate) general unintelligi­
bility of the system.
The first objection is concerned with. Hegel's idea that
dialectical movement is the result of contradiction in the concrete §
world, and that by basing his principle of movement on contradictions in
the latter, Hegel has based his whole system on a piece of evasive and
mystifying nonsense. This objection, which utterly misunderstands the
type of contradiction which Hegel is concerned with, would hardly be
worth discussing were it not the case that so many eminent thinkers
seem to have been convinced by it. Popper, for example, displays his
total ignorance of the nature of dialectic, when he writes in Mind that
Hegel "simply said that contradictions do not matter. They just have
28to occur in the development of thought and reason." Popper follows
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this up by saying that for Hegel "it is this very fact, namely that
the world is full of contradictions, which shows us from another side
that the law of contradictions, has to be discarded. For this law says
that no seIf-contradictory proposition, or no pair of contradictory
29propositions, can be true, that is, can correspond to the facts."
Popper goes on to "clarify" matters, by giving us an example of an 
Hegelian dialectical contradiction:
"An example of a contradiction would be the 
following two sentences:
'The body here was, on the 1st of November 1938, between 9 and 10 a.m., charged 
positively,' and an analogous sentence about the same body, saying that it was at the same 
time not positively charged." 30
It is Popper and those who think like him who have made a mystery 
of the notion of contradiction in dialectics, by making it appear as 
formal contradiction, which it quite patently is not. Yet from this 
mistaken belief Popper concludes that Hegel can, and does, deduce 
anything (arbitrarily) so that Hegel's whole outline of how self- 
consciousness develops is utterly arbitrary.
"From two contradictory premises, we can logically deduce anything, and its negation as well. We therefore convey with such a 
contradictory theory - nothing. A theory 
which involves a contradiction is entirely useless, because it does not convey any sort of information." 31
The sort of contradiction which Hegel operates with in his 
discussions of dialectic was never intended to be anything like formal
29. ibid, p.419.
30. idem.
31. ibid. p.410.
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contradiction. We saw in our exposition earlier, that the basic
dialectical concepts with which we are concerned are the universal and
the particular, two opposites which mutually require and complete each
other. It is the interplay of these two moments which determines the
course of development which self-conscious spirit is to take, and
which issues in various historical forms in the concrete world. The
general drift is towards the perfect harmonisation of particular with
universal, but everything which exists is imbued with these two moments.
It is the presence of these two moments which enables all that exists
32to have "difference and opposition in itself."
It is important to realize however that it is not simpty the 
infusion of the world with, the two complementing opposites of 
universal and particular which comprises the contradictoriness in 
concrete reality. The real contradictions arise when concrete reality 
expresses one of the moments one-sidedly, at the expense of the other. 
And these contradictions are not formal (logical) contradictions, but 
oppositions, disharmonies, failures of things and institutions to 
function satisfactorily. This is to say that were the opposites of 
universal and particular perfectly balanced, this would be precisely 
the negation of all contradiction in the concrete world. (Why they do 
not easily reach this balance has to do with the independence of the 
particular, which we discussed earlier, and which will be elaborated 
upon in relation to the second objection).
Once we see that it is the one-sided expression of universal or 
particular which constitutes the real contradiction, we can see how such 
contradictions suggest a definite line of movement. An historical state
32. Encyclopaedia of The Philosophical Sciences. The Logic Sec. 119 Ss. (Wallace translation).
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of affairs which embodies one-sidedly the moment of the particular 
(or bondage) will become one in which a general malaise arises, and 
this malaise will contain within itself a strong tendency to bring to 
birth a new epoch; one in which the universal (or freedom) is more 
fully represented. And this is the answer to Popper's view that a 
dialectical development can go one way as well as another. (There is 
one way in which it is more likely to go, or better fitted to go, than 
any other).
We can now understand clearly why Hegel asserts:
"Contradiction is the very moving principle 
of the world, and it is ridiculous to say 
that contradiction is unthinkable. The only thing correct in that statement is that contradiction is not the end of the matter, but cancels itself." 33
The second objection is the most convincing of the three, so it 
is necessary to take it seriously. It is the objection which has to 
do with arbitrariness in the dialectical development and is well put by 
Findlay :-
"Hegel is, of course, wholly wrong if he thinks 
that the particular dialectical trail that he 
blazes is the onty one that thought can follow: 
quite obviously his embarrassments (due to the dialectical tensions at any given phase) could have been developed in different ways at every point." 34
Part of the answer to this is that there is no reason to suppose 
that Hegel ever held that the particular dialectical trail which he 
blazes is the only one that thought can follow. But then we are led
33. idem.
34. Hegel, A Re-examination, p.95.
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to ask just what sort of necessity is induced by dialectical tensions? 
What sort of necessity was it that Hegel saw as running through self- 
consciousness in the course of its historical and epistemological 
development?
We may reply at once that Hegel's necessity has not to do with 
the rigorous necessity of formal logic, but rather with a natural 
drift, or tendency to develop in a particular way, of consciousness.
It is a necessity which, gives full weight to contingency, indeed it is 
a necessity which explains why there must of neoessity he oontingenay 
in the world. The drift may be always towards the Concrete Universal, 
but we saw in our earlier exegesis that the particular has a strange 
sort of independence, which means that it is often alienated from that 
universal essence, the adequate expression of which would be the ful­
filment of its own meaning and nature. This means that precisely how 
the interplay between universal and particular will be worked out in 
concrete form is not totally determined a priori. The development of 
self-consciousness might indeed have been different if the moment of 
the particular had behaved otherwise- The overall drift however, would 
have been the same.
This independence of the particular, which is contingency existing 
of necessity in a dialectical development, may be illustrated by way of 
an analogy with the Christian faith. If God created the world, then it 
is the meaning and fulfilment of his creatures to know themselves as 
his artefacts and to express the God-like qualities which he has imbued 
them with. But if these things are truly to be a creation (rather than 
an abstract identity with, the Creator), they must stand over against the 
creator as retaining some degree of independence. If they had no 
independent choice in whether or not to express their creator's purpose, 
they would be no more than a direct expression of the creator's will.
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which is to say, they would be part of the creator's nature. Thus a 
genuine creation must have the freedom not to express its own essence 
in varying degrees (though of course, it can never wholly escape from 
it), which implies the freedom to choose slavery. This freedom to 
choose slavery constitutes the genuine independence of the particular 
and the history of self-consciousness in Hegel is infused with its 
contingent and arbitrary aspect precisely as the independent particular 
chooses slavery in varying degrees at various times.
What Hegel sets out to do is to explain how the dialectical 
development of self-consciousness has in fact been carried out; his 
explanations are in retrospect and take into account the moment of 
contingency. In prospect, all historical development appears capable of 
going in any of several directions. But in retrospect, when we see 
that there is only one in which it has gone, it may well appear to have 
been necessary. But of course such necessity would not be of an a priori 
logical kind, since a necessity of that kind would have no place for 
human will and freedom. It is necessary that a dialectical struggle 
must be what is the fate of self-consciousness, but the precise stages 
along the way, the points at which, there are qualitative transitions, 
are not of necessity located where they are. It is not necessary, for 
example, that slavery had to collapse into Stoicism in the precise 
historical form which the latter took. The break with lordship and 
bondage was necessary since alienation had risen to an extreme pitch, 
but the precise way in which self-consciousness sought solace was not. 
Hegel's aim was to explain the rationale of what actually did happen, 
which is quite different from attempting to explain why it must have 
happened. That qualitative breaks will occur we can know, but the 
precise time when they occur and the exact form they are to assume, 
cannot be predicted in advance. Spirit would not be free were it
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35otherwise.
Hegel’s dialectic is then something which he uses to help us to 
understand the development of self-consciousness, but its justification 
does not lie in the precise sequence of the historical stages them­
selves. We would not have to discard the dialectical principle had 
history taken a somewhat different course, nor must we discard it 
when we discover (as in fact we do) that Hegel's historical knowledge 
was often inaccurate.
But is then the dialectical movement compatible with any and 
every course of history, and if so, what definite information about how 
we should understand history can it possibly give us? And what, in any 
case, is the justification of the dialectical principle if its justifi­
cation does not lie in the temporal development of self-conscious 
spirit?
The answer to this last question is that part of the justifi­
cation for the dialectical way of understanding history is indeed to be 
found in the temporal development, but in the essential nature of the 
temporal development, not in the precise details of the events along 
the way. This essential nature of the temporal development has to do 
with the structure of consciousness, which involves the interplay between
35. The element of surprise and suddenness in the development of self- 
consciousness is beautifully captured by Hegel in the following 
passage:
"Frivolity and again ennui, which are spreading in the established 
order of things, the undefined foreboding of something unknown - all these are hints that there is something else approaching.
This gradual crumbling to pieces, which does not alter the general look and aspect of the whole, is interrupted by the sunrise, 
which, in a flash and at a single stroke, brings to view the form and structure of the new world."
Phenomenology of Mind (Baillie translation) p.10, Vol.l.
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subject and object, between particular and universal. This interplay 
must manifest itself in an historical spatial world, if it is to be 
anything at all.^^
We are now in a position to answer our first question, and to
37affirm that there are indeed historical processes which are togioatty 
conceivable but which are excluded by a dialectical understanding. 
Dialectic then does tell us something definite about how we should under­
stand history; it is not compatible with every and any historical 
pattern. Any historical pattern which did not involve the dynamic 
interplay of particular and universal, and thus of bondage and freedom, 
and which did not entail alienation and its overcoming in the drift 
towards concrete universality and a genuine liberation, would be 
incompatible with a dialectical understanding. In principle. I could 
write down an undialectical history of, for example, beings perpetually 
at the level of immediate sense-certainty, without this issuing in 
formal contradictions. But I could never write down this type of history 
as my own history. For in the very act of writing I become aware of 
the distinction between Cmy) finite self and its Other. I become aware 
of consciousness and its object, and express something whose truth
36. Hegel argues, and quite successfully, that the notion of a noumenal 
world which does not manifest itself to consciousness is incoherent, There cannot, he argues, be two worlds, a world of appearances and an inner supersensible world. For were it not the very essence of 
this supersensible world to appear as phenomena, what would it mean to affirm the existence of such a world? It would be, says Hegel,
a complete vacuity which could only be filled up with dreamings.The world of pure noumena, says Hegel "would have to be content with being treated so badly, for it would not deserve anything better, since even dreams are something better than its own barren 
emptiness." (Phenomenology of Mind, p.140, Vol.l. Baillie trans­lation) . The whole point Hegel is making is that the essence of 
what it is to be real lies precisely in the real's creative power to make itself manifest to subjective consciousness.
37. Using "logically" in the sense of "avoiding formal contradictions".
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stretches beyond myself through myself. An interpenetration of universal 
and particular would have begun in which the drift of self-consciousness 
is toward liberation and seIf-transcendence. Beings at the perpetual 
level of immediate sense-certainty could never read or understand the 
history I wrote of them. An undialectic history is the history of 
something less than human.
Hegel's great attention to the details of historical epochs has led 
many to think that he derives his view of dialectical necessity by 
focusing upon these details. We may perhaps admit that Hegel takes a 
somewhat one-sided interest in those details, at the expense of a fuller 
discussion of the implications of the intentionality of self-consciousness 
as such. When we come to discuss Findlay's version of Hegelianism, we 
shall see that he to some extent at least corrects this one-sidedness.
But this one-sided emphasis is the most that Hegel can be accused of, 
for the place he gives to contingency in his system is quite deliberate 
and definite, and it shows that Hegel was hardly so blind as to take 
all the details of historical development as necessary a priori.
We now come to Popper's claim that Hegel produced a system which 
contains an artificially built-in immunity to falsification and indeed 
even to criticism. The Hegelian philosophy, it is claimed, was 
expressly invented in order to be able to deal with any conceivable 
new evidence on its own terms, so that it could never in principle be 
subject to revision. Yet for this very reason - by being compatible 
with anything and everything - the philosophy is vacuous, and serves in 
the end only to confuse and confound. Popper puts all these ideas 
forward in Volume II of The Open Society and its Enemies.
Popper's work generally is nothing less than a total travesty of 
Hegelian scholarship. We find that here, condensed into a few pages, 
almost all of the commonest and crudest misunderstandings of Hegel's
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thought are represented. According to Popper, Hegel thought that
formal contradiction was a feature of the concrete world and indeed a
highly desirable f e a t u r e . H e g e l  made absurd use of what he claimed
was contradiction in the actual world says Popper, to set up a
rigorous a priori deduction of historical empirical facts. (The
absurdity results from the fact that anything follows from a formal
contradiction, and not, as Popper tells us that Hegel held, from there
being one strict line of development). Hegel's aim in producing this
dialectical gibberish we are told, was to stupefy, and to make his
system immune from criticism by placing it outside the bounds of rational
discussion altogether. "By making argument and criticism impossible"
Popper writes, "he (Hegel), intends to make his own philosophy proof
against all criticism, so that it may establish itself as a reinforced
dogmatism, secure from every attack, and the insurmountable summit of
39all philosophical development." And Popper goes on to say that Hegel 
combined his nonsense about dialectics with an equally nonsensical 
philosophy of identity, according to which "everything that is now real 
or actual exists by necessity, and must be reasonable as well as good."^^ 
Popper further claims that Hegel produced all these absurdities 
quite knowingly and intentionally, in order to serve the interests of 
his employer, Frederick William III of Prussia. To conceal the absurd­
ities, we are told, Hegel had to couch them in a terminology which made 
them almost unintelligible (Popper never tells us, however, just how a 
philosophy as unintelligible as he considers Hegel's to be could have 
assisted the absolute monarchy). If we are to believe Popper, Hegel
38. See The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol.II, p.39.
39. ibid. p.40.
40. ibid. p.41.
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had not an ounce of intellectual honesty.
We have seen already just how distorted is Popper's understanding 
of Hegel's dialectic. Hegel was not playing around with formal contra­
dictions, nor did he seek to derive empirical facts a priori.
We have seen that Hegel's dialectical principle makes perfectly 
good sense if we have the patience necessary to properly understand it; 
it is not made immune from rational criticism by way of being simply 
unintelligible. Insofar as the principle defies criticism, this is a 
reflection of how well it can deal with objections, not of its 
unintelligibility. It is difficult indeed to think of a way to falsify 
a theory or principle which can be seen to be deeply true, but this is a 
possibility which Popper never considers.
There is no justification, we may conclude, for Popper's view that 
the Hegelian dialectic is immune from appraisal, for its immunity from 
objections is wholly dependent upon its ability honestly to meet them. 
Popper thus cannot claim that Hegel has produced a closed system, unless 
he wants to claim that Hegel has produced a perfect system (in which 
case it would be immune from criticism entirely!). But perhaps, it may 
be said, there is a basis for this claim in the aspect of Hegel's 
thought which Popper calls the philosophy of identity.
Of the philosophy of identify Popper asks:
"How is this doctrine derived?" And he replies:
"Merely by a series of equivocations. Plato, whose Forms or Ideas, as we have seen, are 
entirely different from 'ideas in the mind', 
had said that the Ideas alone are real, and that perishable things are unreal. Hegel adopts from this the equation Ideal-Real.Kant talked, in his dialectics, about the Ideas 
in the mind'. Hegel adopts from this, the 
doctrine that the Ideas are something mental 
or spiritual or rational, which can be expressed in the equation Idea= Reason. Combined, these
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two equations, or rather equivocations, 
yield Real= Reason: and that everything
that is real must be reasonable, and that the development of reality is the same as 
that of reason." 41
The philosophy of identity, taken in Popper's way, says no more 
than that whatever happens to exist at a certain time is both rational 
and justifiable, "it must be reasonable as well as good." The doctrine 
is thus compatible with anything, since anything is rational just by 
way of coming to exist. But if it is compatible with anything, then 
this makes it (artificially) immune from criticism, for any historical 
epoch, or any empirical facts, come under the head of rationality just 
insofar as they manage to exist. There is no way to falsify the 
philosophy of identity, because it excludes by definition anything real 
from being non-rational. Popper is quite confident that Hegel was 
perfectly aware that the philosophy was nonsense, but that he invented 
it for ulterior motives. 1j
"For behind the apparent confusion there lurk |
the interests of the absolute monarchy of "I
Frederick William. The philosophy of identity J
serves to justify the existing order. Its ;|main upshot is an ethical and juridical i
positivism, the doctrine that what is, is good, 1
since there can be no standards but existing ,standards; it is the doctrine that might is [right." 42 |
41. ibid. p.41. In this passage we should note that Plato, as well as 
Hegel, is assailed without cause. Plato, in the Republic, says that the Ideas, the objects of which we have knowledge, have true Being; perishable things are not said to be unreal but to oscil­late between Being and not-Being. The only thing that is unreal 
is (abstract) "Not-Being" itself; for this cannot even be an object of opinion or belief, but corresponds to a cognitive state of total nescience. Further, in the Sophist, Plato expressly 
says that - contrary to the views of certain misguided "Friends
of the Forms" - not only the Ideas are real, but also souls, or 
the possessors of life, mind, and intelligence. And in the Tiraaeus he makes it quite clear that what Popper here calls 
"perishable things", though they are continually changing and both 
begin and cease to be, do nevertheless have that existence which is conferred on them by the Demiurge or Artificer, who makes 
all things (in the physical universe) after the pattern of the Forms,
42. ibid. p.41.
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The claim that Hegel's connection between the real and the
rational was argued for in the way that Popper outlines and made true
by definition is simply ridiculous. Hegel spends volumes upon volumes
attempting to demonstrate how and why the structure of reality is deeply
rational. The Phenomenology of Mind, the Philosophy of History, the
History of Philosophy and the Philosophy of Right, all aim to show that
epochs in social and political history as well as in the history of
ideas are not mere conglomerations of discrete events, whose relations
43to each other are external and contingent.
So far from artificially making his philosophy of identity immune 
from criticism, Hegel is constantly arguing for his view against a quite 
logically conceivable alternative, an alternative which, if true, would 
certainly falsify his doctrine.
This alternative is the type of empiricist existentialism which 
views the universe as a massive heap of contingencies - as a universe 
in which (in Hume's words) all events are "loose and separate". Hegel 
in no way tries to dispose of this world-picture by means of a series 
of facile equivocations. His procedure is rather to argue against this 
picture by attempting to show that the telos of all being lies in self- 
conscious rational thought, and that the world of empirical particulars 
can only be coherently accounted for when seen as incomplete manifest­
ations or "moments", of a context which transcends them. Whether Hegel 
actually succeeded in demonstrating that his world-view is correct, is 
of course an important question, and one which it would be wrong for 
anybody to prejudge. But Popper's criticism is not, we should note, 
just that Hegel's arguments lack cogency, his point is rather that Hegel
43. At the very end of Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion he states this aim explicitly.
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does not bother to adduce any arguments, because he (Hegel) regards that 
which exists to be rational, simply because it exists. Yet it is only 
because Hegel finds it quite conceivable that what exists may not be 
Tationat that he writes many pages and volumes specifically to prove 
that the opposite is in fact true.
For our part we shall, later on, find reason to firmly agree 
with Hegel that the world of mere empirical particulars is, given as 
a world of empirical particulars, an incomplete and inadequate expression 
of something more. We shall see that Hegel gives us at least a basis 
for cogent arguments which show, that finite individuals and the finite 
material world are unsatisfactorily conceived of as a contingent heap 
of meaningless empirical particulars, and we shall contend that this 
basis consists in Hegel's demonstration that all particulars presuppose 
universels (and ultimately one Concrete Universal). However, whatever 
we ultimately conclude about the cogency of Hegel's arguments, this is 
quite irrelevant to our necessary rejection of Popper's criticism.
For Popper's criticism arises, not from an appraisal of Hegel's argu­
ments, (since he never addressed himself to those arguments) but from 
the erroneous view that Hegel advanced not arguments, but equivocations. 
When we consider all that Hegel says about why finite individuals, 
things, and historical epochs, are incomplete taken in isolation from a 
transcendent whole, it becomes very clear that Hegel could never have 
merely assumed that "the real is the rational."
In any case. Popper seems to have misunderstood what Hegel 
means by "the rational." By rational, Hegel did not mean, as Popper 
assumes he did, morally defensible and therefore good. Many of the 
historical forms which Hegel discusses are forms where alienation and 
apprehension have risen to a tremendous pitch. Hegel would hardly have 
called them good. But they nonetheless are imbued with a deep i
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rationality, which means that if we look at the preceding forms of
conscious life, we can explain how they gave birth to the new society,
44and see the rationale underlying the alienation and oppression.
It is the fact that we can offer this type of explanation that 
Hegel had in mind when he produced his philosophy of identity. From 
this, and the other misinterpretations we have discussed, it is quite 
clear that Popper had no clue whatsoever as to what Hegel was trying to 
say. He misunderstands Hegel at every point. Or does he? If we were 
inclined to Popper's own way of thinking, we might think it interesting 
to notice just how well Popper's own view of what it is to be an "Open 
Society" accords with the type of openness upheld by actually existing 
western liberal democracies. That Hegel's philosophy had at least 
deeply radical implications which in no way upheld totalitarianism is 
a truth known well to many. But Popper's philosophy contains no trace 
of anything which is not in accord with the political system which 
happens to be his own employer.
We shall however, not be so invidious. It is kinder to assume 
Popper's sincerity and ascribe to him only lack of understanding. It 
is unfortunate that the nonsense he writes about Hegel is so readable 
and clearly written, that his book is certain to deceive many. It is 
difficult to know how the injustice done to Hegel could be compensated 
for.
We have now considered some of the major objections to Hegel's 
arguments for the view that finite individuals are not ultimately 
distinct from one another. None of the arguments considered so far
44. It might surprise Popper to learn that Hegel was prepared to classify the Prussia of his day as such an alienated society. 
This becomes clear in the final sections of his Philosophy of Right.
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has been convincing, since all of them rest on a misunderstanding of 
what dialectical development means within the Hegelian system.
However, not all the objections to this view of the non-ultimacy 
of finite individuals consist of an attack on alleged bad logic in the 
conception of dialectical developments. There are other objections, 
put forward by pluralist philosophers such as Pringle-Pattison and
H.D. Lewis, which purport to show that some of the major phenomena 
of human life (e.g. love, morality and religion) cannot be accounted 
for within the terms of any doctrine according to which we are not 
ultimately separate from each other. Hegel himself could not answer 
these objections, since they were put forward in a later age than his.
It has therefore been the task of more recent philosophers, sympathetic 
to the Hegelian viewpoint, to try to answer them.
Philosophers like Bernard Bosanquet and J.N. Findlay attempted 
to restate the case against the ultimacy of separate, finite individuals 
in such a way as to take account of the objections which have been 
raised by the recent pluralist philosophers. They realised, as we must 
too, that no verdict about the nature of finite individuality could be 
finalty arrived at until the pluraliste' arguments had been fully 
considered. It is therefore to an evaluation of the way the Hegelian 
position was defended against the pluralists' attack that we must now 
turn.
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CHAPTER FIVE
BOSANQUET's REFUTATION OF PLURALISM
Bosanquet is the most Hegelian of the British Idealist philos­
ophers. In essence, his account of finite individuality is the same 
as that of Hegel. Finite individuals are not ultimately finite, they 
are modifications of the whole of reality, of the Infinite. In 
Hegelian language, they express through their particularity the 
universal. Or to use Bosanquet's own language, they have an adjectival 
rather than a substantial mode of being.
Bosanquet arrivés at this position, as does Hegel, by a pheno­
menological account of self-consciousness. But Bosanquet's phenomen­
ology is clearer and more directly concerned with the form which 
experience invariably must take for all finite consciousnesses, and we 
are not confused by having this basic structure of experience related 
back (as it is in Hegel) to contingent historical events, which might 
have been otherwise. By leaving out the historical discussions which 
Hegal involves himself with, Bosanquet is able to concentrate on a more 
thorough and detailed account of the relation between self and its 
Other, which enables us to see much more easily why there is, in the 
last analysis, a sort of confluence of finite individuals.
Bosanquet is quite clear about what it is which he wants to 
refute. It is "the popular attitude" which "in considering finite 
individuals, whether things or persons, is frankly pluralist. Alike in 
contemplating the natural and human world, it models itself on the
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apparent self-identity of the moveable and self-coherent body".^
Bosanquet is quite prepared to admit that there is a certain 
substantiality about finite individuals which cannot be claimed for 
material things. This felt substantiality is the phenomenological 
base of the popular pluralistic view of selfhood for it gives us a 
feeling of existing as independent and self-complete beings. The other 
side of this, which is that at every moment, our independence and self­
completion are broken down by factors outside our control, is overlooked 
by the popular attitude, since here self is overwhelmed by the impact 
of knowing itself as substantial.
If we were mere things, we are told, we would not have definite
limits set to us as individuals. For "there is no ultimate reason for
taking one complex, at least below conscious individuals, as a single
thing more than another. They include one another in innumerable
subordinations, from the Sahara for example, or any patch of it, down
2to any grain of sand in it." We, however, as finite consciousnesses 
or spirits, are qualitatively different from mere things. The walls of 
personal identity are not arbitrary demarcations which we merely use for 
convenience. There is a very good reason why we distinguish ourselves 
from each other as we do. It is because we feel ourselves to be unities, 
or unifying centres, both of cognition in the passive sense and of 
(free) activity.
"Turning to the spiritual, finite individual, 
"says Bosanquet, "we feel ourselves here at 
last attempting to deal with him in his proper character. We have no doubt of his unity, his
1. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Supplementary Vol.l, p.89 (Journal henceforth referred to as P.A.S.).
2. ibid. p.79.
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freedom, his real and substantive being, 
which in principle and on the whole, though 
still subject to limitations springing from 
our impotence, yet reveals the individual in 
the general or typical light in which he must be taken as truly experienced within the universe." 3
Moreover,
"It is our nature to be a single self. We 
claim it is as a right and accept it is a duty. Our very repudiation of elements 
within our existential complex means the rejection of what we cannot unify." 4
To deny the existence or the ultimacy of the individuality such 
as we seem, at this level, to possess, looks at first, as if we are not 
only denying what appears to be a clear and evident truth, but we are 
also removing the basis of many aspects of human life, such as moral 
responsibility, religion and love. For if we are merely modifications 
of the Absolute and not true individuals, how can we be held, as 
individuals, responsible for our actions? And if we are ourselves 
expressions of the Absolute, what is there, apart from ourselves, to 
worship? And if we are all in the end not separate, how can I genuinely 
love another?
That there are answers to all these questions which lead us, not 
to despair, but "to a wider outlook," is something we come to understand 
when we see precisely in which way, for Bosanquet, individuality collapses. 
For this collapsing is not mere annihilation, it is rather sublation, 
since the finite individual is preserved yet transformed and transcended
5in the Absolute.
3. ibid. p.92.
4. idem.
5. The term sublation, as used here, refers to the finite individual's being subsumed within, yet transcended, in the Absolute.
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We can know that finite individuality breaks down in this way, 
by looking more deeply at precisely that feature of our consciousness 
which seems strongly to confirm our idea of our self-completion and our 
independence as individual units, - that is, our experience of ourselves 
as unifying centres or focal points of experience. For it emerges that 
although we certainly are, each of us, centres which are attempting to
unify experience, the unification is never completed in any one of us.
Our unrealized (i.e. uncompleted, or imperfect) unity is merely a 
pretension, and not an actuality.
"We carry with us a pretension to be ourself, 
which includes less and more than we find in 
our existence. Our unity is a puzzle and an unrealized aspiration. It is demanded bythought and action, but we cannot find it inexistence."
"Philosophy tells us, as we agreed, that if we 
possessed our unity, we should no longer be 
what we experience our existence as being."
Bosanquet goes on to tell us exactly how it is that we fall short 
of being completed unities. Of the finite individual, he says, -
"Its existence, as an existence, bears the unmistakable stamp of the fragmentary and 
provisional. Can there by anyone who does J
not feel it to be so in every act and every thought? But through all this, and operative in it, there shines the intentional unity.
It is not my monad nor my star. It is the 
life which lives in me, but it is more of that 
life than I succeed in living." 6
The unity such as I do in fact have, thus derives its being from 
a great and more complete unity than I actually measure up to. The 
unity which I regard as myself is an abstraction from the whole, the
6. P.A.S. Sup. Vol.l. p.93.
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unity which I aim to be but cannot be. It is only by forgetting the 
abstraction that I
"set up to be a self-centred real", 
and in this way,
"I become ipso faoto in the main a false 
appearance and all but worthless. This is when I come nearest to being a substantive in ray own right, in error and in sin."
It is very simple to see how I can come to 
have this illusion of myself.
"I can mistake the character in which I appear. I seem to myself, perhaps, to be 
the King, and I am the fool." 7
To become aware of our non-ultimacy as individuals is to become 
aware of that true self-complete unity from which we are merely abstrac­
tions. And this is to become aware of a sort of lateral identity between 
selves, as well as the continuing identity (through temporal change) of «■
individuals. By caring only about the continuing survival of individuals, 
we find that we were "like a horse in blinkers, blind to all that is not 
straight a h e a d . B o s a n q u e t  protests against the fact that all too 
often this lateral identity is not even taken into account as a 
possibility.
"Hope, anxiety, and expectation fix themselves 
at every moment on the linear future, and if this basis is shaken, the substitute is not a wider outlook, but despair." 9
7. idem.
8. ibid. p.94.
9. ibid- p.91.
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Once we adopt this wider outlook, however, we have less reason 
to despair, in the face of the hazards and hardships of finite selfhood, 
and in the face of the ultimate death of each finite individual, than 
we should have if we adopted views which emphasize the importance of 
linear continuity. Our conceptions of such prominent features of human 
life as morality, freedom, religion, and love, are in no way negated, 
but are rather deepened. They cease to be as puzzling as they are if we 
adopt the suppositions which regard finite selves as ultimate.
Consider, for example, freedom. There appears at first to be an 
incompatibility between the idea that finite individuals are not 
ultimately independent units and the attribution of freedom to them.
As Lewis puts it: "To be accountable, it would seem, we require to be
beings whose actions can be regarded as pre-eminently their own."
And if we are modifications of the Absolute, how can this be? Bosanquet 
replies to this quite directly:-
"A man is free - insofar as he wills the |universal object. The reason is obvious. I
It is only what is universal that is free Ifrom self-contradiction, that can be willed |
without obstruction. Every contradiction ^
in my world of experience obstructs myaction and embarrasses ray will; and every Ipain or defeat or confusion of which I am aware, in any subject or object apprehended
by me, is a contradiction in my world. I am |free in such objects of volition as confront |with adequate solutions the situations which I apprehend. Thus, in accordance, with a
familiar paradox, it is only in a will above |my own that I can find my own will and my Jfreedom and independence. Here again, it is only by acknowledging myself adjectival and 
under necessity that I can become substantive and free." 11
10. The Elusive Mind, p.283.
11. P.A.S. Sup. Vol.l., p.94-5.
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In this passage, Bosanquet shows how it is possible to solve, or 
rather to avoid, difficult problems which are, or come to be connected 
with freedom when freedom is regarded as a characteristic which is 
ascribable to the finite individual self. On the existential view, 
which insists on the absolute division between selves, (since each self 
expresses only its own particularity) human freedom can only be regarded 
as a matter of sheer individual choice. The choices actually made may 
be prompted by feeling, and inclination, or they may be made totally 
arbitrarily - as leaps in the dark. A freedom based on feeling is no 
real freedom, and indeed ends in tyranny, since the more this type of 
freedom is achieved, the more dominated the individual will be by his 
momentary whims. The culmination of this freedom is absolute bondage, 
when the whole personality becomes the slave of its passions, over which 
it no longer has control.
Existentialists are of course aware that this domination by 
feeling is in no sense real freedom, but what account remains to them? 
Only the account which identifies freedom with caprice. The more free 
the action, on this view, the more fortuitously it is carried out.
And the freest actions of all are those for which no reason whatsoever 
can be given. They are a product of the decision of the subject, and 
decision alone.
It is a strange type of freedom which rises to a pitch as it 
becomes most difficult to give reasons for our actions. For it means 
that the more detached I am from what I do, the more freely I do it.
The existentialist doctrine of freedom is really nothing less than a 
doctrine that alienation is freedomI
The existentialists themselves are not unaware of the emptiness 
which inheres in the conception of freedom which they espouse. In 
Sartre's novel. The Age of Reason, we are presented with the story of
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the search for just this (individualistic) mode of freedom. The hero, 
Mathieu Delarue, has throughout the novel a burning desire - to do at 
least one thing in his life totally freely, to bring something about by 
sheer force of his own decision, a decision in no way determined or 
influenced by anything in his past life, his upbringing, his personal 
situation, and so on. He demands the absolute in (abstract) freedom. 
Towards the end of the novel he manages to do something which embodies 
everything that his own conception of freedom demands. He leaves his 
lover, Marcelle. Sartre describes how Mathieu came to see this supposed 
expression of freedom as an empty freedom, for having left Marcelle, he 
feels so detached from his action that he realizes that any alternative 
course would have been just as adequate as a realization of freedom.
The fact that Mathieu*s decision was purely arbitrary, meant it was more 
like the outcome of chance than an expression of human freedom.
By willing this individualistic freedom then, we defeat our own 
purpose, and contradict ourselves. For even if we achieve individualistic 
freedom, we discover soon enough that we are not free but in a state of 
bondage. We have done nothing less than to choose our own unfreedom.
To be truly free, we must express our essential nature. We must 
will that which is the highest expression of rational self-consciousness, 
which is to say that we must not give our personal perspective undue 
weight. For if we do, we find that we have limited ourselves by not 
allowing our vision to rise beyond one narrow point in space and time.
The freedom of this standpoint is the freedom of an extreme parochialism, 
which is no less than the extreme of limitation; it is the attitude 
in which human consciousness is most dominated by contingent factors.
To want to have only the freedom which, can accrue to finite 
individuals is to seek bondage, since finite individuals have no ability 
for self-transcendence. They are Cor would be if they could actually
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exist in this attitude) at the extreme point of the scale of subjection.
In real freedom the moment of subjectivity does not serve as a J
limitation, but rather as a vehicle by means of which we transcend the 
walls of our finite selfhood. In knowledge, for example, we are freest 
when the subjective conveys to us information about things-in-themselves, 
when there is no opposition between subjective and objective. This 
principle finds its analogue in action, for action is freest when it is 
least determined by the mere contingent features which limit and delimit 
the particular. The particular is used as a vehicle for the expression 
of something which transcends its own standpoint, if the latter is 
abstracted from the whole and taken in isolation. Free action will not 
put the stress on my particular interests, it will rather express what 
I essentially am, someone capable of more than these particular interests.
The Platonic view that evil is a form of ignorance is thus not 
entirely misguided. It arises because we misunderstand what our interests, 
as beings with the capacity for rational self-consciousness, ultimately 
are. We see ourselves as isolated individuals, separate from and in 
competition with similar individuals. From this viewpoint, freedom 
seems to involve the necessity to subdue such antagonistic creatures 
which, at every point, stand in our way, from whom fulfilment is 
impossible, and who would subdue us given only the opportunity. Our 
ill intentions towards others are based on these pluralistic assumptions.
It is these assumptions then which give rise to moral evil, assumptions 
which are a product of ignorance. Yet the' type of ignorance here is not 
one which renders the finite individual totally devoid of responsibility, 
since the ignorance is not merely a matter of a lack of (essentially 
passive) experience or information, it is an ignorance which is in a sense 
freely chosen. For as we explained previously, we are endowed with a 
strange sort of freedom which enables us to choose bondage. Moral evil
1
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is indeed based on a type of ignorance, and ignorance is certainly 
limitation upon our free activity, yet the ignorance is not purely the 
result of a cognitive process, it is the product of a vefusdi to take 
a wider view of things than individualistic pluralism permits.
Turning now to mankind’s inclination towards religious worship,
Bosanquet's account not only explains why this impulse is present as a 
feature of the phenomenology of self-conscious life but at the same time 
rids us of idfficulties which arise when this impulse manifests itself 
through the worship of a Divinity conceived of as utterly transcendent.
Broadly, the religious impulse is essentially a desire for self­
transcendence. It is the desire to get beyond our finitude and to 
apprehend something which transcends the limitations of our individual 
perspective. Religion conceives of God as totally transcendent when 
the difficulties of self-transcendence are most keenly felt by 
consciousness. For this form of religious worship the eternal is iregarded as something quite outside human consciousness, it stands over 
against us as an "other". Human consciousness in this posture is over­
whelmed by the boldness of its ambition to transcend its finite 
limitations (to which it feels itself inexorably bound). We have seen 
that the moment of the universal, which necessitates transcendence 
beyond a finite personal perspective, is part of the nature of any self- 
conscious life. In an utterly transcendent theism, this universal aspect 
is abstracted from worldly self-consciousness, which has not the confidence 
to acknowledge that this moment is its own; it is projected outside 
itself into an other-worldly realm, such that the universal moment 
presents itself in the form of an unfathomable "Beyond". I
This abstraction from human self-consciousness of what is in itruth its own essence means that the infinite appears to the finite as *
something alien and external, something whose transcendence only is known
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but whose immanence is forgotten.
This view of the Infinite, which indeed may be identified with 
the God of certain theistic sects, gives rise to grave epistemological 
problems. For how can something so utterly "wholly other" than man even 
begin to be known by him?
Theologians and philosophers of religion have spent much time 
and effort grappling with this question, without much reward for the 
intensity of their energies. To take just one example Kierkegaard 
acknowledges that for Christianity, the relation between the finite and 
the eternal is an absolute paradox; he admits that if the Infinite 
really stands beyond the finite, the idea that a finite mind could have 
knowledge of the Infinite is a literal absurdity to the understanding. 
Kierkegaard wants to claim that it is only by a sort of miracle that 
man comes to have knowledge of God. The miracle consists in our being 
able to be "in the truth" about God, even when it is togioatty unintelli­
gible that we, as the purely finite, can know God's nature. In the 
Philosophical Fragments Kierkegaard exalts in the miracle with these 
words :
"This thought did not arise in my own 
heart! .., And is it not altogether miraculous and does not this word come as a happy omen to my lips, for as I have just said, and as you yourself involuntarily 
exclaim, we stand here before the Miracle." 12
In spite of his raptures about the Miracle, it is quite clear 
that Kierkegaard cannot be true to a belief in what he admits to be a 
logical absurdity. In Concluding Unscientific Postscript and The 
Concept of Dread, he elaborates further upon the nature of his "Miraçle"
12. Philosophical Fragments, p.45.
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until so much is explained that some of its miraculousness begins to 
disappear!
When we stand before the miracle we are looking into ourselves,
into our inwardness, our subjectivity. Kierkegaard specifically says
that this is the only way in which we may find God. For he says that
"Nature, the totality of created things, is the work, of God. And yet
God is not there; but within the individual man there is a potentiality
(man is potentially spirit) whioh is awakened in inwardness to become a
13God-relationship, and then it becomes possible to see God everywhere."
Knowledge of God then comes to us while we are looking into our 
own finite selves, into our inwardness. But what sort of miracle is 
this? A miracle is something whose whole essence is to be unintelli­
gible. It is a phenomenon which cannot in principle be explained. Yet 
here we have an account of how we know God which renders such knowledge 
perfectly intelligible. We know the infinite through the finite because 
the finite itself expresses the Infinite, A full knowledge of our own 
nature leads us to a knowledge of the divine nature. To put this another 
way, self-conscious life is a synthesis of particular and universal, and 
the universal is known by turning our attention inward, and attending 
to the condition which is the condition of our particular experiences 
of ourselves and of things in the external world. Kierkegaard falls 
back finally on the view that God is not "wholly other" than man, and 
is forced to concede that his God is immanent as well as transcendent.
That Kierkegaard cannot sustain the position which holds that 
God is purely transcendent comes through especially strongly in The 
Concept of Dread. We need only quote one important passage to 
illustrate how Kierkegaard had to concede in the end that (human) self- 
conscious life is a synthesis of the finite and the Infinite. Speaking
13. Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p.220-221.
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of the knowledge we have of our (potentially) infinite freedom, 
Kierkegaard says :-
"Thus dread is the dizziness which occurs when the spirit would posit the synthesis, and 
freedom then gazes down into its own possi­
bility, grasping at finiteness to sustain itself." 14
Kierkegaard's miracle, through which, we know the nature of the 
Infinite, turns out to be nothing more than the miracle of the universal 
finding expression through the particular. It is indeed the miracle 
which allows for the possibility of all self-conscious life. But this 
type of miracle, which Kierkegaard is forced to describe in this way, 
is quite incompatible with his other-worldly theism and his idea that 
Christianity is an Absolute Paradox, such that Infinite and finite are 
so utterly opposed that the latter could not even begin to know the 
former through its own efforts.
Kierkegaard begins with a determination to preserve the otherness 
of God and ends up by stressing the dialectical interdependence of 
Infinite and finite: -from which it follows that the otherness of God 
vanishes. For to be infinite is to have a potential for self-conscious 
life, and self-conscious life is here, on this earth. Kierkegaard, in 
spite of all his efforts to do precisely the opposite, commits himself 
in the end to a view the implications of which are essentialist and 
dialectical, rather than existentialist. And it is interesting to 
remember that Hegel, no less than Kierkegaard, thought that the Infinite 
- finite relation was an absurdity and could not be grasped by the 
(analytical) Understanding. It could only be grasped by the higher 
synthesizing faculty, which he called Reason.
14. Concept of Dread, p.55, Lowrie translation. a
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Kierkegaard's exertions show how problematic are attempts to 
show that God is "wholly other". Those who have tried have always 
espoused various brands of irrationalism, the gist of which is captured 
by Barth's assertion that faith cannot argue with unbelief, it can only 
preach to it. Any attempt to explain further inevitably leads to the 
abandonment of the view of God as totally transcendent and "Beyond".
It comes to be seen that such views are arrived at simply by abstracting 
the infinite moment of human self-consciousness and projecting it 
heavenward, so that the universally valid and infinite appears as something 
outside of self-consciousness. When this happens we can say no more.
We can worship something which we do not, and cannot, understand.
The irrationalism and alienation which arise from a conception 
of God as an utterly transcendent Being may be explained and overcome 
if we adopt Bosanquet's view of the nature of finite selves and the 
Concrete Universal. For according to Bosanquet we are all partial 
manifestations of an unlimited fully rational "Whole", and are therefore 
imbued with a nature which is at once particular and universal. Our 
consciousness of God, as expressed in our feelings of religious worship 
constitutes, in Bosanquet's view, an awareness of a Being which is, in 
reality, immanent as well as transcendent. The fact that religious 
feelings of worship have led many to posit a Divinity which is "wholly 
other" than human beings is not surprising when we consider how seldom 
we manage to reach the highest (moral and cognitive) levels of our own 
nature. The divine nature, although perhaps correctly conceived of as 
the ultimate potential of any being imbued with self-consciousness and 
rationality, is nonetheless a potential which human beings persistently 
fail to make actual, and this is why God appears so frequently as 
utterly transcendent.
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Yet it is necessary for God (or the Absolute) to be immanent (as 
well as transcendent) if we are to have any determinate knowledge of the 
Divine nature. If God really were "wholly other", or wholly transcendent, 
we could know nothing of his nature. Only the view advanced by Bosanquet, 
that the Absolute is at once immanent and transcendent, can satisfactorily 
explain why we seek to do the impossible, that is, to worship a Being 
which is wholly trnascendent yet whose nature we can (at least partially) 
know.
Having discussed the implications of Bosanquet's view of individ­
uality in relation to moral responsibility and religious feelings of 
worship, we come finally to the problem about love. If we are not 
ultimately separate individuals, it could be argued, how could it be 
that there can exist love as we experience it?
Pringle-Pattison in particular raises this objection. Love, he 
claims, is impossible, so long as there is not a plurality of finite 
beings. In his reply to Bosanquet in the Symposium we have been 
quoting from, Pringle-Pattison states:-
"If love, then, becomes the ultimate expression 
of the divine nature, as it is in the Christian 
conception, self-centredness must disappear; 
the divine life must be a life with and for others, and the otherness must be real and not only apparent." 15
With regard to love, we may begin with a question which is 
analogous to the one we asked about freedom. If individualistic 
pluralism were true what would then be the nature of love? How would 
such a view make it possible for self-centredness to disappear, in 
a way that in Bosanquet's view it could not? And we may reply, as we
15. P.A.S. Sup. Vol.l, p.123.
193
did with respect to freedom, that such love would either be based on 
pure feeling, or else it would be a matter of an arbitrary decision.
Love between individuals who are merely individuals could have none of 
that lasting and eternal significance which we want to convey through 
it. To love someone for the individualist is nothing less than tragic, 
since his experience of love seeks to exact something from another 
which that other cannot, as an individual, provide. He knows his love, 
experienced at first as something with infinite power and significance, 
to be illusory, for nothing in his own nature conceived of as a particular 
finite being, tells him that love is. anything more than the product of 
whim or chance. Bounded by a sea of contingencies, it flickers for a 
short time and then goes out for ever. Also associated with this 
individualistic conception of love is the notion that the only reason 
which we can have for loving is our own personal satisfaction.
If love, then, is impossible on a theory which holds that there 
is no ultimate division between finite individuals, it is certainly 
no more possible on individualistic premises.
The objection that if we are not ultimately separate we cannot 
love, since there is no genuine otherness, may well be an objection to 
a thorough-going monism but not to the theories upheld by Hegel and 
Bosanquet. For their theories hold that our particular natures, through 
which we express the universal, have a certain substantial independence - 
indeed it is for this very reason that Bosanquet tells us that finite 
individuals have a type of individuality which is not shared by mere 
things (which are delineated as units only for practical convenience).
This substantiality is so definite that we have the power to assert 
our particular interests against our higher nature, (in which we would 
transcend this mere particularity and thereby become free) even though, 
in so doing, we choose our own unfreedom. We are then, in a sense,
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genuine selves, but these selves contain the potential to be more than 
what they are in all their finitude and limitation, they are more than 
they experience themselves to be in any single moment. They are 
incomplete unities whose pretensions to be complete are not actualised.
The completion of these intentional unities transforms them into 
something which is other than they appear to themselves to be, something 
which coalesces and is one with the other finite selves when so 
completed. The essence of knowledge, as well as morality, lies 
precisely in the way in which we are able to overcome the limitations 
imposed by our own particular perspective. Knowledge aims to cease 
regarding things purely instrumentally, as objects which are merely 
useful to our practical purposes. It tries to get beyond this and know 
how things are more truly, either as they are in themselves or at the 
very least, as they are intersubjectively, that is, for all self- 
consciousnesses. And there could be no such thing as morality if self- J
consciousness did not have an attitude in which it refrains from putting 1its particular interests first, before those of others. There is 1widespread disagreement about how such impartiality is best achieved 
and over the details of what it consists in, but from Plato to Hare, 
some sort of capacity to not give our special needs predominance and to 
formulate and live by universally binding moral rules has been seen as 
the driving force behind, and the reason for, the existence of such a 
thing as moral consciousness. Returning to love: it seems that it is
best explained as a sort of limiting case of the moral consciousness, 
in which the tendency to put oneself first as a particular is not even 
felt. The morally-aware consciousness, which lives by universal rules 
and binding duties, keeps these firmly before it since at this stage 
it is aware of the strong temptation of the mind as a particular to 
assert itself against these universels. There is fragmentation within
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the personality; two sides are at war, the side which makes claims 
for itself as particular and the side which seeks transcendence of self 
as particular. This explains why the very word "duty" often has a 
loveless and harsh ring about it; when one does one's duty, one 
defies one's inclinations. For when I do my duty, the principle of 
universal self-transcendence and my spontaneous inclinations have not 
been fully reconciled. Once the reconciliation has been completed, and 
the self-transcendence of the particular (by realising itself as the 
expression of a higher will) takes place without strain, that is, when
duties and inclinations are perfectly harmonised, then what emerges is s;'1neither duty nor inclination, but a synthesis which is qualitatively i
different from either. This synthesis is love. And it is only on a 
view of finite individuals which sees the individual as ultimately an 
expression of the Absolute that such a reconciliation between duty and 
inclination can be effected.
The absence of ultimate otherness, then, so far from being an 
obstacle for love, is its very precondition. For only on this basis can 
transcendence of self-as-particular be a real possibility. It is true 
that I direct my love towards an object, an object which is, in a sense 
my other, but just in so far as I overcome my estrangement from this 
"other" do I succeed in loving. I do not become at any time absolutely 
identical with this "other" since there must indeed be some genuine otherness 
if there is to be love. But genuine otherness does not mean ultimate 
otherness, and Bosanquet's view fully allows for differentiation and 
particularity within the universe. The problem with critics such as 
Pringle-Pattison is that they have failed totally to perceive that tà
genuine otherness may exist without this requiring that there be ultimate 
otherness.
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In love, we recognize more fully^^ what this chapter has been 
arguing for all along, that the dividing line which seems to separate 
finite beings from each other is not impregnable. In love, we 
experience not identity with the "other" but a sort of ultimate 
closeness and unification therewith, which is the experience of a self­
transcendence which is as near as we come in daily life to what can be 
made manifest only in the life of union with the Absolute.
Further Objections of Pringle-Pattison
Pringle-Pattison puts forward what are basically two types of 
argument against Bosanquet's position. Firstly, he argues that we are 
committed on Bosanquet’s view of selfhood to unacceptable propositions 
concerning our moral responsibility, our religious impulses, and our 
ability to love. Bosanquet's theories, we are told, contradict what 
Pringle-Pattison regards as the elementary certainties of life. 
Pringle-Pattison, we should note, gives no argument to show why we have 
to regard the things he mentions as elementary certainties, and in the 
case of his main example he simply states:
"The authorship of our own acts and our responsibility for them - this is the 
innermost meaning of our freedom and independence and any theory is self­
condemned which can find no room for this elementary certainty." 17
In view of the philosophical arguments which have been adduced for
16. But not necessarily completely fully. For with love often we recognize the principle only as it relates to one or a very limited number of individuals.
17. P.A.S., Sup. Vol.l, p.114.
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determinism, together with the strong fatalistic feelings which mankind 
has experienced and written about down the ages (e.g. in the Greek 
tragedies) it seems highly dubious to regard human freedom as something 
which is immediately self-evident. If it is a certainty at all, it is 
not an immediate one. We can know it to be so only at the end of a 
deep and wearisome process of thought. We saw previously that there is, 
in any case, no conflict between the aspects of human life which Pringle- 
Pattison seeks to preserve and Bosanquet’s view of selfhood. It is 
indeed only by way of the latter that we explain and understand the 
former. Thus we have already seen that Pringle-Pattison's first set of 
arguments, his attempts at a reduot-io ad absurdum of Bosanquet's position, 
cannot get off the ground.
The second type of argument which Pringle-Pattison advances, i
proceeds by trying to show more directly that there are deficiencies |
■Jin Bosanquet's phenomenology. The idea here is that Bosanquet has come ij
to his view of the nature of finite selves by overlooking certain â
Iimportant considerations. Arguments of this type we now have to 1consider.
The arguments which try to show that Bosanquet's phenomenology J
is deficient, rest on a view of Bosanquet's phenomenology which is itself 
deficient. Often it looks very much as if Pringle-Pattison has totally 
misunderstood Bosanquet's notion of finite selfhood. What he cannot 
seem to grasp is that although Bosanquet does not believe in the self­
completeness and total autonomy of finite individuals, this does not 
mean that he regards them as mere appearances or illusions. Pringle- 
Pattison forgets that when Bosanquet uses terms like "apparent" and 
"superficial", these terms are not intended to qualify the finite 
individuals themselves, but rather their seeming independence and 
distinctiveness from each other. For Bosanquet, finite individuals are
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the expressions or modifications of the one reality. We have already 
seen, in our discussion of Hegel's dialectic, just how important is 
the moment of the particular, to which the finite individual corresponds.
We saw that the universal absolutely requires the particular, if it 
(the universal) is to be creative and dynamic, and not to collapse into 
the nothingness of an abstract self-identity. Further, Bosanquet shows 
an awareness of the limited independence possessed by finite individuals 
when he points out that, in this case, unlike that of inanimate things, 
we do not and cannot delimit what counts as a unit arbitarily or for i
practical convenience. The nature of spiritual finite individuals as
■intended unities dictates that we should distinguish one from another as 4*
we do. Because the unification is not complete in finite individuals, |
such individuals cannot by themselves be taken as self-complete. But
this certainly does not mean that he wants to claim that finite
individuals are in the end non-existent, for this would be to espouse
the extreme form of thorough-going monism which denies the moment of the
particular.
Granted this major misinterpretation of Bosanquet's theory on 
Pringle-Pattison's part, we can see that the two leading arguments which 
presuppose it and by which he seeks to establish his position must 4
inevitably fail.
The first of these holds that Bosanquet can only establish his 
position by attending to the content of finite selves, and not to the 
form. By so abstracting the content from the form, Pringle-Pattison 
maintains, Bosanquet is able to ignore the significance of numerical 3
identity, or the plurality of egos which binds the content of experience 
together. Pringle-Pattison maintains that he does not want to claim 
that there is a mere plurality of extevnaZty related selves, since he '
would not want to affirm what this would imply, the existence of unrelated
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reals. Nonetheless, he still wants to emphasize the importance of 
numerical identity.
By contrast, says Pringle-Pattison, "Professor Bosanquet appears 
to think of contents as a self-existent continuum and of the conditions 
of individual existence as comparable to partitions introduced into 
this continuum (as v/e might let down vessels of different shapes into 
a stream) by which one section or area is temporarily enclosed and to 
its own misfortune, isolated from the rest."^^
This picture is a total distortion of Bosanquet's idea of 
finite selfhood. For vessels of any size could be let down into a 
stream at any point and such enclosures would have bounds which are 
utterly arbitrary. Bosanquet does not ignore the significance of 
numerical identity, except insofar as he regards each finite individual 
as more than a result of numerical addition.
It is the distortion of Bosanquet's views as exemplified by the 
"vessels in the stream" analogy that enables Pringle-Pattison to claim 
that Bosanquet draws a conclusion (concerning the ultimate confluence of 
finite selves) based on ignoring the form of experience in favour of 
the content. Pringle-Pattison perceives that it would be plausible to 
hold that vessels let down into a stream contain a content which is part 
of the same stream! And from this he concludes that if Bosanquet wants 
to say that we are manifestations of the same Absolute, he can only have 
reached this conclusion by attending to the content of experience and 
ignoring the form in a way analogous to the way we ignore the form of 
the vessels. (But whereas in the stream analogy this does not matter, 
here, Pringle-Pattison maintains, it is crucial). Bosanquet's phenomen­
ology, we are told, contains a vital omission, and renders his
18. ibid. p.108.
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conclusion unjustified.
Pringle-Pattison, we can see, mistakes the nature of Bosanquet's 
conclusion, for it is quite evident that on Bosanquet's view we are 
not parts of the Absolute in the same way that water is part of a 
stream. But because Pringle-Pattison regards being an expression of 
the Absolute as like being part of a stream, he concludes quite 
correctly, granted this (mistaken) premise, that the only way of reach­
ing this conclusion is to attend exclusively to the content. Yet if 
we attend only to the content in the case of selves, no justifiable 
conclusion can arise.
We can see now that Pringle-Pattison does not conclude that 
Bosanquet's phenomenology ignores the form of experience by examining 
how Bosanquet actually looks at finite individuals. He rather looks 
at a mistaken interpretation of Bosanquet's conclusion and says, in 
effect, that if Bosanquet can come up with such a theory, he must have
ignored the form. For it seems to be the only possible way to arrive
at Bosanquet's conclusion.
If we look at Bosanquet's actual procedure, instead of discover­
ing what it must have been by looking for the presuppositions of a view 
he did not hold, it becomes quite clear that Bosanquet did not abstract 
the content from the form of experience. It is true that Bosanquet does 
not specifically tell us why his view of finite selfhood arises from a 
consideration of firstly the content and secondly the form of human 
conscious experience, but that is because, for Bosanquet, there is no
sharp distinction between the form of such experience and the content.
In taking account of the content of experience in all its, depth and 
fullness, one becomes aware of oneself as an experiencing subject, so 
that awareness of the form of experience is actually internal to aware­
ness of the content. The experience that comes before me does so as
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essent'Catiy my experience. The quality of "my-ness" infects the basic 
nature of the objects of experience itself.
That Bosanquet takes due account of subjectivity, or what Pringle- 
Pattison chooses to call the form of experience, becomes plain when we 
look at what he has to say about how we experience ourselves. Contrary 
to Pringle-Pattison's remarks, we can see that Bosanquet constantly 
argues for his position by stressing features that concern how an ego 
experiences itself. He speaks for example of the fragmentation and 
limitation of finite subjectivity that we all know as finite subjects.
"Every contradiction in my world of experience obstructs my action and embarrasses my will; and every pain or defeat or confusion of which 
I am aware, in any subject or object apprehended 
by me, is a contradiction in my world." 19
Thus,
"The existence of the self is hot adequate to 
its implied unity, which is a pretension inherent in a thinking being." 2 0
The second objection raised by Pringle-Pattison is that 
Bosanquet arrives at his conclusions by taking up the standpoint of 
the observer. According to Pringle-Pattison, Bosanquet never looks at 
what it is to be a self as it were, "from the inside." Thus he remarks, 
"The truth is. Professor Bosanquet's view is of the type mentioned 
above, in which the logical analysis of knowledge is substituted for 
an account of living experience." The view that finite selves are 
merely "peepholes, so to speak, from which an identical content is 
contemplated" is arrived at by failing to look at the self as it 
experiences itself.
19. ibid. p.95.
20. ibid. p.97.
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The view that Bosanquet takes up the standpoint of the observer 
is in line with the view that he attends only to the form. And ,we can 
answer it in exactly the same way. It is simply false to say that 
Bosanquet does not look at finite selves "from the inside". The 
quotations already cited are sufficient to show this. But we may cite 
one more quotation concerning how Bosanquet establishes his position 
precisely by considering finite individuals, as they appear to be to 
themselves, from the inside. Here, in the following passage, it is a 
very specific attention to subjectivity which leads Bosanquet to speak 
in the first person and say: "I cannot believe that the supreme end
of the Absolute is to give rise to beings such as I experience myself
21to be."
In this passage Bosanquet, so far from failing to take up his 
stand "within the self" is more in danger, if anything, of being one- 
sidedly subjective than a detached observer. Were it not for the rest 
of his argument, one might accuse him of taking his stand so much within 
the self that he was relying far too much on his immediate feelings and 
perceptions. If this is, as Pringle-Pattison claims "the logical analysis 
of knowledge" substituted for "an account of living experience" one is 
led to wonder what an account of living experience would be like for 
Pringle-Pattison. One wonders too, just how t'iV'Lng would be the type 
of experience which could not be described in any intellectual or 
philosophical terms at all.
We have now seen that the two interrelated objections with which 
Pringle-Pattison attempts to refute Bosanquet are both totally unfounded.
They arise from a basic misunderstanding of Bosanquet's doctrine. But 
why was Pringle-Pattison led, in the first place, to misunderstand?
21. ibid. p.88.
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Why was he so anxious to defend a pluralism of finite selves that he 
overlooked important aspects of Bosanquet's view which greatly weaken 
his case? The answer to be given is indicated by one remark which he 
let slip in his paper: "It is certain, at all events, that our con­
clusions as to the value and destiny of the individual must ultimately
depend upon our conception of God and of his relation to his 
22creatures."
For all his insistence that a correct view of selfhood depends 
upon carefully studying what it is to be a subject and for all his 
condemnation of Bosanquet for not taking up his stand "W'ith'in" the 
self, Pringle-Pattison suddenly comes out with the admission that our 
view of selfhood depends ultimately, not on a close scrutiny of 
subjectivity, but rather upon something which, on his own pluralistic 
view, is quite external to it, that is, our conception of God. We now 
see why Pringle-Pattison is so anxious to defned pluralism. It is 
because pluralism of selves is alone compatible with the type of theism 
which he wishes to espouse. He realises that Bosanquet's view of self­
hood is a threat to the absolute transcendence of God, which he wants at 
all costs to emphasize. One thing which he does not misunderstand about 
Bosanquet's view is that it holds that finite beings are in some way 
expressions of the Infinite. This is too close to deifying man for ,
Pringle-Pattison's liking, it is too close to claiming that finite 
beings are in themselves divine, that they are in the end identical with
God. The objections of Pringle-Pattison do not we may conclude, seem }I
to be so much motivated by a desire to avoid certain philosophical 1
errors, (such as not abstracting content from form or taking too ]
detached a viewpoint), as by a strong and pervasive determination to avoid i
------------------------------------------------------------------- '  i22. ibid. p.113. ' . I1
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what he considers to be blasphemy.
The Pluralism of H.D. Lewis
H.D. Lewis is a Cartesian dualist, a Christian theist, and a
fervent advocate of the independence and plurality of finite selves.
But he regards Pringle-Pattison's arguments for pluralism as weak, and
in particular, weaker than the arguments of his opponent Bosanquet, in
spite of the fact that he sees the conclusions of the latter as
ultimately less defensible. The reason for this, Lewis tells us, is
because both Bosanquet and Pringle-Pattison accept a presupposition
about the nature of the self from which. Bosanquet's view more plausibly
follows. To have got the better in the debate, Pringle-Pattison would
have had to repudiate this initial assumption. By failing to do this,
however,Pringle-Pattison allows Bosanquet "to score heavily, in point
of rigidity and consistency of argument over his immediate opponent in 
23the symposium."
Since Lewis admits that once we locate the essence of selfhood 
where Bosanquet and Pringle-Pattison do, a non-pluralistic view 
follows, we need to discover just where it is - for the latter two - 
located, and where and why Lewis would re-position it.
Lewis asserts that for Bosanquet, the fundamental feature of a 
finite self is that it is a unifying centre of experience. "The point 
to note especially," writes Lewis, "is the preoccupation with the 
content of experience and its unification, whether in thinking or in 
action.
23. The Elusive Mind, p.285.
24. ibid. p.284.
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It is quite true that for Bosanquet it is indeed the unifying 
feature of finite individuality that constitutes its essential self­
hood. It is this that makes finite selves genuine individuals whose 
bounds are drawn for us so that we can delimit the units as we do with 
"things", for convenience. It is also this unifying feature of selves 
which leads us to notice that in any particular finite self the unifi­
cation is never complete, but is such that selves are only intended 
unities. Lewis admits that;
"Once this move is made, the important thing 
about us, as persons, seems to be the unifi­cation and extension of experience by which 
it becomes identical with the experience of others ... " 25
Once we accept that the essence of selfhood is to be a unifying 
centre of experience, Lewis agrees that it follows to say with 
Bosanquet that if the intended unity became actualized, we would be 
"the absolute, for certainly we would be blended with innumerable 
other selves.
Pringle-Pattison, Lewis tells us, shares Bosanquet's initial 
assumption about selfhood. He then proceeds to argue for the ultimate 
separateness of finite individuals by employing arguments whose weakness ^
Lewis is fully prepared to admit. Lewis mentions in particular the 
argument of Pringle-Pattison which insists that there must be individua­
tion and differentiation which he (Lewis) claims is quite compatible 
with Bosanquet's position. To Pringle-Pattison's remark that "every 
part of the whole exhibits the same characteristic of concrete thisness,"
Lewis replies that "it is by no means clear what is at issue here which
25. idem.
26. ibid. p.285.
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27Bosanquet could not accept." For, "Bosanquet certainly does not
want to regard the finite self as a mere appearance. The absolute
28would not be what it is without it." In these comments Lewis 
recognizes the truth of what we argued for earlier, that Pringle- 
Pattison only makes his arguments look plausible by grotesquely 
distorting Bosanquet's position.
Lewis, having disposed of Pringle-Pattison as the "ineffective 
champion of a worthy cause", sets out on his task of attempting to 
demolish the assumption which renders Pringle-Pattison's arguments so 3ineffective. Concerning that assumption, he asks: a
"Have we still not too rarefied a view of the 
individual person, and is the independence required in morality and religion so keenly 
championed by Pringle-Pattison, guaranteed at all by 'a unique focalisation of the universe?'" 29
This rarefied view of the individual, Lewis claims, "might have I
1been avoided if Pringle-Pattison had followed out more effectively his
own insistence that we should look at finite selves from the inside. 3
For it is then that we properly see how the self is not merely a focus
to which our various experiences are referred, but a reality on its own
account, however much also involved in having its experiences, a reality
which is known to itself uniquely in a way which cannot be reduced at
30all to the specification of distinctive characteristics."
Two points may be made in reply to Lewis. The first, which is
27. ibid. p.287.
28. ibid. p.288.
29. ibid. p.289.
30. ibid. p.290.
.f;
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the less important of the two, is that we cannot dismiss a view of the 
individual as rarefied simply because it does not support a particular 
religious or moral view of the self. Or at least, if we wanted to 
claim its inadequacy by virtue of its being so incompatible, we would 
have to argue for the religious or moral view on independent grounds.
If Lewis tells us that Bosanquet's view of the self is incompatible 
with the independence required in morality and religion (which he seems 
to equate with ChT'Cst'ian morality and Ch.T'ist'tan religion) , this does 
not tell us anything until he has successfully argued for the 
proposition that we should accept such a morality and such a religion.
If what Lewis means is that a Bosanquetian view of finite selves is 
incompatible with any religion and any morality, we have seen already 
why this is not so.
If a view of selfhood does not go along with moral responsibility 
and religion as understood in Christian terms, this does not make it 
self-evidently false.
Lewis earlier argues that we should attend to what he calls the
element of inescapable brute fact in experience. "There seems," he
writes, "to be an element of brute fact in all that we encounter in the 
31world around us." And he agrees with Pringle-Pattison's remark that 
we should not substitute a logical analysis of knowledge for an account 
of living experience. His idea is that theories should be made to 
accommodate what we find to be deeply true in our experience, it is 
indefensible to perform a reduction of the latter to make it fit a theory.
With this idea, which is formal only, we may agree. The problem arises 
when Lewis assumes that we will accept a specific content as brute fact. |
31. ibid. p.278. Even if we do not wish to hold that there are
absolute'ly brute facts, which involve no element of interpre­
tation, we could no doubt accept at least that some facts are more brutish than others.
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This content has to do with our moral and religious awareness. We 
could perhaps accept that some sovt of moral and religious awareness 
is a basic feature of human experience. But then, some sovt of moral 
and religious experience is quite compatible with Bosanquet's position; 
such details could not plausibly be regarded as being in the realm of 
brute fact.
We pass on now to our second and more important argument in 
reply to Lewis's claim that the Bosanquet/Pringle-Pattison idea of the 
self is rarefied. Lewis, as well as telling us that our view of self­
hood must allow for moral and religious awareness, also tells us that 
the individual experiences himself as more than a mere unifying centre 
of experience. The idea here is that once we attend to the richness 
and depth of self-conscious experience, we cannot avoid the conclusion 
that we have the sort of ultimate independence which Lewis wants to 
claim for us.
We may reply at once that we may admit that we are more than
mere "principles of unification." For there is also the content which
32is unified and this, in a sense, is part of ourselves. This particular
content is different for each one of us, and also the degree to which we 
succeed and fail in the task of unification will vary greatly. Our 
experience of ourselves will naturally be an experience which includes 
experience of what has been unified, and not purely and simply an 
experience of a consoiousness-'in-the-aot-of-unifying. We may agree with 
Lewis too that the particular content of consciousness, that which is 
unified, is just as important for self-conscious life as the activity 
of the subject. Indeed, once we accept that the self is a unifying
32. Although we may be more or less estranged from such content, the alienation can never be total.
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centre we are absolutely compelled to regard it as something more as 
well for the act of unification presupposes a determinate content to 
be unified. It would indeed be not only a rarefied but a self­
contradictory view of selfhood to affirm that selves are nothing more 
than the formal principle of unification.
Having accepted these considerations about the importance of 
the specific content of experience, one could well be led to wonder 
why Lewis regards them as lending support for pluralism. The fact that 
a finite self is moTe than a focalising centre of experience does not 
mean that it is not that as well. And if it is, we can still argue for 
Bosanquet's position on the grounds of the finite individual's intended 
unity. Bosanquet's view can quite well accommodate the fact that for 
each finite self-consciousness there is a different overall content of 
experience, this is the moment of the particular which must always be 
present so long as the unity is only intended.
It is no use for Lewis to argue against Bosanquet then on the
grounds that finite individuals are more than mere unifying centres of 
33experience . The only possible way in which he could prove his case 
is by showing that the speoif-io nature of this "more" is such as to 
make non-pluralistic views of finite selfhood totally implausible.
But Lewis does not seem to think it is possible to even attempt this 
approach. For he tells us that the self has a "peculiar elusiveness" 
and that it is impossible in the end to specify its "distinctive character­
istics". How then, we might ask, is it possible to be so sure that these 
avowedly elusive distinctive characteristics are specific enough to 
exclude Bosanquet's view of the self?
33. Lewis, we should note, never attempts to argue that selves are not
unifying centres of experience, but only that they are more as well.
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The only answer to this lies in the fact that there are times 
when Lewis does not hold to his view that it is impossible to specify 
the distinctive characteristics of selfhood. When he talks of moral 
and religious awareness, this, if anything, is surely an attempt to 
specify some of the features of selfhood. And it becomes clear too 
once again that it is Lewis's understanding of the specific nature of 
such awareness that for him excludes Bosanquet's view. Insofar as 
Lewis's arguments sound plausible, this rests on his enshrouding of the 
fact that he has a very precise conception of certain specific features 
of selfhood. This leads us to overlook what is the case, namely that 
he excludes Bosanquet's position on the grounds of his very detailed 
conceptions about selfhood, conceptions which - in such detail - he at 
no point justifies.
Although Lewis's very detailed conception of selfhood remains 
unargued for (he does not argue for a detailed and specific view of 
the nature or the value of selfhood on the grounds that he hasn't got 
one, the self being elusive), we do not need to look very far to 
discover from where he surreptitiously imports it. Echoing the words 
of Pringle-Pattison which we quoted at the end of our last section, 
Lewis too gives himself away.
"It seems peQut'iar'ly inconsistent with the Christian religion to identify ourselves 
in this fashion with the being of God 
rather than understand ourselves as separate created finite beings, distinct from God and from one another." 34
34. The Elusive Mind, p.286.
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Lewis is certainly right when he says that Bosanquet’s view is 
peoutiarty inconsistent with the Christian religion, at least as he 
understands it, for he has not been able to show that it is incompatible 
with anything exoept his interpretation of the Christian religion.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE POSITION OF J.N. FINDLAY ON
THE NATURE OF FINITE SELVES
In the preceding two chapters, we have been concerned to demolish 
the objections which have been levelled against Hegel's and Bosanquet's 
view of the nature of finite individuals. We have seen, in the course 
of our discussion, that the view has (broadly) two types of opponents. 
There are firstly opponents such as Popper, who attack the dialectical 
logic by which Hegel and other Idealists arrive at this view, and 
secondly, there are opponents such as Lewis and Pringle-Pattison, who 
seek to show that the account is incompatible with important facets of 
human life and experience. Regarding both types of critics, we have 
seen that the arguments upon which they rest their case break down. 
However, although we have rejected the arguments adduced by the critics 
of the Hegelian position, we may strengthen our case still further if we 
can say a little more about the positive reasons why that view is 
right. Thus in this chapter, it is necessary to try to indicate more 
fully than we have done hitherto, why it is that on any adequate under­
standing of the nature and unity of our experience, it is utterly 
implausible to view finite beings as wholly separate from each other.
To help us in this task we shall take as our starting point the
philosophical ideas of J.N. Findlay, and carry out our investigation 4l
by way of an appraisal of his arguments. J
'IThe reason for choosing Findlay is that he is a contemporary 
philosopher who has done a vast amount of work in the area of our present
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concern, perhaps more than any other.
Findlay, in his two chapters on "The Realm of Minds" from The 
Discipline of the Cave, sets out a phenomenological account of the 
nature of mind. He begins his account by attempting to pinpoint just 
what it is which gives finite egos such individuality as they in fact Ipossess. He is very careful to give a full phenomenological account, ;|
and to avoid all forms of reductionism. Thus he pays special attention 
to the way in which a finite individual experiences itself. Yet Findlay 
hopes to show that it is precisely when we have given the fullest possible 
account of the world of minds as that world initially appears, that is, 
when we have before us the most complete picture of communicating minds,
that we shall have to "compass the collapse" of this world. For Findlay, 315:
it is not by way of reducing the finite mind to something less than it i
is that we are able to see (or imagine) the breakdown of its ultiraacy.
It is rather the building up of the substantiality of the finite mind - 
even qua individual finite mind - to its highest possible degree, that 
finally secures its collapse, or rather, transcendence. It is in this 
"building up" procedure that Findlay elucidates the general dialectical
Iprinciple upon which the unity of minds ultimately rests, that principle ÿ;
which issues in the more general unity of subjectivity and objectivity.
To show the degree to which individual minds are substantial, L
Findlay asks the question: "what happens when we try to deny their
existence entirely?" It is through reflection upon Descartes' cogito 
argument that Findlay arrives at his answer. His assessment of Descartes' 
argument is that it is no trite logical syllogism telling us only that 
"thought is not predictable of non-existent thinkers" but rather a fine 
phenomenological description of what inevitably must happen when a 
thinking subject tries to deny his own existence. As Findlay puts it, @
Descartes saw that the cogito argument: 3
;=5
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"was no ordinary syllogism complete with 
major, minor and middle terras, and other formal machinery, but he was inclined to 
construe it as a simple intuition of a necessary connection between thinking and 
being: something that thinks is also
something that must be held to be. This view of the argument is reflected in the 
unfortunate formula, Cogito Ergo Sum, which, 
we can say, does not represent the true course of the Cartesian argument and which, 
so far from expressing a worthwhile intuition really makes the emptiest of assertions, a mere application of the tautological trans­
formation of 'something is X' into X exists."
The real and positive lesson of Descartes' cogito argument is 
for Findlay a dialectical one. The importance and (tentative) independ­
ence of finite minds becomes most clear just when we most try to deny it, 
Descartes, in his attempt to deny everything which he normally perceived 
to be true about the world, became more clearly aware of the undenia- 
bility of one thing than he had ever been before - his own existence 
as a thinking subject. He became aware of his own thinking existence 
with a degree and mode of certainty which he would never have had had 
he not undergone the supreme intellectual struggle to cancel everything 
including his own perception of himself and even to deny his existence. 
What Descartes discovered, Findlay tells us, was that if we attempt to 
carry the denial of all perceived reality to its logical limit, there 
emerges an affirmation, an affirmation of selfhood which reaches the 
logical limit of certainty. When uncertainty is most fully itself - 
only then can we truly be certain.
1. Discipline of the Cave, p.166.
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"There may be no sun, no moon, no animate 
or inanimate bodies, none of the things in short, which we say enter into nature. It is then, when doubt in this undermining sense 
is at its greatest, that we switch to the other kind of doubt in which unqualified 
existential assertion replaces undermining; the non-being of the natural world which has 
become increasingly likely suddenly points to the being of the psychological processes, 
the doubts in which that possible non-being has made itself felt. And the being of these 
psychological doubts is as much assured as the being of their objects was in doubt." 2
The way in which the undeniable concrete existence of finite IIindividual selves, such as Descartes, is built up, gives us a clue as IIto how, as ultimately individual and undifferentiated, they break down. IFor just as the most forceful denial of all one's perceptions and j
knowledge leads to the most positive affirmation of individual selfhood, J
SO it is only when individual selfhood is affirmed most positively and 
reaches a peak of substantiality, that it breaks down. At that point, |
it finds its truth in passing over to being an expression of that which |
Iutterly transcends its own finitude. In this breaking down the finite Iself is not annihilated but rather fulfilled. ;|
IWhen Lewis and Pringle-Pattison characterise the Idealist denial |
of the ultiraacy of finite individuality as a simple immediate cancell- i|
ation they show that they have misunderstood that it is only by way of |
affirming individuality in the most absolute way possible that the 
finite mind finds it is forced to deny its total independence.
In his discussion of Descartes' cogito argument, and in the 
implication of this concerning the way in which finite minds ultimately 
collapse (just when they are most satisfactory even as individual 
minds), Findlay has revealed to us in broad outline the dialectical
2. ibid. p.167.
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nature of thought and reality. He has given us that principle which 3
lies at the base of the wider unity we mentioned earlier between 
subjectivity and objectivity generally. For we have here the dialect­
ical principle which, tells us that for any finite particular, when that ” 3
finite particular is most adequately grasped, it can no longer be seen 
as a mere finite particular, standing in abstract isolation.
When we consider the way in which Findlay is led to his dialectical 
conclusions, much light is cast on why so many modern philosophers have ^
not felt it necessary to think about the world dialectically. Findlay, 
it must not be forgotten, is led to a dialectical philosophy by giving 
non-reductionist phenomenological accounts of various aspects of the 
life of mind. It is possible, however, to avoid dialectics by way of ft
reductionism. For example, if one puts forward a reductionist account 
of finite selfhood, one never develops the concept of selfhood to the 
point where it is seen to pass beyond finite individuality. But what 
are these reductionist accounts of the life of mind and in what way do 
they portray the individual ego as less than it is?
There are two types of reductionist account of mental phenomena 
and it is to Findlay’s credit that he deals with them both. Firstly, '
there are the accounts, so popular in much recent philosophy, which seek 
to reduce the mental to a set of behavioural dispositions. The driving 
force behind this type of reduction is the idea that we can only 4
communicate thoughts if they can be translated into the realm of the 
publicly observable, that is into the objective. The second type of
ireductionism is that reductionism which attempts to deal with the mind 3
one-sidedly in terms of subjective inwardness, an approach, which 
assumes that only through introspection can one reach the inner recesses 
of the mind. This second type of reductionism is admittedly less common 
in modern philosophy than the first but it has been a popular approach
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in the past, and indeed has had much influence in the sphere of psycho­
logy. All introspective psychologies from Wundt onwards hold in common 
that a subject’s behaviour is a kind of barrier to our knowledge of a 
subject's inner life, and it is only by penetrating this outward "screen 
of illusion" that we can really know the subject's mind. We shall see 
however, that one does not need to fall into behaviourism to hold that 
the behaviour of a subject, the way in which it fulfils its conscious 
intentions in the external world, is essentially related to the nature
3of mind. Accounts that attempt to reduce mind to inner life alone are 
as one-sided and inadequate as those which attempt to reduce it to 
behavioural dispositions.
The Inadequacy of Behaviouristic Reductionism
Findlay gives two arguments against behaviouristic reductionism, 
both of which we may accept. In the first place, Findlay points out 
that the reduction of mind to behavioural dispositions relies on the 
fundamental mistake of equating the criteria of identity with the whole 
of what is identified. It assumes that because our knowledge of another 
mind is necessarily mediated by the way in which that mind expresses 
itself in the corporeal world, then all we can know is that corporeal 
world itself. Any attempt to go beyond this is idle speculation. This 
reductionism ignores what Findlay calls the "touching off" role of 
criteria of identity. The fact that we require behaviour to identify 
an other as the other he or she, is, does not mean that the other (or 
our knowledge of that other), is wholly commensurate with, the behaviour 
(or our knowledge of the behaviour) of that other. It means only that
3. Precisely in what way we shall see later.
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our knowledge is mediated. There is no reason why we should not know 
that other as a mind whose total being transcends the mediating signs.
A philosopher who insists on ignoring the "touching off" role 
of criteria of identity and who steadfastly refuses to accept that a 
person can be more than the behaviour through which he is known to 
others, will inevitably be led to take a pluralistic view of finite 
individuals. For he will see-before him distinctive sets of actions 
and dispositions, and, by avoiding the conception of selfhood according 
to which there is an inner mental world as well as an outer objective 
world, he will preclude himself from the possibility of discerning in 
the subject-object relationship any structure which might be suggestive 
of a non-pluralistic view of finite individuals. Yet a pluralism which 
arises as a result of the behaviouristic refusal to fully acknowledge 
the subjective (and consequently the relationship between subjective 
and objective) is profoundly unsatisfactory. It rests on an attenuated 
view of finite beings even qua finite beings, which serves to guarantee 
that the case for the dialectical transformation of finite individuals 
into manifestations of something more than merely finite, does not 
get a chance to be considered.
Findlay’s second argument against behaviouristic reductionism 
consists of a brilliant attempt to show how the demand which is the |
■Imotivation of this form of reductionism, the demand for absolute 4Iobjectivity through the construction of a world wherein all lies open
to view, - a world in which the shadowiness of inner mental life has
no place and presents no problems - is a demand which can be met in its I
imost total purity only for the solipsist. Findly argues that such an 3
"objective" world would then cease to be objective in the sense *
originally intended, and it would make as much sense to say that such ■
»a world would be purely mental or subjective as to say that it would be i
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objective. Or rather, it would make little sense to describe such a 
world in either way since there would be no way of distinguishing 
between them. According to Findlay, Wittgenstein actually accepted 
the solipsism which is the presupposition of the limiting case of 
objectivity. It is necessary however, to elucidate further.
Findlay explains in The Discipline of the Cave how solipsism and 
ultimate objectivity are really two sides of the same coin. He writes:
"solipsism seriously entertained immediately 
swings over into the purest of realism: ifthere is no sense in seeking to pass beyond 
the limits of my own experience, there ceases to be sense in treating it as personal and subjective. It makes no sense to say that I 
alone feel, think, etc., if there is no conceivable other to which I could oppose 
myself. If solipsism therefore becomes 
absolute, all discussions of language and meaning can blessedly take place in the clear 
daylight of objectivity, without any cross- lights from the inner life of anyone. It is 
hence not remarkable that we should come to deny the possibility of a language whose meanings are not pinned down by physical 
criteria, and which is not, in reality, a purely physical language." 4
Findlay, in the passage quoted, tells us that solipsism seriously 
entertained passes over into the purest of realisms. This does not of 
itself imply that "the purest of realisms" can onty be arrived at 
through solipsism, and that solipsism and absolute objectivity pass over 
into each other. We may criticise Findlay's carelessness here for he 3
■ 'Ifails to make his meaning absolutely explicit. However it seems clear
that Findlay has in mind the idea that absolute objectivity passes into "j
solipsism just as much as the converse. For starting from the object!- |
I
vity standpoint, we may say that it is only in a world where there are
4. Discipline of the Cave, p.186.
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no ”cross-lights from the inner life of anyone" that the use of meanings 
can be wholly adequately "pinned down by physical criteria." And what 
could such a world be if not a solipsistic one?
The attempt to give an analysis of the nature of mind in utterly 
objective behaviouristic terms is transformed when it reaches the 
point of greatest purity, for pure objectivity collapses into an all- 
embracing subject. And in such a subject, the corporeal external world 
and subjective conscious intentions completely coincide.
That behaviouristic reductionism collapses into solipsism is 
sufficient to enable us to decide, once and for all, that a behaviouristic 
account of a self-conscious ego is not one which can coherently be sus­
tained. If it could be, then it might lend support for a pluralistic 
view of finite individuals. But the solipsism into which it collapses 
is hardly such as to confirm the position of the behaviouristic pluralist. 
Behaviourists themselves, of course, do not notice the collapse of their 
reductionism into solipsism. If they did, they would not remain 
behaviourists, but become solipsists. It is because they fail to notice 
the implication of their own reductionism that behaviourists can build 
a case for pluralism on a restricted account of the human mind whose 
implications they have failed to think through. On such an inadequate 
phenomenology, a transformed view of the finite individual is excluded 
even as a possibility.^
It is utterly impossible, therefore, to completely reduce the 
inwardness of subjectivity to the terms of objectivity, but it is equally 
impossible to reduce objectivity to subjectivity (except in a very 
special sense of subjectivity which implies the unity of subject and 
object, as we shall see later). Accounts of the nature of mind like
5. Transformed, that is, from the common-sense pluralistic view.
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those of the subjective idealists, which emphasize the subjective and 
inward aspect of mind and of reality at the expense of objectivity 
are also one-sided and reductionist. And again, just as with the 
behaviouristic reductionism, we never arrive at the need for the 
dialectical transformation of finite selfhood if we leave our 
characterisation of selfhood so attenuated. For in leaving out the 
objective sphere, we deprive ourselves of grasping the subject-object 
relationship in which the need for dialectical transformation is rooted.
We saw earlier, in our section on Hegel's phenomenology, that 
consciousness must have an object and it must grasp that object by 
means of universals which go beyond its limited particular perspective.
That is to say, the object of consciousness must be a genuine other, 
which exists independently of its being apprehended from a particular 
perspective at a particular moment, yet part of whose essence it is that 
it can be apprehended in that way at that moment. It is because objects 
of consciousness are apprehended by way of universals which give them 
meaning beyond any absolutely particular and unique experience, and 
which bestow upon them universal intelligibility, that we can make sense 
of the world and communicate our intentions to others. If self- 
consciousness had no objective world, the universals of thought and 
meaning could never find concrete expression, and thus thought and 
communication would be impossible. ' I
It is the essence of self-conscious life that it should manifest 
its thought-intentions in an outward way. The objective is that J
necessary medium through which subjectivity expresses itself, although '' 
because the former must be in a sense independent - that is, it must '
transcend the finite apprehensions of finite selfhood just in order to 
be encountered through universal concepts - for this very reason the 
objective world must also be a foil to subjectivity.
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Speaking of the corporeal dimenion of mind, Findlay states:
"The character of an inner state comes across 
in the gestures that express it, and in the 
fancifully modified introspective language that describes it, only because such, gestures, and the normal sense of such a language, have a true affinity with it, because they represent some­thing which is continuous with it and that fully 
deploys it, not some adventitious outward sign that might have been wholly different. It seems 
clear that there can be no communication among egos that does not either ultimately look back­
ward upon or look forward towards some such detailed and sensuous bodily deployment. An ego may involve an aspect of metaphysical depth and purity, but it must possess contingent and variable as well as transcendental and necessary properties if it is to be a fully concrete being 
at all, and these must, in the last resort, point to possible bodily manifestations and realization. Egos can certainly be given to 
each other as 'bodiless presences' as they in 
fact often are given when we dwell in certain recollecting or prayerful intentions upon our friends, whether living or dead. But such a giveness, if it is not to be wholly empty, must 
'condense' many bodily as well as spiritual 
states. Thoughts we know may be impalpable, 
but that does not hinder them from being ot things gross and palpable." 6
Consciousness must have an object, against which it at first 
stands as an alien "other", precisely in order to allow for the develop­
ment of creative spiritual life. This presupposes some sort of spatio- 
temporal world upon which subjectivity can and must impose its form. 
What happens, however, when this objectivity, this object of conscious­
ness, is oneself? Findlay does not face this question, but we must do 
so here.^
6 . Discipline of the Cave, pp.196-197.
7. We shall see later that the corporeal dimension of reality is not
the most ultimate case of the non-subjective, since when we speak 
of bodies we have already employed universals, and have ascribed
to the objective world that which is of the nature of mind. Forthe time being however, we shall overlook Findlay's identification 
of the corporeal with the essentially objective, to concentrate 
upon what he says about the relation between subjectivity and its 
"other".
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It is not inconceivable that a conscious being, at least through­
out a certain period of its life, should have before it itself and only 
itself as its object of consciousness. And if so, surely here we have 
found a mode of thinking which does not require mediation through the 
bodily world? Is it not then in the end possible to produce an account 
of at least one mode of consciousness in terms of subjective inwardness 
alone?
The answer to this is that by the time one's consciousness becomes 
aware of itself with this degree of sophistication, that is, as an 
object for itself, then one has risen to the standpoint of apprehending 
oneself as imbued with specific (universal) properties, which are not 
only graspable by the consciousness whose properties they are. To know 
oneself as an object-for-oneself one also knows oneself truly as one is- 
for-another. Now if I am to be for-another because of the essential 
nature of my being-for-self it is also of my essence that I must be 
identifiable for those others. The universal properties which determine 
my egohood as egohood and also as the particular determination of egohood^ 
which I am, enable me to be an object to myself as well as to others.
And these universals, to avoid being abstract and empty, must be 
concretized in the spatio-temporal world. They neoessavity encompass 
the way in which I fulfil my conscious intentions in the spatio-temporal 
world, through my dispositions and behaviour generally. To be a living 
consciousness, for myself as for others, I must necessarily manifest 
myself in bodily fashion.
Subjective Idealism, like behaviouristic reductionism, cannot 
therefore be coherently sustained. But those who think it can be are, 
like the behaviourists, inevitably led to a pluralistic view of finite 
beings. For finite beings are seen as separate "centres of thought" 
and problems regarding how it is that they seem to perceive and
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communicate through the medium of a transcendent objective world can 
always be (shakily) patched up by the postulation of something like 
Leibniz's Pre-Established Harmony which enables the separate beings to 
co-ordinate their thoughts in such a way as to take account of and 
communicate with each other.
At this point, it is germane to examine the ideas of a school of 
philosophy which has indulged in the second form of reductionism we have 
been discussing, by trying to account for the depth and richness of the 
subject/object relationship, in terms of subjectivity alone.
This school, the school of subjective idealism, is the obverse of 
behaviouristic reductionism, since it seeks to reduce human experience 
and consciousness, not to an objective "outer" but to a subjective 
"inner". It is of extreme importance for our purposes to demonstrate 
why subjective idealism is as unsatisfactory as behaviouristic reduct­
ionism, for only once we have done so will it be absolutely clear that 
we must reject both the possible forms of reductionism, and therefore 
reductionism itself.
The Mistake of Subjective Idealism
Hegel, contrary to the view of the positivist tradition, had a 
keen sense of what can legitimately be meaningfully said. He was 
extremely quick to point out that when we talk about that which in 
principle can never appear to any form of consciousness, our talk soon 
becomes empty and vacuous. Thus he criticises Kant for postulating a 
world of things-in-themselves whose essence it was never to appear in 
the outward world. Hegel comments : "It is manifest that behind this
so-called curtain, which is to hide the inner world, there is nothing 
to be seen unless we ourselves go behind there, as much in order that 
we may thereby see, as that there may be something behind there which
à
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can be s e e n . H e g e l  acknowledges, in the very next sentence, however,
(and herein lies the nub of his disagreement with the positivists) that 
it is not the world of immediate outward appearances that is exhaustive 
of reality, for he writesj "But it is clear at the same time that we 
cannot without more ado go straightway behind there. For this knowledge 
of what is the truth of the idea of the realm of appearance and of its
9inner being, is itself only arrived at after a long and devious process."
Hegel's point is that what we do and must mean when we speak of 
the real is just that this real manifests itself in the world of appear­
ance. For anything which exists, its truth and essence is the infinite 
series of its possible appearings to possible subjects. It is in this 
sense that the world of mind is as dependent upon the world of nature as 
nature upon mind. 1
We have said that our apprehension of the world is by means of 
universals, but we have to ask whether these universals are the work 
of mind, or whether they inhere in the objective world itself. Or is
'-!i
it rather the case that we fall into one-sidedness if we locate these 
universals on either side of the subject/object dichotomy? Some 
materialist philosophers have taken the first view, and have held that 
what exists in the external world is absolutely particular, saying that H;
in no way do universals inhere in the very nature of the objective.
For such philosophers, universals are merely a sort of tool which the 
mind brings to bear on the objective world, in order to make sense of 
that world. Yet if the view which we have been considering is correct, 
and the essence of the real is precisely that it manifests itself, then 
it becomes necessary to say that we can as well ascribe those universals
8 . Phenomenology of Mind p.162. Baillie trans. Vol.l.
9. idem.
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by which the mind makes sense of its world to the objective world 
itself as to the realm of subjective mind.
The Subjective Idealists noticed this.^^ They were deeply 
impressed by the fact that universals, those seemingly mind-like 
entities, are as much attributable to what is apprehended as to the 
subject's activity of apprehension. And this amazed them so much that 
they leapt to the conclusion that the whole of reality must be reducible ^
to mental subjectivity. a
Insofar as the Subjective Idealists saw that the universals which %
are so often considered merely mental actually inhere in what is normally 
thought of as corporeal and external, they were absolutely right. But 
this observation should never have led them to Teduoe objectivity to ^
subjectivity, for when we said that mind-like qualities inhere in that
part of reality normally thought of as non-mental, we transformed our
view of the objective and bodily to the point where we might just as well 
have said that the mental realm is made up of bodily-type qualities.
We could have said this, that is, if we were really determined to follow
10. It is not always an easy matter to decide whether a particular
philosopher should be defined as a subjective idealist. Berkeley is often viewed as a major example, but there are problems with this. For Berkeley, although an antinaturalist, cannot adequately 
be regarded as an antirealist, since the created world (for him) 
although totally dependent on God, is nonetheless in a certain sense God’s "other". That is to say, although the world is created by God's power, it is nonetheless coeval with the mani­festation of that power. A better example than Berkeley of a 
subjective idealist is the less known philosopher Arthur Collier, whose Clavis Universalis appeared posthumously in 1713. In this 
work Collier made no attempt, as Berkeley had done, to reconcile his view of the external world with common-sense. He simply stated without reservation that the material world is unreal, when 
conceived of as material. In the end however, it does not much 
concern us precisely which philosophers should be placed in the subjective idealist camp. For it is a philosophical position which we are attacking rather than particular individuals, and it is a position which has often enough been held in the history of philosophy.
■■ ■
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through the implications of the insight of Subjective Idealism, which 
was that there is a deep affinity between the subjective and the 
objective, such that when self-conscious life reaches what is in 
principle its highest possible level, it would make as little sense to 
locate that which was apprehended through a wholly concrete Universal 
on one side of the subject/object dualism as on the other. And the 
Subjective Idealists would have said this, had they been truly convinced 
that bodiliness itself partakes of the universal qualities which the 
mind requires in order to apprehend it.
The Subjective Idealists' problem, it seems, was that they could 
never bring themselves to really believe that there is such a profound 
affinity between the subjective and objective. At a deep level, they 
went on accepting the old materialist contention that the mental and the 
corporeal must inevitably be so different and utterly disconnected, that 
when they discovered that the mental does indeed bear an essential 
relation to the objective world, they could only deal with it by denying 
that the objective has any independence whatever, in short, by reducing 
it to subjectivity.
For our part, we may hold that it is possible for there to be a 
genuine objective world, which may transcend subjectivity, not because i|
the nature of that objective world is utterly alien to subjectivity, but -4
because the universals through which we apprehend the world but which 1
are of the essence of both subjectivity and objectivity, are, from any *4ifinite perspective, inadequately and incompletely realized. The essence
of the objective is its capability of being-for-a-subject. But because
the whole does not appear to finite consciousness immediately and at the i
Isame time, and because objectivity serves not only to express but also to 3
resist subjective intentions, it cannot be merely reducible to subject- ■1ivity. Were there to be no independence attaching to the objective 4
:
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world, and thus no possibility of that world behaving as a foil to 
subjectivity, it would be the case that there would be no vehicle for 
our self-expression, and rational free creative life would be rendered 4
impossible.
The Ultimate Unity of Subject and Object
We have now seen that the reduction of objectivity to subjectivity 
is no less one-sided and inadequate than the opposite reduction, and 
that any complete phenomenology must in consequence allow for the 4
ultimate unity of subject and object. We have now to elucidate further 
the precise nature of this unity, by looking more fully at how the 
breakdown of finite minds as isolated units rests upon it and pre­
supposes it.
We said previously that according to Findlay, it is just as that 
point when our phenomenology of the •individuat mind is most complete, 
and when it seems that the mind has been endowed with the greatest 
dignity and independence possible, that the seemingly ultimate independ­
ence of the individual mind is exposed for the sham that it is.
Findlay discusses this in his chapter, "The dissolution of the Realm 
of Minds" in The Discipline of the Cave.^^ We have already seen that 
minds require the bodily world in order to communicate with each other.
What Findlay stresses is that this bodily world is something alien to 
our subjectivity, as well as something deeply adapted to it. It is the 
"other" which resists our will, or as Hegel calls it, "the negative", 
yet this "other" is absolutely necessary for the development of our 
powers of creative self-expression. We have seen, in our section on 
Subjective Idealism, that this bodily world is adapted to mind, so much 4
11. Discipline of the Cave p.203 ff.
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so that it is pointless to try to locate the universal properties 
through which we apprehend it on one side or other of the subject/ 
object dichotomy. However, this does not mean that it is not also alien 
to us, for the material world resists our will, and we cannot transform 
it by means of a simple volition. In this sense, the bodily world is 
not commensurate with and is alienated from mind. And it is alien to us 
the more precisely because we need it; we require this resisting 
externality, if we are to manifest ourselves in the world, and therefore 
to be what we are, self-conscious beings with creative freedom.
The dialectical interdependence of subjectivity and its alien 
otherness is best exemplified when minds are attempting to be at their 
most independent, to communicate with each other as independent minds. 
For, here, it is literally senseless to suppose that minds might 
communicate without something resembling the independent bodily world. 
Findlay says that it represents a deep crack in our conceptual structure 
that "bodies and their changes are essential to ego-life and ego- 
communication, and yet bodies also represent something alien, anti­
thetical to the ego-life in question, that cannot simply be taken up
12into or shown to be a phase of it." We need the resisting bodily 
world since we need something reliable and stable which we can call 
upon to express ourselves through and "bodies are the very type of the 
reliable and c r e d i b l e " . T h e y  not only provide the necessary foil 
for our subjectivity, but they provide that subjectivity with the basic 
materials for all its higher achievements.
In communication with others and in the most creative forms of 
life the need for the bodily is obvious. But also in thinking to our-
12. ibid. p.206.
13. ibid. p.207.
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selves, we find that the precondition of this is the bodily world:
"Plainly acts of mind, being second or higher order affairs, must busy themselves with some­
thing or other, and though they may busy themselves with other acts of mind, or with various abstracts which represent things or 
situations just insofar as the mind refers to them, and no further, still all such higher- order subject-matters must, on pain of vacuity, 
ultimately lead back to something of lowest order, 
and nothing known to us is more essentially of 
lower order than a body. While it may stand in many relations, and even be the seat of forces and tendencies pointing to things which do not as yet exist, it has a core to its being which 
is not all tendentious and relational, and which 
is certainly not thought of as capable of anything like conscious reference." 14
In rational thinking and communications with others, and thus in 
the very highest activities of self-conscious life (at that very moment 
when we are most truly ourselves), we find that we are not ourselves, 
as we thought we were. For we find that we cannot separate ourselves 
except as empty abstractions from the natural world, and precisely 
because we are so inseparable, we are (ultimately) inseparable from each 
other as well.
To communicate with others, and even to think to ourselves, we 
require something of a low order through which to express ourselves.
That something must have a sort of independence and stability, otherwise 
how could we make use of it? It is through bodily manifestations that 
we carry out our mental intentions, and it is just because mental 
intentions can manifest themselves in the concrete world (a world which 
taken by itself we may aptly describe as the finite), that we can have 
meaningful mental intentions at all. For what would it mean to have a
14. idem.
-Ü
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mental life which could not manifest itself in the world of appearance?
Surely it would mean no more than the type of noumenal world which can 
never manifest itself to consciousness, which in principle, could never 4
appear. A world which cannot appear to any consciousness turns out to be 
the same as a world which is no world at all, for as Hegel says; "The 
result is, of course, the same if you place a blind man amid the wealth |
of the supersensible world ... and if you place one with sight in 
absolute darkness, or if you like, in pure light, supposing the super­
sensible world to be this. The seeing man sees in that pure light as
little as in absolute darkness, and just as much as the blind man in
15the ample fullness which lay before him."
Rational self-conscious mind, in order to be creative, whether that 
creativity be merely thinking or communicating with others in some way, 
must express itself in the world of finite appearances. To put this 4
another way, if mind is essentially the capability to deal with 
universals, still this presupposes the world of particulars which are 
apprehended and/or formed through the universals. It is just the way 
that minds subsume these particulars under universal terms, and the way 
in which conscious mind requires the particular to express universal 
ideas, that explains the breakdown of any supposed ultimate separation 
between mind and its "other" (this "other" consisting for the most part 
of the natural world, the environment in which the ego finds itself) and 
also the apparent separation of finite minds from each other. It is the 
universals through which we apprehend the particular which enable us to 
apprehend a world which is intelligible to ourselves and other minds 
alike, albeit that these other minds apprehend the world from their own 
particular vantage points. Through universals, we are enabled to
15. Phenomenology of Mind p. 13-9. Vol.l. Baillie translation.
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transcend our vantage points, and to avoid becoming solipsists of the 
moment. The limiting case of perceiving the world of finite particulars 
through universals, a limiting case which all rational beings tend 
towards is precisely that point at which there would be a confluence of 
minds, and where the individual differences which arise from the 
limitations of finite perspective would fade away. Insofar as we know 
the world as it is in its very truth, just to that degree do we become 
one with others.
It is, then, through our relation to the object of consciousness 
that we are inseparable, not only from that object, but from other 
minds. Findlay sees that we are so inseparable from our "other" but 4
that its genuine independence means that we are also alienated from it.
But he does not go on to explain fully why we are not totally distinct 
from other minds; he rather limits himself to affirming that we are not 
totally distinct from other minds.
The reason for this is that he regards the lowest order necessary 
as the vehicle for conscious expression of intentions to be the
Icorporeal, rather than the sphere of the particular. This is a mistake 5
on his part. For once we speak of bodies, or even bodiliness, we are 
already dealing with universal concepts. And this means that there is 
something of a lower order still, which the concepts are being used to 
subsume. We saw earlier in relation to Subjective Idealism, that when 
we are concerned with material bodily things, it makes as little sense 
to locate the universal properties through which we apprehend them on 
one side of the subject/object dichotomy as on the other. We cannot 
therefore equate bodily entities with particulars. Particulars are 
pre-conceptual, and the moment we employ a universal term we lose theI
element of sheer particularity. As Hegel puts it; "We utter what is
universal; in other words, we do not actually say what, in this ;sense- î
.1
;
J
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certainty, we really mean ... It is not possible for us to eegress any 
sensuous existence which we 'mean'."^^
Findlay is right in saying that we need the bodily world to think 
and communicate but he is wrong to regard the bodily world, when 
conceived of under the term "bodily", as the lowest (in the sense of 
least mind-like) mode of existence. "The bodily" is a stage in the 
development of the interpenetration of particular and universal, 
although at this stage there is a one-sided bias towards the estranged 
otherness of particularity. It is this bias which no doubt misled 
Findlay into the view that in "the bodily" we have the limiting case of 
particularity.
Findlay finds it unintelligible that the two opposites of mind and '
its objective "other" (which he regards as the bodily, but which we have 
recast as the realm of partiuclars) are at once necessary and alien to 
each other. For Findlay, this case of two opposites hanging together
Jin a single whole is a sort of dialectical brute fact, something which J
can be seen to be the case, but which defies rational explanation. IHowever, he is so bewildered by it that on this bewilderment he builds #
Ithe idea that the only final reconciliation there can be between mental |
subjectivity and natural objectivity is a reconciliation that must take 'j
place within the context of another world, a world which utterly transe- |
ends, to the point of displaying a sharp discontinuity with, this one, {
I
and of which we can have little knowledge. Yet the bewilderment which i
:"t{
leads to Findlay's postulation of such a transcendent world is nothing I
more than the bewilderment which arises from his failure to weld together '
two supposedly ultimate opposites - which are not really ultimate j
opposites - into the type of dialectical unity which in reality arises ■|
..1 :       '4
. i16. ibid. p.152. \
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from the synthesis of the true ultimate dialectical opposites, of 
particular and universal.
When Hegel found a dialectical contradiction in any sphere of 
social or individual life, he realized that the contradiction arose 
within a given context. For dialectical contradictions do not appear 
in vacuo; they are internal to a given context, a whole which the 
dynamic of the contradiction reveals to be inadequate. Thus a more 
adequate whole is postulated, within which the contradiction is resolved 
and also in which one may see why it had to arise given the previous 
inadequate whole.
Findlay, unlike Hegel, sees no way in which dialectical tensions 
such as the one between mind and nature can be resolved in this world.
A new context, a new whole, can only be provided by the postulation of 
another world, a beyond. Hegel is attacked for his belief that any form 
of earthly rational free self-conscious life can transform the world we 
find ourselves in, to the point where it would be the final whole such 
as would explain and sublate the contradictions of the previous world.
Findlay thinks that this would be too much to ask of terrestrial life, as, 
for Findlay, free rationality cannot supply the whole. Findlay in 
arguing his case, refers to the limits of free rationality itself, but 
as we have seen, his view is coloured by the fact that for him free ^
rationality cannot weld together two non-ultimate dialectical opposites 4
as ultimate dialectical opposites. Findlay remarks that Hegel's view is '4
inadequate because: t|
"For the sort of teleological idealism we have I
been considering there is no end beyond |
rational conscious activity, which aims Jprimarily at perpetuating and maintaining and |
enriching itself, and ultimately at becoming 3
clearly conscious that it is itself its own aimand the aim of all other things. For Hegelianism ,^|the Idea, the final, all-explanatory goal of '4
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everything, is simply rationality which sees 
itself to be the goal of everything. These 
Hegelian ideas do not so much, therefore, 
point out a way beyond the cave in which we are immured, and whose arrangements we find so absurd, as that they seek to transform our 
life in the cave." 17
In objecting to the modesty and inadequacy of what Hegel proposes, 
Findlay forgets that for Hegel, rational self-conscious subjectivity 
has not merely the potential to transform our life within the cave, its 
essence and potential is to transform the world such that it ceases to 
be a cave.
In spite of Findlay's misunderstanding of Hegel, there is something 
in what led him to his conclusions which was at least partially right.
Any Whole or Absolute which could explain and resolve the dialectical 
tensions of the world we now exist in would be so unlike this present 
world that it is scarcely likely that we in our finite state would find 
any continuity with it. If the Absolute is no more and no less than 
human potential, it is also true to say that if human beings ever 
realized their potential, they would be so different from us as to be 
hardly recognizable as human. Findlay is correct to emphasize the 
transcendence of the Absolute, a transcendence which goes far beyond 
the present human condition. Also, even if this Absolute is Universal 
Mind, and Universal Mind is no more than the limiting case of rational 
self-conscious subjectivity, there is still an important sense in which 
we must accord independence to this Absolute. For even if Universal Mind 
is never expressed through human beings, or through any actually existing 
conscious being, it would be nonetheless true that this Absolute would 
be the force which expressed itself albeit in inadequate form, through
17. Discipline of the Cave p.221,
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finite consciousness, as well as being the ultimate precondition for 
any finite life.
Findlay, however, takes his transcendence so far that the Absolute 
becomes discontinuous with the world we experience, and his heaven thus 
becomes something "beyond" or other than this world, rather than the 
creative essence of this world.
Yet if the Absolute is to be truly Absolute then it must be the
essence of the whole of reality, and one aspect of that whole is the 
world experienced by finite minds. Were this not so, the "Absolute" 
would stand over against the world, as something outside, and as such it
would be limited. The true Absolute can be outside the world only in the
sense of transcending it, and then what it transcends is not the world 
as it is in its fullness, but an abstraction from the world which we are 
so prone to (falsely) mistake for the whole.
The fullest creativity is achieved when the absolutely limited 
overcomes, through self-activity, this limitation, to become the 
absolutely unlimited. Were this emancipation not the product of the 
Absolute's own self-activity, that Absolute would not be Absolute, for 
it would not be that "than which nothing greater can be conceived." 
Indeed, that "than which nothing greater can be conceived" must develop 
itself from the lowest conceivable mode of existence, from the utterly 
finite and limited. Otherwise something greater aoutd be conceived, 
namely, that which could overcome those limitations. For this reason, 
the "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" must be a 
development from the lowest, one-sidedly particular1st level of being, 
and thus would include that level of being which comprises our everyday 
reality.
In addition to the argument which we have now outlined, in which 
reasons have been adduced to show why the reconciliation of dialectical
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tensions cannot occur purely outside the world, we may offer a further 
argument for the proposition that the ultimate reconciliation cannot be 
confined to heaven. {Heaven being conceived of here as another world - 
quite outside the spatio-temporal world as we know it.)
Dialectical tensions cannot be resolved in another noumenal type
of world because the idea of such a world does not make sense. What
does make sense, is that we should first look for the creative source 
of the world in such a beyond. It is the reaction to the realisation 
that the world which appears to us is limited and finite, that leads us 
to seek the unconditioned in such a beyond. Hegel very well explains
the genesis of the Kantian noumenal realm as well as the genesis of
Findlay's other world.
"A supersensible world ... henceforth opens up as the true world, lying beyond the sensuous 
world which is the world of appearance. Away, remote from the changing vanishing present lies 
the permanent beyond; an 'in-itself which is ... the pure element where truth finds its abode 
and its essential being." 18
Ultimately, however, such a world fails to make sense because either 
(i) it does manifest itself in the spatio-temporal world and is not 
genuinely noumenal, or (ii) it remains noumenal - does not go out into 
the world to appear at all, and thus lacks all creative power whatsoever. 
Indeed, by not going out, but by remaining one with itself, it remains 
an abstract self-identity which is no more than an empty void.
The lesson for us is now clear. A world which lacks the power to 
exist also lacks the power to provide a context wherein our dialectical 
contraditions are to be resolved. The world we posit to resolve them 
must be, not a world discontinuous with the world of our experience, but
18. Phenomenology of Mind Vol.l, p.191, Baillie translation.
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ila whole which is the essence of and the creative force behind that 
world. And as we have also seen, it must be a world in which finite 
individuals are united by being (partial) manifestations of the life 
of the Concrete Universal.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
MAN, NATURE, AND THE PRIMACY OF THE SUBJECT
In the previous three chapters of this thesis, we considered and 
defended the view that finite individuals are not ultimately distinct 
from one another. We saw that the main philosophical objections to 
this view could not be substantiated, and also that there were good 
reasons for adopting it. We saw too, in the course of our discussion, 
that not only must there by an ultimate unity, or continuity, between 
finite subjects; there must also be an ultimate unity (of the same sort) 
between subjectivity and objectivity. We found that all intersubjective 
relations must have an objective world as their essential precondition, 
and that objectivity makes no conceptual sense if not construed as that 
which can, under certain circumstances at some particular time appear 
to some form of consciousness. In conceptualising the world, it was 
argued, we inevitably make use of universals, and although it may seem 
prima facie that they are purely mental constructions, in the end it 
makes as little sense to attribute them to one side of the subject- 
object dichotomy as to the other. And this is to say that the subject- 
object dichotomy breaks down.
To say that the subject-object dichotomy breaks down is to assert 
that there is an ultimate unity between man, as self-conscious thinking 
spirit, and the unconscious world of nature. They require each other 
and are, in the end, inconceivable without each other. However, although 
this is so, it shall be our contention in this chapter that there is 
nonetheless a sense in which the subjective side of the subject-object
3
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relationship may correctly be said to be primary. This is because 
(as we shall argue later) the reconciliation of subject and object 
can only be the product of subjective effort.
Our doctrine of the primacy of the subject, it must be admitted, 
sounds at first like a contradiction of what we have already said about 
the ultimate breakdown of the subject-object dualism. For surely, it 
will be argued to assert that the subject is primary is just to deny 
that there can be any ultimate subject-object unity. Aren't we, in 
making the subject primary, continuing to take one of the terras of the 
unity and set it against the other?
Now this objection would be perfectly valid if we were ascribing 
primacy to the empirically existing finite subject, in any given subject- 
object relationship. To say that the finite subject, or for that matter 
the finite object, was the major term in an empirical subject-object 
relationship, would certainly destroy the possibility of the two terms'J
reconciliation and unity. For if either finite subject or finite object 
were the major term, the one finite term would be imposing its own 
finite form upon the other, rather than reconciling the other terra with 
itself through a "whole" which transcends them both.
However, although it is true that if we adopted the view just 
criticized, we would be contradicting our view of the ultimate subject- 
object unity, it is not the case that we contradict ourselves if we 
ascribe primacy to the pri?ioipte of subjectivity as such. In our earlier 
claim that the subjective is ultimately reconciled with the objective 
through a whole which subsumes and transcends both, we intended to convey 
the idea that the separateness of the finite terms is in the end transc­
ended and lost. And this is quite compatible with the view that the 
new unity, brought into existence by the reconciliation of (what was once) 
finite subjectivity with (what was once) finite objectivity, is the
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product of subjective labour. Indeed, it shall be our task in this 
chapter to try to show that this reconciliation through which a new 
unity is produced, not only can be, but also must be, the result of 
subj e ctive labour.
We shall also, in the course of our discussion, attempt to discuss 
in depth the nature of that subjectivity which is the essential 
precondition of the ultimate unity of (.what was once) finite subject 
and finite object. Having done this, we shall then be in a position 
to decide whether the primacy of the subject, understood in a specific 
way, has any bearing on the validity of religious experience.
The Emergence of the Primacy of the Subject
The primacy of the subject first begins to emerge when we consider 
those philosophies which seek to uphold the ultimate unity of subject 
and object, and man and nature, without seeing the reconciliation as the 
product of a fully developed subjective self-consciousness. These 
accounts are useful for our purposes, for they serve to bring out the 
inadequacies in any philosophical attempt to reconcile man with nature 
which does not base itself on the reconciling power of a fully fledged 
subject.
In what follows, we shall consider three philosophical perspectives, 
all of which attempt but in the end fail to provide a basis for a 
unification of many with nature. These are, firstly, (what we shall 
call) the interpretive vision of the world, secondly, the post- 
Enlightenment view of the world,^ and thirdly, the Hegelian view that
1. The post-Enlightenment view of the world referred to here and 
subsequently in this chapter, excludes the Hegelian view even though Hegel would be correctly regarded as a post-Enlightenment 
thinker. This is because Hegel represents an advance on the 
mainstream of post-Elightenment thought, and shall be dealt with in a separate section.
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substance is a subject. We shall see that although all three views 
misunderstand the vital role of subjectivity in overcoming the subject- 
object dualism, they nonetheless represent a line of progress towards 
an increasingly more adequate understanding. Through an examination of 
the mistakes and insights of these three philosophical perspectives, 
we shall seek to achieve a more adequate understanding of the 
reconciling role of subjectivity.
The Interpretive Vision of the Unity of Man and Nature
In the first chapter of his recent impressive book entitled Hegel 
Charles Taylor sketches those early visions of the unity of man and 
nature which (according to him) the philosophers of the Enlightenment ■Ireacted against, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 4
According to these pre-Enlightenment visions, Taylor tells us, the
world was seen as a text, as a locus of meanings, and man^was considered to 
be united with nature through being part of a pre-ordained and "given" 
cosmic order. The task of man, on these views, was to discover his own II
place in the order and live in accordance with it. Thus Taylor writes: '"'4
" ... the view of the subject that came down ^
to us from the dominant tradition of ancients,was that man came most fully to himself when he was in touch with a cosmic order, and in touch with it in the way most suitable to it as an order of ideas, that is, by reason. This is 
plainly the heritage of Plato; order in the human soul is inseparable from rational vision of the order of being. For Aristotle, contem­
plation of this order is the highest activity of man. The same basic notion is present in the neo-Platonic vision which through Aristotle 
becomes the foundation for much medieval thought." 2
2. C. Taylor. Hegel p.6. (.Cambridge University Press 1975).
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The unity of man and nature, according to the ancients, Taylor 
tells us, is discerned by the subject's reason, but in no way is created 
by the subject. I find my own identity in relation to a meaning which 
I "read off" from the universe when I am at my most rational. According 
to this vision, the union with nature is achieved through conformity 
with a pre-given cosmic order; the emphasis is on the subject's 
contemplation and discovery, not on creativity. Individuals have no 
identity which they can define for themselves.
Taylor goes on to comment on how the view of the ancients about 
the cosmic order was carried over in Medieval and early Renaissance 
thought, and how this view was challenged by the thinkers of the 
Enlightenment. Thus:
"As epistemological innovators, the moderns 
of the seventeenth century directed their scorn and polemics against Aristotelean 
science, and that view of the universe which 
had become intricated with it in Medieval and early Renaissance thought. Final causes and the related vision of the universe as a mean­
ingful order of qualitatively differentiated 
levels give way first to a Platonic-Pythagorean vision of mathematical order (as in Bruno, Kepler, and partly too, in Galileo), and then finally to the modern view of a world of ultimately contingent 
correlations, to be patiently mapped out by empirical observation. From the modern point of view, these earlier visions betrayed a deplorable if understandable weakness of man, a 
self-indulgence wherein they project on things the forms which they most desire to find, in 
which they feel fulfilled or at home." 3
Taylor goes on to criticise the way in which the Enlightenment 
thinkers saw the interpretive vision of things as a view arising merely
3. ibid. p.4.
4. ibid. p. 5.
5. idem.
6. idem.
7. ibid. p.6.
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from wishful thinking and therefore "suitable to an age in which man |
was not fully adult." We cannot merely see the issue, Taylor tells us, j
as a struggle between two tendencies in the self, one deploying j
5 Icomforting illusions, the other facing stern realities." The i
transition to the "modern" (Enlightenment) view should rather be seen -4
6 jas "a revolution in the basic categories in which we understand self." I"The essential difference" says Taylor, "can |perhaps be put in this way; the modern subject j
is self defining where on previous views the 
subject is defined in relation to a cosmic order." 7
Now Taylor is no doubt quite right in his claim that it is extremely 
unfair to hold that the ancients' vision of the world (and the vision 
which Medieval and early Renaissance thinkers developed from it) was 
based merely on illusions arising from wishful thinking. Nonetheless, 
the vision of these thinkers does present serious problems as an account
iof the relationship between man and nature. It posits, on the one hand, 
a unity between self-conscious selfhood and the realm of the not-self, 
but, on the other hand, it presents a cosmic picture which cannot hold 
together this unity. Certain things which we inevitably confront in 
the world are totally omitted from this "unity" and it therefore cannot 
be truly said that here we have a unity at all.
This so-called unity leaves out, firstly, an essential part of the 
life of a self-conscious being. That is, it leaves out the active, 
volitional, and emotional side, since the unity posited is one which
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serves to unify only contemplative reason (as opposed to a reason 
which expresses itself through activity in the objective world) with 
the (alleged) order of things. And secondly, just as only one aspect 
of man enters into the unity, so does only one aspect of the external 
world. This is the aspect (corresponding to the Forms of Plato and 
Aristotle) which can be grasped by detached contemplative reason.
Why the world of perceptible nature can only approximate to the Forms 
remains forever an enigma, the gap between the shadow-world of our 
sense experience and the intelligible world graspable by reason can in 
no way be bridged by self-conscious transforming activity. The world 
as experienced through the bodily senses is thus outside the posited 
unity of subject and object, and man is therefore most reconciled with 
the world when he is most alienated from his perceptual experience.
It is hardly difficult to see that a posited "unity" which leaves, as 
this one does, a residue, cannot be regarded as a genuine unity at all.
I
The type of "unity" we have been discussing, which is in truth a 
unity between a mere aspect of subjectivity and a mere aspect of 
objectivity, is one which falls far short of the kind of unity envisaged 
by the mystics and the great majority of subjects of religious experience 
For such people are usually at pains to stress that an encounter with
the Divine involves the whole personality, not just the rational or
affective side in isolation from the other. And such an encounter, we 
are told, involves the whole personality in a union through God or the 
Absolute - with the whole of reality, a "whole" in which the perceptible
world of nature has a place.
If we properly follow through the full implications of our view, 
outlined at the end of our last chapter, that there is and must be an 
ultimate unity between subject and object, it becomes clear that such a 
unity must consist in the objective world of the not-self being an
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appropriate.vehicle for subjectivity. This does not mean that the
Îexternal world must present itself as the malleable material perfectly *
suited to the self-assertion of finite egos, as such egos are in their 
limited finite state. But it does mean that the world must be the 
appropriate vehicle for the expression of subjectivity at its highest; 
that is, for a wholly rational Absolute Subject, or, if we like, God.
Clearly the view of the ancients, at least as interpreted by 
Taylor, fails to follow the implications of its own posited subject- 
object unity through to their logical conclusion. It therefore fails to 
come to terms with what is necessary for a unity of man and nature. Thus 
the fact that it fails to corroborate what the mystics and subjects of 
religious experience have said about the nature of this unity need not 
worry us at all.
The Post-Enlightenment View of Man's Unity with Nature
J
Many heroic attempts were made by philosophers in the climate of 
post-Enlightenment Europe to understand and elucidate the mode of unity 
which can most truly be said to exist between self-conscious beings 
and the unconscious natural world. These attempts are especially 
interesting because they show a respect for the role of subjectivity 
which was lacking in earlier visions, a respect which manifests itself 
through a realisation that any unity of man and nature which is genuine 
must consist of a unity between an active creative subject and an 
objective realm whose essence is to-be-for-a-subject. Whereas the 
thinkers who upheld (what we have called) the interpretive vision 
sacrificed the fullness of the subject, by making it the passive recipient 
of a cosmic order imposed from outside, the post-Enlightenment thinkers 
saw a much more full-blooded subjectivity as the essential precondition 
for any subject-object synthesis. How, we may ask, did this new respect
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for the subject come about?
We have already mentioned how the thinkers of the Enlightenment 
reacted against the interpretive vision of the ancient. Medieval, and 
early Renaissance thinkers, and how the Enlightenment brought with it a 
pluralistic empiricism in which disbelief in a "given" cosmic order 
made way for the view that human subjects are self-defining, having no 
pre-ordained role. To self-conscious subjectivity was ascribed a new 
freedom; a freedom accompanied by a strong feeling of exhilaration at 
the prospect of a subject's being able to manipulate the world, and 
shape it after its heart's desires. What Enlightenment thinkers held 
to be the essence of a free creativity, turned out in reality to be a 
somewhat arbitrary mechanistic manipulation of the world by subjects who 
were quite distinct from the "other" which they proceeded to hammer into 
shape. But although this was a defect, consisting (as it did), of a 
shallow interpretation of what it means to be free, the new- confidencei
in the essential freedom of the subject was a tremendous breakthrough. 
The Enlightenment view of free subjectivity, it must be admitted, had 
the effect of severing man from nature, but in later philosophies, when 
the need to restore the lost unity of man and nature was again keenly 
felt, it was still found that the Enlightenment ideal of free self­
defining subjectivity had to be retained. The restoration of man's 
unity with nature had now to be carried out on the basis of free, 
self-defining subjectivity, rather than, as was previously the case, 
at the subject's expense.
Indeed, it is true to say that one of the main reasons why the 
Enlightenment vision had to break down was because the notion of self­
defining subjectivity clashed with the empiricist epistemology to which 
the thinkers of the Enlightenment also subscribed. For according to 
this epistemology, all knowledge is the product of our observing
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empirical regularities and relationships, but this meant that man too 
had to be studied., in this way. Man in other words had to be treated as 
a part of nature, his uniformities and regularities being dispassionately 
catalogued. And this was hardly compatible with the view that man is a 
free self-defining subject. Thus there was a kind of contradiction 
running through the heart of the Enlightenment view of man; man was 
seen as at once a self-defining subject, set over against nature, and 
also a part of nature, the latter being characterised as a great machine.
The problem inherited by later thinkers from thinkers of the 
Enlightenment was how to reconcile man's existence as a free self­
defining subject with his existence as a part of nature. From this 
attempted reconciliation arose some of the profoundest insights into the 
nature of the unity between man and the world outside him.
Post Enlightenment philosophers came gradually to see that free 
subjectivity, so far from being an obstruction to, is the essential 
precondition of the actualisation of a potential union of man with 
nature. For only the most radical form of freedom would be capable 
of overcoming all alienation between a dirempted subject and object, 
and of restoring the unity between them.
The story of post-Enlightenment philosophy may well be understood 
as the story of the struggle to come to a satisfactory understanding 
of the radical mode of freedom, which could enable an (idealized) 
subject to overcome the separation and alienation between finite subject 
and object. Many of the attempts to restore the unity of man and nature 
on the basis of subjective spiritual freedom, proved, in the end, to be 
inadequate, but one definite insight common to nearly all European 
philosophers of this period was to be found in their view that if 
subjective freedom was to be, as it must be, the vehicle for restoring 
the unity between man and nature, then such freedom can in no way
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consist of spontaneous arbitrary volition. That is to say, there must 
be necessity for freedom. The task therefore was to try to discover 
just which sort of necessity free subjectivity must embody, if it is 
to be able to restore, rather than erode, the unity of man with nature.
The first major reaction against the shortcomings of the Enlighten­
ment view of man's relationship with nature occurred in and around the 
decade of the 1770's, a period which has come to be known as that of 
the Sturm and Drang. In this period, one theory in particular attempted 
to build a union between man and nature on the notion of free subjectivity 
the theory which is associated chiefly with Herder, and which Charles 
Taylor has dubbed "Expressivism".^  Taylor describes the main motivation 
behind "Expressivism" as follows;
"The expressivist anthropology was a response 
to a mechanist, atomist, utilitarian picture of human life. If we can think of Enlightenment anthropology as recommending itself through the 
sense of freedom, even exhilaration, of sel-f- 
definition, the reaction to it experienced this picture of man as dry, dead, as destroying life.For the sense of freedom as self-defining was 
won by objectifying nature, and even our own nature in so far as we are objects for ourselves.
It was won at the expense of a rift between the subject who knows and wills, and the given things 
as they are in nature. And this realm of thegiven includes not only external things in the
world, but also what is given in the subject, his ,desires, feelings, leanings, and affinities. |
IThe Enlightenment developed a conception of nature jincluding human nature, as a set of objectified j
facts with which the subject had to deal in jacquiring knowledge and acting. Of course, jnature as a harmonious whole whose parts meshed ;
perfectly also represented a model or blue-print ifor man, as well as offering the raw material for 
his fulfilment. But the rift was still there between nature, whether as plan or instrument, 
and the will which acted on this plan.
8. ibid. p.13. See footnote 1.
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It was this rift which the originators of 
the expressivist theory - Rousseau, Herder, 
later the Romantics - could not tolerate.They experienced this vision of things as a tearing apart of the unity of life in which 
nature should be at once the inspiration and the motive force of thought and will. It was not 
enough that nature provided the blue-print for the will, the voice of nature must speak through the 
will." 9
It is clear enough from the above passage that the Expressivists 
held that the Enlightenment conception of subjective freedom was badly 
mistaken, since it would not heal the diremption between man and 
nature. The type of freedom which, they thought could, and which they 
sought to put in the place of the view they rejected, centred on the 
category of "expression". Taylor comments on how "expression" came to 
be at the centre of a new view of freedom as follows;
" ... the expression theory both alters the notion of freedom and greatly enhances its 
importance. It alters the notion in that tlie standard Enlightenment view of freedom was that of independence of the self-defining subject in relation to outside control, principally that 
of state and religious authority. Now freedom 
is '.seen as consisting in authentic self-expression. It is threatened not only by external invasion but by all the distortions that expression is menaced by. It can fail through a mis-shaping which is ultimately of external origin, but may become anchored in the self." 10
Freedom then is authentio self-expression. It is not any arbitrary 
assertion of self which a particular individual happens to will. 
Authentic self-expression must be imbued with the element of necessity. 
But in what does this necessity consist?
9. ibid. p.22-23,
10. ibid. p.24.
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According to the Expressivists, and in particular according to 
Herder, the necessity involved in an authentic self-expression consists 
in a process of clarifying to ourselves, through expressing ourselves, 
what we most truly are. Thus expression is not merely self-assertion 
but a coming to self-awareness and this is as much a discovery as a 
creation. If we characterise self-expression as a discovery, it 
becomes easier to see why there must be an element of necessity.
Taylor describes the expressivist view of authentic self-expression as 
follows :
" ... the notion of human life as expression sees this not only as the realization of these purposes 
but also as the clarification of these purposes.It is not only the fulfilment of life but also the clarification of meaning. In the course of living adequately, I not only fulfil my humanity but clarify what my humanity is about. As such a 
clarification my life-form is not just the fulfil­
ment of purpose but the embodiment of meaning, 
the expression of an idea. The expression theory breaks with the Enlightenment dichotomy between meaning and being, at least as far as human life is concerned. Human life is both fact and meaning­
ful expression; and in being expression does not reside in a subjective relation of reference to 
something else, it expresses the idea which it realizes.
This provides a new interpretation of the traditional view of man as a rational animal, a being whose essence is rational awareness. This idea is now formulated in a new concept of self awareness. As 
we saw, our life is seen as self-expression also in the sense of clarifying what we are. The clarific­
ation awaits recognition by a subject, and man as a conscious being achieves his highest point when he recognizes his own life as adequate, a true expression of what he potentially is - just as an 
artist or writer reaches his goal in recognizing his work as a fully adequate expression of what he 
wanted to say. And in one case as in the other, the 'message' could not have been known before it was 
expressed. The traditional view reaches a new formulation in expressivism; man comes to know himself by expressing and hence clarifying what he is and recognizing himself in this expression.
The specific property of human life is to
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culminate in self-awareness through 
expression." 11
Taylor goes on to remark that, according to Herder, language must 
be seen, not as consisting of symbols which refer to objects they are only 
contingently related to, but rather as a vehicle for human self-expression, 
when self-expression is conceived of as a mode of cognitive awareness in 
which feelings and emotions play a part just as much as judgment and 
ratiocination. True awareness is seen here as a function of the whole, 
unified person.
For Herder, although all language is a vehicle for the expression 
of our self-awareness, when self-consciousness rises to the pinnacle of 
its creative capabilities, it expresses itself through art. Language is 
continuous with art, in that both are essentially forms of human 
expression, but only through art can feeling be adequately incorporated 
into the expression. Art expresses the deepest feelings of the artist,i
and so, in a sense completes him (Goethe uses the term "Purification") 
but at the same time transforms nature to bring out is highest potent­
ialities. Thus at this point we can begin to see the extent to which, 
for the Expressivists, human freedom links up with communion, or union, 
with nature. As Taylor puts it: for Expressivism "the highest art is
so because it is true to Nature; but not in the sense of an imitation,
12rather as the highest and fullest of its potentialities."
Does Expressivism really succeed in its attempt to unite man with 
nature through the concept of free subjectivity as the latter is under­
stood by philosophers such as Herder? Taylor makes no attempt to answer 
this question, despite his excellent exposition of Expressivist theory.
11. ibid. p.17.
12. ibid. p.20.
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It is essential however, for us to try to answer it here.
We must begin our answer by pointing out that, however much we 
must praise the Expressivists for seeing that authentic self-expression 
cannot be an arbitrary matter, and for seeing that it must involve a 
process of self-clarification, in the end these philosophers totally 
fail to locate exactly where the necessity in the work of the artist 
lies. True, it lies (according to them) in self-clarification, but 
what sort of self is being clarified (other than simply a self which 
is of such a sort as seeks to clarify itself I), and according to which 
rules must this process of self-clarification be carried out?
Expressivism provides us with no criteria for distinguishing an authentic 
self-expression from an inauthentic one. Since for the Expressivists 
the "true self" is merely the one which expresses itself most truly, 
and since there is no necessity in freedom apart from authenticity of 
self-expression, there is no reason why (on Expressivist assumptions)i
a self with evil intentions should not find freedom and self-clarification 
through expressing these; freedom being maximized when the evilness 
of the actions is truly commensurate with the evilness of the intentions.
The necessity through which freedom is achieved on the Expressivist 
account, therefore turns out to be quite empty. And despite the explicit 
intentions of Expressivist theorists, the content of freedom had in the 
end to be filled in with arbitrary volitions, for sheer lack of any 
necessary content. Although the Expressivist thinkers grasped the truth 
that subjective labour alone can reconcile man with nature, the vacuity 
of their conception of authenticity showed that what they had in mind 
when they spoke of subjectivity was a subjectivity which was finite.
It is no wonder that their attempted reconciliation failed.
That subjectivity of a finite mode can never provide a basis for 
the reconciliation of man with nature, the Expressivists themselves
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sometimes seem to have been almost unconsciously aware of. For they 
did not even attempt to say just how finite beings could produce this 
reconciliation, apart from saying that it must be through a self- 
expression which is authentic (which tells us very little). At the 
very point where it would have been appropriate for the Expressivists 
to have developed their conception of subjectivity to show how a free 
subject can unify man with nature, they seem instead to speak as though 
the final man-nature reconciliation is produced by man's coming to fit 
in with the "great current" of nature. It is almost as if the 
Expressivists, despairing of the incapacity of their own conception of 
subjective freedom as an instrument for healing the rift between man 
and nature, are driven through desperation to look around for a f'inite 
action which could, without total absurdity, be held to overcome the 
division between man and nature, and manage only to find it in the 
finite subject's act of self-sacrifice. In the end, the Expressivisti
thinkers upheld a view of the role of the subject which takes us little 
beyond the Interpretation View, which we have already discussed and 
rejected.
Taylor brings out how the Expressivist view of unity of man and 
nature is, in reality, based on the sacrifice and annihilation (rather 
than the fulfilment) of finite subjectivity, and indeed all subjectivity, 
in the following passage:
"It is this greater current, and not just the life of my own body, which has to be united with higher aspiration to freedom and expression, 
if there is to be unity in the self. Thus our self-feeling must be continuous with our feeling for this larger current of life which flows 
through us and of which we are a part; this current may nourish us not only physically but 
spiritually as well." 13
13. ibid. p.25.
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We have discussed the theory which Taylor calls Expressivism at 
some length, because it exemplifies one of the main ways in which the 
unity of subject and object has been misunderstood. That is, it shows 
us how easily one can slip into positing a unity, supposedly of subject and 
object, which in the end is only able to hold together as a unity because 
that unity is a world from which the subject has in reality disappeared.
The mistake of Herder and the Expressivists was repeated or 
magnified by many of the later Romantic thinkers. Schiller is an example 
here, speaking as he does of a great unifying force, "Joy", which flows 
through everything but which is not the serious product of subjective 
freedom and effort. Many other examples could be cited, and we shall 
return to some of these later. But it is clear from what we have said 
so far that because finite subjectivity can never be adequate to effect 
a reconciliation between man and nature, any theory which views human 
activity such as language and art as the vehicle through which
J
reconciliation can be finally achieved must stand condemned. This 
does not mean that we cannot, through art and language, come closer to 
such a reconciliation, or even that we cannot at times come very close, 
nor does it mean that art and language can never express anything more 
than particular finite perspectives on life. What it does mean, however, 
is that as long as the artist, or the language-user, must remain a 
finite individual, he will never be in a position to totally overcome 
his alienation from the external world.
Our critique of Expressivism, therefore, leads us on to a critique 
of other post-Enlightenment thinkers who would not normally be regarded 
as Expressivists, but who were nonetheless committed to the view that 
finite subjectivity was sufficient to bring about a reconciliation 
between man and nature. Of course, many of these thinkers held overtly 
that it was not finite subjectivity itself which could bring about a
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reconciliation, but a principle of subjectivity which worked through 
finite subjects. Nonetheless, th.e very fact that such philosophers 
presupposed that the principle of subjectivity could be embodied in finite 
subjects to such a degree as to effect a total reconciliation shows that 
in the end their reconciling subjectivity amounted to finite subjectivity, 
whatever they actually said.
Numerous examples of philosophers who made this mistake abound in 
the period following the Sturm and Drang. As Taylor tells us, young 
Romantic philosophers such as the Schlegels and Novalis drew on Boehme,
Spinoza, and Goethe to develop a view of nature as "a kind of poetry of |
cosmic spirit, with which men can unite through their own poetic 
expression." The Romantics were strongly influenced by Fichte, who 
also attempted but failed to arrive at a non-naturalistic view of man's 
unity with nature based on subjective freedom. For Fichte, as Taylor 
says "the self posits a not-self which it struggles to overcome.i
But subjectivity needs to be related to something else in order to be.
Consequently, the overcoming of the not-self can never be completed,
if the subject himself is not to disappear. It must therefore be seen
as an infinite progress of self-realisation towards a goal which ought
14to be realised but never fully is."
This passage reveals quite clearly how Fichte made the same mistake 
as the young Romantics he influenced, the mistake of equating the 
pv'Cnc'ipte of subjectivity with f'inite subjectivity. The implication 
that the process of reconciliation (of man and nature) can never be 
completed only follows once this equation has been made. Had Fichte 
distinguished between finite subjectivity and the principles of 
subjectivity as such, the destruction of the finite subject qua finite
14. ibid. p.40.
259
subject in a reconciling unity would have been no problem. For this 
reconciling unity would be a more adequate expression of the essential 
nature of subjectivity. It would not, as Fichte suggests, have to 
stand over against an alien "other" in order to be. This is true only 
of finite subjectivity, but Fichte, through his failure to distinguish 
finite subjectivity from the essential nature of subjectivity, thinks 
that because finite subjectivity must be counterposed to an alien 
"other" then so must be subjectivity as such.
A post Enlightenment philosopher who came a little closer to 
grasping how subjective effort can reconcile man with nature is to be 
found in Hegel's contemporary and colleague at Jena, namely Schelling. 
Schlelling, like Fichte, looked to human subjective effort to effect 
this reconciliation, though for Schelling, this took the form of art, 
rather than (as for Fichte) moral activity. For Schelling, as against 
Fichte, the process of reconciliation can be completed without totallyJ
destroying subjectivity, for the former saw that a new unity could be 
arrived at in which finite subjectivity was destroyed only qua finite, 
through the finite subject's being subsumed and transcended in a more 
all-embracing subject.
Unfortunately however, the new reconciling subject which Schelling 
presented us with turned out to be an Absolute without differentiation.
It was, as Hegel was later to remark, like "a night in which all are 
black." Thus, although the abnegation of finite subjectivity was 
supposed to give rise to a new and higher form of subjectivity, it turned 
out in the end to be indistinguishable from a state of affairs in which 
finite subjectivity is submerged in an objective realm. There is no 
genuine subjectivity left in an Absolute without differentiation. But 
Schelling, like Fichte, simply could not see how a genuine principle of 
subjectivity could sustain itself once finite subjectivity ceased to
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exist in its finite form.
It becomes clear that although Schelling tried hard to avoid the 
Fichtean equation of finite subjectivity with the principle of subject­
ivity as such, in the end he did not succeed. For when finite 
subjectivity is transmuted, in Schelling's philosophy, through subsumption 
within a new whole, nothing resembling genuine subjectivity is left. <
Schelling's Absolute turned out to be a total failure as a Cosmic 
Subject which could unify the whole world. But his insight that it was
only a Cosmic Subject of some sort which could unify the world, was one
from which later philosophers had much to learn.
Hegel's View that Substance is a Subject
The post- Enlightenment insight that only in free subjectivity can 
we find the basis for overcoming the diremption and alienation between 
subject and object, man and nature, came to a culmination dn the 
Hegelian development of the idea of Cosmic Subjectivity. For Hegel 
shows, more adequately than any of the philosophers we have already 
mentioned, just why subjectivity must be primary in any subject-object 
reconciliation, and what form that subjectivity must take. In the 
Preface to his Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel writes:
"In my view, which can be justified only by 
the exposition of the system itself, every­
thing turns on grasping and expressing thetrue, not only as Substance, but equally asSubject." 15
In exploring the Hegelian view that substance is a subject, we 
shall, in what follows, find reason to disagree with Hegel about the
15. Phenomenology of Spirit, p.9-10. A.V. Miller translation.
«261
precise way in which this subject must actualise itself in order to 
bring about a reconciliation with objective world. But we shall see 
that the very possibility of making this cricitism is based on a justifi­
able acceptance of the deepest insights of Hegel, insights which led 
him in the first place to affirm that substance is a subject. In 
criticising Hegel, we shall therefore be attempting to work out the 
implications of his deepest insights with greater consistency than he 
did.
What then were these insights which led Hegel to conclude the 
substance is a subject? In order to confront this question, it is 
necessary to understand just what Hegel meant by this affirmation that 
substance is a subject.
The Hegelian statement that substance is a subject arises, primarily,
as a reaction against Kantian scepticism, a scepticism which holds that
the true nature of things is hidden from us, and thereby sets up an
}
eternal and insurmountable opposition between subject and object. For 
Kant, the only objective world that can be known is an intersubjectivity 
constructed phenomenal world, since the realm of things-in-themselves 4can never be apprehended, let alone shaped, by a subject. Hegel however 
saw that being, if it is to have any meaning at all, must involve being- 
for-a-subject (actually or potentially existing), and that this means 
that there must be an ultimate unity or continuity between subject and 
object. Thus subjectivity divorced from objectivity and objectivity 4
divorced from subjectivity must be regarded as abstractions. But this 
new substantial unity (Hegel's "substance"), a unity which overcomes the 
initial alienation between (what was once) finite subjectivity and (what 
was once) finite objectivity, can only be actualised through subjective 
toil and effort. The unity, although always implicit in any subject- 
object relationship, can only be made explicit when the objective world
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becomes the vehicle for the expression of rational self-conscious and 
free subjectivity. To this new unity as a whole can be ascribed the 
qualities of rational self-awareness and self-determination, attributes 
which are the product of the transformation of (what was once) the 
unconscious world of nature.
Freedom's necessity consists then for Hegel in the discipline of 
reason, there can be no subjective freedom which is the product of whim 
or caprice. The new free unity, which is the product of a transformation 
in which finite subjectivity is subsumed and transcended, is correctly 
characterised as a subject, and indeed as an Absolute Subject, because 
in its life no part is played by blind unconscious forces, mere fortuit­
ousness, or brute "givenness". It is a unified self-conscious rational 
spirit which has overcome all forms of limitation and ignorance. But it
is important to remember that the mode of subjectivity here is quite 4
different from finite subjectivity, since the former subsumes the object-
i
ive world, whereas the latter is an abstraction from the subject-object 
unity, a unity which, by its mere existing, excludes finite subjectivity 
from ultimate or separate existence.
When Hegel declares that substance is a subject, therefore, he 4
means that implicit within the everyday world of partial self-consciousness, 
finite limitation, and alienation between subject and object, there exists 
an ultimate unity between subject and object (substance), a unity which 
itself bears the properties of the ideal self-conscious subject.
In arriving at his view of the primacy of the subject, Hegel had 
learned much from his predecessors. In particular, he had learned from 
the hopeless inadequacies in those philosophies which sought to unify man 
and nature through the finite subject's coming to "fit in" with the great 
current of nature. He had also learned from the pitfalls encountered by 
philosophers such as Schelling, the pitfalls of trying to create a unity
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of man and nature by positing an Absolute Subject which merely cancels 
the finite moments of subjectivity and objectivity. From all this, arose 
the insights to which reference has already been made. It was clear to 
Hegel that if (a) implicit within any subject-object relationship there 
exists a subject-object unity and (b) the new unity does not arise through 
the mere cancellation of one Cor both) of the finite terms in the 
subject/object division, then the new unity must be such as can overcome 
the alienation existing between the finite terms through fvee, and 
therefore wholly rational, self-activity.
The account which Hegel gave of the nature of this reconciling 
Absolute Subject represents one of his highest philosophical achievements. 
We can begin to understand how his account took shape when we reflect upon 
how "substance", i.e. the new reconciling unity of subject and object, 
is implicit within any, even the most alienated, subject-object relation­
ships. The reason why this is so becomes clear when we remember that for
JHegel, alienated subject-object relationships can only bb understood as 
partial manifestations of the complete subject-object relationship; the 
former have (as it were) no autonomous or independent existence.
The world of finitude and limitation, shot-through, as it must be, 
by blind unconscious forces, irrational givenness, and chance, is then 
an incomplete expression of the Absolute Subject. A definite picture of 
the nature of the Absolute Subject begins to emerge when we come to 
understand why the finite world must be regarded as somehow incomplete, 
since the Absolute Subject is just that which is required to bring it to 
completion. It is necessary, therefore, to say a little more eibout our 
characterisation of alienation between subject and object as a form of 
incompleteness, in order to grasp more fully what is required for 
completion.
264
Alienation and the Completion of the Finite World
Alienation between subject and object arises in and is a perennial 
feature of the completion of the finite world because of the inability 
of either the subjective or the objective side to reconcile the other 
side to itself. In the case of the objective side it is self-evident 
that this is so, since the very concept of an objective realm contains 
the idea of a world of passive and finite non-consciousness, a world which 
is capable only of being shaped, that is of having things "done" to it.
An objective realm which ceased to be like this would be, as we have 
said, subsumed into the being of a subject. However, in the finite 
world, it is not only the objective realm which has no final reconciling 
power, for in this realm the same applies to finite self-conscious beings. 
Such beings cannot, qua finite individuals, ever succeed in bringing 
about a reconciliation between themselves and the objects to which they 
stand opposed. And this is true, even if they manage to^form the world 
in accordance with their own desires, since these desires are in them­
selves at least in part the product of caprice, ignorance, and limitation. 
In forming the world, finite beings cannot be wholly conscious of the 
full meaning and implications of what they are doing, and therefore the 
alienation between them and the objective realm must remain. Or to put 
this another way, finite subjects do not have the power to totally 
overcome their alienation from the objective world, because their 
subjectivity is attenuated, and they are themselves partially object­
like. Finite substances can thus never be substances in the Hegelian 
sense, nor can they effect, so long as they remain finite, the act of 
reconciliation which produces a "substance".
However, although it is true that finite subjects have an incomplete 
subjectivity, it is also important to remember that they have quite
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genuine subjective attributes. That is to say, we must of necessity, 
in describing finite subjects, make use of concepts which are really 
only appropriately applied to a perfect, or absolute, subject. We 
must ascribe subject-like properties to finite subjects, even though 
the latter can never wholly measure up to such a description. For 
example, we cannot avoid using concepts such as freedom, rationality, 
and self-conscious awareness in our quest to apprehend the mode of being 
of finite subjects; if we refused to use such categories we would be 
forced to assimilate finite subjectivity to the realm of unconscious 
nature through the use of object-predicates, and this would be to 
misunderstand finite subjectivity to a much greater degree than we should 
misunderstand it as a result of its having subject-predicates, ascribed 
to it. Finite subjects do indeed fall short of possessing subjective 
attributes in their fullness and perfection, but they have to be under­
stood as falling short of these attributes, and not merely possessing 
others. Truly subjective attributes are what finite subjects aspire to. 
It may seem strange, but it is true nonetheless, that the very terms 
which are necessary to describe a thing (in the present case, finite 
subjects) also can have a critical edge. For not only do they bring out 
what the thing is, they can, in cases such as the one in question, go 
beyond this and show us how a thing's existence is not commensurate with 
its essence. They show us, that is, how the thing in its present mode 
of existence is somehow incomplete.
Finite subjectivity is alienated from the natural world therefore, 
because it at once falls short of and aspires towards genuine subject­
ivity. It requires its own completion through a reconciliation with the 
objective, but lacks the power to provide it. It is the task of the 
Absolute Subject to resolve this dialectical contradiction; the path 
whereby this is achieved constitutes the path of subjective freedom's 
necessity.
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The Nature of the Absolute Subject
The Absolute Subject must be such as to reconcile subject with 
object through the completion of finite subjectivity. This much we 
may accept, through our previous development of the Hegelian line of 
argument. However, at the point where we have to decide just how the 
Absolute Subject is able to achieve the completion of finite subjectivity, 
we shall be forced to part company with Hegel. And, as we said earlier, 
we shall disagree with Hegel on the basis of a working out of his own 
insight, that is, by working out with greater consistency what the 
completion of finite subjectivity must involve.
Our contention shall be, as against Hegel, that the Absolute 
Subject can never fulfil its task of bringing about the completion of 
finite subjectivity through a perfect, or allegedly perfect, social 
order or state, realized at some latter-day point in human history.
For even if a political state or society could be brought'about in which 
alienation were totally overcome, and in which finite individuals found 
total freedom and self-fulfilment through their participation in the 
social "whole" (a state of affairs which is, in itself highly improbable) 
the very fact that such a state would comprise merely a small portion 
of human history, and would be bounded by spatial, geographical factors, 
this fact alone, would be sufficient to preclude that state from being 
the ultimate manifestation of the reconciling power of the Absolute 
Subject. The Absolute Subject must be limited by no temporal or geograph­
ical power if it is to be truly absolute, its reconciling power cannot be 
narrowly contained within a finite period and place, somewhere towards 
the end of human history. If the Absolute Subject is to genuinely complete 
the finite world, it must complete it throughout eternity, that is to say, 
it must be coeval with it.
the Absolute Subject in the final or latter days of human history would 
not provide this context, and an Absolute which completed the world in 
a temporal sense could not possibly complete it in the (relevant) 
logical sense.
The "greater context" which seems to complete the finite world 
may of course be apprehended and expressed more or less adequately in 
the lives of finite individuals of different societies and in different 
ages. There may be some societies which have become so corrupt and 
some individuals who have become so evil that from their standpoint it 
is almost impossible to grasp the "overall context". But there is no 
a priori reason to suppose that there will be a linear progression in 
which the Absolute Subject is more adequately expressed in the lives of 
finite individuals as history advances. The Absolute Subject, which is
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Hegel's notion that the Absolute Subject is realized at a latter- 
day point in human history, seems to arise from his view about the way 
in which the Absolute Subject must develop itself out of the finite world, 
as the completion of that world. That is, Hegel seems to think that 
because the Absolute Subject is necessary for the completion of the 
finite world, then it must be actualised in its fullness at a point late 
in time. However, this totally conflates two senses of the term 
"completion", the one logical and the other temporal. Hegel's greatest 
insight was that the world of finite subjects is inadequate as it stands 
and it needs "completion" to be transformed into that substantial unity 
which is always implicit within it. But it does not follow from this 
that the "completion" must take place towards its temporal end. The 
completion of the finite world is not the same as the completion of an 
essay, for the former sense of "completion" is logical, it involves 
placing the finite world within a context which can alone make sense of '
-Iit, through resolving its dialectical contradictions. A realization of g
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the overall completion throughout all time of all self-conscious (and 
lesser forms of) life may express itself through the finite world more 
or less adequately at any point in history. Communion with the 
Absolute Subject is available at any time to all finite spirits who are 
sincerely seeking their own completion and fulfilment.
The Absolute Subject and the "Cunning of Reason"
One objection which might be levelled against our critique of 
(what we may call) Hegel's historical thesis, is based on the notion that 
the Absolute Subject develops itself from the finite world through a 
process which Hegel calls the "Cunning of Reason". Once we understand, 
it may be argued, what the "Cunning of Reason" is and how it works, it 
will be seen that the completion of the finite world by the Absolute 
Subject must be understood chronologically, as well as logically. What 
then, we may ask, is the "Cunning of Reason"?
The Hegelian doctrine of the "Cunning of Reason" is well summed up 
by Peter Laska in his essay Hegel and Kant on Practical Reason. In 
this essay, Laska writes:
'"The universal' Hegel argues, 'must be 
actualised through the particular.' The rational will which must be developed from the universal through its opposite the particular is for Hegel 'The Cunning of Reason' (die List 
der Vernunft). Reason in the sense of the 
universal rational community (i.e. the Kantian Kingdom of Ends) is realised in the concrete 
world of human history, as a result of individuals pursuing their own particular interests rather than consciously pursuing this 
Ideal. He sees it as part of the notion of the cunning of reason that human civilisation has 
advanced not through conscious intent hut rather 
in spite of it." Thus, "Spiritual or social
16. Published in Hegel and the History of Philosophy. Proceedings of the 1972 Hegel Society of America Conference, p.136.
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development then, is a process which goes on 
'behind the back of consciousness.' The 'cunning' in the 'cunning of reason' is that 
the human individual acts freely, (i.e. spontaneously) in his own interest but actual­
ises a 'universal', a rationally necessary 
constraint on his power of arbitrary choice. 
This 'universal' of rational thought attains objective existence in the institutionalised relationships of human society, that is, in what Hegel calls the 'spiritual' or 'cultural' 
aspects of human life." 17
The cunning of reason then is the process by which finite individuals 
come to express, in spite of themselves, something of the Absolute Subject. 
As Hegel quite rightly saw, a consciousness of the universal comes to be 
formed in the course of struggles for the particular. For once we have 
achieved our particular aims and goals it soon becomes clear - even if 
we have fully achieved them - that we cannot rest contented in this
state. The very fact that we have fulfilled our particular purposes and
still are not wholly contented brings to light our deeper and morej
universal needs. That is, our continuing alienation brings to light more
clearly what it is we lack as finite beings, and what is required to
overcome this lack.
It may seem therefore, that as time advances, finite beings will 
be in a position to express the nature of the Absolute Subject with 
progressively increasing adequacy. That is to say, it looks at first as 
though the Absolute Subject can only serve as the completion of the 
finite world once the world of finite individuals has managed to overcome 
its alienation. And this surely, it may be argued, must be a process 
which takes place in time.
However, on closer consideration, the doctrine of the Cunning of 
Reason, though seeming prima facie to lend support to Hegel's historical
17. ibid. p.137.
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thesis, serves, in the end, to undermine it. For if it is true that 
finite subjects can advance and tend to advance towards a more genuine 
subjectivity in spite of their conscious intentions, then this is 
surely because the influence of the Absolute Subject is present from the 
beginning. If the Absolute Subject only arose out of the efforts of 
finite subjects, towards the end of history, there would have been 
nothing to guide those efforts at the beginning, and the emergence of an 
Absolute Subject from the action of (unguided) finite beings would have 
been the most incredible and unlikely coincidence.
The force which is capable of guiding finite subjects towards the 
expression of Absolute Subjectivity in spite of their conscious intentions, 
cannot be actualised as a full reality, post festum, that is only after 
that guidance has been completed. The operation of the cunning of reason, 
whereby reason, freedom, and self-conscious awareness are developed even 
in spite of conscious intentions, only makes sense it we posit an 
Absolute Subject which is always present and which is capable of guiding 
us, in spite of ourselves, towards goals which are truly universal.
The Absolute Subject and Religious Experience
From our critique of Hegel's historical thesis, a positive view 
have emerged of the nature of an Absolute Subject, which alone can bring 
about the "completion" of the finite world. It cannot, we have seen, 
be identified with one particular period in the life of human society; 
it must rather be an external influence running through the whole 
history of self-conscious life on this, and possibly on other planets. 
Finite spirits may come more or less close to expressing this Absolute 
Subjectivity, but so long as they remain finite, they can never wholly 
express it. The more adequately, however, that Absolute Subjectivity is
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expressed through the lives of finite spirits, the more free, rational, 
self-conscious, and morally good they become.
All this has been established by our metaphysical reflections, by 
means of which we have attempted to establish, and work out the 
implications of, the ultimate unity of subject and object. But what do 
our metaphysical conclusions tell us about the validity of religious 
experience? Do the subjects of religious experience really have a direct 
intuition of the primacy of a subject, corresponding to the Absolute Subject 
which we have described?
We may reply at once that, so long as we are not tempted to entertain 
the historical thesis that the Absolute Subject only actualises itself, 
as a result of human labour, at a certain point in history, the answer is 
resoundingly yes.
Mystics and others who have claimed to have encountered the divine 
have consistently reported an experience in which they have been liberated 
from their everyday concerns as a finite particular, made more conscious 
of themselves and their continuity with nature, and have overcome the 
conflict between duty and inclination. Above all, such people have, 
through their experiences, been led to feel that the various aspects of 
the perceivable world, including themselves, are ultimately unified through 
a supreme conscious awareness, a power or being from which nothing is 
hidden, and which serves to complete the attenuated self-consciousness of 
the finite subject. Thus for the mystics, as well as for metaphysicians, 
it is a liberating, reconciling Subjectivity which stands at the apex of 
all self-conscious life. It would be difficult to imagine what the 
Absolute Subject of metaphysics could be, if it is not the God of the 
mystics.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
THE TESTIMONY OF RELIGION AS IT IS PRACTISED
At the beginning of Chapter Four it was promised that, in the 
course of this thesis, we would attempt to confirm the conclusions of 
mystics and others who have claimed to have encountered the Divine, 
through metaphysical analysis of self-conscious life and experience.
And already, in the past four chapters we have begun to fulfil this 
promise, firstly through our discussion of the nature of finite selfhood, 
and secondly by reflecting upon the subject-object relationship. In 
those chapters we found reason to come to conclusions which were highly 
favourable to a mystical view of the world. >
In this chapter, it shall be our task to see whether this mystical 
view of the world can be further substantiated, by reflecting upon yet 
another important aspect of self-conscious life and experience. We 
shall be concerned to discover the deepest meaning of that species of 
religious consciousness in which a conception of God is arrived at, not 
through any striking or mystical religious experience, but through 
participation in the ritual and devotional practice of one of the world’s 
religions. And this enquiry will be attempted, in order to determine 
whether within this ritualistic religious consciousness, there is to be 
found a conception of God which can in any way corroborate the views of 
the mystics, and others who have claimed more direct experience of God.
That it is important to consider the meaning of this ritualistic |
religious consciousness for the purposes of our enquiry becomes clear as 
soon as we remember what an important part it has played in shaping the
3
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ordinary person's "sense of the Infinite" down the ages. Unlike the more 
unusual religious experiences which we discussed earlier and whose valid­
ity we are now trying to corroborate, the consciousness generated by 
devotion and ritual has been experienced, not by only a small minority 
of people ; it has rather been an important facet of the self-conscious 
experience of a vast number, and possibly the majority, of human beings 
who have lived throughout history. It would therefore be something of an 
oversight to fail to consider the question of whether religion as it is 
practised has anything to tell us about the nature of religious truth.
If religion as it is practised is to lend support to the mystical 
world view, two conclusions must be established; firstly, it must be 
established that devotion and religious practice reflect a genuine aware­
ness of something which is true about the world however incomplete and 
inadequate the ritualistic expression may be, and secondly, it must be 
established that the religious awareness reflected in ritual and devotioni
is ultimately in line with the mystical world view. The first question 
must be answered before the second, because there would be little comfort 
in a conclusion that the consciousness of God in ritualistic religion is 
supportive of a mystical world view if the ritualistic consciousness were 
itself seen to be the product of illusion. We shall therefore turn to 
that question at once.
Hegel and the Ultimate Meaning of Religion
Is the devotional practice of the ordinary religious believer 
expressive of anything deeply true about the world? The most striking 
affirmative answer to this question is to be found in the works of Hegel. 
Indeed Hegel's treatment of it is so comprehensive, and so thorough, that 
we shall seek to arrive at our own conclusion through a detailed analysis 
of the meaning of religion which Hegel presents us with, and by an
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examination of how his analysis might be improved upon.
It is well known of Hegel that he sought to understand the meaning 
of religion by comprehending it through philosophical speculation, and 
also that he located the chief significance of religion in its being 
the expression of a supreme truth which is only partially grasped from 
the standpoint of its own self-understanding. This much has been enough 
to offend a good many theologicans and adherents of religious faiths; 
consequently regarding Hegel's philosophy of religion little more is 
widely known. In particular, it is not widely known what Hegel thought 
the ultimate meaning of religion to be, nor how he developed and 
attempted to justify his view. Yet it is just these aspects of Hegel's 
philosophy which must be considered here.
In order to understand Hegel's view of the ultimate meaning of 
religion, it is necessary to begin by looking at why he rejected its 
own self-understanding as inadequate. For it is largely through a•j
critique of the self-understanding of religion that Hegel claims to
arrive at a more adequate grasp of its real meaning; a meaning which
the various religions themselves are half-blindly groping towards.
Hegel's dissatisfaction with religion left as it stands,
uncomprehended by philosophy, first comes to light in his Early
Theological Writings. In his essay, the "Positivity of the Christian *î
Religion", Hegel argues that underlying the message of Jesus there is -I
deep truth, but that this was totally distorted by the way in which it
was presented. Hegel tells us from the outset what it was which in his
CO\ùr\view was the essential truth which Christianity distorted:"The aim and 
essence of all true religion," he remarks, "our religion included, is 
human morality ..."^.
1. On Christianity, Early Theological Writings (referred to hence­
forth as E.T.W.) T.M. Knox translation, p.68.
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This sounds at first as if Hegel were advocating a reduction of 
religion to morality, and is disregarding the question of whether 
Christian beliefs are actually true. This however cannot be so, for 
there is a total link in Hegel's thought between ethical truth and 
other forms of truth. The point is that all truth for Hegel is a matter 
of expressing the Universal, or pure rationality. Pure rationality is 
achieved once the Universal wins mastery over the particular, so that 
all one-sidedness is done away with. Morality is the expression of 
rationality through human actions, for in acting morally I express my 
rational nature, rather than my subjective interests which correspond Ito my nature as a mere isolated particular. If one approaches all that j
one does from this rational standpoint, one is then expressing the [
I
deepest truth, a truth in which theory and practice are in total harmony. |
It is impossible to be rational in practice without being rational in -I
theory. By affirming that the aim and essence of all true religion is 'Ihuman morality, Hegel was saying no more than that the life of God or ,
/'I4the Universal must be worked out through the lives of human beings. Hegel j
■Ihad no time for other-worldly gods, at least not as the ultimate truth '
of the matter, and to this view he remained faithful throughout his life. {•!1
The problem with the Christian message as Jesus taught it, says |
Hegel, was that it issued from him as positive commands. Jesus was Iforced to present his teaching in this way, we are told, because only i'I
by doing so could he get the legalistic society of his day to pay j
'Iattention. Therefore he talked a good deal about his own personality |
and performed miracles, thereby shifting the emphasis away from his |
teaching and towards his authority. The greatest shift in this direction, 
however, was not brought about by Christ himself, but by his disciples.
These were simple men who, as Hegel says, "had found the basis of their 
conviction about the teaching of Jesus principally in their friendship
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2. ibid. p.8.
3. ibid. p.73.
4. It was just this view of Hegel's which Kierkegaard so severely
criticized. According to Kierkegaard, man can never rise to such dizzy heights; the individual is and must remain "a poor existing 
individual" in a constant process of "becoming". In spite of this however, Kierkegaard is at times unable to avoid the Hegelian conclusion himself. Consider, for example, the description of the 
nature of man which we find in "Problem One" of Fear and Trembling. 
W. Lowrie translation, pages 64-65. (Continued p.278)
with him and dependence on him. They had not attained truth and freedom
by their own exertions; only by laborious learning had they acquired a
2dim sense of them and certain formulas about them". The fact that the
Christian message was chiefly promulgated by such men led to its being 
imbued with a strong authoritarian element.
Hegel is emphatic however, when he tells us that although for the 
Jews of Christ's day the moral teaching could only come to their attention 
as commands, its essential content is really nothing other than the 
expression of the Universal nature in man.
"The assertion that even the moral laws propounded 
by Jesus are positive, that is that they derive 
their validity from the fact that Jesus commanded them, betrays a humble modesty and a disclaimer of any inherent goodness, nobility and greatness in 
human nature; but it must at least suppose that man has a natural sense of obligation to obey divine commands. If nothing whatever in our hearts 
responded to the challenge to virtue, and if |
therefore the call struck no chord in our own 'nature, then Jesus' endeavour to teach mem virtue {would have had the same character and the same |outcome as St. Anthony of Padua's zeal in preaching I
to fish." 3 J
1
In the "Positivity of the Christian Religion" then, we see the *
early origins of Hegel's mature view about the ultimate unity of the 
divine and human nature. Man does not forever remain finite, with the 
Infinite standing over against him. He rather contains within himself j
the divine potential. }
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4. (.contd)
"Conceived immediately as physical and psychical, 
the particular individual is the individual who 
has his tetos in the universal, and his ethical 
task is to express himself constantly in it, and to abolish, his particularity, in order to become 
the universal. As soon as the individual would assert himself in his particularity over against 
the universal he sins, and only by recognizing 
this can he reconcile himself with the universal."
Kierkegaard goes on to tell us that if there is such a thing as faith then it must be possible for the individual to rise above 
the universal, and stand in an "absolute relation to the absolute". I want to argue that Kierkegaard's notion of an 
"absolute relation to the absolute" is precisely what Hegel 
has in mind when he speaks of the human individual as having 
a universal nature. And it is important to be clear from the outset about the different ways in which Hegel and Kierkegaard use 
the term "universal". For Kierkegaard, as we have said, it is 
not the highest category. He thinks of it in a more Kantian way as the sort of reasoning which in ethics produces "rational 
love". When, through one's life, one expresses this type of universal, one lives by impersonal values, and insofar as it 
is the ability to do this which distinguishes us from animals, 
it is not to be despised. Kierkegaard calls a life on this 
level the ethical way of life. ,'
Both Hegel and Kierkegaard saw however, that so long as one 
remains at this level, full human potential is not realised.
They saw that insofar as one remains at the ethical level one only subordinates one's inclinations to universal principles, 
thereby retaining a gap between duty and inclination. Although these universal principles are apprehended by reason, and do not 
constitute merely unreffective obedience to positive commands, 
they nonetheless are not an expression of the whole individual, whose inclinations still strive against them. Thus, from the point of view of a total ethical person, the moral law still 
appears as having a positive element in that it comes as an incursion from outside, being as it is, an expression of only one side of the person's nature. In the continued efforts to 
put down one side of one's nature, as it were, by violence, one loses some of the passion which is essential for a totally 
fulfilled human being. Thus we see Kierkegaard depicting the ethical way of life as the least passionate of the three ways he 
describes. In the highest way of life, there must be no disremption or tension between duty and inclination. This absence of tension is discovered for Hegel in the expression of the 
Universal, and for Kierkegaard in the religious way of life.In this we have the ultimate consummation of the moral law 
through which it ceases to be law and becomes an expression of 
freedom. The view of the moral law as law is simply the dis­tortion which must appear to the finite alienated individual. The fulfilment of the law which Christ preached, turns out to be nothing 
other than love expressing itself freely.
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In the "Spirit of Christianity", written only a year later than 
the "Positivity of the Christian Religion", Hegel has come to a much 
more sympathetic understanding of Christianity. We here see Christianity 
presented, not as a religion having an overdose of positivity, but as 4
having the minimum degree of positivity possible for truth which is 
couched in religious terminology and rests upon religious ways of thinking.
Here we see the origins of his later view that in true religion we are 
presented with infinite content in a finite form. He has not yet worked 
out, however, his detailed view about how it is that the limitations 
inherent in religious ways of speaking and thinking can and must be 
overcome.
In the "Spirit of Christianity" Hegel begins by telling us how 
the sharp hostility which the Flood introduced between man and nature 
resulted in a strong positive element in the Jewish faith. For it gave 
people the idea that they must oonquev nature, and this brought with it 
the type of consciousness which had great respect for power. Hegel 
writes:
"If man was to hold out against the outbursts 
of a nature now hostile, nature had to be mastered; and since the whole can only be 
divided into idea and reality, so also the supreme unity lies either in something thought or in something real. It was in a thought-product that Noah built the distracted world together again; his thought-produced 
ideal he turned into a (real) Being and then 
set everything else over against it, so that in this opposition realities were reduced to thoughts, i.e. to something mastered. This Being promised him to confine within their 
limits the elements which were his servants, so that no flood was ever able again to destroy mankind. Among living things, things capable 
of being mastered in this way, men were subjected to the law, to the command so to restrain them­
selves as not to kill one another; to overstep these restraints was to fall under the power of this Being and so to become lifeless." 5
5. _E.T.W. p.182-3 T. Knox translation. University of Chicago Press.
 -1
280
Abraham, Hegel tells us, carried on this tradition:
"The first act which made Abraham the progenitor of a nation is a disseverance which snaps the 
bonds of communal life and love." "Abraham wanted not to love, wanted to be free by not 
loving." 6
Hegel goes on to expound his view, which was to remain with him 
throughout his life, that if one does not love, one is alienated from 
oneself, and therefore cannot be free. What Abraham tried to do was 
impossible, and its only effect was to negate his freedom and make him 
the slave of the very world he tried so hard to master. Abraham's 
attitude eventually came to infect the whole Jewish nation, Hegel tells 
us, and it led to the result that in Jewish eyes slavery came to be 
regarded almost as a virtue.
"It is no wonder that this nation, which in its 
emancipation bore the most slave-like demeanour, regretted leaving Egypt, wished to return- there 
again whenever difficulty or danger came upon it in the sequel, and this showed how in its 
liberation it had been without soul and spontaneous need of freedom." 7
When Jesus came into Jewish history, Hegel continues, a great 
effort was made to reverse the tendencies which had been so deeply 
ingrained into the Jewish faith. It was the task of Jesus to do away 
with the positive element in morality, and to replace it with an ethic 
whose foundation was in the needs of man. Hegel writes that "Against 
purely objective commands Jesus sets something totally foreign to them, 
namely, the subjective in general."^ We are told that Jesus' distaste
6. ibid.
7. ibid.
8. ibid.
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for positive law was so great that it would be, from his point of view, 
better to give way to the merest whim, which at least has some (albeit 
distorted) basis in human need, than to carry out an action simply 
because it is commanded. Jesus, says Hegel, taught us love, not obedience. 
For example: "Over against dutiful fidelity in marriage and the right
to divorce a wife, Jesus sets love." "In the face of love so long as it
9lasts, or even when it ceases, there can be no talk of leave or rights."
We now turn to Hegel's Berlin Lectures on the Philosophy of 
Religion. These were composed towards the end of Hegel's life, and 
represent his mature thinking on the philoosphy of religion. These may 
in a certain way be regarded as a sort of synthesis of the "Positivity 
of the Christian Religion" and the "Spirit of Christianity". He retained 
the view that the essence of religion is love, or the free expression of 
the Universal, but he came to grasp the necessity of why this Universal 
had, at certain times in history, to appear in the guise of ritualistic,I
positive religion. Positivity he saw, was linked with the fact that in 
religion our mode of thought is partly pictorial or sensuous; thus we 
cannot, from this standpoint, avoid treating the truth which such 
thinking presents as to some degree external. That there should be this 
level of thinking is not a bad thing, not only because the masses need 
such a way of thinking of the divine content, but because a truly 
Infinite and creative absolute must express itself on all the various 
levels of finitude. For Hegel, we may say, religion is the highest of 
such levels - it is only one step from here to the Infinite. Hegel sums 
up his view that God or the Absolute must express itself on all the 
levels of finitude, and therefore through human religion, in the following 
way:
9. ibid. p.216.
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"The expression that God as reason rules the 
world, would be irrational if we did not assume that it has reference also to religion, 
and that the Divine Spirit works in the special 
character and form assumed by religion." 10
Religion then, for Hegel, is an expression of the life of Spirit, 
or free rational self-consciousness, and Christianity is this expression 
in its most developed form. For the purposes of this chapter we shall 
not discuss the mature Hegel's claim regarding the particular status of 
Christianity as the Absolute Religion, but shall rather be concerned 
only with his attempts to grasp the essence of the phenomenon of 
religion in general.
The mature Hegel of the LPR continues to uphold his earlier view 
that the true significance of religious life and devotion only emerges 
fully once it has been comprehended by philosophy, and that the impetus 
for this comprehension springs from a tension in religion's self- 
understanding .  ^'
Religion, left to itself, does not make any more sense for Hegel 
than does the world of sensuous immediacy left to itself. It is only 
in its collapse that it discovers its true nature and value, for this 
breakdown is not destruction but the attainment of its true destiny and 
essence, as a moment of the Absolute Whole.
Just how this collapse from within occurs, and how it gives to 
religion its true value as an expression of pure rational self-activity, 
is dealt with by Hegel in his LPR under the general heading of "The 
Conception of Religion".
Hegel begins his LPR by giving various descriptions of the nature 
of the religious consciousness. These descriptions do not yet diverge
10. Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (henceforth referred to as 
LPR). Vol.l, p.33.
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from the self-understanding of religion, although in a certain way they 
go deeper; they are aimed at setting that which is the essence of the 
religious consciousness apart from what could be described as its 
trimmings. For example Hegel states:
"We know that in religion we withdraw ourselves 
from what is temporal, and that religion is for our consciousness that region in which all the enigmas of the world are solved, all the contra­dictions of deep reaching thought have their 
meanings unveiled, and where the voice of the heart's pain is silenced - the region of eternal 
rest, eternal truth, eternal peace." 11
We are next told that there is an important connection between 
freedom and religion, and in particular, that religion is free because 
it is infinite, it has no "other" which might limit it.
"Religion, as something which is occupied with 
this final object and end, is therefore 
absolutely free, and is its own end; for all other aims converge in this ultimate end, 
and in presence of it they vanish and cease to have value of their own." 12
3
We are then told that the religious consciousness is to be found 
in all peoples, and that through religion we can overcome all sorrow:
"Whatever awakens in us doubt or fear, all sorrow, all care, all the limited interests of finite life, we leave behind on the shores 
of time; and as from the highest peak of a mountain far away from all definite view of 
what is earthly, we look down calmly upon all the limitations of the landscape and of the world, so with the spiritual eye, man, lifted out of the hard realities of the actual world, contemplates it as something having only the 
semblance of existence which seen from this
11. ibid. p.l.
12. ibid. p.2.
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15own finite fashion." Because such a conception rests on finite
13. ibid. p.3.
14. ibid. p.4.
15. ibid. p.29.
pure region bathed in the beams of the spiritual sun, merely reflects back its 
shades of colour, its varied tints and lights, softened away into eternal rest." 13
After stating all these propositions, Hegel remarks;
"Such is the general sensation, consciousness, 
or however we may designate it of religion.
To consider, to examine, and to comprehend 
its nature is the object of these present 
lectures." 14
Although Hegel proffers these descriptions at the outset, we are 
not supposed to be able to grasp their full significance at once.
Only after much argumentation are we able to see why there is and must 
be such a form of consciousness, indeed, only after we have grasped 
that which is the truth of religion.
The philosophical comprehension of religion, Hegel stresses,
must be a comprehension of definite religion: religion as it is actually?
practised. This shows that, even if Hegel does not explicitly discuss 
religion as it is understood by its own believers, he does not intend
to ignore this. If religion truly contains the unfolding of the life
■I
of Spirit, albeit in the form of "Vorstellung", then the Absolute must 
express itself in the definite religions of the world. Thus Hegel scorns |
those who would seek to understand the nature of God apart from all doctrine 
by way of a Theology of Reason. The Theology of Reason was doomed to |
failure, says Hegel, because it would not be led to God by his manifest- 
ation in the world, it rather tried to conceive of "the infinite in its
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understanding, any content we give to God will be inadequate for such -I
an Infinite Being, and thus we can have no idea of the nature of God, 
and are left with an empty abstraction. If we want to know the nature 
of God, we must look at his self-expression in the world. We can only 
know the nature of a creator by looking at his artefacts.
Hegel then goes on to show how the Theology of Reason, though 
itself misguided, gives rise, in its breakdown, to our first glimpse 
into the true nature of religion. It does so because it is bound up with 
the view that man has immediate knowledge of God.
"For with the thought that all objective 
determinateness has converged in the inward­
ness of subjectivity, the conviction is bound 
up that God gives revelation in an immediate way in man; that religion consists in just 
this, that man has immediate knowledge of God." 16
Immediate knowledge, however, Hegel tells us, contains an internal
inconsistency, for we find that it presents us with an ohj^ect of
knowledge for which this mode of knowledge is inadequate. Hegel says - 
and here it is worth quoting him at some length - that:
"If, however, we bring out what is inherent in 
the principle of immediate knowing, that is what is directly affirmed in it, we find it to be 
just this, that God is spoken of in relation to ftconsciousness in such a way that this relation is something inseparable, or in other words, that we must of necessity contemplate both." 17
Thus, from a form of knowledge which is said to be immediate, we
are led to a contemplation which has to acknowledge the distinction
between subject and object.
16. ibid. p.42.
17. ibid. p.45.
.à
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"It implies, in the first place, the essential 
distinction which the conception of religion contains; on the one side, subjective conscious­
ness, and on the other, God recognized as Object in himself, or implicitly. At the same time 
however, it is stated that there is an essential 
relation between the two, and that it is the inseparable relation of religion which is the 
real point, and not the notions which one may have concerning God. What is really contained 
in this position, and really constitutes its 
true kernel, is the philosophical Idea itself, 
only that this Idea is confined by immediate knowledge within limitations which are abolished 
by philosophy, and which are exhibited in their 
onesidedness and untruth." 18
This conception of immediate knowledge of God, then, is ultimately 
to be seen as a onesided apprehension of the truth, whose very onesided­
ness moves us on to a more adequate standpoint. Immediate knowledge 
tries to stress only the unity between God and consciousness, but in so 
doing, it is forced to pay attention to the other side, to the differe­
ntiation. So far, however, our insight into the life of Spirit is very)
incomplete, for we have before us only that there is an essential 
relation between subject and object and an essential difference; the 
nature of this relation and difference and their relation to each other 
are not yet grasped. There is a huge gap between this and the ultimate 
Hegelian conclusions about the nature of Absolute Spirit. For that there 
is an essential relationship between subject and object, and an essential 
difference, is not of itself enough to suggest that this unity in 
difference is something spiritual. We find after all such a relation 
in the phenomenology of Sartre. Further arguments therefore need to be 
adduced for the conclusion that in this difference in unity we find the 
essence of Spiritual Reality.
18. ibid. pp.45-46.
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Hegel's detailed account of how religion as it is practised 
expresses the development of Spirit is set out in LPR. The "Notion" of 
religion, we are to be shown, unfolds itself by way of three distinct 
movements. These Hegel calls the moments of the "Notion". Hegel 
explains in this way;
"In the first place, the notion or conception 
of religion will be considered in its universal 
aspect, then, secondly, in its particular form 
as the self-dividing and self-differentiating 
notion that is under the aspect of judgment, of limitation, of difference, and of finiteness; 
and thirdly, we shall consider the notion which encloses itself within itself, and had it not this movement, it would be something dead." 19
In an important section of the first volume of LPR, Hegel describes 
these moments of the notion of religion in some detail. His treatment is 
however confusing, since in this section he outlines these moments as a 
programme for dealing with religion, (so that the exposition and 
development of the "Notion" of religion can be presented in three parts), 
but leaves most of the argument for why he makes such a division until 
later. However, it is important to realize that this presentation is 
not jwst a programme for dealing with religion, it is rather the only 
rational way of understanding it. Its necessity however, does not emerge 
in full, until the arguments in Part One of the book have been expounded.
In the sections of Part One, A, B, and C correspond to the three moments 
of the "Notion". To make matters worse however, we do find some argument 
for the necessity of this division in the outline of the programme itself. 
We shall therefore attempt to draw the two relevant sections together for 
each moment of the "Notion". Later in his lectures, Hegel goes on to 
apply the moments of the notion to his understanding of definite religions,
19. ibid. p.59.
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but for the purposes of this chapter we shall continue with Hegel's
general conception of religion.
The first moment which religion contains, says Hegel, is that of
universality. This is because the most fundamental thing about religion
20is that it is a "departing from sensuous finite objects". In religion
we try to grasp what is not limited and finite, but universal. In this,
says Hegel, religion expresses the highest thought, for "The object is
21the Universal which, as active, is thought." It is clear that Hegel 
equates this moment of the "Notion" with very abstract conceptions of 
God. Hegel offers several such definitions.
"God is the absolutely true, the Universal 
in and for itself." 22
and God is also
"The all-containing, the all-comprehending, 
that from which every thing derives subsistence." 23
Hegel tells us that it is this conception of God which forms the 
foundation of the religious consciousness. However, we cannot remain at 
this standpoint. We have here only an empty notion of the divine 
unity which needs to be filled in before we can know anything of God 
at all. "The unity of God", says Hegel, "is always Unity, but every­
thing depends upon the particular nature of this U n i t y . H e g e l  shows
how different the various conceptions of this unity can be by contrasting
the type of view which holds that God is simply the sum of all contingent
20. ibid. p.52.
21. ibid. p.61.
22. ibid. p.90.
23. ibid. p.90.
24. ibid. p.100,
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things with the view, which he attributes to all genuinely pantheistic 
religions, that God expresses his essence through the created world.
This latter view which Hegel attributes, quite rightly it seems, to 
pantheism proper, is to be in the end very close to Hegel's own view, 
though from this abstract universal which we now have before us, the 
concept of a God who expresses his essence through the created world, 
has yet to emerge.
Because the abstract universal is, as abstract, incomplete, it 
has to be given content. As soon as we give it content, we introduce 
diversity into what was previously an abstract unity. For we now have 
the Universal, or that which unifies, and that determinate content which 
is held together as a unity by it. Universality, or infinite creative 
freedom, cannot then remain as abstract self-identity, but must express 
itself in a determinate way, and with, this we have the second moment 
of the "Notion". It is this expression of the Universal in determinate
J
fashion which gives rise to consciousness and religion. Hegel sums 
all this up in this way;
"What we have first is this divine Universality - r|Spirit in its undetermined Universality - for ;
which there exists absolutely no element of .{difference. But upon this absolute foundation,(and this we state for the moment as fact), ithere now appears that element of distinction
which, in its spiritual character, is conscious- 4ness, and it is with this distinction that ;|
religion as such begins. When the absolute iUniversality advances to the stage of judgment, ;|
that is to say, when it proceeds to posit itself ias determinateness, and God exists as Spirit for 4
Spirit, we have reached the standpoint from which |God is regarded as the object of consciousness, :and Thought, which at the beginning was Universal, .!is seen to have entered into the condition of J
relation and differentiation." 25 1
25. ibid. p.100. |
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It is not difficult to see why the Universal must differentiate 
itself in this way in order for consciousness to begin. Consciousness 
depends on there being a distinction between the perveiving subject and 
the perceived object, and in order to have such a relation there must 
be a differentiated world. Religion arises at this level because with 
consciousness comes awareness of the distinction between the particular 
finite world through which the Universal expresses itself and the 
unconditioned creative power itself. In the following passage Hegel 
explains how it is that the differentiated universal gives rise to the 
religious consciousness:
"The relation of these two sides which are 
so sharply opposed - the absolutely finite consciousness and being on the one hand, and the infinite on the other - exists in religion for me." 26.
The particular finite side of the opposition is that which makes 
for the possibility of sin and suffering, since this is the world of 
frustration and limitation. This possibility of sin and suffering is for 
Hegel an essential moment in the life of an Absolute which is infinite.
As he so well puts it in the Phenomenology of Spirit :
"Thus the life of God and divine cognition may well be spoken of as the disporting of Love with itself; but this idea sinks into 
mere edification, and even insipidity, if it lacks the seriousness, the suffering, the patience and the labour of the negative." 27
In religion we are aware of both sides, the finite and the infinite, 
as well as their relation to each other. This relation is, as Hegel 
says, that "Both sides seek each other, and both flee from each other."
26. ibid. p.63.
27. The Phenomenology of Spirit A.V. Miller translation p.10.
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Religion arises then because of the conflict which goes on within me, 
as well as the unity which contains that conflict.
"I am the feeling, the perception, the idea alike of this unity and this conflict, and am what holds together the conflicting elements, 
the effort put forth in this act of holding together, and represent the labour of the 
heart and soul to obtain mastery over this 
opposition." 28
In the second moment of the "Notion" of religion, what is stressed 
is the opposition between the Infinite and the finite. There is unity 
implicit in this, for clearly an infinite which stood over against the 
finite and stopped at the letter's borders would not be infinite. The 
unity is brought explicitly to consciousness in the third moment of 
the "Notion", that is, in worship.
"It is this unity, reconciliation, restoration 
of the subject and of its self-consciousness, 
the positive feeling of possessing a share'in, of partaking of this Absolute, and making unity with it actually one's own - this abolition of 
the dualism which constitutes the sphere of 
worship." 29
In worship then, we are bridging the gap between the finite and 
the Infinite, or reconciling our particular with our Universal nature.
At this point we should notice that Hegel has so far been arguing that, 
assuming we start from the abstract universal, we can see that this must 
give rise to the beginning of consciousness, and to religion. That is, 
the abstract universal must become concrete if it is to be aware of 
itself, and it must be aware of itself if it is to be truly Universal.
28. LPR p.64, Vol.l,
29. ibid. pp.66-67.
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But why do we need, in the first place, to see the world as a concretiza-
tion of such a Universal? Why can we not have simply the empirical
world? The Absolute may not make sense without an empirical world, but
that is not to say that the empirical world makes no sense without an
Absolute. We need then to ask, what is Hegel's justification for starting
with the abstract Universal anyway? He says at one point that "At first
30it is the simple, the abstract, which enters into consciousness."
However, this is a confusion, for Hegel has shown that the Universal
31must be differentiated before consciousness can begin. Further, he 
explicitly states that as soon as consciousness does begin one is aware 
of the conflict between the Infinite and the finite. Hegel then is not 
justified in starting from the abstract universal - neither is he justi­
fied in showing that we must go on to see the world as a concrétisation 
of this. He will only be able to prove his case if he can start with 
the phenomenology of ordinary experience and from here go on to show f
that the world is only plausibly regarded as an expression of the 
Absolute. In the section of LPR entitled "The Necessity of the Religious !
Standpoint", Hegel announces his intention to attempt just this. He
states: "We have now, therefore, to consider Nature as it really is in
itself - as the process of which the transition to Spirit is the ultimate
32truth, so that Spirit proves itself to be the truth of Nature." It is
30. ibid. p.93.
31. It could be objected here that Hegel, in saying that it is thesimple and abstract which enters into consciousness at first, 1
does not intend "at first" to be interpreted temporally. It 1might be held that what Hegel is really saying is that when we reflect philosophically, we see that this is, of all possible 
contents of consciousness, that which is logically the most elementary, and in that way enjoys a certain species of priority.
However, if this is what Hegel does mean, he does not explain 
adequately just how or why this is so.
32. LPR p.109, Vol.l.
J
33. ibid. pp.109-110.
34. ibid. p.118.
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shown that "It is the essential character of Nature to sacrifice
itself, to consume itself, so that the Psyche comes forth out of this
burnt offering and the Idea rises into its proper element, into its 
33ethereality."
If philosophical thought is, as Hegel says it is, infinite, it 
ought to be possible for it to grasp the necessity of why Spirit is the ÿ
truth of Nature. If it cannot do this, then the so-called philosophical 
comprehension of religion is no advance upon the self-understanding of 
the ritualistic consciousness. For Hegel, the fact that religion has 
the form of pictorial or partly sensuous thought is tied up with the 
fact that in religion we do not grasp the necessity of the development 
of the life of Spirit; it appears as something which just is.
Religious symbols and imagery do not allow us to grasp the necessity of 
the truth which they represent. Even in the Absolute Religion, which 
for Hegel is Christianity, the relation of the Infinite and finite is 
pictured by the relation of God the Father to Christ the" Son. This 
makes the relation appear external and contingent, a mere matter of fact.
In religion says Hegel, we have faith in God, "insofar as we do not have 
any perception of the necessity which constitutes G o d . T h e  necessity 
only becomes apparent, Hegel tells us, when religion is comprehended 
by philosophy. And it is only when this necessity becomes apparent, 
that the deep truth which religion can only express in a limited way 
becomes clear. Hegel finds this necessity in our being unable to make 
sense of the finite world if it is not regarded as the expression of 
Absolute Spirit.
i
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In arguing for this claim, that is that the finite world makes no
sense on its own, Hegel asks us to begin by considering the lowest form
35of finiteness, feeling. It is in feeling that religious awareness first 
arises. If Spirit is to be truth for Nature, then religious feeling must 
come to be seen as necessarily an expression of Spirit. That is, 
religious feeling must truly have reference to a spiritual Reality, and 
Thought must be able to see why. Hegel wants to argue that feeling does 
provide a basis for our understanding of the spiritual principle, for we 
find revealed, in its inevitable breakdown and in its provision of the 
impetus for advance to more developed forms of consciousness, the 
necessary development of Spirit itself. Hegel explains the breakdown 
of feeling in this way:
"Now, if feeling be the essential religious 
attitude, this attitude is identical with my empirical self. Determinateness, representing 
the eternal Thought of the Universal, and I as wholly empirical subjectivity, are in me * comprised and comprehended in feeling. l" am the immediate reconciliation and resolution of the strife between the two. But just because 
I thus find myself determined on the one hand 
as a particular empirical subject, and on the 
other raised into a wholly different region, and have the experience of passing to and fro from the one to the other, and have the feeling of the relation of the two, do I find myself determined as against myself, or as distinguished 
from myself. That is to say, in this very feeling of mine I am driven by its content into contrast or opposition - in other words to reflection and the distinction of subject and 
object." 36
From feeling, therefore, we have to advance to reflection. We 
have to advance because we find it impossible to be content with the
35. ibid. p.118 ff.
36. ibid. pp.127-8.
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state of being divided against ourselves, in which we were left, when we 
did not go beyond the condition of "feeling". And the reason why we cannot 
halt the advance until we arrive at the stage of reflection is that the 
first step takes us only as far as perception, or becoming aware of the 
existence of an object of consciousness - but, at that stage, we remain 
divided, or separated from the object.
The life of feeling can never be known by feeling alone, for, as
Hegel tells us, feeling can never guarantee the truth of what is felt.
Before we can decide whether something is true, it must present itself
to our view as an object for consciousness. It is this putting before
37itself its object which Hegel calls Perception. Hegel says that the 
most perfect form of perception is art prerception but here we shall be 
concerned only with his general remarks. The most important thing about 
perception is that as soon as consciousness arrives at this level, it 
immediately begins to break down. It breaks down because^ in perception, 
one puts the religious object over against oneself and is therefore 
still estranged from it. The necessity of its truth cannot be seen 
because the relation between self-consciousness and its object is 
thoroughly external. Or, as Hegel puts it:
"In perception the elements of the totality of the religious relation, namely, the object, 
and self-consciousness, have got separated." 38
From this it follows that: "The advance now necessary is this, that
the totality of the religious relation should actually be accepted as
39such, and as unity". Consciousness strives to express its own truth, 
but this truth stands over against it as an object and its initial 
_ _  ibid. p. 138 ff.
38, ibid. p.141.
39. ibid. p.141.
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alienation therefrom is the precondition of their ultimate unity. It 
is in overcoming the estrangement between itself and the object that 
consciousness comes to recognize this object as reflecting a truth which 
is internally related to its own being. I have, as Hegel says,
40"identified myself with it, and have maintained myself in it ... "
This identification I represent to myself in worship at the level of
ordinary conception, by way of religious myths and imagery. But even
though I represent the truth to myself in a partly sensuous way, I know
that this truth has an essential relation to me. "The content, it is
then said, commends itself to me for its own sake, and the witness of
the Spirit teaches me to recognize it as truth, as my essential 
41determination."
It should be added that so long as one remains on the level of 
ordinary conception, the unity which -is my essential determination is only 
implicitly recognized as such by consciousness. The unity of subject 
and object, of finite and infinite, is represented in all religions, 
certainly, but the full significance of what is represented is not 
grasped. The fact that one finds this unity represented through events 
in history, and such-like, means that one is still looking outside 
oneself to external forces in order to find this unity, which shows that 
one does not fully realise how essentially one is involved in it. We 
may say that in the religious mode of thought, we have not come to 
realise the seriousness with which the affirmation that truth is my 
essential determination is meant. Thus definite religions have a quality 
of remoteness from life which for Hegel is a distortion of the truth and 
must be overcome.
40. ibid. p.150.
41. ibid. p.151.
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We are now in a position to understand the sort of internal 
tension which religion contains, and why, because of this, its own 
self-understanding must collapse. The infinite content, which religion 
is, cannot be contained happily within a finite form. By this inner 
discord we are pushed on towards a level where the infinite content can 
find its infinite form. This, according to Hegel, is Thought.
Thought comes to the explicit awareness that truth is my essential 
determination. It perceives that the drift of consciousness is towards 
greater and greater unity with its object, inspired by the drive towards 
completeness. When completeness is achieved, religious truth is seen 
as nothing more than the expression of true human potential. What 
appeared previously as knowledge, and as such stood in need of being 
grasped by a subject, now appears as the product of rational free self­
activity. From the Absolute standpoint we can look behind us at all the 
previous levels of finite consciousness and understand their place in 
the struggle to reach the Absolute. For as Hegel says: "In the ego,
as in that which is annulling itself as finite, God returns to himself,
42and only in this return is he God. Without the world, God is not God."
It is now possible to understand why Hegel can give such a strong 
affirmative answer to the question of whether ordinary religious 
practices reflect an awareness of the turth. It is because religion, 
when fully understood, can be seen to be a further development of the 
same conditions which make possible any form of conscious awareness.
There is no speoi-al problem about religious truth, since the religious 
consciousness is an inevitable consequence of the precondition of all 
consciousness, the Concrete Universal expressing itself through the finite
42. ibid. p.200.
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differentiated world. Hegel does not have the problem which other 
philosophers of religion have grappled with, of finding justification 
for a subject's awareness of a Deity which exists totally outside 
himself. Religious truth for Hegel is a truth about ourselves, as beings 
which are not ultimately alienated from the Absolute. Thus, the 
devotional religious consciousness is a form of our own self-awareness, 
it tells us as much about ourselves as about that which lies beyond. 
Self-awareness can be achieved in varying degrees, so it is not surprising 
that the religious practices and ideas of finite human beings do not 
express a self-awareness which is utterly complete. But Hegel's account 
of the consciousness of the ordinary believer being the outcome of an 
attempt to complete self-conscious experience and thus to create greater 
self-awareness is one which seems to make good sense. In putting forward 
this account, Hegel has found what is probably the only way of surmounting 
the formidable epistemological problem involved in accounts of man's 
knowledge of God which do not see God as a completion of self-conscious 
experience.
Hegel seems therefore to have produced a good case for his view 
that there is a natural drift of consciousness away from the- tensions of 
its lower levels, and towards a goal of completeness which is not 
misleadingly regarded as spiritual. Religion as it is practised points 
towards this goal. Hegel seems right too, in his view that Thought is 
the appropriate faculty for apprehending these tensions in the light of 
their effect on the trend of consciousness. But when he says that 
Philosophical Thought is itself to be equated with this goal of 
consciousness, I find what he says both unproven by him and highly 
dubious in itself.
Hegel is suggesting that Philosophical Thought is commensurate 
with the expression of infinite truth in a way that religion is
J
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not. He seems to think that because philosophy can point out the
43. When we refer here and subsequently to Philosophical Thought, we 
are referring, not to the thinking that is empirically carried on 
by people claiming to look at things philosophically, but to the idealized thinking which our actual thinking may very well fall 
short of. Thus, when we assert that thought cannot adequately comprehend the full meaning of religion, we do not mean only that 
finite thinkers must fail to comprehend it (though of course they always do). We mean rather that thought is, by its very nature, 
an inadequate vehicle with which to grasp the full meaning of religion. Because all thought must make use of finite concepts, 
even if a thinker could achieve the supra-personal level of 
idealized thought, the very form of thought would prevent him from grasping the deepest meaning of religion.
onesidedness in various other forms of thought and discourse, it must 
of itself be entirely complete. This however does not follow. What is 
more, it is not difficult to show that Philosophical Reflection does 
not measure up to Hegel's task of grasping the infinite in infinite form.
We only need examine some of the concepts used in philosophical 
thought to show this. Consider, for example, Hegel's use of the 
concepts 'infinite' and 'finite'. Hegel tells us that what is expressed 
by sensuous imagery in the Incarnation doctrine is expressed in its 
pure speculative form when we grasp it as the interpenetration of the 
infinite and the finite. Yet the term 'infinite' here does not express 
directly what Hegel wants it to; it works by suggestion in rather the 
same way as does the Incarnation doctrine. To do this work of suggesting, 
it even makes use of the sensuous world, since any conception of infinity 
which I form, however unlike Hegel's "bad infinite", seems always 
ultimately to be based on some sort of analogy with a continuous series 
of things in the sensuous world.
Furthermore, it is not easy to see how Philosophical Thought can 
grasp the internality of internal relations in their purity. When Hegel 
says that the finite and the infinite totally interpenetrate one another, %
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there remains a residue of externality in the relation thus thought of, 
shown up by the very fact that one uses the conjunction "and". The 
best we can do, in trying to understand such thoroughgoing inter­
penetration, is to think of it by analogy with something like a chemical 
compound.
My contention is then, that so long as thought remains thought, it
has the form of the finite and not the infinite. Spiritual truth, if
presented in philosophical form, will therefore always contain an
element which appears simply as a matter of fact, whose necessity cannot
be grasped. To grasp what Hegel wants to grasp in its true form, one
would have to step outside the bounds of thought and discourse all
together. Whether this could be done is questionable, but at any rate
it is the only hope of success. Many mystics have reported experiences
which have far more in common with what Hegel calls Philosophical
Speculation than has philosophical thought itself, and these are always
said to have a degree of ineffability. I would agree with F.C.
Copleston when he writes, in his essay "Hegel and the Rationalization 
44of Mysticism" that :
"Hegel attempted in my opinion to do what cannot be done, namely to make plain to 
view what can only be apprehended through 
the use of analogies and symbols."
This does not mean, of course, that one must not try to make 
things plainer so that one is less likely to be misled by the symbols. 
In this, Hegel did a valuable service to religion. For his insistence 
that we must comprehend religion by way of thought meant that he was
44. F.C. Copleston. Talk of God - Royal Institute of Philosophy 
Lectures, Vol.2, p.132.
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able to get closer to those deep affirmations of religion which underlie 
the often superfluous clutter of imagery. It is interesting too, that 
once the essence of religious life and consciousness is made clearer Iin this way, the gaps which separate the various religions of the world
begin to close.
However, not all philosophers have been happy with the view that 
a more adequate understanding of religion can be attained by using philo­
sophy to transcend religion's own self-understanding. S^ iren Kierkegaard 
is a major example here. In a spate of volumes, Kierkegaard never tires 
of railing against attempts to locate the truth of Christianity (which to 
him is the true religion), in a metaphysical system which purports to 
go beyond it. But although Kierkegaard repeatedly said that one could 
only accept or reject Christianity, and not philosophically understand 
it, the very fact that he tried in his major works to describe its |
essential nature meant that he was doing something very similar to that 
which he so much repudiated in Hegel. Their conclusions may have been 
somewhat different, but their programme was the same.
Probably, or so it seems to me, the reason why Kierkegaard so 
much condemned in Hegel that which he did himself was because he thought 
that Hegel was using external criteria in order to judge Christianity, 
thus ruling out, a priori, the possibility that the Christian faith is 
absolute in which case the ultimate measure of truth could only be found 
in its own content. We have seen however that Hegel did not do this.
That which leads to his philosophical comprehension of Christianity and 
religion generally is contained implicitly within Christianity and 
religion themselves. Oddly enough, also, Hegel and Kierkegaard saw the 
same problems with Christianity from the standpoint of its own self- 
understanding, and upheld solutions which had a great deal in common.
ft
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Both saw that in Christianity, the relation of Unity between God 
and man is not amenable to the finite understanding. In Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript and Philosophical Fragments the central problem 
raised is how a finite human being can ever come into contact with the 
Eternal. In the end Kierkegaard can only conclude that we have in this 
divine-human relation the Absolute Paradox, which cannot be grasped by 
the understanding but only through one’s inwardness, that is, by looking 
into oneself, into one’s true spiritual nature. Man can only grasp the 
Eternal, the divine essence, because he is not limited to the finite 
channels, he is ultimately infinite himself. That one finds God when 
one truly discovers oneself is a fundamental tenet of both thinkers; 
the stress which Hegel too puts on inwardness may be seen from the 
following quote:
"When however, by this means, I am transplanted into an intellectual world in which the nature 
of God, the characteristics and modes of action 
which belong to God, are presented to knowledge, 
and when the truth of these rests on the witness and assurance of others, yet I am at the same time referred into myself, for thought, 
knowledge, reason are 'in me, and in the feeling of sinfulness, and in reflection upon this, my 
freedom is plainly revealed to me." 45
Not only does this quote bring to attention the regard which Hegel 
had for inwardness, it also shows us that he located our knowledge of 
the divine specifically in our awareness of our own freedom. Sin is 
seen as the way in which this freedom is forced upon my attention, 
since sin is freedom’s product. And this is precisely the view which 
Kierkegaard outlines in The Concept of Dread. There we are told that 
only through our awareness of our freedom do we come to know our true
45. LPR p.17. Vol.l.
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spiritual potential, and that this awareness - though always with us even 
in innocence as a "dreaming awareness" - is brought explicitly to 
consciousness by the possibility of sin. In this way, Kierkegaard assigns 
a positive function to sin, just as Hegel tells us that for the Absolute 
to be what it is, it must not lack the suffering of the negative.
Kierkegaard tells us that the individual who discovers the real 
meaning, even of the basest sin, discovers that it is nothing less than 
the product of a spiritual freedom which can enable him to find the 
courage to overcome evil's enslavement. In this way, says Kierkegaard, 
such an individual can find faith. In the last chapter of The Concept 
of Dread, Kierkegaard describes this as follows:
"He sank absolutely, but then in turn he 
floated up from the depth of the abyss, lighter now than all that is oppressive 
and dreadful in life." 46
What one learns from sin and limitation, is, says Kierkegaard, 
that if one "does not wish to sink in the wretchedness of the finite"
47then one "is constrained in the deepest sense to assault the infinite."
For both Hegel and Kierkegaard, philosophical thought is necessary 
to bring out the true meaning of religion. Both their philosophies 
involve accounts of religion which transcend the self-understanding of 
the ordinary religious believer. However, because Kierkegaard will not 
admit explicitly that thought has any place in grasping the true 
meaning of religion, he is unable to see the real reason why philosophical 
thought cannot understand the meaning of religious truth in its fullness. 
For Kierkegaard, what is wrong with thought (according to his explicit
46. Kierkegaard. Concept of Dread, p.142
47. ibid. p.144.
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comments, if not according to his philosophical practice) is that it 
takes us too far beyond the self-understanding of religion. But the 
real reason as we shall see, why metaphysical thought cannot capture the 
ultimate meaning of religion (.although it can help us to clarify it, 
and to understand it more adequately) is that it does not take us far 
enough. We must explain further.
The ordinary devotional consciousness, we earlier agreed, is a 
mode of self-awareness which inevitably arises in the struggle through 
,which rational beings must go towards the completion of their self- 
conscious experience. This ritualistic consciousness however, employs 
a symbolism and sensuous imagery which can be misleading, since it 
suggests that religious truth consists of contingent facts about the 
world. Metaphysical thinking can help us to rectify this mistake by 
pointing out that the true meaning of religion consists, not in a 
contingent set of facts about the world, but in its being the expression 
of a drive towards the completion of self-conscious experience, a drive 
which is the essential outcome of the very possibility of any form of 
consciousness. But although metaphysics can grasp this much, and can 
tell us why religion cannot be a total expression of the ultimately 
complete self-conscious experience, it in no way follows from this (as 
Hegel seems to think) that the philosophical thought which serves as a 
corrective to self-understood religion, itself expresses the totally 
adequate self-conscious experience. Metaphysics may get further towards 
this completeness than the faith of the simple believer, but it would 
be rash indeed to hold that philosophical thought, as engaged in by 
finite human beings and as expressed in human language, can adequately 
express the nature of the Absolute. The ultimate meaning of religion, 
and indeed of other forms of consciousness, philosophical thought can 
hint at, and certainly it can tell us what must be excluded from the
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fully adequate self-conscious experience; but in the very course of this 
hinting, it quickly becomes clear that what is being hinted at, meta­
physics could never grasp in its fullness. To find the ultimate meaning 
of religion, even as characterized by philosophical thought, it is 
necessary to look beyond philosophical thought. And in doing so, we 
begin to see how the insights of the mystics are confirmed.
Mysticism and the Complete Self-Conscious Experience
The ultimate meaning of religion, metaphysics can tell us, lies 
in the complete self-conscious experience or mode of being which as we 
have said, cannot adequately be captured by philosophy. However, from 
the hints which philosophical thought can give us about the nature of 
such an experience, (or mode of being), it is possible to build up a 
description of an experience which strongly agrees with the descriptions 
of union with God presented to us by the mystics. And if-this is so, 
then it seems fairly clear that we can reply in the affirmative to our 
question raised at the beginning of this chapter, the question whether 
religion as it is practised by ordinary believers can, when properly 
understood, provide us with any reason to hold that the views of the 
mystics are corroborated.
If the meaning of religion is located ultimately in the complete 
self-conscious experience, it is clear, firstly, that such an experience 
would involve a total transcendence of all finite states. Such an 
experience would involve the total transformation of the finite subject 
into a pure expression of a Being whose nature is utterly universal; 
one which is totally unlimited by finite perspectives. That is, in the 
complete self-conscious experience, the finite subject would be trans­
formed, so as to share in the divine nature. This, of course, is
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strongly reminiscent of what the mystics have told us about their 
experience of union with God.
Also, because the complete self-conscious experience must involve 
a total transcendence of finitude, the subject of such an experience 
must be absolutely free.^^ This too, corresponds closely to the sense 
of freedom which mystics have spoken of, when they have claimed to have 
been absorbed into God.
A third feature of a complete self-conscious experience is that 
all tendency to evil must be overcome, since to tend towards evil is to 
assert one's particular will over against purely universal purposes.
And we have already discussed at some length the way in which mystics 
have claimed that in their encounter with God, the gap between duty and 
inclination closes so that the subject's moral consciousness knows only 
love.
Many more similarities between mystical experience and the complete 
self-conscious experience hinted at by metaphysics, could doubtless be 
listed, but we shall mention only one more. That is to do with the quality 
of ineffability. We have already mentioned that any adequate metaphysical 
account of the complete self-conscious experience must contain within 
itself an acceptance of the fact that such an experience cannot be 
adequately expressed in human thought and language. And this is 
precisely what the mystics have claimed when they have said that their 
experiences cannot properly be described. Human language, being some­
thing finite, is totally inadequate to express the complete self-conscious 
experience hinted at by metaphysics or the union with God of the mystics.
What has been said so far is sufficient to show how the phenomenon 
of religion, understood as an incomplete awareness of the self-conscious 
experience, serves strongly to confirm the mystical world-view. Indeed
48. Free, that is, in the non-arbitrary sense which we have discussed |
previously.
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it is beginning to look as though the complete self-conscious experience 
which is inadequately described in metaphysics, is in the end identical 
with mystical experience. However, we shall conclude this chapter by 
suggesting otherwise.
What we shall suggest, rather, is that the mystic, like the 
metaphysician, has a vision of the complete self-conscious experience, but 
that, although the mystic's vision is more adequate than that of the 
metaphysician (who is confined to finite thought and language throughout 
the whole of his work), it is nonetheless a vision which falls short of 
such completeness.
One thing alone is sufficient to make this clear; that is, that 
in the experiences of mystics and those who have brought news of special 
encounters with God, such persons have always had their experiences 
bounded on either side by time. It may well be true that such people 
have, for a little while, been totally absorbed in the nature of God and 
to a very large degree transcended their finitude. But a totally 
adequate and complete self-conscious experience cannot last ten minutes, 
ten days, or even the length of a human lifetime. It must be genuinely 
complete, in the sense of being free from all temporal limitation.
This means that for a human being to experience absolute rational 
self-conscious awareness, he would have to cease to be human. His 
nature would have to be permanently transformed. Only a permanently 
unlimited Being, such as theists have called God and philosophers have 
called the Absolute, is capable of such awareness.
CHAPTER NINE
MORAL EXPERIENCE AS EVIDENCE
FOR THE MYSTICAL ABSOLUTE
308
%
i€
309
CHAPTER NINE
MORAL EXPERIENCE AS EVIDENCE FOR THE MYSTICAL ABSOLUTE
In the previous chapters of this thesis, we have considered various 
ways in which the claims of individuals to have encountered a Divine 
Being might possibly be verified. We have seen, in the course of our 
enquiry, that metaphysical arguments can be adduced, which not only are 
not impossible a priori, but also carry considerable justificatory force. 
However, the one metaphysical argument which we have not yet considered, 
the argument for a Divine Being on the basis of moral experience, is 
perhaps the most important of all. Kant certainly thought so; his 
argument for the view that our moral experience provides not only a 
basis but the only possible basis for a (justified) belief in a Divine 
Being is well known. We shall, in what follows, take a different line 
of argument from that of Kant, though the importance he attached to moral 
considerations shall be fully endorsed here. We shall contend, with 
Kant, that the fact and nature of human moral experience is relevant 
evidence for a Divine Reality (though this Divine Reality, we shall see, 
will be more than a "postulate of practical reason") but against Kant we 
shall not hold it to be the only relevant evidence. For, as we shall 
argue, the finite moral consciousness is only one of the ways in which 
(what we have called) the Absolute Subject makes itself manifest through 
the lives of self-conscious beings.
If morality can only be adequately understood as a manifestation 
of the Absolute Subject, it is obviously the strongest possible 
evidence for the existence of such a subject. And, bearing in mind what
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was said at the end of Chapter Seven about the Absolute Subject of meta­
physics and the Divine Object of religious experience, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that if moral experience is a manifestation of 
the Absolute Subject, it provides the strongest corroboration for the 
claim of the mystics.
But why must human morality be understood as a manifestation of 
the Absolute Subject? To answer this question we must begin by saying 
something about the essential nature of morality.
What is the Essential Nature of Morality?
In response to our question about the essential nature of morality, 
we may take as our starting point our previous conclusion that the self- 
conscious subject is so important in any epistemology or ontology that 
the notion that there is an objective world of the non-ego does not 
make sense without it. We came to this conclusion without in any way 
slipping into a thorough-going subjective idealism in which there is a 
one-sided dependence of the objective upon the subjective, and in which 
the objective loses its substantiality by being dissolved into subjective 
consciousness. In our view, the substantiality of the objective was 
retained, despite the fundamental role of the subject in "constructing" 
the realm of human knowledge, because that creative process of 
"construction" was in no way arbitrary or dependent upon the whims of 
partioutar subjects. it was rather governed by a principle which could be 
regarded as the principle of subjectivity as such, a principle to which 
particular subjects must conform if they would free themselves from 
ignorance. Because the subject plays its part in the "construction" of 
the real, though not in a particular and arbitrary way, it makes as 
little sense, we said, to fix the locus of the reality of any existent 
thing on one side of the subject/object cleavage as on the other.
311
If the role of the subject is fundamental in the epistemological 
sphere, because it "constructs" or is internally related to the world 
it knows and does not merely apprehend it as a "given", then clearly any 
world of moral value will also be a construction. If we cannot regard 
the objects of knowledge as external entities most truly apprehended with 
maximum passivity and detachement, then, a fortiori, moral concepts - 
which are much more obviously produced by human societies - cannot refer 
to the sort of objective qualities which are quite independent of self- 
conscious life.
However, the fact that our view of knowledge carries the implication 
that moral concepts cannot be concerned with qualities somehow external 
to the agent and that moral rules and concepts are some sort of social 
construction, does not put us in a position to conclude anything about 
the type of social construction which morality is. We cannot merely 
assume that moral rules and concepts are produced as in the case of 
knowledge by a "principle of subjectivity" (which, we have said previously, 
can be identified with the Concrete Universal) for much work is done in 
the world by the arbitrary and particular will. (Indeed, some moral 
systems in the world must be placed in this category, since in a world 
of competing and conflicting empirically existing moralities not all can 
be [even primarily] the expression of the Concrete Universal.) However, 
neither can we assume that all moral systems are merely subjective 
constructions without rational justification.
Many recent philosophers have sought to produce a value-free moral 
philosophy which is neutral as to the content of any particular morality, 
because they have regarded all moralities as necessarily the work of the 
particular and arbitrary will, and reducible in principle to sets of 
prescriptions or emotional reactions. However, if there is any rational 
basis for the criticism of existing moral practices then there is more to
312
morality than would be discovered by an empirical sociological enquiry 
into the practices themselves. It would then be clear that morality, 
although necessarily the work of self-consciousness, would not be in 
principle its arbitrary work and would not in principle defy attempts 
at rational justification. Indeed, it would be precisely by examining 
the basis of rational criticism of existing moral rules and concepts that 
we could uncover the essent'Lal nature of morality, by explaining how 
morality is in essence (which would be its most rationally based form) 
an expression of the principle of subjectivity.
It will be our task in the rest of this Chapter to establish that 
moral concepts and rules are amenable to rational criticism, and that it 
is both meaningful and useful to speak in terms of the justification of 
such rules, concepts or systems, though ultimately this justification 
will be seen to rest on intuition.^ Thus, we shall produce a view of 
morality which outlines its essential structure, but at the same time 
shall not be neutral as regards content.
Recognition of the Role of the Active Subject in both the 
Cognitive and Moral Spheres makes evident the Impossibility 
of Value-Free Theories
The breakdown of the is/ought dichotomy begins with the understand­
ing that the world we think about and act in does not consist of a mere 
object "out there", but bears an essential relation to subjectivity.
The world of our experience is the product of a dynamic and dialectical 
interpenetration of subject and object, to a point where both are 
transmuted into something which is utterly different from what they appear
1. We shall see that the introduction of intuition into the enterprise 
of moral justification does not make morality unamenable to rational 
criticism. Intuition, in the sense in which we shall outline it, is rather the pinnacle of human rationality. I
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to be when taken in abstract isolation. Thus, the world of enquiry does 
not reveal itself to us more truly when we pare away from it the part 
which the subjective plays in constructing it and transforming it, and 
regard it as an object to be contemplated in cold detachment.
Thomas Kuhn, writing in Structure of Scientific Revolutions, argues 
that there can be no scientific theory which merely describes how the 
world is and which contains no element of evaluation. We shall see that 
what Kuhn says about scientific theories can also be applied to moral 
theories, and from this we shall infer that there is no moral theory 
which is in no way normative. That some philosophers purport to have 
such theories makes no difference to their impossibility, it means only 
that those philosophers have not thought through all the implications of 
their own theories.
According to Kuhn, the image of science which is derived from the
study of finished scientific achievements is seriously misleading as
regards what goes on in scientific practice. That image is that science
develops by an accumulation of discoveries, all of which have been
produced by the application of a more or less external scientific method,
which has to do with getting a close fit between ideas and nature.
Kuhn accepts that any viable theory must be able to account for the
facts, but points out that this criterion leaves the door wide open for
different scientists to uphold rival theories. What differentiated the
different schools of thought in, for example, Galileo's time, says Kuhn,
was "their incommensurable ways of seeing the world and of practising 
2science in it." Kuhn adds that these ways of seeing the world are not 
just a matter of observation and experience. Observation and experience
2. T .S. Kuhn: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions p .4
(International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science , Vol.II, No.2).
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must restrict the range of possible belief, otherwise science would be
impossible. But they cannot by themselves determine a particular body of
Vsuch belief, there is always an additional element. Kuhn refers to 
this as the arbitrary element, an element which depends upon historical 
and personal accident. The degree to which Kuhn is justified in calling 
this subjective element arbitrary we shall see later, after we have 
followed through his argument for the existence of a subjective evaluative 
element.
Kuhn tells us that normal soienoe, (by which he means normal
scientific practice in a particular historical period), is conducted on 
the assumption that the scientific community knows what the world is 
like. The scientific community will be ready to defend that assumption, 
if necessary at some cost. That is to say, the community will try to 
suppress novelties which fail to fit in with basic commitments. (This 
will be done by trying to bend old theories to account for new phenomena - 
even when the 'fit' is somewhat clumsy). It is not possible, however, |
to suppress novelties forever. Eventually an anomaly can become so great that
"normal science" has to be revised to accommodate it. When this happens - 
and the point at which it happens very much depends on subjective evalu­
ation as does the choice of the new theory - it is not a matter of one %
more scientific discovery added to the pile. It is rather that a whole
scientific way of looking at the world shifts. In such a case there is 
a scientific revolution.
Kuhn emphatically points out that scientific theories are not 
rejected because of one falsifying instance. Somebody who accepts a 
new paradigm has to act to a large extent on the basis of faith (or 
intuition, or subjective evaluation) because although the old paradigm 
has failed to deal with a few new problems, the new paradigm has to deal 
not only with the new problems, but also with the whole field of knowledge
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which the old paradigm satisfactorily accounted for. Kuhn, in 
recognizing the subjective element in paradigm choice, concludes that 
in the end "there is no standard higher than the assent of the relevant 
community.
Kuhn has clearly perceived how it is that in any serious attempt 
to explain the world, it is also necessary to evaluate the world. Or 
to put this another way, to discover the element of value which is in 
the world already, because the world already is, in a certain sense, a 
subjective construction, and thereby infused with value. Underlying 
Kuhn's philosophy of science is an idea which has been emerging and 
recurring throughout the whole of this thesis:- that knowledge in the 
deepest sense of the word is a discovery which is also a creation.
Where Kuhn goes wrong, however, is in his equation of the subject­
ive element in science with the arbitrary element, and in particular in 
his failure to distinguish between subjective evaluations which are 
genuinely arbitrary (or elements in subjective evaluations which are 
genuinely arbitrary) and subjective evaluations as such, which are not 
necessarily arbitrary. Kuhn merely assumes that there is no principle 
of subjectivity, and that any contribution to knowledge which gives 
scope for subjective freedom necessarily involves only the freedom of 
the particular and arbitrary will. Kuhn is no doubt influenced by the 
large part that contingent circumstances have always played in scientific 
development, circumstances which have to do with the accidental factors 
bearing upon the subject, (e.g. being in a certain room at a certain 
time may suggest something to a scientist which would never have occurred 
to him in other circumstances, it could even lead to the development of
3. Quoted from T. Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions in Modern Sociology (Editor Peter Worsley) p.33 (Penguin 1970).
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a theory which greatly advances science). However, this does not mean 
that the evaluations contributed by the thinking subject are wholly 
arbitrary in that they are all "on a par" or that there is no rational 
basis for preferring one to the other. Indeed, the fact that evaluative 
judgments, be they choosing a scientific perspective or following a moral 
code, often follow a long and arduous struggle, together with the fact 
that it is not utterly meaningless to criticise somebody else's evaluative 
judgments, is enough to strongly suggest that the values (which can as 
meaningfully be said to inhere in the objective as in the will of the 
subject) are not expressions of the arbitrary and particular will, but 
are rooted in the essential rational nature of a free self-conscious subject
in dynamic interaction with the world.
We have now established that the impossibility of freedom from all 
value-judgments in scientific knowledge is connected with the fact that 
all such knowledge is and must be a product of active subjectivity.
And we have seen that this does not imply that theories containing such
evaluations are necessarily and fundamentally arbitrary constructions.
Thus, the relevance of Kuhn's view of science to moral philosophy is 
now apparent, and could be summed up in this way. If value-judgments 
are necessary for all human knowledge as well as human action, and if 
these can be established to be non-arbitrary, then in the arguments which 
establish this we have the basis for a moral philosophy which is at once 
descriptive and prescriptive. It is to the arguments which purport to 
establish this that we must now turn.
Hegel's View of Morality
Accounts of morality which purport to be value-free are rooted
iwithin the empiricist tradition in philosophy, whereas accounts which ^
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are openly prescriptive are rooted in the rationalist and idealist 
traditions. We have criticised the former tradition throughout this thesis 
on the ground-that it attenuates the nature of the rational subject, by
underestimating his creative role in the theoretical and practical realm.
The latter two traditions (which are found together at various points in 
the history of philosophy) emphasize the place of the thinking self- 
conscious subject in the 'construction' of the world we know, and thus
S
have an inbuilt critical prescriptive element. From the philosophy of 
Plato onwards these traditions have held that the very ideas needed to 
make sense of empirical reality must have a rational base, and just 
because they have a rational base they transcend empirical reality and 
are also (potential) tools for the criticism of it. In moral philosophy 
a description of the structure of morality reveals concepts which can 
be used to criticize empirically existing moralities, and thereby says 
something about the adequacy of the content of any particular morality, 
as well as providing a description of its form.
There is a striking example of this critical approach in the 
philosophy of Hegel. Hegel elucidates the relation between morality and 
reason through the concept of the free will. Through reason, I overcome 
the limitations imposed upon me by way of my initial finite and limiting 
particular perspective. To fully realize my potential for freedom, I 
must not be subject to the tyranny of whim and feeling which affect me in 
my capacity as a particular. Thus freedom is not a matter of arbitrary 
expression of tlie will, but rather of transcending my particularity to 
a point where I express the universal. The restrictions which must be 
imposed upon my arbitrary will in order for me to become truly free are 
for Hegel the basis of morality. Thus Hegel asserts:
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4. Additions to paragraph 15, Philosophy of Right.
5. Early Theological Writings, p.215.
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"The man in the street thinks he is free if 
it is open to him to act as he pleases, but his very arbitrariness implies that he is not 
free. When I will what is rational, then I 
am not acting as a particular individual but in accordance with the concept of ethics in general. In an ethical action, what I vindicate 
is not myself but the thing. But in doing a 
perverse action, it is my singularity which I bring to the stage. The rational is the high 
road where everyone travels, where no-one is 
conspicuous." 4
For the young Hegel, morality is only really possible when complete 
freedom has been attained, such that there is no longer any conflict 
between duty and inclination. In his Early Theological Writings, in 
the course of discussing Christ's Sermon on the Mount, Hegel writes that:
"the moral disposition, etc., ceases to be particular, opposed to the law, and therefore 
the correspondence of law and inclination is 
life, and, as the relation of différents to one another, love, i.e., it is an ‘is'." 5
For the mature Hegel, however, self-conscious rational freedom 
could be found to be embodied in imposed morality and law, even before 
the gap between duty and inclination had been entirely closed. Hegel 
thought that it was necessary for freedom to express itself in these 
inadequate forms in order for there to be a basis for the subsequent 
development of more adequate forms of expression. (Indeed, even when the 
mature Hegel is describing what he sees as the ideal society he speaks 
in terms of individuals continuing to require the coercive power of the 
state, if they are to refrain from expressing particular whims and aims
at the expense of the universal).
The moral rules and laws of certain societies, Hegel admits, may «
I
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fall a long way short of embodying the principle of freedom in adequate 
form; however they do at least teach man that he must stand above his 
own particular impulses and express (some sort of) universal. It is 
the moral philosophy of the mature Hegel which we shall be considering 
in this chapter.
Questions which must be raised about how far we can follow Hegel
Hegel's moral philosophy, we have now seen, is grounded in the 
principle that the particular has to be transcended and transmuted if
ever it is to come to express its essential nature. When it finally does
come to express its essential nature, it will have overcome that tempta­
tion to follow its pavt'leutcn? interests (as opposed to its more genuine
universàt interests) which are the basis of immoral behaviour, and which 
inhibit the expression of the free will.
However, we have still to decide what exactly follows from the 
concept of the totally free will. We said earlier that a moral philosophy 
based on the Hegelian principle of the sublation of finitude by infinite 
freedom would imply something as regards the content of morality. Hegel 
certainly claimed that morality was only possible within a specific 
social context - thus, he 'prescribed' and described the type of social 
set-up he thought necessary for human ethical relations to reach their 
highest pitch. According to Hegel, some very specific, seemingly 
empirical features of society are implicit within the concept of the 
free will, and are necessary preconditions for the realisation of the 
highest human moral potential. Thus, in attempting to decide what is 
really implicit within the concept of the free will which is relevant to
morality, we shall also be considering ways in which Hegel's views need to 1be modified, and the reasons why he goes wrong at various points.
II
5
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The Concept of the Free Will
Hegel explains his view that freedom involves following a 
necessary course - as opposed to an arbitrary one - in the opening 
sections of the Philosophy of Right, by way of a discussion in which he 
discusses the three moments of the will. The third moment must contain 
within itself the 'truth* of the first two moments; it must also 
constitute their reconciliation. (The first two moments are, it must 
be remembered, opposites, when considered in abstract isolation.) Only 
in the third moment does the will find concrete freedom, but its 
composition is dictated by the necessity which the need for reconcilia­
tion imposes. However, it is necessary to elucidate further.
The first moment of the will consists in the capacity which the 
will has to detach itself from particular purposes and choices and to 
leave everything as possibility. Because, at this level of the abstract 
will, everything is still a possibility and the will has, not yet limited 
itself by making determinate choices, to common sense it seems that in 
this most abstract and empty freedom we have the greatest possible 
freedom. This view is often reflected in the assumption that those who 
try (though they never totally succeed - since this abstract freedom of 
mere possibility is never found in its purity) to suspend judgment on 
all things are somehow freer than those who have thought out their ideas 
and have actually come to conclusions, or in the view that to get 
married is to lose your freedom, since prior to marriage you could marry 
anyone - and thus you still have before you an infinite range of 
possibilities, even though - (and at this level this is not consciously 
realised) - the possibilities represent only an infinite range of ways 
in which you can sacrifice your freedom.
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What we learn from the first moment of the will is that there is 
a real sense in which rational beings have an infinite range of 
possibilities open to them. But while these possibilities rômat-n 
possibilities the very feature that renders possibilities of value - 
i.e. the possibility that they may become aotuatïties - is missing.
This feature is put forward by Hegel as the second moment of the will.
The second moment of the will consists of the capacity of the 
will to choose a determinate content. Thus the second moment provides 
a corrective for the abstract one-sidedness of the first moment. But 
taken by itself, the second moment is also one-sided, for if determinate­
ness is cut off from its source in creative freedom and is seen only as 
the content it immediately appears as, the accent falls heavily on 
limitation. The will now has a particular content, and this particularity 
brings it into the realm of finitude. It is no longer in a position 
where it could do anything, it has transformed infinite possibility into 
determinate and particular content.
The third moment of the will is that which unites the abstract 
freedom of infinite possibility with the overcoming of abstract emptiness 
as it is represented by the second moment. The moments of universality 
and particularity are thus brought together as self-consciousness grasps 
that only by finding expression in the particular finite world can it 
express its (potentially) infinite freedom. The finite world thus 
appears not merely as the world of limitation, but the world where 
possibilities can become actualities by means of self-conscious freedom.
For determinateness to be an expression of freedom all arbitrary 
elements in the will must be eliminated. For the third moment of the 
will to be realized, the will must express itself in the one way whereby 
it can both make a determinate choice and overcome the finitude which 
inheres in the determinate and particular, when taken in abstract isolation.
'-1
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This therefore already says something about the content of a morality 
rooted in freedom. It says that a life based on the pursuit of partic­
ular pleasures and inclinations leads to a state of bondage. For 
human relations to be truly ethical, the one particular must not put 
himself above another particular, since in such a mode of relating, one 
may gain power in a certain sense over the other particular but lose 
all power over oneself. ("What does it profit a man if he gain the 
whole world but lose his own soul?")
We may accept Hegel's view that freedom can only be realised 
through necessity, and that this necessity is so relevant to how we relate 
to others that it is indeed at the basis of morality. We must also 
accept the Hegelian view that only under specific social conditions can 
the third (reconciling) moment of the will manifest itself in its full­
ness. Social conditions must be compatible with the will's determinate 
choices being the expression of freedom, if determinate choices are not 
to produce a content, the accent of which is likely to fall upon
'Ilimitation. A society which for example, does not concern itself with
a person's motivations but only with the consequences of his actions j
(be they the 'intended consequences or not) is not giving the true moral 
consciousness, in which subjective intentions are important, an nIopportunity to develop. An individual living in such a society would I
never really learn to think of his actions as the product of his i1freedom, for that society would define as part of his actions consequences |
which became his only by virtue of fortuitous circumstances. From this .:9
'1alone it is clear that morality does not inhere only in the isolated W
individual, since it is very much influenced by social conditions.
  :]
6. As we shall see later, moral conduct is not impossible under
imperfect social conditions. But the more adequate the social l|conditions are, the easier does moral vision become.
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Hegel says far more than that there must be specific social conditions 
for human ethical life to develop and sustain itself. He says a great 
deal about what those conditions must be. His philosophy is prescriptive, 
not only for the individual moral agent but for society as a whole.
(That is why political philosophy and ethics are inseparable in Hegel). 
Hegel, as we have said, is not wrong to be prescriptive. But this does 
not mean that we shall accept Hegel's views when we come to consider 
precisely what it is that he prescribes.
Hegel's Critical Method
Hegel's task is to discover the social conditions under which the 
free will can be most truly and deeply expressed, and under which 
human ethical relations can arrive at the highest degree of perfection.
To do this, Hegel employs the method of describing societies whose 
social morality embodies the principle of the free will .in totally 
inadequate form, and thereby exposing the contradiction of recognizing 
the existence of any sort of moral code - which presupposes the free 
will - on the one hand, and effectively denying the principle of the 
free will, on the other. Thus, Hegel's descriptions are inevitably 
critical, but it is precisely by discovering the point of inadequacy - 
of contradiction, in any one society's social morality - that we can be 
in a position to postulate a further type of society with a new social 
morality which can overcome the contradictions and inadequacies which 
inhere in the old. Once the contradictions of the previous society 
have satisfactorily been resolved, the social morality of the new 
society is such that the moral agent can more fully express his essential 
freedom, by making determinate choices within that society.
We need not quarrel with Hegel about this method of proceeding,
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since it is in essence the same critical method which we have argued 
for and advocated all along. What we must try to decide is whether 
Hegel applies it adequately and consistently, so that he at last ends 
up with a set of social conditions wholly commensurate with the adequate 
expression of the free will.
The Society in which Abstract Right Predominates
Hegel, in his attempt to find the adequate social morality, 
begins by considering forms of society in which the social morality is 
not adequate. The first type of society he considers is one which has 
not gone beyond seeing morality in terms of Abstract Right. Although 
this view of morality contains an aspect of the truth about an adequate 
morality (i.e. that morality is not merely a matter of what seems to be 
right to a particular individual) it contains that truth in a most 
inadequate and one-sided form. To see why, we must outline the Hegelian 
argument further. The mentality which sees morality in terms of Abstract 
Right is the most primitive form of moral consciousness. When a self- 
conscious being first learns to differentiate itself from the world and 
from others, it will notice that it has an individual will which stands 
over against other individual wills. Thus, what leaps to attention in 
this primitive stage of self-consciousness is individuality, since 
individuality is a new discovery. Being impressed with this new 
discovery, self-consciousness will see itself in terms which stress its 
isolation from and its opposition to the other self-consciousnesses 
rather than in terras of its interaction with them, and the fulfilment 
that derives from such interactions. The world is seen as a heap of 
atomized differentiated wills, which are primarily threatening and hostile 
to each other.
3•j.
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This most primitive stage on the road to adequate self-awareness 
contains a stress on the importance of the isolated individual which 
leads to a characteristic view of human ethical relations. That view 
arises because the individual who has just discovered his individuality 
will seek fundamentally to protect and preserve it. He is afraid that 
the world may invade him without him being able to offer any resistance. 
But he does not only want to protect his individuality out of fear.
He wants to protect, and indeed also assert it, because he sees it as 
something of value, something worth preserving. The isolated individual's 
desire to preserve himself and have himself recognized as an individual 
leads to a moral outlook in which the moral world is seen in terms of 
individual rights, rights which one has by way of being a significant 
individual unit, but which accrue to the self as an essentially isolated 
and private self, and which are therefore essentially rights aga'tnst other 
selves. In other words, the moral world is seen in terms of rights which 
prevent others from invading an individual's private world, for such a 
morality has no place for any assumption that mutual satisfaction might 
be the result of relations between selves.
To effectively assert my individuality, it is necessary to impose 
my form upon the world. This is so even at the highest levels of self- 
conscious life, for a great work of art is a transformation of the world 
and a negation of "the given" in accordance with the free expression of 
a subjective will. However, at these high levels, the subjective will 
embodies less particularity, and more of the Concrete Universal, than 
it embodies in the more primitive attempts at self-assertion. The most 
primitive attempts to "impose my form on the world" are attempts to 
impose my form, as a paTtioular 'ùnd'iV'ùduat, on the world. And just 
because these attempts to transform the world are in accordance with my 
nature as a particular, the degree of creativity involved in this type of
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transformation is slight. The natural expression of my search for 
recognition as a mere particular is to take possession of part of the 
world and call it mine. At the level of Abstract Right, I am therefore 
chiefly concerned with rights as they relate to property.
"A person must translate his freedom into 
an external sphere, in order to exist as 
idea. Personality is the first, still wholly abstract, determination of the absolute and infinite will, and therefore this sphere 
distinct from the person, the sphere capable of embodying his freedom, is likewise deter­
mined as what is immediately different and separable from him." 7
"The rationale of property is to be found not in the satisfaction of needs but in the super­
session of the pure subjectivity of the person­ality. In his property a person exists for the first time as reason. Even if my freedom is 
here realized in an external thing and so falsely 
realized, nevertheless abstract personality can have no other embodiment save one characterized by immediacy." 8
For Hegel, the most primitive ways in which an individual takes 
and retains - possession of a thing are " (a) by directly grasping it
9physically, (b) by forming it and (c) by merely marking it as ours."
Hegel acknowledges that even at this level of Abstract Right, the 
network of essentially individual rights must find a means to secure 
recognition by the community as a whole. Hegel therefore introduces the 
concept of Contract as an essential feature of Abstract Right. Hegel 
asserts:
"Existence as a determinate being is in essence 
being for another. One aspect of property is
7. Paragraph 41 of Philosophy of Right. 'j
8. Addition to paragraph 41 of Philosophy of Right.
9. Paragraph 55 of Philosophy of Right.
g
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that it is existent as an external thing, and in this respect property exists for other external things and is connected with their 
necessity and contingency. But it is also 
existent as an embodiment of the will, and 
from this point of view the 'other' for which 
it exists can only be the will of another person. 
This relation of will to will is the true and 
proper ground in which freedom is existent. The sphere of contract is made up of this mediation 
whereby I hold property not merely by means of 
a thing and my subjective will, but by means of another person's will as well and so hold it in virtue of my participation in a common will." 10
The contradiction which inheres in Abstract Right, thereby 
revealing that Abstract Right is utterly inadequate as a basis for 
human relationships, is exposed when we reflect upon the notion of 
Contract. For on the one hand. Contract shows how even Abstract Right 
presupposes that ethical relations with others are a matter of expressing 
the Universal and overcoming (mere) particularity, since it is requisite 
that the individual property rights are recognized by the common will.
But on the other hand, a universally recognized contract can have almost 
any content, for it is a matter merely of what a plurality of particular 
and not necessarily rational individuals agree upon. The type of 
universality expressed through the institution of Contract is wholly 
inadequate, since the only thing which matters is that both sides "keep 
the bargain", and it is only by chance that particular individuals would 
will the rational content. In Contract, there is a contradiction between 
the essential need to express Universality which is its presupposition, 
and the actual way in which that Universality is expressed.
"The principle of rightness, the universal will, 
receives its essential determinate character 
through the particular will, and so is in relation with something which is inessential." 11
10. Paragraph 71 of Philosophy of Right.
11. Paragraph 82 Philosophy of Right.
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The contradiction which inheres in Contract sets up a malaise in 
the individual or community whose code of conduct is fundamentally seen 
in terras of contractual obligations. For in Contract, one finds 
absolute obligations to pursue courses of action which have as their 
content the morally inessential. When the malaise becomes too great, as 
it almost inevitably must, the outcome is a violation of the principles 
of Abstract Right, which Hegel calls Wrong. An analysis of Wrong leads 
us to see that the accentuation of particularity which is a precondition 
of the existence of Abstract Right is also what leads to its breakdown.
"In contract we had the relation of two wills as 
a common will. But this identical will is only 
relatively universal, posited as Universal, and so is still opposed to the particular will. In contract, to be sure, making a covenant entails 
the right to require its performance. But this performance is dependent again on the particular 
will which qua particular may act in contravention 
of the principle of rightness. At this point then the negation is just what wrong is. In general 
terms, the course of events is that the will is 
freed from its immediacy and there is thus evoked out of the common will the particularity which then comes on the scene as opposed to the common will. In contract the parties still retain their 
particular wills; contract therefore is not yet 
beyond the stage of arbitrariness with the result that it remains at the mercy of wrong." 12
Hegel divides Wrong into non-malicious Wrong (in which, for example, 
a man genuinely thinks he owns something and treats it as his, even 
though in reality it belongs to another), Fraud, where right "is made a 
show of" ("the universal is set aside by the particular will and reduced 
to something only showing in the situation") and Crime, in which the 
principle of right openly ceases to be respected.
At the level of Abstract Right, the particular is inclined to run
12. Addition to paragraph 81, Philosophy of Right.
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wild in the various forms of Wrong, because Abstract Right does not 
offer scope for a more adequate development of particularity. Paradox­
ically then, the particular runs wild, not becuase it has been granted 
too much scope, but because it has been too confined. There is no real 
scope for the development of subjectivity. One important feature which 
is indicative of this is that at the level of Abstract Right a system of 
strict liability operates, one is held responsible for violating these 
rights irrespective of intention or motivation.
This strict liability view of morality is obviously inadequate, 
for it ignores some of the most fundamental features of human moral life. 
However, despite its limitations, it does also contain an important 
insight, the truth of which must be preserved at the higher levels.
That insight is that the particular individual with his arbitrary will 
is not the final judge in ethical matters. The fact that an action is 
carried out conscientiously is not enough to justify it morally, unless 
that conscience has some form of objective backing. Abstract Right 
contains this principle in a very distorted form, since the content of 
the obligation is the morally inessential, and because strict liability 
leaves no room for subjective conscience.
The violation of the principle of Abstract Right leads on to the 
need to negate this violation. But Wrong cannot be annulled simply by 
retreating to an abstract universal and 'imposing this, as an external 
force, upon the offender. It was because the universal was too abstract- 
and appeared as too external to the agent - that Wrong arose in the 
first place. The corrective measures taken when Abstract Right is 
violated must not proceed by trying merely to crush the particular 
individual. Rather, the individual's claims for self-expression must 
be accepted but an individual must also learn that truest self expression 
is really found in the expression of his nature as universal. T.M. Knox
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puts it as follows:
" ... the contradiction of right by the 
criminal cannot be annulled by a mere 
regression to bare universality. Mere denial 
of the corruptive invader will not root it 
out - tarnen usque recurret. The only solution is to reorganize the claims of the 
particular by allowing that the universally right must be mediated by the conscientious 
convictions of the subject. We go beyond the criminal's defiance only by substituting 
for the more abstract conception of personal­
ity the more concrete conception of subject­ivity. A 'subject' is the universal will 
embodied, no longer in universal rights, but 
in a particular will; hence from the point 
of view of the subject, the law which the criminal breaks is his own law; i.e. his crime is not a contradiction of a right outside him but a self-contradiction, a defiance of 
right embodied in him."
However,
"As soon as the rational agent realizes this 
he rises above the contradiction simply by 
keeping the law, the law which is the law of his own conviction, i.e. he has transcended the sphere of right altogether and become a moral 
agent." 13
The World as it is Seen from the Standpoint of Individual Moral
Consciousness iIIt is through the mediation of punishment, according to Hegel, |
4that the transition from Abstract Right to Morality is effected in real
life. A man who violates another's rights renders himself liable to be 3
jpunished. But the phenomenon of punishment hardly makes sense without |
the idea that there are universal moral laws which each individual can ^Ihave knowledge of. If we are expected to obey a just law, then 1
13. Both quotations from T.M. Knox's Translator's Notes to paragraph 104 Philosophy of Right.
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obedient behaviour is more rational if we can see for ourselves the 
obligatory force of that law. The standpoint of individual moral 
consciousness is thus concerned, not just with rights against others, 
but with rules for behaviour, and rules which are the sort of rules 
which unite us with others, and which subjective consciousness can see 
to be justified. In the Philosophy of Right Hegel asserts:
"The right of the subjective will is that whatever it is to recognize as valid shall 
be seen by it as good, and that an action, as its aim entering upon external object­ivity, shall be imputed to it as right or 
wrong, good or evil, legal or illegal, in 
accordance with its knowledge of the worth which the action has in this objectivity." 14
In Abstract Right objective value is upheld yet this objectivity 
is sundered from its basis in subjective freedom. The standpoint of 
individual moral consciousness knows of objective value, but takes 
seriously the demand to see for itself what is of such value.
Because of the emphasis on subjectivity, intention and motivation 
now become extremely important:
"So far as right in the strict sense was concerned it was of no importance what my 
intention or my principle was. This question about the self determination and motive of the will now enters at this point in 
connexion with his own self-determined 
choices, he is free in this relation to himself whatever the external situation may impose upon him. No-one can break in upon 
this inner conviction of mankind no violence 
can be done to it, and the moral will, therefore, is inaccessible. Man's worth is estimated by 
reference to his inward action and hence the 
standpoint of morality is freedom aware of itself." 15
14. Paragraph 132 Philosophy of Right.
15. Addition to paragraph 106, Philosophy of Right
"'4
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16. Paragraph 120 Philosophy of Right.
The individual who follows a moral code and who is aware of 
himself as so doing refuses to accept the ascription of total responsi- 4
bility to him for actions which are not produced intentionally and 
whose full nature he is not in a position to grasp. This is utterly 
different from how it was with Abstract Right, where, "it was of no 
importance what my intention or principle was." Hegel points out how 
this standpoint of Abstract Right is reflected in Greek tragedy, for the 
heroes in Greek tragedy accept responsibility for the full compass of 
their act, irrespective of whether circumstances prevented them from 
knowing the true nature of what they did (e.g. the Oedipus story).
This mentality is utterly rejected at the level of individual moral 
consciousness.
"The right of intention is that the universal 
quality of the action shall not merely be implicit but shall be known for the agent, 
and so shall have lain from the start in his 
subjective will." 16
Under the general heading of (individual) morality, Hegel deals 
with various types of moral codes, all of which turn out to be ultimately 
inadequate - despite the fact that all are more adequate than the view 
of the moral world based on Abstract Right. Hegel does this because he 
realises that morality does not only involve the attribution of 
responsibility to individuals for consequences of actions which were 
intended, (or which ought to have been foreseen, even were they not 
consciously intended), but also a judgment of approval or disapproval 
based on the determinate content of the action. In particular, morality 
concerns itself with how human actions bear upon human Welfare. In 
connection with Welfare Hegel disusses the specific moral outlooks of 
Utilitarianism and Egoism. It would seem odd to many philosophers that
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Hegel should treat these two together, but once we understand what 
Welfare involves for Hegel, the reason becomes clear.
Welfare, as Hegel conceives it, is not the content of the natural 
will, for we have now arrived at the level of thinking.
"The subjective element of the will, with 
its particular content - welfare, is reflected into itself and so stands related 
to the universal element, to the principle 
of the will." 17
However, although Welfare is not the content of the natural will, 
it is nonetheless a mode of benefit which can accrue only to isolated 
particular individuals. Hegel accepts that it is a right of subjectivity 
to have its welfare catered for; however, it is a mere accident if the 
welfare of particular isolated individuals qua isolated particular 
individuals corresponds to their deepest welfare, which would involve 
their fulfilment by satisfying the universal side of their natures.
It is because both Utilitarianism and Egoism are concerned with the well­
being of particulars qua particulars that Hegel treats them together.
"This moment of universality, posited first of all within this particular content itself, 
is the welfare of others also, or as specified 
completely though quite emptily, the welfare 
of all. The welfare of many other unspecified particulars is thus also an essential end and right of subjectivity. But since the absolutely universal, in distinction from such a particular 
content, has not so far been further determined 
than as 'the right' it follows that these ends of particularity, differing as they do from the universal, may be in conformity with it, and may be not". 18
17. Paragraph 125 Philosophy of Right.
18. Paragraph 125 Philosophy of Right.
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:The Problem of Subjective Conscience 3IThe truth of the matter, for Hegel, is that the particular has a 
right both to its own self-realisation as an expression of the universal 
and to the knowledge that such a self-realisation is its own deepest 
essence. The particular thus has an absolute right to do what it knows 
to be good and right, which is something which would involve self 
transcendence. But there is a problem here which Hegel clearly perceives 
and does not attempt to hedge. If we accept that an individual has an
Iabsolute right to do only that which he perceives to be good, we make Ihis conscience the sole moral judge. But then what happens if he is 
wrong? Suppose he claims (and really sincerely believes) that his 
actions express the universal, whereas in fact they express gross 
particularity? If we fall back on authority and say that the individual 
should conform to the morals of his society, we would then deny the 
sanctity of subjective conscience, and in the end destroy the sphere 
of conscience entirely, for we would end by allowing it scope only at 
times when it happens to coincide with a behavioural code determined by 
quite extraneous factors. But if we do not allow outside influences to 
curb subjective conscience, then we do nothing to safeguard ourselves 
against those whom Hegel describes as "bad men with well-meaning hearts."
We have before us the dilemma that we seem to need a criterion 
for moral virtue outside subjective conscience (for even if we accept 
that the determining characteristics of morality lie somewhere within 
the domain of subjective conscience how do we know whose subjective 
conscience to follow when claims conflict?) yet cannot introduce one 
without resorting to the arbitrary and non-rational one of positive
aauthority, a procedure which is seemingly incompatible with the doctrine j
that individuals should be able to see for themselves the rightness of
their actions, and which cannot be defended on independent grounds, for 'i
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it would give bad men every bit as much scope as does allowing the total 
sovereignty of subjective conscience.
The way out of this dilemma has for Hegel much to do with the
concept of rationality. It shall have for us too, though we shall not
accept Hegel's detailed working out and application of this concept.
Rationality transcends the individual yet stems from subjectivity. It
curbs subjectivity as particularity in the name of subjectivity as an
expression of the Universal. However we must face the problem that
people can be mistaken as regards being wholly rational. Since it is
possible to be mistaken, how can any individual at any time be sure he
is not mistaken? The problem of conscience seems to recure in the
sphere of rationality. For Hegel "What is right and obligatory is the
absolutely rational element in the will's volition, and therefore it is not
19in essence the particular property of an individual." But this leaves 
unanswered the question - how does an individual know when he possesses 
that which is in essence the universal property? How can he differentiate 
this from cases where he thinks he knows? And if he can't, why should 
society at large be in any better position to know itself to have a 
rationally based moral code, which it can justify imposing upon deviants?
The whole problem is perhaps best formulated as the dialectical 
contradiction that any society which did not allow for the claims of 
conscience could hardly be called a moral community at all, yet to allow 
the claims of conscience opens the way to the destruction of such a 
community.
19. Remark to paragraph 137 Philosophy of Right,
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Hegel's Solution to the Problem of Conscience
We have so far followed Hegel in his view that the concept of 
individual morality, with the importance it attaches to conscience, 
provides a corrective for the inadequacy in any notion which sees 
moral obligation as having nothing to do with subjective intention, 
and we have also followed Hegel in his view that there is a dialectical 
contradiction involved in the concept of individualistic morality.
How then do we resolve the contradiction? How can we reconcile the 
right of the subject to see for himself that what he is obligated to 
do is good, with the demand that there are obligations, transcending 
the particular or transcending those obligations which are actually 
acknowledged by particular individuals? In the perfectly rational 
society, there would be no confusing of the particular will with the 
demands of the Concrete Universal, but then in an irrational society, 
part of that irrationality could mean that it might see itself as 
wholly rational, and its members would mistake their assertions of 
particularity for perfectly rational expressions of the Concrete 
Universal. And if such a mistake is possible, how can we ever be 
absolutely sure that our will expresses the Concrete Universal, even 
on those occasions when perhaps it does?
Hegel tells us that this problem can be solved through the 
integration of the individual into the communal life of his society.
The details of his arguments we shall elucidate further below.
It is at the point when Hegel attempts to answer this difficult
question about conscience that we must begin to diverge from his moral
philosophy. Indeed, both Hegel and Bradley were unable to satisfactorily 
come to terms with this problem, and their case for Absolute Idealism
..
1
is considerably weakened because of it. Both Hegel and Bradley, in the 
absence of any criterion of correct conscience which is truly compatible 
with the right of subjectivity, fall back on the idea that the proper 
criteria of conscience are the moral standards of one's own society.
The right of subjectivity is retained in a grossly attenuated form, 
through the idea that subjective freedom can be salvaged by freely 
accepting one's own society's standards I
In F.H. Bradley's My Station and its Duties we find that the 
problem of conscience is solved through a thorough-going retreat into 
positive authority, in which the standards of the status quo become the 
absolute measure of private conscience. In the end conscience is deprived 
of any real role at all, since if actions are to be mediated by conscience 
only when conscience coincides with accepted moral values, the mediation 
is in reality utterly redundant. In the end we are no further than the 
sphere of Abstract Right, where subjective motives and intentions are 
irrelevant, and where obedience is enjoined "because it is commanded".
Hegel does not retreat into the same degree of conservatism as 
Bradley, for he (Hegel) at least gives a non-positivistic reason for 
accepting prevailing standards of a particular individual's society.
He does not, therefore, like Bradley, merely assume that prevailing 
social norms are morally superior to those of private conscience, he rather 
argues for it. However, his arguments for this are extremely dubious, 
for they turn on the idea that some one particular society is the most 
developed expression of the Concrete Universal in the world so far - 
and on the assumption that the social whole will (almost) always embody 
the rationality of the Concrete Universal more adequately than will any 
individual member of it.
Hegel thus accepts in principle the sovereignty of the negating 
and rationally critical consciousness over the uncritical acceptance of
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the positive and given, and would claim that an individual who defers
to his society's values does not lose his right of subjectivity. The
most rational side of him goes along with it, and it is through
expressing his most rational side that the individual is most truly a
free subject. Hegel would no doubt warn against confusing the right ;
of the subject with the self-assertion of the isolated particular.
There is still however a strong retreat here into positive 
authority, and at two levels. Firstly, there is the weakness of Hegel's 
arguments for the view that any particular society is the most rational, 
so far. At no point does Hegel succeed in proving that the further one 4
advances into the future, the more rational do societies become, and 4
indeed Hegel even suggests himself that there may sometimes be retro- •
gression. To believe that the latest society is also the most adequate 
form of society (in relation to its capacity to express the Concrete 
Universal) or even that it is very likely to be requires an act of 
faith whose precondition is deference to the momentary given.
In any case, if Hegel were able to demonstrate the truth of the 
proposition that "the most recent society is very likely to embody the 
Concrete Universal most adequately" this could be established only 
through the application of criteria which are themselves demonstrably i
rational, and this would make a comparison of conscience with one's Isociety's dictates redundant, since one could use the demonstrably j
rational criteria directly. Hegel's failure to advise this betrays the iIfact that in spite of his plea for rationality, Hegel wants subjectivity |
to take its criteria for the rational from a source which is positive '4|Iauthority. j
We have thus seen that Hegel falls into an appeal to positive iIauthority when he is discussing how conscience can be reconciled with l|.1objective moral standards in actual societies which have historically -|i
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existed. But we now must add a second level at which Hegel appeals to 
positive authority. This level is concerned with the fact that Hegel 
sacrifices the "right of subjectivity" to see for itself the rightness 
of its obligations, not only in the inadequate and imperfect societies, 
but also in the perfect society, the State which he describes.. We might 
accept that the element of reliance on the positive in the less perfect- 
societies is an inevitable - though not in itself good - consequence of 
being so imperfect. In such a society, the rational could not be seen 
clearly, and that this was so could be considered an unavoidable mark ^
of the tragedy of the finite. But in the perfectly rational State, 
where subjective conscience and the objective rational moral law are 
finally reconciled, the individual should not be called upon to accept 
anything on authority. Yet Hegel builds into his perfect State a 
strong necessity for positive authority. Thus the reconciliation which 
Hegel seeks is totally impossible. Precisely how and why Hegel does 
this, we must now elucidate further.
The Failure of the Hegelian State to Reconcile Subjective .gMoral Conscience with Objective Moral Standards *4
À
According to Hegel, the one-sidedness embodied in both abstract 3I
right and subjective individual morality is overcome and finds its ^
reconciliation with its (apparent) opposite in an Ethical Life which
is itself subsumed within the State. Ethical Life is meant to emerge 
as the synthesis of the conflict between Abstract Right and Morality, 
and the State emerges to heal the inadequacies which inhere in an 
Ethical Life, considered in abstract isolation from a more ultimate 
unifying force. Ethical Life consists of two moments, the Family and 
Civil Society. It is not necessary to follow Hegel's argument very far
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before we discover that the ultimate reconciliation between subjective 
and objective will never be realised in the way he proposes. For Hegel, 
we shall see, picks on quite contingent social institutions and then 
tells us that they are logically necessary stages on the way and 
contributors towards performing a task of reconciling subjective with 
objective which is quite beyond their capacity. It is necessary 
however to consider Hegel's reasons for thinking that the institutions 
of Ethical Life could bring us nearer to a reconciliation with objective 
moral laws, a reconciliation which could find its completion in the 
State.
According to Hegel, the institutions of the Family and Civil 
Society bring us closer to the Concrete Universal and overcome (at least 
in part) the one-sidedness which arises in Abstract Right and subjective 
conscience because in these institutions the individual has his 
subjectivity integrated into something which transcends him, but he 
does not thereby lose his subjectivity. Thus, for Hegel, the whole 
problem of the clash between subjective conscience and objective moral 
standards is less likely to arise. Because the individual can be 
integrated into a social whole without thereby losing his individuality 
then that integration is a stage on the way to overcoming the subject/ 
object dualism.
Hegel's Family and Civil Society provide for this integration, and 
therefore bring the social whole and the individual closer to expressing 
the Concrete Universal. It is through this integration that, for Hegel, 
the onesided emphasis on objectivity in Abstract Right and onesided 
emphasis on the individual in subjective morality are overcome.
There are two questions which must now be asked if we are to assess 
the argument which Hegel presents for the ultimate reconciliation.
(1) Are the Family and Civil Society, later subsumed in the State,
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necessavity the only vehicles through which the subjective/objective 
reconciliation can occur?
(2) Is it even possible that these social institutions can perform the 
reconciling task which Hegel intends them to? Can they really achieve .;|
Îthe sort of social integration which would make it possible to say that 4
the subjective individual conscience has genuinely been reconciled with 
objective moral rules?
In reply to (1) we may say that all that is required by the need 
to grant subjective conscience its right yet still retain an objective 
rational moral structure is a social form in which rational thinking is 
unimpeded by ideology or by sectarian interests which such ideology 
normally serves to render legitimate. There is no reason to suppose 
that the family as Hegel describes it is the first necessary step 
towards such a social form, nor must we suppose that the Hegelian Family 
or Civil Society have a necessary or even special place in effecting the 
subject/object reconciliation. The Family does not necessarily emerge out 
of the conflict between Abstract Right and subjective conscience, nor 
does Civil Society arise out of the Hegelian nuclear family.
Hegel regards the Family as the first step towards reconciling 
subjective morality with objective standards since it is within this 
small group that the individual learns, at the most basic level, to 
express his universal nature. Thus, the individual fulfils his particular 
sexual wants through the universal institution of marriage.
Two points may be made in criticism of Hegel here. The first is 
that the nuclear western style family is not the only way, nor the most 
obvious or fundamental way, in which the principle of expressing 
particular aims through universal institutions could be learned and 
implemented. And secondly, Hegel shifts at this point from his concept 
of the universal as having to do with rationality, to a universality
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which has to do merely with what everybody in fact does. Thus, at no 
point does Hegel attempt to demonstrate the universality of marriage 
by showing it to embody rationality, it is rather universal simply 
because it's a generally accepted custom, and one is nearer the Concrete 
Universal by engaging in it because in so doing you subject your 
particularity to the discipline of what is generally done. The question 
of whether this curbing of particularity is done on behalf of a content 
which is in itself rational is one which Hegel leaves unanswered.
We may criticize the place which. Hegel gives to Civil Society on 
the same grounds on which we have criticized the Hegelian view of the 
Family. Civil Society may well teach people to curb their particularity, 
but to what end? It is the content of the end which will determine 
whether this curbing is in reality a greater fulfilment for subjectivity 
or merely its denial, and Hegel does not adequately consider this second 
possibility. He rather has a strong tendency to assume that all 
integration is good, and that so long as there is no de facto clash 
between subjective moral opinion and the morality of a society then a 
genuine reconciliation of subjective morality with objective moral 
standards has taken place.
Hegel thus does not consider what sort of whole the parts are 
being integrated into. And precisely because many authoritarian 
structures have a strong power to integrate people to the point where 
their beliefs completely coincide with social morality, Hegel is led to 
totally overlook positivistic elements in his moral philosophy which 
are in reality utterly incompatible with the type of subjective 
fulfilment and freedom required by the Concrete Universal.
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Further Inadequacies of the Hegelian State S
From what we have said so far, it is clear that Ethical Life, in 
the Hegelian sense, cannot provide a solution to the possible antagonism 
between subjective moral conscience and objective obligation. The 
social institutions associated with Ethical Life do not necessarily 
emerge from the conflict, nor do they help with reconciliation. But 
can Ethical Life, subsumed by the Hegelian State, provide for this 
reconciliation?
At first, the State, as the mediating and unifying force between 
the competing, conflicting atoms of Civil Society, may seem a plausible 
vehicle for the ultimate subject/object reconciliation. The (Hegelian)
State, (so it seems), after all does not seek to express the Concrete 
Universal simply by way of individuals agreeing to "all do the same 
thing", it seems rather that the State must have a content, beyond the 
contingent will of individuals, which has by virtue of its very nature 
the power to unify. This is just how the State is distinguished from 
Civil Society. But what is this content, which enables individuals to
I
J
be truly integrated into the common life, without simply integrating 4
them by getting them to think and do the same things?
Hegel does not elaborate much upon this. He rather concentrates 
on the sheer power of the State to thoroughly integrate, without acknow­
ledging that individuals can be very well integrated into social wholes 
which are perfectly evil. He comes close to the assumption that 
subjective freedom is a product of the mere fact of total social 
integration, an assumption which is in no way warranted.
However, insofar as Hegel succeeds in giving a content to his 
ideal State, beyond its power to unite individuals, this content is far 
removed from any which has to do with rationality and freedom. It is a
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de facto unity, and has all the contingency and particularity of an 
extreme nationalism, as is well exemplified in the remarks which Hegel 
makes about war. Here the citizens of one State are urged to identify 
with their State and to fight against another particular State. What 
the war is being fought about Hegel regards as essentially irrelevant, 
since war in itself is a feature which is necessary to rejuvenate the 
health and vigour of the nation. It does this by reminding the individuals 
who are called upon to die that there is something greater than they, 
for which they can justifiably be asked to sacrifice themselves as 
particulars. Thus:
"It is necessary that the finite - property 
and life - should be definitely established 
as accidental, because accidentality is the 
concept of the finite." 20
And
"War is the state of affairs which deals in 
earnest with the vanity of temporal goods. and concerns ... " 21
Hegel overlooks the fact that when two nations are at war, then 
in at least one of them, and most probably in both of them, particular 
finite lives are being sacrificed not in order to express and fulfil 
the Concrete Universal, but merely because they have clashed with the 
totally finite aims and interests of an opposing nation.
From Hegel's remarks on war, we can conclude that the unifying 
power of his State rests not on reason and the fulfilment of the 
subjective, but on a contingent and finite nationalism in which the 
subjective is frequently negated rather than fulfilled. Particular is
20. Remark to paragraph 324, Philosophy of Right,
21. Remark to paragraph 324, Philosophy of Right,
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sacrificed to particular, not fulfilled through the whole. In Hegel’s 
State, therefore, there is not an inevitable coincidence between 
subjective fulfilment and objective obligation. In the army of the 
Hegelian State, soldiers would fight not because they could find 
subjective fulfilment through a subjectivèly-correctly-perceived- 
objective-obligation to do so, but merely because they had been told to.
From what has been said so far, it is quite clear that the Hegelian 
State does not provide a way of subsuming Ethical Life such that the 
positivistic elements are removed and the clash between subjective 
conscience and objective morality is overcome. The positivistic element 
is still very much present, and the "right of subjective conscience" so 
see for itself the rightness of what it does, is a principle which is 
not realised. This becomes even more clear, however, when we consider 
the relation of the Hegelian State to Civil Society.
In the Hegelian State, at one level of social life, a very 
important level, the isolated individual continues to exist, and often 
has to be "kept down" by the State. The rational society has been 
actualized, but Hegel admits that many will still be unable to see or
will not even be interested in seeing the rightness of what the State 1decrees for themselves. For such people, the State's dictates can only --i
ibe accepted on the basis of positive authority. Thus for Hegel, even
1at the most rational level of social life which he can envisage, the 4Iright of subjective conscience remains unfulfilled, and the clash between ^
isubjectively perceived moral goodness and objective moral obligation ij
Iremains a viable possibility.
What the Hegelian Failure to Solve the Problem of Conscience 
Teaches us
Earlier in this chapter, we argued for the view that the only
I
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adequate morality is one which, is constructed by subjectivity, but by 
a subjectivity which constructs, not according to the arbitrary whim 
of its nature as a mere particular, but according to the necessity which 
is the deepest expression of its own nature. Hegel grasped this 
principle, he realized that the only objective backing which can be 
demanded by and presented to the subjective conscience is the disciplined 
necessity which flows from the nature of subjective consciousness itself.
Unfortunately Hegel, realizing that conscience might express more 
of the particular than the universal, constructed a moral edifice which 
was meant to be the true expression of subjectivity, but which ended up 
as an objective moral structure in which the moral law did not issue 
from any subjectivity, however that subjectivity expressed itself. That 
is, the moral law which was meant only to transcend particularity, ends 
up by transcending subjectivity too.
In the very failure of Hegel, however, to specify the conditions 
under which subjective conscience will be in line and know itself to be 
in line with objective moral standards, (objective in that they transcend 
particular moral feelings but not objective in the sense of standing 
over against subjectivity), can be seen the importance of the task of 
discovering such conditions. For only under such conditions can there 
exist the sort of self-conscious moral conduct which alone is morality 
in the deepest sense, a morality which is a subjective construction yet 
not an arbitrary one, and, which knows for itself the law of its own 
necessity. Under such conditions, subjective conscience could be granted 
its "sacred right", and before such, conditions obtain, morality in the 
deepest sense is impossible.
Hegel's State can never provide the conditions under which subject- f
ive conscience can be granted this right. But his arguments did point 
the way to an awareness of the type of conditions which are necessary in
I
347
1
order for the clash between subjective conscience and objective obliga- f
tion to begin to be removed. He does this by telling us the reason for 
the clash in the first place.
The clash occurs because it is possible for the individual 
subjective mind to be, as it were, blinkered to its own (potential) 
nature and to the (potential) nature of its own activity. It fixes 
itself upon finite aims and interests, either its own, but perhaps more 
often when it mistakes such finite aims for moral ones, those of others, 
which it has, through ideological means, been taught to regard as the 
moral law. Subjective conscience goes wrong when it mistakes the interests 
and aims of particular individuals and groups for an objectively binding 
moral law.
Removing the Blinkers
The first step towards removing the moral blinkers is the exist­
ence of a community in which the actions which facilitate the interests 
of particular groups and individuals are not (falsely) elevated to the 
status of the moral law. In such a society, it would not be inevitable 
that people would have clear moral vision, but it would be very much more 
likely, since the main features which normally block such vision would <•§
be removed. Whether such a society will ever actually come into being is 
something which cannot be predicted in advance, for a society which 
allowed an unfettered moral law would itself be a product of the free will.
No social structure however, can provide a guarantee that moral i
vision will be clear, nor is it impossible to attain such vision without 
a social edifice. Moral vision is merely easier and more likely, if it 
is not impeded by an ideological "moral law" which is based, not on 
expressing the Concrete Universal, but on the attempt to render legitimate
i
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the furtherance of particular private interests. But, in fact, as well 
as in principle, the Concrete Universal can be expressed by those who 
have discerned it in any society.
What we have said so far brings us to answer the question - how
can we be sure that we are, in our moral actions, expressing such a
Concrete Universal, and that we are not unwittingly merely the vehicle 
of particular interests? For we can see now that it is quite possible, 
and we may suspect fairly common, for private interests to masquerade 
in the clothes of genuine morality. The recognition that this is so, 
is the first and perhaps most crucial step towards clear moral vision.
We shall be more able to identify genuine expressions of the Concrete 
Universal once we realize that there may be counterfeit ones.
However, the way is still open for mistakes to be made, since
moral ignorance is not exclusively the result of social codes of practice 
which render legitimate certain private interests that pose as the moral 
law. Moral ignorance and error might result from the individual 
mistaking his finite aims, interests or ideals for the Concrete Universal 
While this is so, we cannot grant to subjective conscience its "sacred 
right" absolutely unconditionally. Under what conditions then could we 
be certain that our moral actions were genuine, and that we have not been 
misled, to the point where we may grant to subjective conscience its 
sacred right to see for itself the rightness of its obligations?
We must not underestimate the difficulty involved in this problem.
A moral judgment is, as we said earlier, a subjective construction which 
nonetheless is not arbitrary; it is a creation which is also a discovery 
It is not arrived at by ratiocination, nor is it arrived at by empirical {f
testing. It is rather an intuitive judgment, in the deepest sense of 
the term, the depth of which consists precisely in its encapsulation of 
the faculty of the mind to synthesize. But just because making moral
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judgments is a matter of intuition depending on a process of synthesis 
it is extremely difficult to find any obvious guarantee that the 
judgment is correct. How then is it possible to identify a valid moral 
intuition?
This question may be answered at two levels. At the first level, 
we need only to point out that we do not need criteria by which we may 
infallibly identify correct moral intuitions as against false ones in 
order to accept that there is such a thing as intuitive moral knowledge 
in the world. Perhaps nobody can be absolutely oeTtain that he is 
right, but that doesn't imply that he can't have knowledge of his 
rightness. If two people have conflicting intuitions, and one happens 
to be right while the other is wrong, the fact that the person who is 
wrong is as committed to his view as the one who is right doesn't stop 
the person who is actually right from having genuine knowledge, and 
rightfully claiming that he has.
The sacred right of subjective conscience can thus be said to 
accrue to the person who has a correct moral intuition. The fact that 
we cannot always be certain as to the correctness of a moral intuition does 
not abnegate the possibility of genuine intuitions, which are known to 
be genuine, or at any rate does not do so entirely. The assumption that 
we cannot have knowledge because we cannot have absolute and infallible 
certainty is just as unwarranted in moral matters as (more obviously) 
it is in scientific matters. As A.C. Ewing puts it;
4\" ... there will be an end to all talk about 4
most topics of interest, and certainly about 4
philosophy, if we refrain from making any |assertions that other people will dispute." 22 i|
22. Value and Reality, page 110.
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At the first level therefore, the answer to our question about 
how to identify correct intuitions is simply that we don't need known 
decisive public criteria for doing so, before we can accept that the 
correctness of an intuition may be seen, as it were, from the inside.
That such an individual would be naive to claim absolute certainty does 
not mean that he would be wrong to claim knowledge.
At the second level, our question may be answered by adding that 
lack of certainty about moral intuitions (and other things) is a feature 
of a world, such as ours, in which subjective and objective are sundered 
from, each other and stand over against each other. In such a world, 
the subjective consciousness can never be certain it knows its object, 
or even its own potential to inform the objective, because it stands at 
a distance from the objective realm.
Morality is an attempt to close the subject/object gap, by informing 
the subjective with the mark of actions which are the product of Universal 
Reason. Were morality to be wholly successful, the gap between subjective 
and' objective would close, all alienation would vanish, and in such a 
world there would be, as well as knowledge, certainty. One would then 
have wholly transcended the limiting tyranny of the finite.
In the world as it is, there cannot be absolute certainty. But 
this does not mean that (genuine) conscience cannot claim its 'sacred 
right'. It merely means that people can be wrong about their intuitions.
And this is not the objection to the whole notion of subjective demands 
in morality that it at first looked, since there can still be moral 
knowledge.
Within the finite world, it is perfectly true to say, there can be 
no criterion, internal to the moral intuition or its content, for 
(absolutely) proving or demonstrating that it is a correct moral i
intuition. But this does not mean that it is nonsensical to speak of
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correct moral intuitions, and in any case, even in the absence of such 
an absolute criterion, it seems to make good sense to posit a kind of 
"external" criterion. This type of criterion could only be applied 
after having acted upon a moral intuition, for in retrospect, it might 
well be seen that the consequences of adopting the "correct" moral 
intuition and acting in accordance with it will be different from, and 
better than, the consequences of adopting an "incorrect" one. By 
reflecting upon the consequences of the various intuitions, we 'would be 
led to a deeper understanding of the moral nature of those intuitions.
We would, of course, have to rely on further intuitions to determine 
whether the consequences of adopting a particular intuition were good or 
bad, and it might be argued that because of this we are, in advocating 
an external criterion, really doing no more than begging the question.
However it becomes clear that we are not merely begging the
question when we consider that the further intuitions by which the moral
value of the original intuitions consequences are judged’, might be much 
less in doubt than the initial intuition itself and therefore serve to
shed light on the nature of the original intuition. Our external
criterion will not of course be infallible, for the further intuitions by 
which we evaluate the consequences of acting upon the original moral 
intuition, might be just as much in doubt as the original intuition 
itself. But this only means that our external criterion is fallible, 
not that it is useless.
We live in a world which is engulfed by alienation and a multitude 
of uncertainties, and moral uncertainties are only one species of the 
latter. Yet if moral knowledge is possible, even in this setting, then 
its application will tend to close the subject/object gap, and thus make 
something more like certainty possible for the future. The more the 
gap has been closed the easier will clear moral vision, and therefore
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moral knowledge, become.
Thus, the problem of subjective conscience conflicting with 
objective obligations to the point where it could be certain that its 
moral intuitions were correct could only occur in a world in which 
objectivity was totally informed by and unalienated from subjective 
self-conscious life, which had become transmuted into a vehicle for 
Universal Reason. Or, as it would be expressed in the Christian tradition, 
the subjective individual would have become transformed into an 
instrument of the Holy Spirit.
In such a world, the blindness brought on by our natures as limited 
particulars would simply not be present. In a world such as this, and 
only in a world such as this, could we rely completely on the validity 
of all our moral intuitions.
In this world, it is part of our finitude that we cannot have 
this kind of certainty. It is part of the tragedy of finite life that 
that life must consist - at least in part - of a sort of semi-blind 
groping. Yet it is one of the wonders of finite life that from this 
partial blindness can come greater vision, and that it contains within 
itself the potential for its transformation, a transformation which 
could provide it with the clear vision of Universal Reason. Thus, 
contained within a world of uncertainties and insecurity is a (potential) 
world of certainties and security, indeed, the former does not make 
sense except as an unrealised expression of the latter.
Human moral experience, when taken by itself, reveals itself to 
be a contradictory form of experience. It is, on the one hand, a form 
of experience in which a force of obligation seems overpowering, or even 
absolute. But on the other hand the ultimate criteria of justification 
for these feelings of obligation seems constantly to elude us. One 
reaction to this contradictoriness might be despair; an experience of
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obligation which is so strong yet so difficult to justify on rational 
grounds could well be thought indicative of how little we can rely on 
our experience.
But scepticism leading to despair is not the only possible 
reaction. An alternative reaction would be to replace scepticism and 
despair with what Bosanquet calls "a wider outlook".
A wider outlook, of the kind which, would be relevant here, would 
see in the contradictoriness of the human moral consciousness considered 
in isolation (as a wholly autonomous unit) a reason why human morality 
should not be considered in total isolation. The contradictoriness of 
morality would, on this view, point to an overall context in which the 
finite moral consciousness could be seen to make sense, not as a self- 
sufficient phenomenon, but as a partial manifestation of the whole.
On this "wider outlook", it would become apparent why moral 
intuitions cannot be absolutely justified despite their extreme power; 
any experience which is a partial manifestation of an overall context 
could never have its deliverances justified, at any point prior to the 
total apprehension and understanding of the whole and ex hypothesi the 
finite moral consciousness cannot fully grasp such a transcendent 
content. The power of the moral consciousness would be explained, on 
this view, precisely by its being a product of this transcendent content.
Thus we can see how, on our "wider outlook", the apparent contra­
dictoriness which inheres within human moral experience can be both 
resolved and explained. And that we should adopt this wider outlook, 
rather than scepticism and despair, becomes clear when we consider the 
implications of the characterisation of morality which has already been 
set out in this chapter.
Human morality, it was earlier said, is an attempt by finite beings 
to overcome, through their actions, the various forms of alienation which
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circumscribe their existence. It is an attempt, in particular to 
reconcile finite subjects with each other, which in turn demands as its 
precondition reconciliation between subject and object. As long as 
moral agents remain finite, they never wholly achieve these reconciliations, 
but insofar as they do succeed, they express (in part) a non-arbitrary 
rational, liberating principle of subjectivity. If finite beings ever 
managed to totally overcome their alienation, and achieve a complete 
reconciliation with the entire realm of the not-self, they would then 
become absolute subjects, or rather (since they would also be fully 
reconciled with each other) they would become the Absolute Subject.
However, even while finite subjects remain merely finite, their 
moral actions must be understood as expressing in part the nature of the 
Absolute Subject. For these actions are aimed at, and partially 
succeed in, overcoming the alienation that only an Absolute Subject 
could overcome completely. The overall context within which a partial 
reconciliation between subject and object makes sense can only be 
total reconciliation, as well as the power to produce that reconciliation.
The Intelligibility of Human Morality and the Claims of
Religious Experience
It emerges therefore that the overall context within which human 
morality is alone rendered intelligible is that of absolute subjectivity.
The inherent contradictoriness of human morality, when considered in 
isolation, leads us to posit an Absolute Subject from which finite moral 
action and consciousness issues, and of which it is merely an incomplete 
manifestation. The Absolute Subject is thus the "completion" of 
human morality, just as it is the "completion" of religion as it practised, 
of relations between finite individuals, and of relations between finite
. 3
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individuals, and of relations between finite individuals and the external 
world. That the Absolute Subject which completes human morality is 
identified with the Absolute Subject which completes those other 
phenomena we have mentioned becomes immediately apparent when we remember 
that the Absolute Subject’s completion is always a matter of reconciling 
(finite) subjectivity with objectivity.
We have already argued for the identity of the Absolute Subject
with the object of religious experience in contexts other than the
ethical. And since the Absolute subject which emerges as the completion 
of the ethical is identical with the Absolute Subject which emerged in 
these other contexts, these previous arguments apply equally here.
However, when we consider the Absolute Subject as the ultimate 
completion of human morality, as well as of the other phenomena 
mentioned (i.e. religion as it is practised etc.) it becomes clearer 
than ever before that the mystics' Divine Object and the Absolute Subject 
are one. For in mystical and other forms of religious experience, the 
overwhelming intuition is one of the supreme goodness of the creative 
force which reconciles finite spirits with their own, and the world's 
essence. Thus, in religious experience we have an experiential intuition 
of the supreme value of the reconciliation of subject with object, a 
reconciliation which corresponds precisely to the labour of the Absolute 
Subject.
Furthermore, according to the deliverances of religious experience
as we have described it, the source of all freedom, reason, and creative
endeavour is found in the subjective attempt to overcome alienation.
The value-elements of the reconciling power are in a sense experienced as 
primary, for it is in the goodness of the reconciliation that we find 
the tetos of freedom, reason, and creativity. It is rather as with 
Plato's "Form of the Good" through which alone the other Forms are imbued
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with existence and intelligibility.
The Absolute Subject which arises, as it does, as the completion 
of human morality, must also be understood to transcend such morality, 
when the latter is conceived in the terms of its own self-understanding. 
For the Absolute Subject stands as the completion, not only of moral 
but of all other finite endeavours (e.g. the various intellectual and 
artistic pursuits) which are not normally thought of as specifically moral 
activities. However, reflection reveals that ultimately all these various 
endeavours are actually in a strong sense value-infused, since all of 
them represent partial manifestations of the Absolute Subject's task of 
surmounting alienation between subject and object. The Absolute Subject 
therefore, which emerges as the transcendent context of human moral 
endeavour may, no less than the object or religious experience, be 
described as primarily the source of all value. For it is in moral 
value that we find the essential raison d'etre for its various 
manifestations. It is the Absolute Subject, conceived of as the supreme 
source of all value, which makes possible rational, creative self- 
conscious life as we already know it. And it also makes possible life 
as we have yet to discover it.
J
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